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Abstract: This thesis examines the topic of conflict of norms in European Union
(EU) law and the legal reasoning of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), arguing
that the framework of conflict of norms provides conceptual insight into
justification and the role of value choices in legal reasoning. After examining the
theory of conflict of norms, which seems to have been relatively under-studied
generally and especially in EU law, it examines three particular aspects of norm
conflict resolution in the legal reasoning of the ECJ and EU law: conflict of
interpretative norms, especially the opposition between conserving and innovative
interpretation; conflicts of human rights norms, looking in particular at the idea of
a hierarchy of rights and of specificationism in the articulation of rights; and
conflicts of competence norms. It concludes that the scope exists for a fuller
justification of the choice of norms in the legal reasoning of the ECJ and generally
in EU law and offers a perspective on how the values articulated by the EU
suggest particular approaches to norm conflict resolution by the ECJ in its
decision-making in these fields, in particular, a greater resort to lex specialis and
originalist or historical interpretation, in contrast to its current method.

iii

Summary Table of Contents
Notes and Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………......x
Table of Abbreviations………………………………………………………………......xii
Table of Treaties and Legislation……………………………………………………...xvi
Table of Cases…………………………………………………………………………...xix
Chapter 1 – Values and Conflicts of Norms in EU Law and the Legal
Reasoning of the European Court of Justice – Introduction and
Framework………...................................................................................................1
Chapter 2 –Reasons for Norm Conflict in EU Law...............................................14
Chapter 3 – Conflicts of Norms in Legal Reasoning and Values in EU Law
………………………………………………………………………………………………66
Chapter 4 – Conflicts of Interpretative Norms in the Legal Reasoning of the ECJ
……………………………………………………………………………………………..127
Chapter 5 – Conflicts of Fundamental Values in EU Law and the Legal Reasoning
of the ECJ ………………………………………………………………………………..207
Chapter 6 – Conflicts of Competence Norms in EU Law and the Legal Reasoning
of the ECJ...................................................................................................………267
Chapter 7 – Conclusion………………………………………………………………...329
Appendix I – Translation……………………………………………………………….340
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………......351

iv

Detailed Table of Contents
Notes and Acknowledgments……………………………………………………….........x
Table of Abbreviations………………………………………………………………......xii
Table of Treaties and Legal Instruments…………………………………..………....xv
Table of Cases…………………………………………………………………………..xviii
Chapter 1 – Values and Conflicts of Norms in EU Law and the Legal Reasoning of
the ECJ
1.1 Introduction: Scope and Subject Matter …………………..1
1.2 Summaries of Content of Chapters..........………………...10

Chapter 2 –Reasons for Norm Conflict in EU Law
2.1 Reasons for Norm Conflict Inherent in Any Legal
System…......................................................................…......14
2.1.1 The Temporal Element……………………...………...14
2.1.2 Vagueness and Generality……………………...……..15
2.1.3 Complexity of Subject Matter………………...............16
2.1.4 Value Pluralism……………………………..…...........16
2.1.5 Discontinuity in the Identity of the Law-Maker….......18
2.2 Reasons for Norm Conflict particular to EU Law…….........20
2.2.1 Linguistic Diversity.......................................................20
2.2.2 The ‘Supranational’ Doctrines of Direct Effect
and Supremacy and the Logic of the ‘Integration
Imperative’ relative to Traditional Public
International Law...........................................…….…………21
2.2.3 The Continuing Question of EU Competence
in the Context of Enduring Member State Sovereignty..........25
2.2.4 Pluralistic Membership of the EU Legislature..…….....29
v

2.2.5 The Sources of EU Law…....................……………….30
2.2.6 The Relationship of EU Law with the Law of the
Member States………………...………………….................35
2.2.7 The Interaction of EU Law with the Legal System
of the Council of Europe…….................................................43
2.3. General Methodology……………….………………….............44
2.4 The General Theoretical Context of Norm Conflict
In Contemporary Anglo-American Legal Theory….…………..…...51
2.4.1 Introduction………...............................................……51
2.4.2 Dworkin on Coherence..................................................51
2.4.3 Raz on Coherence..........................................................56
2.4.4 General Remarks on Coherence, Dworkin, and Raz.....60
2.4.5 Structuralist and Systems Accounts of Law…....……..61
2.4.6 Concluding Remarks to the Section and Chapter…......65

Chapter 3 – Conflict of Norms in Legal Reasoning and Values in EU Law
Law
3.1 Introduction……………………………………..........................66
3.2. Rules v. Principles in Legal Reasoning……….….....................68
3.3 Values and the EU Legal System.................................................72
3.3.1 Normativity in Law.......................................................72
3.3.2 Normativity in EU Law.................................................76
3.3.2.1 Introduction.....................................................76
3.3.2.2 Human Dignity...............................................77
3.3.2.3 Integration and Solidarity...............................79
3.3.2.4 Democracy and the Rule of Law....................80
3.3.2.5 Human Rights and Equality............................91
3.3.2.6 The Principles of Conferral, Subsidiarity.......94
3.3.2.7 Summary of Values in the Treaties................95
3.4. Conceptual Clarity and Legal Concepts: Hohfeld’s Analysis.....96
3.5 Rules of Norm Conflict in Legal Reasoning……......………....103
3.5.1 The Definition of Norm Conflict.............…………....103
3.5.2 A Typology of Norm Conflict……………......…...…109
vi

3.5.2.1 Types of Substantive Legal Norms...............109
3.5.2.2 Types of Interpretative Legal Norms....…....113
3.6 Norm Conflict Rules....................……………………….…......116
3.6.1 Lex Superior.................................................................118
3.6.2 Lex Specialis................................................................120
3.6.3 Lex Posterior...............................................................123
3.7 Concluding Comments...............................................................124

Chapter 4 – Conflicts of Interpretative Norms in the Legal Reasoning of the
European Court of Justice
4.1 Introduction………………………………….............................127
4.2 The Debate on Conserving versus Innovative Interpretation
and its Underlying Values ………....................................................135
4.3 Specific Justification of Subjective Originalist Interpretation....151
4.3.1 Legal Texts and Intention……………………............151
4.3.2 Legal Texts and Collective or
Corporate Intention.............................................................. 159
4.4 Overview of Practice of the Luxembourg and Strasbourg
Courts…............................................................................................165
4.5 Case Study – Caselaw Doctrine on Non-Discriminatory
Obstacles..….....................................................................................170
4.6 An Overview of Norm Conflict in Caselaw and Legal
Reasoning of the ECJ........................................................................177
4.6.1 Introduction.....................……….................................177
4.6.2 Some General Comments on Conflict of
Interpretative Norms in ECJ Caselaw...................................180
4.6.3 Explicit Articulation of Substantive Norm Conflict
by the ECJ.............................................................................183
4.6.4 Norm Conflict and ‘Constitutionalising’ the
Community/Union...........…………………………....................…187
4.6.5 Free Movement Caselaw ……...……......…...............196
4.6.6 Linguistic Conflict of Norms.......................................199
vii

4.7 Conclusion……………………………...………………….…..204

Chapter 5 –

Conflicts of Fundamental Values in EU Law and the Legal Reasoning
of the ECJ
5.1 Introduction…………………………………………………….207
5.2 Reprising the Coppel-O’Neill v. Weiler-Lockhart Debate.........217
5.3 Hierarchy and Specification……....……………………......…..247
5.4 Conclusion..................................................................................263

Chapter 6 – Conflicts of Competence Norms in EU Law and the Legal Reasoning
of the ECJ
6.1. Introduction…............………………………………………………....267
6.2 Competence as a Legal Concept…............…………………………….281
6.3 Conflicts of Competence Norms in the EU and
the Principle of Subsidiarity...................……............……………………..289
6.4 The Competence of the Member States Distinguished
from the Competence of the EU Institutions…….…..........…………….....292
6.5 The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty………………………............………295
6.6 Case Studies: ………………………......................................................298
6.6.1 An Example from Social Europe.............................................298
6.6.2 External Relations....................................................................304
6.6.2.1 The General Law of External Relations....................304
6.6.2.2 The Boundary between the General
Law of External Relations and the CFSP.............................314
6.6.3 Criminal Law...........................................................................318
6.6.3.1 Criminal Competence to Date...............................................318
6.6.3.2 The Competence of a European
Public Prosecutor..............................................................................321
6.7 Conclusion…………………………………………..............................…....325

viii

Chapter 7 – Conclusion…………………...……………………………………………329
Appendix – Translation…........................…………………………………………….340
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………......350

ix

Notes and Acknowledgments:
- I would first like to express my gratitude to my supervisors, Prof. Roda Mushkat
and Prof. Abimbola Olowofoyeku, for their help, support, and professionalism
throughout my time at Brunel. I am also very grateful to Prof. Javaid Rehman,
Head of Brunel Law School, for reducing my teaching and administration
workload over the past year and supporting a fee waiver by the University, to
facilitate the last year of work on my thesis; and to Prof. Tom Hadden, Queen’s
University Belfast and the Transitional Justice Institute at the University of Ulster,
for his support and help over several years.
- Many people helped at various times with the preparation of this thesis, but I
would like to mention the following in particular. I am very grateful: to my twin
brother, Dr. Brian Conway, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, and my
father, Frank Conway, for help in proof-reading at different stages; to Kate Shaw,
Leeds Metropolitan University, and Dr. Leanne O Leary, for commenting on and
proofreading parts of the manuscript; to Dr. Nicolás Zambrana-Tévar and Dr.
Fernando Simón Yarza, University of Navarra, for providing information on
Spanish Law; and to Audrey Pagot, University of Montpellier, for helping with
information on French law.
- I am also very grateful to the Library staff at Brunel University, who have been
exceptionally helpful, especially Claire Grover, the Law Librarian, and Jo-Ann
Nash, the Inter-Library Loans Librarian.
- My PhD research was supported by a fees scholarship from the Department of
Education and Learning of Northern Ireland (2005-2008), by a scholarship from
the Modern Law Review (2006-2008), and by a waiver of fees by Brunel
University.
- Style of citation of journal articles: the issue number of a journal, as well as the
volume, is generally given in the references below, except for those journals
whose house style is generally not to include the issue number in a citation (e.g.

x

CMLRev, ELR, LQR, PL); just the volume of the title is given before the
abbreviated title for these journals.

xi

Table of Abbreviations:
Case and Treaty Reports
AC – Appeal Cases
ALL ER – All England Reports
CMLR – Common Market Law Reports
ECHR – European Court of Human Rights
ECR – European Court Reports
ETS – European Treaty Series
HRLR – Human Rights Law Reports
ICJ – International Court of Justice
PCIJ – Permanent Court of International Justice
QB – Queen’s Bench
UNTS – United Nations Treaty Series
WLR – Weekly Law Reports

Journals and Yearbooks
*Note journals in foreign languages and non-law or non-political science journals
referenced in the text are not abbreviated and are not included in the list below.
AJCL - American Journal of Comparative Law
AJIL – American Journal of International Law
ALJ – Australian Law Journal
APSR – American Political Science Review
Bond LR – Bond Law Review
Boston ULR – Boston University Law Review
BYIL – British Yearbook of International Law
California LR – California Law Review
Canadian JLJ – Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence
CLJ – Cambridge Law Journal
Colombia JEL – Columbia Journal of European Law
xii

CMLRev – Common Market Law Review
CYELS – Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies
Denning LJ – Denning Law Journal
ECLR – European Constitutional Law Review
EELR – European Environmental Law Review
EJCCLCJ - European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law & Criminal Justice
EJIL – European Journal of International Law
EJLE – European Journal of Law & Economics
EJLR – European Journal of Law Reform
EJLS – European Journal of Legal Studies
ELJ – European Law Journal
ELR - European Law Review
ERFA – European Review of Foreign Affairs
Fordham LR – Fordham Law Review
Georgetown JIL – Georgetown Journal of International Law
GLJ - German Law Journal
GYIL – German Yearbook of International Law
Harvard LR – Harvard Law Review
ICLQ - International and Comparative Law Quarterly
ICTLR - Information and Communications Technology Law Review
ILM – International Legal Materials
IJSemL – International Journal of the Semiotics of Law
IO – International Organization
Israeli LR – Israeli Law Review
JCMS - Journal of Common Market Studies
JEnvirL – Journal of Environmental Law
JEPP- Journal of European Public Policy
JFC – Journal of Financial Crime
JIEL – Journal of International Economic Law
JLS – Journal of Law and Society
J Pol. Id. – Journal of Political Ideologies
J Pol. Phil. – Journal of Political Philosophy
JWTL – Journal of World Trade Law
L and P – Law and Philosophy
xiii

LIEI – Legal Issues of Economic Integration
LQR – Law Quarterly Review
LS – Legal Studies
LT – Legal Theory
Leiden JIL – Leiden Journal of International Law
Michigan JIL – Journal of International Law
Michigan LR – Michigan Law Review
MLR – Modern Law Review
NoFo – No Foundations-Journal of Extreme Legal Positivism
NYIL – Netherlands Yearbook of International Law
OJLS – Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
PL – Public Law
RdC - Recueil des Cours
RJ – Ratio Juris
Stanford LR – Stanford Law Review
UChicago LF – University of Chicago Legal Forum
UColorado LR – University of Colorado Law Review
WEP – West European Politics
Yale LJ – Yale Law Journal
YEL – Yearbook of European Law

Treaties, International Organisations and Related Abbreviations
AFSJ – Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
PJCCM – Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy
ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights
ECSC – European Coal and Steel Community Treaty
EC – European Community
ECT – European Community Treaty
EEC – European Economic Community
EU – European Union
EURATOM – European Atomic Energy Community (Treaty)
xiv

ICJ – International Court of Justice
ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
ILO – International Labour Organisation
JHA – Justice and Home Affairs
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC - Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
TEU – Treaty on European Union
TFEU – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UN – United Nations
WTO – World Trade Organisation

xv

Table of Treaties, National Legislation and Legal Instruments

EU Inter-Institutional Agreements
Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the
Commission, C5-349/2000, OJ C 121/122, 24.04.2001, p. 122 (agreement revised
in 2005, OJ C 117 E/125, 18.05.2006, p. 125).

EU Legislation and Other Instruments (Non-Treaties)
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 364/01, 18.12.2000,
p. 1.
Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2062/2001, amending for the third time Council
Regulation (EC) No. 467/2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and
services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freezing
of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan,
OJ L 277/25, 19.10.2001, p. 25.
Council Regulation No 1158 determining the languages to be used by the
European Economic Community, JO 34, 29.05.1959
Council Regulation (EC) No. 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive
measures directed against certain persons and entities, OJ L 139/9, 27.05.2002, p.
9.
Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No. 2185/96, of 11 November 1996,
concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in
order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and
other irregularities, OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2.
Decision establishing Eurojust 2002/187/JHA, 06.03.2002, OJ L 63, 6.3.2002, p.
1.
Decision on the Strengthening of Eurojust amending Decision to establish Eurojust
2009/426/JHA, 04.06.2009, OJ L 138, 4.6.2009, p. 14.
Directive 97/7/EC on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts,
20.05.1997, OJ L 144, 4.6.97, p. 19.
xvi

Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely
within the territory of the Member States, 29.04.2004, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p.
77.
European Council mandate for the 2007 Intergovernmental Conference:
Presidency Conclusions, Annex I. 11177/07 p. 15.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 467/2001, prohibiting the export of certain goods
and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the
freezing of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of
Afghanistan, OJ L 67/1, 06.03.2001, p. 1.

EU Treaties
European Coal and Steel Community Treaty 1951 (ECSC Treaty).
European Atomic Energy Community Treaty 1957 (EURATOM).
European Economic Community Treaty 1957 (EEC Treaty).
Single European Act 1986 (SEA).
European Community Treaty (ECT).
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
Treaty on European Union (TEU).
Treaty of Maastricht 1992.
Treaty of Amsterdam 1997.
Treaty of Nice 2001.
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Brussels, 29th October 2004.
Treaty of Lisbon 2007.

Germany
German

Code

of

Civil

Procedure

Strafprozeßordnung 1877 (as amended).

xvii

Code

of

Criminal

Procedure

or

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (the Basic Law or Grundgesetz,
vom

23.

Mai

1949

(BGBl.

S.

1),

zuletzt

geändert

durch

Gesetz

vom 28. August 2006 (BGBl. I S. 2034) ).

International Treaties
European Convention on Human Rights 1950, ETS No. 005.
European Social Charter 1961, ETS No. 35.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 999 UNTS 171; (1967)
6 ILM 368.
Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters 1988, (1989) 28 ILM 620.
Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, ETS no. 09.
Right to Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers Convention 1951,
ILO No. 100, UNTS 303.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998, (1998) 37 ILM 1002; 2187
UNTS 90.
Statute of the Council of Europe 1949, ETS no. 01.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, 1833 UNTS 396.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679.
World Trade Organisation Agreement 1994, (1994) 33 ILM 1140.

UK
European Communities Act 1972

xviii

Table of Cases*
*Please note that in the main text, abbreviated case names are given for those with
long full titles – the full title (personal first names of parties excluded) is given
below.

Court of Fist Instance
Case T-115/94, Opel Austria v. Council [1997] ECR II-39………….…………...31
Case T-102/96, Gencor v. Commission [1999] II-753……………………………31
Case T-112/98, Mannesmannröhren-Werke v. Commission
[2001] ECR II-729…...........................................................................................34
Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Commission [2005]
ECR II-3649….……………………………………………………….31, 240, 242
Case T-47/03, Sison v. Council [2005] ECR II-1429…………………………...244
Cases T-125/03 & T-253/03, Akzo Nobel Chemicals v. Commission
[2007] ECR II-3253……………………………………………………………..34

Czech Republic
Decision of 26th November 2008, Case No. Pl. ÚS 19/08
(published as No. 446/2008 Coll.)………………………………………………39
Judgment of 3rd November 2009, Case No. Pl. ÚS 29/09……………………......40

European Court of Justice
Case 1/54, France v. High Authority of the European Coal and
Steel Community [1954-1955] ECR 1……………………………....…….180, 182
Case 6/54, Netherlands v. High Authority [1954–1956] ECR 118.......................181
Case 8/55, Fédération Charbonnière Belgique v. High Authority
[1954–1956] ECR 260................................................................................181, 287
xix

Case 1/58, Stork v. High Authority [1959] ECR 17……………..…….……….....41
Case 3/62, Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium [1964] ECR 625...............181
Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend
en Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration
[1963] ECR 1…….………………...........21, 31, 87, 131, 142, 148, 188, 196, 326
Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585….21 31, 45, 87, 131, 142, 148,
………………………………………………………..168, 191, 192, 196, 201, 268
Case 57/65, Lütticke GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Saarlouis [1966] ECR 205....148, 189
Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419….....32, 41, 81, 149, 194, 201
Case 9/70, Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein [1970] ECR 825……......191, 319
Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970]
ECR 1125…......................................................................32, 34, 35, 148, 193, 230
Case 22/70, Commission v. Council (Re European Road
Transport Agreement) [1971] ECR 263 (‘ERTA’)…............21, 277, 294, 304, 305
Case 80/70, Defrenne v. Belgian State (‘Defrenne I’)
[1971] ECR 1-445.........................................................................................93, 299
Case 7/71, Commission v. France [1971] ECR 1003...........................................268
Cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company NV. & Ors. v.
Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit (No. 3)
[1972] ECR 1219................................................................................................184
Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission [1974] ECR 491….........................41, 81, 149, 194
Case 181/73, R. & V. Haegeman v. Belgium [1974] ECR 449…………………...30
Case 2/74, Reyners v. Belgium [1974] ECR 631…………………………..……165
Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville [1974] ECR 837.....148, 171, 172, 277
Case 36/74, Walrave & Koch v. Association Union Cycliste
Internationale [1974] ECR 1405..…………………………………...........148, 190
Case 35/75, Matisa v. Hza. Berlin [1975] ECR 1205……………….………..…202
Case 36/75, Rutili [1975] ECR 1219....................................................................218
Case 43/75, Defrenne v. SABENA (‘Defrenne II’)
[1976] ECR 455…………………………..……..................93, 184, 189, 190, 299
Opinion 1/76 Re European Laying-up Fund for Inland
Waterway Vessels [1977] ECR 741……..……………………..……198, 204, 307
Case 7/76, IRCA [1976] ECR 1213......................................................................221
xx

Case 71/76, Thieffry v. Conseil de l' Ordre des Avocats à
la Cour de Paris [1977] ECR 765......................................................................198
Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanzo delo Stato v.
Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629...……………………………………….45, 148, 193
Case 149/77, Defrenne v. SABENA [1978] ECR 1365
(‘Defrenne III’)………………………………………………………...32, 93, 299
Case 98/78, Firma A. Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz [1979] ECR 69...............32, 84
Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung
für Branntwein (‘Cassis de Dijon’) [1979] ECR 649. …………8, 71, 171, 172, 277
Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti [1979] ECR 1629…………………...129
Cases 104/79, Foglia v. Novello (No. 1) [1980] ECR 745…………………...…278
Case 149/79, Commission v. Belgium [1980] ECR 3881……………………….165
Case 155/79, AM. and S. v. Commission [1982] ECR 1575……………………...34
Joined 142 & 143/80, Amministrazione delle Finanze Dellostato v. Essevi
[1981] ECR 1413.……………………………………………………………….22
Case 244/80 Foglia v. Novello (No. 2) [1981] ECR 3045……………................278
Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982] ECR 1035...................205
Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. CA Kupferberg
& Cie KG [1982] ECR I-3641….…………………………….………………....31
Case 230/81, Luxembourg v. Parliament [1983] ECR 255……….....……….......70
Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT v. Ministry of Health
[1982] ECR 3415 ………………………………………………………181, 200, 201, 202
Joined Cases 177 and 178/82, van de Haar and Kaveka de Meern
[1984] ECR 1797..................................................................................27, 238, 276
Case 14/83, Von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891……...129
Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Industry and Energy
[1984] ECR 2727………………………………………………………………..67
Case 143/83, Commission v. Denmark [1985] ECR 427. ………………………166
Case 240/83, Procureur de la République v. ADBHU [1985] ECR 531…..223, 228
Case 294/83, Parti Écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. European Parliament
[1986] ECR 1339………………..……………………………………..........45, 81
Joined Cases 60/84 & 61/84, Cinéthèque v. Fédération National
de Cinémas Francais [1985] ECR 2605.............................................................220
Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton and South-West
xxi

Hampshire Area Health Authority [1986] ECR 723……………………..……188
Case 238/84, Criminal proceedings of Hans Röser [1986] ECR 795..................201
Case 181/84, R v. Intervention Board ex parte Man Sugar Ltd.
[1985] ECR 2889………………………………………………………………..32
Case 139/85, Kempf v. Staatsecretaris van Justitie [1986] ECR 1741.................205
Cases 281, 283-5, 287/85, Germany v. Commission [1987] ECR 3203...............287
Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt
Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199…….…….………………….......................192, 201
Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmund [1987] ECR 3719...................220
Case 120/86, Mulder v. Minister van Landbouw en Visserij [1988] ECR 2351…32
Case 222/86, UNECTEF v. Heylens [1987] ECR 4098........................................223
Case 46/87, Hoechst Ag v. Commission [1989] ECR I 3283….…………….........34
Case 165/87, Commission v. Council [1988] ECR 5545......................................287
Case 5/88, Wachauf v. Federal Republic of Germany [1989]
ECR 2609....................................................................................218, 219, 222, 251
Case C-18/88, Régie des Télegraphes et des Téléphones v.
GB-Inno-BM SA [1991] ECR 5941……………………………….….………...170
Case 68/88, Commission v. Greece [1989] ECR 2965………………….………..33
Case C-262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange
Assurance Group plc. [1990] ECR I-1889…..…………………………...........299
Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA. v. La Commercial Internacional de
Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4145……………………………………..…...129
C-213/89, The Queen v. The Secretary of State for Transport,
ex parte Factortame [1990] ECR I-2433…………………………..……………39
Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE (ERT) v.
Dimotiki (DEP) [1991] I-2925....................................................................219, 220
Case C-292/89, The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal,
ex parte Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745……………………………..…………165
Case 353/89, Commission v. Netherlands [1991] ECR I-4069............................219
Cases C- 6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italy
[1991] ECR I-5357………..……………………………...........................148, 195
Case C-159/90, SPUC v. Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685…………….....106, 221, 263
Case C-204/90, Bachmann v. Belgium [1992] ECR I-249...........................197, 198
Case C-286/90, Anklagemyndhigeden v. Poulsen Diva Navigation Corp.
xxii

[1992] ECR I-601…………………………………………………………......…31
Opinion 1/91 Re European Economic Area Agreement I
[1991] ECR 6079……..……………………................................23, 308, 209, 310
Opinion 2/91 Re Convention No. 170 International Labour Organisation on
Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work [1993] ECR I-1061......................307, 309
Case C-267/91, Criminal proceedings against Keck and Mithouard
[1993] ECR I-6097…………………………………......…………………172, 176
Case C-2/92, The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food, ex parte Bostock [1994] ECR I-955.........................................................289
Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Wuerttemberg
[1993] ECR I-1663......................................................................................197, 198
Case C-91/92, Paolo Faccini Dori v. Recreb [1994] ECR I-3325……………...188
Case C-350/92, Spain v Council [1995] ECR I-1985...........................................273
Cases C-46 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Germany and
R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame
Ltd. and Others [1996] ECR I-1029……….....……………………..........148, 195
Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association
v. Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921…………………....……………………...172, 190
C-450/93, Kalanke v. Bremen [1995] ECR I-3051.................................................93
Opinion 1/94 Re World Trade Organisation Agreement
[1994] ECR I 5267…………………………………..................294, 305, 307, 310
Opinion 2/94 Re Accession of the Community to the European
Convention on Human Rights [1996] ECR1-17……..….……..........194, 271, 275
Case C-13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County Council
[1996] ECR I-2143……………………………………….…………….............169
Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di
Milano [1995] ECR I-4165.................................................................................228
Case C-233/94, Germany v. European Parliament and Council
[1997] ECR I-2405…...……………………………...…….…………...............289
Joined Cases C-283/94, C-291/94 & C-292/94, Denkavit Internationaal
and Others v. Bundesamt für Finanzen [1996] ECR I-5063…….………..166, 202
Case C-144/95, Criminal proceedings against Maurin [1996]
ECR I-2909.........................................................................................................278
Case C-329/95, VAG Sverige [1997] ECR I-2675……………………………....165
xxiii

Case C-368/95, Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und Vertriebs
GmbH v. Heinrich Bauer Verlag [1997] 1 ECR -3689......................................239
Case C-67/96, Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds
Textielindustrie [1999] ECR I-5751...................................................................301
Case C-162/96, Racke v. Hauptzollamnt Mainz [1998]
ECR I-3655…………………………………………….………………………31
Case C-262/96, Sürül v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [1999]
ECR I-2685……………………………………………………….…………….30
Case C-274/96, Criminal proceedings against Bickel & Franz [1998]
ECR I-7637.........................................................................................................278
Case C-368/96, The Queen v. Licensing Authority [1998] EC6
I-7967……………..............................................................................................175
Case C-78/98, Preston and Others [2000] ECR I-3201……………………….…33
Case C-186/98, Nunes and de Matos [1999] ECR I-4883……………………......33
Case C-228/98, Douinas v. Minister for Economic Affairs
[2000] ECR I-577................................................................................................230
Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council
[2000] ECR I-8419 (‘Tobacco Advertising’).............27, 71, 177, 273, 275, 276,
.....................................................................................................................301, 336
Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-7079……78
Case C-192/99, The Queen v. Home Secretary, ex parte Kaur
[2001] ECR I-1237...………………………………………………..167, 183, 333
Case 268/99, Aldona Malgorzata Jany and Others v. Staatssecretaris
van Justitie [2001] ECR I-8615..........................................................................202
Opinion 2/00 Re Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety
[2001] ECR I-9713......................................................................165, 232, 234, 311
Case C-17/00, De Coster v. Collège des Bourgmestre
et Échevins de Watermael-Boitsfort [2001] ECR I-9445.. .................................201
Case C-50/00, Union de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council
[2002] ECR I-6677…………………………….………………………….…....182
Case C-112/00, Schmidberger v. Austria [2003] ECR I-5659......232, 233, 234, 235
.............................................................................................................237, 264, 265
Case C-339/00, Ireland v. Commission [2003] ECR I-11757…………………....70
Case C-444/00 Mayer Parry Recycling [2003] ECR I-6163……………....……121
xxiv

Case C-186/01, Alexander Dory v. Bundesrepublik [2003] ECR I-2479.....269, 288
Joined Cases C-187/01 & C-385/01, Criminal proceedings
Against Gözütok and Brügge [2003] ECR I-1345………………......201, 318, 319
Case C-224/01, Köbler v. Austria [2003] ECR I-10239…………………...148, 195
Case C-491/01, R v. Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British
American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd. [2002] ECR 1-11453.............................290
Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH
Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609........78, 235, 239
Case C-327/02, Panayotova and Others v. Minister Voor
Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie [2004] ECR I-11055....................................185
Case C-387/02, Berlusconi and Ors. [2005] ECR I-3565……………....………320
Opinion 1/03 Re Lugano Convention [2006] ECR I-1145….......167, 309, 314, 315
Case C-105/03, Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino
[2005] ECR I-5285…………………………………………...…………....…..129
Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council [2005] ECR I-7879.......287, 294, 319, 324
Case C-336/03, easyCar (UK) Ltd. v. Office of Fair Trading
[2005] ECR I-194................................................................................................203
Case C-459/03, European Commission v. Ireland (‘MOX Plant’)
[2006] ECR 1-4635.....................................................................312, 313, 314, 324
Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm [2005] ECR 1-9981……………………........194
Cases C-154 & 155/04, The Queen on the application of Alliance for Natural
Health and Nutri-Link Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Health
[2005] ECR I-6451…………........................................................................33, 290
Case C-169/04, Abbey National Plc. v. Commissioners of Customs
and Excise [2006] ECR I-4027...........................................................................200
Case C-217/04, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council
[2006] ECR I-3771..............................................................................................273
Case C-234/04, Kapferer v. Schlanck [2006] ECR I-6307……………………….33
Case C-13/05, Chacón Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA
[2006] ECR 1-6467.............................................................................................200
Case 91/05, Commission v. Council (ECOWAS/Light Weapons)
[2008] ECR I-3651..............................................................................315, 316, 317
Case C-252/05, R (Thames Water Utilities Ltd.) v. Bromley
Magistrates’ Court (Interested party: Environment Agency)
xxv

[2007] ECR I-3883…………………………...………………………...............121
Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareföbundet
[2007] ECR I-11767...........................................245, 261, 262, 264, 265, 276, 290,
.............................................................................300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 327, 335
Case C-438/05, The International Transport Workers’ Federation and
The Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking
Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779.................................245, 261, 262, 264, 265, 299,
....................................................................................300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 335
Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and al
Barakaat International Foundation v. Council
[2008] ECR I-6351..................................................31, 70, 168, 240, 241, 242, 243
..........................................................................................244, 246, 264, 265, 275
Case C-440/05, Commission v. Council [2007] ECR I-9097…….......................320
Joined Cases C-231-233/06, National Pensions Office v. Jonkman
and Another [2007] ECR I-5149.........................................................................183
Case C-268/06, IMPACT v. Minister for Agriculture and Food,
[2007] ECR I-12327……..………………………………………………..........129
Case 127/08, Metock v. Minister for Justice, Equality &
Law Reform [2008] ECR I-6241.........................................................................273
Case C-58/08, Queen (Vodafone & Others) v. Secretary of State for Business,
judgment of 8th June 2010...........................................................................273, 276

France
Decision of 1st March 1968 in Syndicat Général de Fabricants de
Semoules de France [1970] CMLR 395………………………………………...36
Decision of 24 May 1975 in Administration des Douanes v. Sociétés ‘Café
Jacques Vabre’ et Sàrl Weigel et Cie [1975] 2 CMLR 336...…………………...36
Raoul Georges Nicolo [1990] 1 CMLR 173……………………………………...36
Decision of 30th October 1998, Sarran and Levacher (RFDA 1998, p. 1091)…...36
Décision n° 2009-595 DC, 3 décembre 2009, cons. 14 et 22, Journal officiel
du 11 décembre 2009, p. 21381, texte n°2............................................................37
Décision n° 2010-605 DC, 12 mai 2010, Journal officiel
xxvi

du 13 mai 2010, p. 8897, para. 18.........................................................................37

Germany
Brunner v. European Treaty, BVerfGE 89, 155; [1994] 1 CMLR 57…..35, 37, 270
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, BVerfGE 37, 271;
[1974] 2 CMLR 540..............................................................................................35
Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft, BVerfGE 73, 339; [1987] 3 CMLR 225….….......57
Lisbon Treaty Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08,
judgment of 30th June 2009……..........................................................35, 209, 279

International (including Council of Europe)
Administrative Decision No. 11 (1923) Dec. & Op. p. 103
(German-United States Mixed Claims Commission)......……………………….32
Barcelona Traction, ICJ Reports 3 (1970)............................................................252
Bosphorus Hava Yollari v. Ireland (2006) 42 EHRR 1........................................244
Case of the SS Lotus (1927) PCIJ Rep Series A No 10........................................293
Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo,
ICJ Reports 116 (2005) …………………………………………………….....121
Engel & Ors v. The Netherlands, judgement of 8th June 1976,
Series A, no. 22, p. 34; (l976) I EHRR 647........................................................200
Free Zones Case (1930), PCIJ, Ser. A, no. 24, p. 12…………………………......32
Glass v. United Kingdom [2004] ECHR 102........................................................250
Golder v. UK (1975) 1 EHRR 524…………………………………………........169
Hungary v. Slovakia (‘Gabičíkovo-Nagyymaros Project’),
ICJ Reports (1997)…..........................................................................................121
James & Ors v. UK, Series A, no. 98…………………………………………....170
Kjeldson and Ors v. Denmark (Danish Sex Education)
(1979–80) 1 EHRR 711 ………….....................................................................170
Nicaragua v. US (Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
Against Nicaragua) (Merits), ICJ Reports (1986)……………………………..121
xxvii

Özturk v. Germany (1984) 6 EHRR 409...............................................................200
Streletz, Kessler & Krenz v. Germany (2001) EHRR 31......................................253
Tyrer v. UK (1978) 2 EHRR 1…………………………………………………..169
Tysiąc v. Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42...........................................................253, 263

Ireland
Clarke v. Governor of Portlaoise Prison & Minister for Justice
Equality & Law Reform v. Clarke, Supreme Court of Ireland,
judgment of 23rd May 2006……………………………………………………. 44

Italy
Frontini v. Ministero dele Finanze [1974] 2 CMLR 372.......................................37
Spa Granital v. Amministrazione delle Finanze, Dec. 170 of 8 June 1984,
unofficial translation at 21 CMLRev. 756 (1984)……………………………….37
Spa Fragd v. Amministrazione delle Finanze, Dec. 232 of 21 Apr. 1989,
(1989) 72 RDI….………………………………………………………........37, 38

The Netherlands
Opinion of the Raadvanstaat, 15th February 2008 (W01.08.0004/1/K)…………..40

Poland
Judgment of 11 May 2005 r. in the case K 18/04 [Wyrok z dnia
11 maja 2005 r. Sygn. akt K 18/04] OTK Z.U. 2005/5A......................................39

xxviii

Spain
Constitutional Court of Spain, Declaration on the consistency of the
European Constitutional Treaty with the Spanish Constitution, DTC 1/2004,
13 Dec. 2004……………………………………………………………….........38
UK
Heydon’s Case (1584) 76 ER 637, Pasch 26 Eliz……………………………….158
R v. Sec. of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. (No. 1)
[1989] 2 All ER 692; 2 WLR 997…………………………………………...38, 39
R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame
Ltd. (No. 2) [1991] 1 AC 603 1.............................................................................39
Equal Opportunities Commission v. Secretary of State for Employment
[1994] 1 WLR 409……………………………………………………………....38
Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin)……………..134

US
Lochner v. New York 198 US 45 (1905)………………………………………...147
Guy v. Donald 203 US 399 (1906).......................................................................102
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish 300 US 379 (1937)…………………………...147
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 US 36 (1961)....................................257
Roe v. Wade 410 US 113 (1973)…………………………………………...147, 148
Michael H. v. Gerald D. 491 US 110 (1989)………………………………112, 121
Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 US 833 (1992.……………………………...148

xxix

Chapter 1: Values and Conflicts of Norms in EU Law and the Legal
Reasoning of the European Court of Justice – Introduction and Framework

1.1 Introduction: Scope and Subject Matter
‘Fragmentation’ and ‘pluralism’ have become bywords for the phenomenon of a
proliferation of norms in increasingly multi-level legal frameworks of governance,
where norms at national, regional, and international level may overlap and
conflict.1 This is especially so in the European Union (EU), given the relative
strength and breadth of regional obligations involved in both the EU and the
Council of Europe systems. This overlap involves a potential for conflict broadly
understood: (a) conflict in the classical sense of obligations simultaneously
existing and containing contradictory elements2 and (b) conflict in the sense of
norms of different degrees of reach and breadth negating or overtaking other,
differently sourced norms.3
The term ‘norm’ has a potentially wide range of reference to include any
proposition in a legal system that has some valence or influence on actual law.
Rules in the sense of conclusive, all-or-nothing requirements could be taken as the
paradigmatic example of norms.4 At the other end of the spectrum of bindingness
lie soft law instruments, such as formalised statements or programs of action with
some definition of methods or ways of implementing policy, or material that may
influence interpretation of norms, such as travaux préparatoires.5 For the purpose

1

Recently, see, e.g. International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law:
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, A/CN.4/L.682,
13th April 2006; S. Besson, ‘How International Is the European Legal Order? Retracing Touri’s
steps in the exploration of European legal pluralism’, 5 No Fo 50-70 (April 2008).
2
W. Jenks, ‘The Conflict of Law-making Treaties’, 30 BYIL 401-453 (1953), 426.
3
J. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003), 176;
E. Vranes, ‘The Definition of ‘Norm Conflict’ in International Law and Legal Theory’, 17(2) EJIL
395-418 (2006), 412-415.
4
J. Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice (Clarendon Press 1993), 69.
5
See generally in an EU context: L. Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart
Publishing 2004). Senden identifies in this study three main categories of soft law: preparatory and
informative instruments, such as White Papers and Green Papers from the Commission;
interpretative and decisional instruments, such as inter-institutional communications and
interpretative communications and notices; and steering instruments, such as Council
Recommendations and Commission Opinions (see, ibid, 188-119).
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of the proposed study, the range of norms covers those that are legally binding,6
which would exclude purely soft law instruments, such as opinions from one of the
EU institutions, but would not exclude material relevant for interpretation in so far
as such material may by incorporation become binding because reference to it is
required by or adopted through a norm of interpretation.7 By ‘legally binding’ is
meant those which can be the basis of a judicial decision.8 As this indicates, the
study encompasses both conflicts of substantive norms and conflicts of norms of
interpretation. Against treating norms of interpretation as excluded from the
general field of norm conflict is the fact that norms of interpretation, depending on
how they are ranked and formulated, can alter the substance of other norms (i.e.
the substantive norms being interpreted).
Pauwelyn excludes norms of interpretation from his study on the basis that
interpretation should only apply rather than contradict existing norms, though at
the same time he suggests interpretation is part of the process of development of
the law:9
Unlike doctrine, [judicial decisions] must be presumed to be an accurate
statement of what the law is, based on genuine sources of law, such as
treaties or custom, as between two parties and as applied to a particular set
of circumstances, at a particular point in time. Hence, at that point in time,
and as between those states, there can, in theory, be no conflict between the
judicial decision and the applicable norms of law since the judicial decision
is presumed to apply those norms, not to contradict them.10

Pauwelyn’s downplaying of the significance of norms of interpretation in his
general typology of normative conflict may partly result from the context of his
case study of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), where the decisions of the
judicial organ are subject to authoritative interpretations of WTO agreements
given by a three-quarters majority of the General Council or Ministerial Council
and where the judicial organ follows relatively restrained and conserving methods
6

Pauwelyn (2003), op cit, 6.
Cf. ibid, 6.
8
Ibid, 6.
9
Ibid, 110.
10
Ibid, 93.
7
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of interpretation. On the latter point, Ehlermann noted the differing approaches of
the judicial organs of the EU and the WTO:
42. According to Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, “a Treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose.” Among these three criteria, the Appellate Body has certainly
attached the greatest weight to the first, i.e. “the ordinary meaning of the
terms of the treaty.” This is easily illustrated by the frequent references in
Appellate Body reports to dictionaries, in particular to the Shorter Oxford
dictionary, which, in the words of certain critical observers, has become
“one of the covered agreements”. The second criterion, i.e. “context” has
less weight than the first, but is certainly more often used and relied upon
than the third, i.e. “object and purpose”.
43. For somebody having spent most of his professional life observing the
European Court of Justice in interpreting European Community law, the
difference in style and methodology could hardly be more radical. I do not
remember that the EC Court of Justice has ever laid down openly and
clearly the rules of interpretation that it intended to follow. What I do
remember is that among the interpretative criteria effectively used by the
EC Court of Justice, the predominant criterion was – and probably still is –
“object and purpose”. While the Appellate Body clearly privileges “literal”
interpretation, the EC Court of Justice is a protagonist of “teleological”
interpretation.…
47 …This choice has given clear guidance to members of the WTO and to
panels….The heavy reliance on the “ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty” has protected the Appellate Body from criticisms that its
reports have added to or diminished the rights and obligations provided in
the covered agreements (Article 3.2, third sentence, DSU). On a more
general level, the interpretative method, established and clearly announced
by the Appellate Body, has had a legitimising effect, and this from the very
beginning of its activity.11

11

C-D. Ehlermann, ‘Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the WTO’,
Robert Schuman Centre Policy Paper No. 02/9 (2002), paras. 43-47.
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The quotation above well captures a fundamental feature of EU law, which is the
central role the ECJ has played in the development of the EU legal system. The
ECJ is widely noted for the creative nature of its teleological interpretation,12 and
although the Court has often been strongly defended in the literature,13 its central
role in developing the norms of EU law in a way that goes beyond just applying
existing norms is hard to deny (a role illustrated in more detail in Chapter 4). In an
EU context, therefore, excluding norms of interpretation from a study of conflict
of norms would substantially limit the relevance of the study and fail to capture the
actual dynamics of norm conflict and their resolution in EU law.14

12

Shaw, for example, noted that the central role of the ECJ in the furthering of integration has been
widely acknowledged in the literature, noting in one piece that it “can hardly be denied by lawyers.
... The Court played its part [in integration] when it embarked upon a task of sui generis
constitution building within the context of the process of economic integration. The importance of
this is generally agreed upon.” (J. Shaw, ‘European Union Legal Studies in Crisis? Towards a New
Dynamic’, 16(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 231-253 (1996), pp. 232-233); Haltern
acknowledged that the ECJ had “invented, out of thin air, unwritten European human rights” (U.
Haltern, ‘Integration Through Law’, in A. Wiener & T. Diez (eds.), European Integration Theory
(Oxford Univ. Press 2004), 183); Weatherill referred to “the (admittedly not entirely inaccurate)
caricature of the European Court as driven to act audaciously in a manner apt to expand its
influence and with it that of the other institutions of the European Community” (SR. Weatherill,
‘Activism and Restraint in the European Court of Justice’, in P. Capps, M. Evans & S.
Konstadinidis (eds.), Asserting Jurisdiction: International and European Legal Perspectives (Hart
Publishing 2003), 255); Dickson has referred to the ‘notorious activism’ of the ECJ (J. Dickson,
‘How Many Legal Systems?: Some puzzles regarding the identity conditions of, and relations
between, legal systems in the European Union’, University of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series
No. 40/2008 (2008), 5). Some of the judges themselves have acknowledged ‘a certain idea of
integration’ motivating the caselaw (see Bengoetxea (1993), op cit, 99-101, referring to Judge
Pescatore’s comment of ‘une certaine idée de l’Europe’, also referring to Judges Pescatore,
Monaco, Kutscher, Lecourt, MacKenzie Stuart, Slynn, and Mancini.
13
Examples include Bengoetxea (1993), op cit; A. Arnull, ‘Interpretation and Precedent in
European Community Law’, in M. Andenas & F. Jacobs (eds.), European Community Law in the
English Courts (Oxford Univ. Press 1998); A. Albors-Llorens, ‘The European Court of Justice,
More than a Teleological Court’, 2 CYELS 73–99 (1999); T. Koopmans, ‘The Theory of
Interpretation and the Court of Justice’, in D. O’Keeffe & A. Bavasso (eds.), Judicial Review in
European Law: Essays in Honour of Lord Slynn (Kluwer 2001); J. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick &
L. Moral Soriano, ‘Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of
Justice’, in G. De Búrca & J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), The European Court of Justice (Oxford Univ.
Press 2001); O. Pollicino, ‘Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Context of the Principle
of Equality: Between Activism and Self-Restraint (Parts 1 & 2)’, 5(3) GLJ 283-317 (2004); MP.
Maduro, ‘Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional
Pluralism’, 1(2) EJLS (2007); G. Itzcovich, ‘The Interpretation of Community Law by the
European Court of Justice’, 10(5) GLJ 537-560 (2009).
14
Despite not formally considering conflicts of interpretative norms in his typology of norm
conflicts, Pauwelyn does in fact address the conflict between evolutive and conserving
interpretations: Pauwelyn (2003), op cit, Chapter 5. He also address interpretation by contrasting
reliance on substantive norms of general public international law as a fallback from WTO norms
with interpretation of WTO norms with reference to general international law: ibid, 200-205, 251274.
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A particular conception of norm conflict is essential for addressing human
rights conflicts, and here differing approaches to interpretation are decisive. As
Zucca has observed, traditional norm conflict maxims such as lex superior, lex
specialis, and lex posterior often do not apply to conflicts of human rights.15 Legal
protection of human rights is generally enacted simultaneously through the
adoption of a catalogue of relatively abstract statements of rights: they are usually
equally ranked (although such catalogues occasionally contain some internal
hierarchy, they do not do in a comprehensive way, thereby largely precluding the
application of lex superior), equally abstract (precluding the application of lex
specialis), and simultaneously effected (precluding the application of lex
posterior). The task of filling out the abstraction and of determining priority so as
to render rights clauses applicable to concrete fact scenarios is thus the task of
interpretation.
Norm conflict is important for what could be called ‘low-order’ reasons
and ‘higher’ order reasons. A low-order reason relates to minimal requirements of
consistency in the narrow sense of non-contradiction; it is necessary to decide
which of two conflicting norms applies. Higher order reasons relate to the question
of the appropriateness of choosing one norm over another norm, i.e. and not just
with the question of arriving at a or at any single un-contradicted norm. This
relates to the role of values in the choice of applicable norms. One of the aims of
the study is to examine the values behind the application of norm-conflict rules
and processes as exist in EU law and the legal reasoning of the ECJ. Finally, there
is a normative examination of what values should inform norm conflict rules and
whether EU norm conflict rules might be modified or developed in light of that.
The ‘values’ that are the focus of the analysis are those articulated by the EU
Treaties: primary amongst them are integration, the rule of law, democracy, human
rights, and subsidiarity. The analysis will examine how these various values
interact in norm conflict in EU law both descriptively and normatively.16 The
conceptual perspective is that the existence of a conflict of norms necessarily

15

L. Zucca, Constitutional Dilemmas: Conflicts of Fundamental Legal Rights in Europe and the
USA (Oxford Univ. Press 2007), 54-55.
16
Conflict of norms is distinct from conflict of laws as a field in that conflict of norms relates to
norms or laws that are part of the same legal system: ibid, 8.
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entails a choice of norms, which opens up the question of values choices in legal
reasoning.
The normative argument in this thesis is that the range of values articulated
in the Treaties is not adequately reflected in the caselaw of the ECJ, which still,
generally, tends to privilege the value of enhanced integration over virtually all
other values. The critique of the ECJ for privileging the value of integration is not
new, it has been quite a consistent criticism in the literature,17 although it has not
translated into a normative debate about differing methods of interpretation. The
thesis seeks to contribute and add to existing scholarship by analysing in greater
depth the normativity of legal reasoning by the ECJ through the conceptual
framework of norm conflict.
The overall aims of the study thus are:
(1) To map a field of conflict of norms within EU law, meaning rules and
principles for resolving conflicts between (legally binding) norms and differences
between overlapping norms that have become part of EU law, to determine to what
extent there are systematic norm conflict rules found in EU law, and to what extent
the issue is adequately articulated in EU law;
(2) To examine how values in the EU legal system are reflected in rules and
techniques of norm conflict resolution in EU law and the legal reasoning of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ);
(3) To offer a normative perspective on norm conflict rules and techniques in EU
law and the legal reasoning of the ECJ and how they could be developed.

17

Most famously, see H. Rasmussen, On Law and Policy of the European Court of Justice
(Martinus Nijhoff 1986). As Schepel noted: “Rasmussen’s criticism … cut deep into the very heart
of what still constitutes the rhetorical fabric of Community law. It questioned the status of the
Court’s case law as the inevitable and necessary precondition of ‘integration’”: H. Schepel,
‘Reconstructing Constitutionalization: Law and Politics in the European Court of Justice’, 20(3)
OJLS 457-468 (2000), 457. See further Shaw (1996), op cit; T. Hartley, ‘The European Court,
Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the European Union’, 112 LQR 95-109 (1996); A.
Stone Sweet, ‘The Juridical Coup d’État and the Problem of Authority’, 8(10) GLJ 915-928
(2007).
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Generally, it appears that norm conflict is very much under-articulated in EU law
and legal reasoning and that the conceptual framework of norm conflict offers
insight into the dynamics of decision-making and legal reasoning, and the values
that underlie them, in a way that is often not acknowledged in caselaw.
The focus of the study is on analysing legal reasoning, and central to its
concern is justification, which is widely considered a legitimising and
characteristic feature of legal reasoning.18 Justification as a concept ties in with
key attributes of adjudication: rationality, social and public legitimation, equity
between competing parties. Relatively little has been written on this general topic
of conflict or choice of norms in EU law, despite its potential to provide
conceptual insight into what matters and is decisive in judgments. The most
relevant book-length work appears to be by Torres Pérez19 specifically on human
rights conflicts and Klabbers20 on the relationship between EU law and
international treaties. In a number of articles, Joerges has proposed conflict of laws
as a framework for understanding EU constitutionalism, which would focus on the
legitimacy of legal intervention and thus address the perceived democratic
illegitimacy of EU law.21 The EU needs to respond to diversity, but not by
eliminating it. A normative framework is thus needed for addressing the
continuing conflict between the paradigm of State sovereignty and that of EU
supranationalism,22 a framework which would both recognise the primary
democratic legitimacy of Member States and the need for shared approaches to
problem solving in the context of the impact on citizens outside a State’s border of
the decisions of that State (in other words, the ‘normative fact of interdependence’23).
18

See generally on the role of justification in legal reasoning, R. Alexy, A Theory of Legal
Argumentation: The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification (trans. by R.
Adler & N. MacCormick) (Clarendon Press 1989), 221 et seq.; N. MacCormick, ‘Argumentation
and Interpretation in Law’, 6(1) RJ 16-29 (1993), 100-101; J. Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of
the European Court of Justice (Clarendon Press 1993), 130 et seq 159-160.
19
A. Torres Pérez, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
20
J. Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009).
21
See, e.g. C. Joerges (with comments by D. Chalmers, R. Nickel, F. Rödl, R. Wai), ‘Rethinking
European Law’s Supremacy’, EUI Working Paper Law 2005/12 (2005), 6-7. More recently, see,
also e.g. C. Joerges & F. Rödl, ‘Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the ‘Social Deficit’ of
European Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’, 15(1) ELJ
1-19 (2009).
22
Joerges (2005), ibid, 9.
23
Ibid, 14.
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Joerges identifies the mutual recognition principle of the ECJ, developed
from Cassis24 on, representing a meta-norm for conflict resolution that is mutually
acceptable to Member States, while furthering the aims of the Community.25 This
conceptual framework, inspired by private international law, proposes openness to
foreign laws and their experiences of regulation and to the impact of national law
on citizens in other Member States,26 which points towards inclusive deliberation
directed at common problem-solving. The approach focuses on the ex ante level of
political decision-making. The present work focuses on legal reasoning, but the
normative framework of ‘deliberative supranationalism’ highlights the concern
with values in EU political and legal processes and with reconciling the sometimes
competing legitimacy claims of the Member States (primarily democratic
legitimacy) and the EU (primarily problem solving or output legitimacy). These
competing values also play themselves out in formal legal reasoning and norm
conflict in EU law.
In comparison, more has been written about the subject of norm conflict in
the law of the WTO: e.g. Marceau, Pauwelyn, Vranes.27 Pauwelyn argues in
general for a greater openness to general international law in the WTO system,
although not in all respects.28
This chapter first examines the reasons for norm conflict in EU law, both
those that can be generalised to any legal system and those that are particular to the
EU and organisations of regional cooperation. Not all norm conflict, which to
some extent is pervasive throughout all law, can be examined in the present work.
The focus is on norm conflict internal to EU law: (1) conflicts of norms of
interpretation, (2) conflicts of human rights norms, and (3) conflicts of competence
24

Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (‘Cassis de
Dijon’) [1979] ECR 649.
25
Joerges (2005), op cit, 19.
26
Ibid, 26-267, and see the discussion of Comitology, 22-27.
27
G. Marceau, ‘Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions: The relationship between the
WTO Agreement and MEAs and other Treaties’, 35(6) JWTL 1081-1131 (2001); Pauwelyn (2003),
op cit; Vranes (2006), op cit. See further Chapter 2 below.
28
e.g. Pauwelyn rejects fall-back on secondary norms (i.e. norms governing change in the law,
adjudication or the resolution of disputes, and norms governing what constitutes law) of
international law as a way of supplementing the secondary rules of the WTO, i.e. he considers the
WTO to be a ‘self-contained regime’ so as to exclude international law countermeasures: Pauwelyn
(2003), op cit, 231-236.
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norms. It does not examine conflicts between EU law and international law, which
have been the subject of existing studies.29 Interpretation is a prior, conceptual
dimension of any norm conflict (since in order to determine the existence of a
conflict, the meaning, or range of meaning, of the norms in question must first be
determined). Human rights touch in a very direct way on questions of fundamental
values, while competences touch on questions of the definition of a polity or legal
entity. All three areas are of fundamental importance in a legal system.30
After discussing the reasons for the existence of norm conflict, this chapter
then examines the articulation of norm conflict in the dominant writings in
contemporary Anglo-American legal theory in order to situate the argument in the
present work for a more systematic and rule-bound understanding of norm conflict
rules and solutions. Finally, it summarises the rest of the chapters.
The central argument of the thesis is that the framework of norm conflict
offers conceptual insight into understanding how different approaches to legal
reasoning reflect different normative concerns. This approach opens up a critical
perspective on the long-standing approach of the ECJ to privilege the value of
integration in EU law and its own legal reasoning. Two points in particular are
developed: the role of speciality and the contrast between conserving or
historical/originalist interpretation and evolutive interpretation. Conserving
interpretation is marginalised in ECJ caselaw (although the ECJ occasionally does
resort to it), but the normative case for it has not been fully considered either in
caselaw or in academic literature. Chapter 3 argues that conserving or originalist
interpretation, despite what might seem its relatively radical character in EU law,
is both epistemically feasible and normatively desirable in light of rule of law and
democratic concerns.

29

See FE. Dowrick, ‘Overlapping European Laws’, 27(3) ICLQ 629-660 (1978); R. Schütze, ‘EC
Law and International Agreements of the Member States – An Ambivalent Relationship?’, 9
CYELS 387-440 (2006-2007); T. Joris & J. Vandenberghe, ‘The Council of Europe and the
European Union: Natural Partners or Uneasy Bedfellows?’, 15(1) Columbia JEL 1-41 (2008-2009);
Klabbers (2009), op cit.
30
Klabbers (ibid, p. 13) notes that international treaty conflicts generally involve questions of
higher values, e.g. the importance of trade relative to human rights. On this issue, see further
Chapter 5 below.
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Chapters 5 and 6 move on to examine conflicts of substantive norms. Chapter
5 argues that specificationism as a theory of rights articulation is preferable to the
quite ambiguous treatment of the normative character of rights in ECJ caselaw.
Specificationism, which can be understood as lex specialis applied to the human
rights context, renders feasible the definition and generality of rights as concepts
with normative priority for guiding both human behaviour and legal reasoning.
Chapter 6 argues that competence norms and the differing approaches to
addressing them have been greatly under-articulated in the legal reasoning of the
ECJ and proposes the lex specialis versus lex generalis distinction as a key to
understanding how they are treated in legal reasoning. The approach of the ECJ in
adopting meta-teleological interpretation has often been to implicitly sideline lex
specialis, preferring lex generalis either in the form of broad Treaty teleology or in
preferring the general competence provisions in what are now Article 114 and 352
TFEU. Further, competence as a concept can be elaborated so as to understand that
the principle of conferral is inherent in it, and this helps clarify why lex specialis
and historical interpretation generally should be preferred in interpreting EU
competence norms given a conception of the EU Member States as ‘Masters of the
Treaties.’
The framework of norm conflict calls forth the need for justification of the
discretionary choice of norms in legal reasoning, and this facilitates the normative
argument in the thesis as to how the ECJ should engage in choice when confronted
with a conflict of prima facie valid legal norms.

1.2 Summary of Content of Chapters
Chapter 2 analyses the reasons for conflict of norms, both in legal systems
generally and in the EU legal system in particular. Norm conflict is inevitable to
some extent in any legal system, but the potential and actuality of it are greatly
increased because of the complex and exceptional nature of the EU as an
organisation of States that have, to some extent, pooled sovereignty.
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Chapter 3 defines the concepts of norms (e.g. when do norms relate to the
same subject matter and what does ‘speciality’ mean?) and values (distinguishing
in some detail, for example, ‘norms’ and ‘normativity’) (in an EU context, relevant
values are those set out in the Preamble of the TEU and the Charter on
Fundamental Rights of the EU: integration or an ‘ever-closer Union’, democracy,
the rule of law, human rights, subsidiarity and Member State sovereignty). The
chapter further discusses a typology of different types of norms, e.g. substantive
norms, norms of competence, norms of conduct, prescriptive norms, permissive
norms, norms of interpretation, and traditional maxims of norm conflict (lex
superior, lex posterior, lex specialis).31 It does so first in light of Wesley Hohfeld’s
typology of legal concepts and then in light of works specifically on norm
conflict.32 Hohfeld’s analysis of legal concepts is assessed to see if it can offer
conceptual clarity to the question of norm conflict, and in a number of respects it
appears to do so. It seeks to further locate the general issue of norm conflicts in
general theories of legal reasoning beyond those of Dworkin and Raz discussed
above, following a discussion of the difference between rules and principles in
legal reasoning.
Chapter 4 examines in more detail the reasons and values behind different
interpretative rules/principles or norms and how these interpretative norms and
values (a) are worked out, explicitly or implicitly, in EU law and (b) how they
might be differently ordered. In particular, the chapter focuses on the values
behind the contrast between dynamic or evolutive approaches to interpretation and
conserving (or historical/originalist) approaches to interpretation. The chapter
includes (b) a case study on evolutive as opposed to conserving or
originalist/historical interpretation, examining caselaw on the development of the
doctrine of non-discriminatory obstacles to free movement, and (b) a survey of
leading constitutionalising cases from the ECJ. The question of conserving or
historical/originalist interpretation versus evolutive interpretation reflects an
important conceptual issue in the study of norm conflict: to what extent can
collective law-making bodies have a coherent, identifiable intention. If the latter is
31

See generally, e.g. C. Perelman (ed.), Les Antinomies en Droit (Bruylant 1965); Vranes (2006),
op cit, discussing WTO law.
32
W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (Yale Univ.
Press 1946).
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not an epistemic possibility, the potential for norm conflict seems greatly
increased; conversely, if it is epistemically possible, norm conflict can be avoided
to a much greater degree. Chapter 4 focuses on this issue.
Chapter 5 deals with norms conflict of fundamental rights and values. It
takes as an initial framework a well-known academic debate in the 1990s between
Coppel & O’Neill, charging the ECJ with instrumentalising human rights in the
EU legal order, and Weiler & Lockhart, defending the Court. It seeks to revisit the
anises in light of some more recent leading cases from the ECJ on human rights in
order to assess what normative priority has developed in the area of human rights.
Finally, the Chapter considers the possibility of (a) of a more pronounced
hierarchy of rights and (b) specificationism of rights as a way of avoiding conflicts
of fundamental rights.
Chapter 6 examines the question of competence norms. Despite the call in
the Declaration of Laeken33 for greater clarity in the definition of the competences
of the EU relative to those of the Member States, there seems to have been
relatively little conceptual study in EU law on understanding the broad question of
competence34 (Vranes suggests the definition of competence has also been understudied in international law35). The notion of ‘competence’ has recently been the
subject of study in jurisprudence.36 This chapter examines how the ECJ addresses
the question of competence between the Member States and the EU in its legal
reasoning: how do norms of competence relate to norms of conduct,37 is this a
useful distinction in EU law?; is integration a meta-norm that is satisfactorily
related to other values in the context of questions of competence?; and to what
extent does and should lex specialis and other interpretative considerations (e.g. on
speciality in international law, see Lindroos38) govern questions of competence in
EU law?. The chapter includes three case studies: (a) the first examines recent
33

The Future of the EU: Declaration of Laeken, document of the Belgian Presidency, 15 December
2001, part 11A.
34
See further Chapter 6 below.
35
Vranes (2006), op cit, 398.
36
T. Spaak, The Concept of Legal Competence (Ashgate 1994); T. Spaak, ‘Norms that Confer
Competence’ 16(1) RJ 89-104 (2003).
37
Vranes (2006), op cit, 407-412.
38
A. Lindroos, ‘Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex
Specialis’, 74(1) NJIL 27-66 (2005).
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caselaw concerning the interaction of free movement with the right to strike; (b)
caselaw on external relations; and (c) the provisions in the Treaty of Lisbon for the
establishment of a European Public Prosecutor.
The conclusions seek to synthesise the results of other chapters and argue
for a more articulated approach to the problem of norm conflict on the basis that
the EU as a legal system, perhaps more than any other, must for reasons of
legitimacy confront this problem of legal reasoning in many aspects of its
institutional activity.
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Chapter 2 – Reasons for Norms Conflict in EU Law
Norm conflict appears to be an inevitable feature of legal systems. Some causes of
norm conflict arise in any legal system, while features particular to a given legal
system may amplify the inherent potential of law for conflict of norms. This
chapter examines both the reasons for norm conflict in any legal system and those
particular to the EU. From the inevitability of norm conflict in a legal system
follows the necessity for tools of norm conflict resolution to render a legal system
satisfactory from the point of view of minimal standards of coherence and
rationality. A thicker normative analysis relative to particular system, such as the
EU, may then add to the basic conceptual analysis of norm conflict tools, an issue
taken up in Chapter 3 below. The final parts of this chapter explain the
methodology of the study and examine the general treatment of norm conflict in
contemporary Anglo-American legal theory to give context to the discussion of
norm conflict resolution developed in Chapter 3.

2.1 Reasons for Norm Conflict Inherent in any Legal System
2.1.1 The Temporal Element
Some degree of norm conflict, e.g. the prosaic example of a contradiction between
later and earlier norms, is inevitable in any legal system, even a primitive one. The
simple example of a later law repealing an earlier law is an instance of norm
conflict, even if its resolution is normally very simple through a lex posterior
maxim. Any legal system must contend with competing pulls of unity and
specificity,1 between, for example, hierarchically higher norms and hierarchically
lower, between more general and more specific norms, and between substantive
norms and systemic or secondary norms.2
1

G. Guillaume, ‘The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Outlook for the
International Legal Order’, Speech to the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly by His
Excellency Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the ICJ, 27th October 2004, p. 4, available online
at < http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?p1=6&p2=1&pr=85&search=%22nagymaros%22
> (last visited 7th December 2009) and cited in Pauwelyn (2003), op cit, 1.
2
i.e. the distinction between substantive primary rules and the secondary rules (rules of change,
rules of adjudication, rule of recognition) that govern how (substantive) primary rules come into
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2.1.2 Vagueness and Generality
Vagueness and different degrees of specificity can create ambiguity as to which
law is most applicable. A degree of vagueness is inevitable in any legal system in
that it is difficult or impossible for a law to comprehensively enumerate in detail
every factual situation to which it is applied. Laws, therefore, have a degree of
generality. The level of generality that determines the scope of a provision is
related to reasoning by analogy.3 To characterise the level of generality more
broadly is to extend the analogical scope of a provision. However, analogy is not a
concept that can be explained in purely formal logical terms; it is a question of
judging real and substantive resemblance between what is compared.4 In other
words, it is related to perceptual experience in a way that cannot be generalised ex
ante. The scope of analogical reasoning is, as a result, to some extent a matter of
judicial discretion, although this discretion will be limited by the plausibility of
analogical reasoning in a given cultural context and more generally in light of
common human experience. For example, it may be difficult to determine the
precise scope of the term vehicle when used in legislation: is a bike or a
wheelbarrow a vehicle? There are borderline cases at the edges of a concept that
can be difficult to define.5

being and are changed, enforced, and judged. The distinction is of course attributable to Hart: HLA
Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press 2nd ed. 1994), 80-81.
3
See generally, e.g. G. Lamond, ‘Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning’, Stanford
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Winter 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-reas-prec/ > (last accessed 29th January 2009); J. Yovel,
‘Analogical Reasoning as Translation: The Pragmatics of Transitivity’, 13(1) IJSemL 1-27 (2000);
JH. Farrar, ‘Reasoning by Analogy in the Law’, 9(2) Bond LR 149-176 (1997); C. Sunstein, ‘On
Analogical Reasoning’, 106(3) Harvard LR 741-791 (1993); J. Mayda, Francois Gény and Modern
Jurisprudence (Louisiana State University Press 1978), 39-40. More generally, see S. Vosniadou &
A. Ortony (eds.), Similarity and Analogical Reasoning (Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).
4
Ekelöf noted the connection between teleological reasoning and analogy: P. O. Ekelöf,
‘Teleological Construction of Statutes’ 2 SSL 76-117 (1958), 80-81. See generally Farrar (1997),
op cit, quoting S. Simitis, ‘The Problem of Legal Logic’, 3 Ratio 60-94 (1960), 78 (Farrer, ibid,
175). See also A. Stone Sweet & M. McCowan, ‘Discretion and Precedent in European Law’, in
Wiklund (ed.), Judicial Discretion in European Perspective (Kluwer 2003), 99-102.
5
See T. Endicott, ‘Law is Necessarily Vague’, 7(4) LT 379-385 (2001), 383-383; W. Lucy,
‘Abstraction and the Rule of Law’, 29(3) OJLS 481-509 (2009), 488-489.
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2.1.3 Complexity of Subject Matter
Legal systems are relatively complex, governing as they do whole societies, or
schemes of cooperation between whole societies at the international or
transnational level. In most legal systems, there exists more than one source of
law, e.g. both legislative norms and judicial decisions interpreting those norms.
Where more than one source of law exists, some mechanisms for relating
differently sourced norms to each other are necessary. Even when a norm comes
from the same source, when greater consistency might be expected as compared to
differently sourced norms, the possibility of a temporal conflict of norms is
obviously present as is the possibility of conflict between more general as
compared to more specific norms. This is because of the complexity of the subject
matter that most legal systems must address.

2.1.4 Value Pluralism
While social complexity might be thought to vary greatly between legal systems in
primitive societies and those in the pluralistic West, the fact of value pluralism is
becoming increasingly pervasive in many jurisdictions globally, and it is probably
now justified to consider it as a cause of norm conflict inherent in contemporary
legal systems generally. Value pluralism6 creates norm conflict in at least two
respects: (1) it increases the likelihood of disparate values being reflected in
different laws, resulting in a reduction of overall or global coherence of the law
and making more likely conflicts in the event of overlapping laws; (2) it renders
more contestable the judicial role in filling in gaps in the law, in that the value
choices that are entailed in judicial creativity are less likely to reflect societal
consensus.
A good example of judicial creativity in many contemporary systems relates
to the under-determination of the concrete application of abstract human rights
6
See generally J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford Univ. Press 1999); S. Besson, The
Morality of Conflict: Reasonable Disagreement and the Law (Hart Publishing 2006). See also
Pauwelyn (2003), op cit, 102-103.
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clauses in Bills of Rights. The latter often do not lend themselves to a clear,
relatively incontestable interpretation, compared to rule-like and clear-cut
provisions such as those relating to the organisation of institutions7 or to
procedural rights in the criminal process. A Bill of Rights will generally not
explain how to prioritise competing rights and values embodied in the text, yet
many cases before the courts call for just such a prioritisation. As Fiss has well
articulated the problem, Bills of Rights are both abstract and comprehensive: they
purport to apply across the full range of public law and at the same time to
encompass all values or interests considered to be of fundamental importance.8
As a consequence, the interpretation of fundamental rights can be highly
controversial.9 The theory of legal reasoning must supplement the texts of Bills of
Rights, for example, which embody generality and comprehensiveness to a high
degree, to determine how their under-determined content is to be interpreted and
applied in concreto. Interpretative norms, however, differ, and can yield different
result to the same ‘raw material’ of legal text: which interpretative methods are to
prevail and how they are ranked are of much practical importance in determining
the practical content of conflicting rights and legal interests.
Apart from modalities of interpretation, value pluralism is subject to some
structuring or determination through the concept of a hierarchy of rights. Some
signs of hierarchy are apparent in public international law, including in the concept
of jus cogens in general international law and in the concept of ‘non-derogable’
rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)10 and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.11 These developments
indicate recognition that not all human rights norms are of the same level of
7

O. Fiss, ‘Objectivity and Interpretation’, 34(4) Stanford LR 739-763 (1982), 743 and passim; H.
Wechsler, ‘Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law’, 73(1) Harvard LR 1-35 (1959), 25
and passim.
8
Fiss (1982), ibid, 742-743. See also, F. Schauer, ‘The Generality of Rights’, 6(3) LT 323-336
(2000).
9
Torres Perez (2009), op cit, 80.
10
ETS no. 05, e.g. the right to life excepting death resulting from lawful action in war (Article 2);
the ban on torture or inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3); the prohibition on slavery or
servitude (Article 4(1); and the prohibition on retroactive criminal penalties (Article 7).
11
999 UNTS 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967). Article 4 of the ICCPR mentions the prohibition on torture
(article 7), the prohibition on retroactive criminal penalties (Article 15), and recognition of every
person before the law (Article 16) as non-derogable.
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importance and that some have normative priority over others. The questions thus
posed are what rights should get priority and how should that priority be
determined? In the context of contemporary moral pluralism, this is a considerable
challenge, and it poses an important question of the procedural character of the
determination of priority of rights: who is to decide on the priority, e.g. is it a
matter of ex ante legislative determination (or determination by the constituent
power) or an ongoing constructive engagement led by the judiciary?
In other words, as well as the substantive question of priority, there is the
matter of comparative institutional analysis12 and design as to how procedurally
and institutionally the determination of priority is made. Answering this question
will to a significant extent depend on what systemic values are important, e.g.
democracy versus good governance. The question of values, and how they relate to
norm conflict, is discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 examines the issue of an ex
ante hierarchy or priority of rights.

2.1.5 Discontinuity in the Identity of the Law-Maker
The lack of continuity of the identity of the law-maker is another reason for norm
conflict. A single, continuous law-maker is more likely to demonstrate consistency
of views and knowledge of the potential of new law for conflict with existing law.
And although the inculcation and habituation to obedience of the law that comes
from experience internal to the legal system can ensure that a sense of duty to obey
the law outlasts a current sovereign to continue into the period of power of the
succeeding lawful authority,13 change in the composition of the law-maker
produces changing political and legislative priorities, reduces sensitivity to the
existing breadth of legal rules, and can dissipate the continuity of knowledge and
awareness of the full extent of existing rules.

12
See generally, N. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics,
and Public Policy (University of Chicago Press 1994).
13
Hart (1994), op cit, 58-61.
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Especially in modern democracies, the composition of the law-making
authority changes quite frequently. And although a permanent civil service
provides greater continuity and may, therefore, help compensate for the relative
inexperience of the current political leadership relative to the existing body of
legal rules, it too will inevitably undergo changes of personnel. Even in a period of
relative political stability and continuity, the composition of the lawful authority
may change according to the type of law in question. International treaties, for
example, may be ratified by the executive, but are often also subject to debate and
approval by a parliament prior to ratification and may in fact be negotiated mainly
by civil servants, while private interest groups may impact on the process at
different stages in seeking to influence it in favour of their preferred outcomes.14
Conflict can, therefore, easily arise through inadvertence.15
These differing actors may have different motivations, which can impact
on the degree of coherence of ‘intention’ behind the adoption of international
treaties, especially if these actors self-servingly advance their own views
irrespective of (a) their awareness of the views of the other relevant national actors
or of their own subordinate authority in the case of officials and (b) legal
coherence in general or the consistency of an instrument under negotiation with
the surrounding body of law.16 Further, compromise between differently motivated
actors, which may be necessary to secure agreement to allow the passing of a law,
may create ambiguity in the resulting text.17
Differing motivations behind the adoption of laws has been much debated
in the context of the notion of legislative or original constitutional intention.
Difficulties attributed to the epistemic possibility of there being a single, coherent
intention amongst a group of law-makers that might inform the interpretation of
legal instruments are related to a rejection of historical or originalist interpretation
in favour of a more constructivist or systemic approach to interpretation. The

14

Pauwelyn (2003), op cit, 15-16, citing E. Benvenisti, ‘Exit and Voice in the Age of
Globalization’, 98(1) Michigan LR 167-213 (1999), 169.
15
See, e.g. Klabbers (2009), op cit, 3.
16
Jenks (1953), op cit, 452; Pauwelyn (2003), ibid, 15.
17
Pauwelyn (2003), ibid, 93.
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conflict here is between different conceptions of original intention in the context of
interpretative ambiguity, an issue taken up in Chapter 4.

2.2 Reasons for Norm Conflict Particular to EU Law
Within EU law, in particular, several factors may operate to increase the likelihood
of norm conflict.

2.2.1 Linguistic Diversity:

Relative to a national legal system, an obvious distinct feature of the EU is the
linguistic diversity of the Member States and of the official languages of the
organisation. The EU has 23 official or working languages, which entails that
documents may be sent to EU institutions and a reply received in any of these
languages and that EU regulations and other legislative documents are published in
all of them, as is the Official Journal.18 At a practical level, this can result in
different language versions bearing a different meaning, with a need to resolve the
linguistic diversity in favour of a single meaning. From the point of view of the
theory of norm conflict, what is significant is the means chosen to resolve
linguistic conflict and the underlying rationale for that means as compared to
alternative resolutions of the problem.

18

Council Regulation No 1158 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic
Community, OJ 34, 29.05.1959, Article 3 of which provides that “Documents which an institution
of the Community sends to a Member State or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of a Member
State shall be worded in the language of such State.” See recently, e.g. K. McAuliffe, ‘Enlargement
at the European Court of Justice: Law, Language and Translation’, 14(6) ELJ 806-818 (2008), 807808 and passim for background references and discussion.
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2.2.2 The ‘Supranational’ Doctrines of Direct Effect and Supremacy and the Logic
of the ‘Integration Imperative’ relative to Traditional Public International Law:
From relatively early in its caselaw, the ECJ sought to mark out the European
Communities as substantially different from general public international law, as a
new departure constituting ‘a new legal order’:
…the Community constitute a new legal order of international law.19
… By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has
created its own legal system.20
…The transfer by the states from their domestic legal system to the
Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the
Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights,
against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of
the Community cannot prevail.21

What marked out the Communities as distinctive were the doctrines of direct
effect22 and supremacy,23 and latter, parallelism and pre-emption.24 An important
implication drawn from this characterisation is a move away from reciprocity as
the founding structural principle, as remains the case for much of general
international law, to an integralist view of the Communities. In particular, the
reference to a ‘permanent transfer’ of sovereignty by the Member States departs
from State consent and reciprocity. This concept of what can be described as
‘integral obligations’25 conceives of the new legal order as having an inherent
importance that transcends the legal interests if the Member States individually,
hence the apparent impossibility of withdrawal by a Member State (at least if
‘permanent transfer’ is to be taken at face value). Although the suggested
19

Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, at 12.
Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585, at 593.
21
Ibid, at 594.
22
Established in Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, supra n. 57.
23
Established in Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, supra n. 58.
24
i.e. the doctrine that the Community has a parallel power externally to its internal powers and
that the Community’s power can exclude any operation by the Member States of their external
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impossibility for a Member State to withdraw from the Communities was perhaps
always contestable and withdrawal is now expressly provided for,26 it points to the
potential and actual conflict between the Community legal order as articulated by
the ECJ and traditional international law based on State consent as the defining
structural principle of the international legal system.27
This move towards integral obligations and away from merely reciprocal
obligations is not unique to the European project, though institutional rhetoric on
the imperative of integration seems especially strong. In general international law,
for example, jus cogens or peremptory norms have an integral character that
renders their legal status immune from a failure of acceptance or recognition by
some States.28 More generally, the international law of State responsibility
recognises a category of treaty clauses that are not subject to suspension by States
as a countermeasure in their dealing toward another Sate who has breached the
treaty; self-help through suspension is prevented because of the particular or
fundamental status of the clause.29 The exclusion of self-help generally in an EU
context has been strongly asserted by the ECJ:
Above all, it must be pointed out that in no circumstances may the Member
State rely on similar infringements by other Member States in order to
escape their own obligations under the provisions of the Treaty.30

Perhaps the strongest statement of the limitations on the competences and
faculties of the Member States under general international law that results from
26
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membership of the Communities is found in Opinion 1/91. This concerned a
proposal by the Member States to create a new court for wider economic
integration under the European Economic Agreement (EEA). In Opinion 1/91,31
the ECJ held that the creation of such a court was contrary to Community law:
3. … Although, under the agreement, the Court of the European Economic
Area is under a duty to interpret the provisions of the agreement in the light
of the relevant rulings of the Court of Justice given prior to the date of
signature of the agreement, the Court of the European Economic Area will
no longer be subject to any such obligation in the case of decisions given by
the Court of Justice after that date. Consequently, the agreement's objective
of ensuring homogeneity of the law throughout the European Economic
Area will determine not only the interpretation of the rules of the agreement
itself but also the interpretation of the corresponding rules of Community
law.
It follows that in so far as it conditions the future interpretation of the
Community rules on the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital and on competition the machinery of courts provided for in the
agreement conflicts with Article 164 of the EEC Treaty and, more
generally, with the very foundations of the Community. As a result, it is
incompatible with Community law.32

Norm conflict here operates between general international law and special
regimes or sub-systems that exclude the secondary rules of general international
law in specific instances. This takes effect at the level of competence in precluding
certain international acts by Member States of the EU. Practically, the issue
revolves around the use of countermeasures in general international law for
breaches by another Member State of EU law. Despite the absolute exclusion by
the ECJ of the logic of reciprocity as applicable to EU law, it is open to debate
whether the EU has entirely severed itself from general international law and it
seems untenable to entirely exclude reciprocity.33 Chapter 6 below examines the
general issue of competences and their interpretation in the context of the
31
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boundary line between the EU’s general external relations power and the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the CFSP being a half-way house between
the residual powers of the Member States in international law and the Union.34
Dashwood identifies here a paradox underling the EU polity, which is that it
consists of a ‘constitutional order of States’: an organisation consisting of States
that are sovereign entities in public international law, yet which have limited that
sovereignty as a consequence of their participation in the EU.35
The issue is further complicated in EU law because of the twin avenues of
cooperation existing alongside each other, namely: (1) the specific ‘Community’
or ‘supranational’ method in what has until 2009 been the First or Community
Pillar of the pre-Lisbon three-Pillar EU, with its doctrines of supremacy, direct
effect, parallelism and pre-emption, qualified majority voting in the Council of
Ministers, and a legislative role for a directly elected European Parliament; and (2)
the intergovernmentalism of the pre-Lisbon Second and Third Pillars, which
amounts to traditional international law cooperation (with an absence of the
aforementioned attributes of supranationalism) except through the institutions of
the Community/Union. Both the Second and Third Pillars had their own specific
types of legislative instruments (which, although denominated by different
terminology, appear essentially to be equivalent to traditional public international
law treaties or conventions).36
The potential for norm conflict here might be thought limited by (1) the
application of a straightforward lex superior rule in Article 47 TEU as it had been
pre-Lisbon, giving priority and competence to Community/First Pillar legislation
in the event of a conflict between Community/First Pillar measure and a Second or
Third Pillar measures and (2) the abolition of the Pillar structure by the recently
34
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adopted Lisbon Treaty. However, two aspects of the Lisbon Treaty resurrect a
potential for norm conflict between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism:
the priority of what has heretofore been the Community Pillar is no longer retained
(it had previously been set out in Article 47 TEU); and, second, although the Pillar
terminology has been abandoned, cooperation in what was the spheres of the
Second and Third Pillars, foreign policy and criminal law respectively, retains
important intergovernmental elements, especially in the case of foreign policy.37
The question of the priority between instruments in the latter two areas and other
legal instruments seems, therefore, somewhat open.38 However, the Lisbon Treaty
enhances clarity if only by reducing the number of distinct legal instruments,
adopting a generic instrument called a ‘decision’.39

2.2.3 The Continuing Question of EU Competence in the Context of Enduring
Member State Sovereignty:
As noted above, complexity is a cause of norm conflict in legal systems generally,
and complexity is certainly a feature of EU law in the matter of the division of
competences between the Union and the Member States. The previous section
noted that the issue arises, for example, in determining the relative scope of
37
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application of the Union’s general external power and the CFSP. The general issue
of delineating competences is not unique to the EU, as it arises in any federal or
multi-level system, which will need some definition of the competences of the
different units in the federal or multi-level entity. It is probably fair to say,
however, that the division of competences is more problematic in the EU,
especially given that the EU does not have the level of legitimacy associated with
States. From its earliest days, it contained the ambiguous programme of
developing a common market between previously disparate and competing
national economies. In practice, it has become difficult to distinguish between the
fundamental principles of the common market and other competences.40
Given this phenomenon of ‘competence spill-over’41 and even though the
extent and degree to which the EU now constitutes an ‘ever-closer Union’ so as to
encompass the ambition to a federal ‘super-State’ is much contested, the
competences of the EU have undeniably extended beyond a common market
narrowly understood to encompass an increasing range of other economic, social,
and political matters, including, e.g. criminal law cooperation and to some extent
foreign policy: “the EU... provides for the possibility of some form of
governmental activity across a remarkably wide range of societal tasks”.42 The
range of legislative matters within the remit of the Union legislature is now thus
very extensive and includes matters relating to complex and continually competing
value and policy choices. For example, since the Single European Act 1986 and
the Treaty of Maastricht 1992, EU competences have been extended to cover all or
aspects of43 monetary policy (money supply and interest rates), environmental
40
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policy, research and technology, social policy, culture, consumer protection,
education, tourism, and development cooperation, asylum and immigration policy,
criminal justice, foreign policy.
The underpinning principles of the common market have a potential reach
that encompasses almost any divergences in national law on any matter: almost
any divergence in national laws could be construed in an abstract way as an
obstacle to free movement or as a distortion on competition. The ECJ itself
recognised the latter principle, i.e. undistorted competition, as a possible basis for
competence overreach in this way:
106. In examining the lawfulness of a directive adopted on the basis of
Article 100a of the Treaty, the Court is required to verify whether the
distortion of competition which the measure purports to eliminate is
appreciable (Titanium Dioxide, cited above, paragraph 23).
107. In the absence of such a requirement, the powers of the Community
legislature would be practically unlimited. National laws often differ
regarding the conditions under which the activities they regulate may be
carried on, and this impacts directly or indirectly on the conditions of
competition for the undertakings concerned. It follows that to interpret
Articles 100a, 57(2) and 66 of the Treaty as meaning that the Community
legislature may rely on those articles with a view to eliminating the smallest
distortions of competition would be incompatible with the principle, already
referred to in paragraph 83 of this judgment, that the powers of the
Community are those specifically conferred on it.44

In the above passage, the ECJ indicates that the adoption of a minimum threshold
has the effect of restricting Community/Union competence. However, the ECJ has
not adopted such a threshold in the area of free movement and has specifically
rejected the idea in some caselaw,45 though the same logic of potentially unlimited
Union competence applies. This vagueness as to the scope of Union competences
is in conflict with the principle of conferred powers in Article 5 of the Treaty on
44
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European Union (TEU), namely, that the Union can only act on the basis of the
limited powers accorded in the Treaty:
1. The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of
conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality.
2. Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits
of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties
to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the
Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.
3. Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can
rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved at Union level.
The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of subsidiarity as laid
down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality. National Parliaments ensure compliance with the principle
of subsidiarity in accordance with the procedure set out in that Protocol.

In these passages, the Treaty recognises both that Union competence is
limited in not applying to areas that remain the exclusive preserve of the Member
States and that in areas of shared competence (the principle of conferral), the
exercise of Union competence depends on the achievement of better results, by
reason of scale or effects, than if the Member States acted individually (the
principle of subsidiarity). Both the principles of conferral and subsidiarity thus sit
uneasily with and can be opposed to the ‘conceptual pull’ of the common market
principles of the abolition of obstacles to free movement and undistorted
competition.
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As one commentator strikingly put it, this potential could lead to the
‘infantalisation’ of the Member States:
In order to prevent a complete infantalization of national governments with
the inevitable consequent political backlash, there is a pressing need to have
a system that defines and contains the legitimate scope of Community
power and legislation. … Alas, as every Community lawyer knows, there
could hardly be more open-ended and ambiguous competences that those
assigned to the Community. As if the individual policies, notably the
legislative competence for the internal market, were not open enough, there
is a mop-up clause allowing legislation that may be necessary “in the course
of the operation of the common market” to achieve “one of the objectives of
the Community”? These objectives include “the raising of the standard of
living and quality of life” in the Community. What kind of rules might be
necessary in operating an international common market? Shared criminal
law, at least concerning fraud? Common tax rules? A common contract
code? Harmonized education systems to ease migration of persons? A single
language? All are arguable.46

How conflict in the matter of competence is and can be addressed in EU
law is discussed in Chapter 6: an attempt is made to demonstrate how the
principles of conferral and subsidiarity could be more fully respected in the legal
reasoning of the ECJ.

2.2.4 Pluralistic Membership of the EU Legislatures:
It was noted above that the identity of the law-making authority changes over time,
and this is a factor of especial significance in the EU, given that the composition of
what can be compared to the upper chamber of a bicameral parliament,47 i.e. the
Council of Ministers, is continually changing according to the electoral cycles
unique to each Member States and the variations of and changes of cabinet
46
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appointees in those Member States, the latter often being more frequent than
electoral cycles. This relates to the epistemic question of collective intention
behind law-making and the possibility of coherent, shared intention as a function
of law-making discourse notwithstanding changes in the actors within that
discourse (a point taken up in Chapter 3).

2.2.5 The Sources of EU Law:
Compared with most other legal systems, EU law has more sources of law. These
include the founding and amending Treaties (‘primary legislation’), legislative acts
of the Union institutions (‘secondary legislation’), general principles of law as
developed by the ECJ, international law, and national laws and constitutions of the
Member States. Set out in Article 249 ECT pre-Lisbon, the three main type of
binding legislative instruments of the institutions listed there being regulations,
directives, and decisions.48 Prior to the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty,
distinct legal instruments existed under the Second and Third Pillars49 and these
remain valid legal instruments post-Lisbon.50 The EU is monist with respect to
international law, in that international agreements concluded by the EU have direct
effect in EU law.51 The ECJ or the Court of First Instance (now the ‘General
Court’) have at various times adopted as a source of EU law public international

48
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law rules concerning, for example, treaty interpretation and suspension,52 rules
concerning the allocation of extraterritorial jurisdiction,53 and rules concerning the
law of the sea.54 Potentially, therefore, international treaties, international
customary law, general principles of international law, and acts of international
organisations are all sources of EU law.55
However, from the early days of the Communities, as noted above, the ECJ
has set out to mark Community law out as distinct from general international
law,56 which in effect has given it a degree of discretion as to when it will take
inspiration from international law as a source. EU law is characterised thus by an
openness to international law, but also by self-positioning as distinct and sui
generis57 that enables the ECJ and the Union to reject at a conceptual level, in a
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given instance, a standard public international law approach in developing the law.
This opens up the problem of opportunistic positioning of the EU as either
consistent with or different from general public international law, depending on
whatever characterisation would achieve a desired result.
As well as international law, the EU looks to the constitutional and legal
traditions of the Member States to fill gaps in EU law, including in the
development of the category of general principles of law as a source of EU law.58
In international law, general principles have been understood as relating to
concepts inherent in legality and in a legal system.59 Examples include the
principle of good faith60 and proximate causality.61 In general, such legal
principles have an open texture and degree of generality or abstraction that makes
them inherently more uncertain relative to more conclusive, clear-cut legal rules.62
In EU law, the category of general principles of law is similar to that in
international law, though it appears to be somewhat broader in EU law in more
explicitly encompassing human rights and principles specific to the nature of the
Union (of the latter, e.g. the principles of equivalence and effectiveness of
remedies). Among the principles that the ECJ has develop in this category are
fundamental human rights,63 proportionality,64 legal certainty,65 equality,66
principles of procedural propriety,67

58

equivalence68 and effectiveness of

See generally T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (Oxford. Univ. Press 2nd ed.
2006).
59
See generally, e.g. B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Tribunals
(Stevens & Sons Ltd. 1953, reprinted by Cambridge Univ. Press 2006); Pauwelyn (2003), 124-131;
I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford Univ. Press 7th ed. 2008), 19-27.
Brownlie refers to a category of ‘general principles of international law’ as distinct from the
category of general principles of law recognised in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, the
former including custom.
60
See, e.g. Free Zones Case (1930), PCIJ, Ser. A, no. 24, p. 12; Cheng (1953 & 2006), op cit, 105162; Brownlie (2008), op cit, 18.
61
See, e.g. Administrative Decision No. 11 (1923) Dec. & Op. p. 103, at pp. 133-134, of the
German-United States Mixed Claims Commission (established 1922), cited in Cheng (1953 &
2006), op cit, 245 et seq.
62
The rules v. principles distinction is examined further in Chapter 3 below.
63
First set out in Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419. See also, e.g. Case 11/70,
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfur-und Vorratsstelle [1970] ECR 1125.
64
See, e.g. Case 181/84, R v. Intervention Board ex parte Man Sugar Ltd. [1985] ECR 2889 See
also Article 5 TEU.
65
See, e.g. Case 98/78, Firma A. Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz [1979] ECR 69.
66
Case 149/77, Defrenne v. SABENA [1978] ECR 1365.
67
See, e.g. on legitimate expectations, Case 120/86, Mulder v. Minister van Landbouw en Visserij
[1988] ECR 2351.

32

remedies,69 and possibly transparency.70 Further, the Treaties recognise the
principles of conferral and subsidiarity.71
The ECJ more often looks to the ECHR72 as a source in developing its
rights jurisprudence; it occasionally looks to the constitutional traditions of the
Member States. Craig & de Búrca well explain the context for this:
The reasons are to some extent obvious, in that it is more difficult for the
ECJ to assert a ‘common’ approach where a particular right does not appear
in every national constitution, whereas an instrument like the ECHR is
supposed to reflect precisely the collectively shared commitments of all
Member States. Further, the fear of compromising the doctrinal supremacy
of EU law by appearing to defer to a particular national constitutional
provision has animated the ECJ’s case law ever since Costa v. ENEL.73

The general approach set out in Hoechst is that it is sufficient if a given principle is
common to several of national legal systems, but ‘non negligible divergences’
constitute an obstacle to its recognition:
Since the applicant has also relied on the requirements stemming from the
fundamental right to the inviolability of the home, it should be observed
that, although the existence of such a right must be recognized in the
Community legal order as a principle common to the laws of the Member
States in regard to the private dwellings of natural persons, the same is not
true in regard to undertakings, because there are not inconsiderable
divergences between the legal systems of the Member States in regard to the

68

See, e.g. Case 186/98, Nunes and de Matos [1999] ECR I-4883, para. 13; Case C-78/98, Preston
and Others [2000] ECR I-3201, para. 31; Case C-234/04, Kapferer v. Schlanck [2006] ECR I-6307,
para. 22.
69
See, e.g. Case 68/88, Commission v. Greece [1989] ECR 2965, para. 24.
70
The ECJ has implicitly recognised the principle, see e.g. Cases C-154 & 155/04, The Queen on
the application of Alliance for Natural Health and Nutri-Link Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Health
[2005] ECR I-6451, paras. 81-82. Judge Koen Lenaerts has suggested transparency should be
considered a general principle of Community law: K. Lenaerts, ‘“In the Union We Trust”: Trust
Enhancing Principles of Community Law’, 41 CMLRev 317-343 (2004), 321.
71
See Articles 4 and 5 TEU and the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity
and Proportionality.
72
Supra n. 48.
73
P. Craig & G. de Búrca, EU Law: Texts, Cases and Materials (Oxford Univ. Press 4th ed. 2008),
386.

33

nature and degree of protection afforded to business premises against
intervention by the public authorities.74

Some support for a much looser and flexible approach can also be found in the
caselaw.75
The wide range of these sources of law increases the risk and likelihood of
conflict between them and raises the question of the ranking or hierarchy between
them: as between (a) sources internal to EU law, (b) between EU law and national
laws of the Member States, and (c) between EU law and public international law.
A range of instruments might be considered soft law,76 such as agreements reached
at the Council of Ministers or at the European Council that are not eventually
translated into a formal legislative form. However, as these instruments do not
have any direct normative status other than as possible travaux préparatoires, they
are considered in the present study only in so far as they may be relevant to
interpretation77 in Chapter 3.
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2.2.6 The Relationship of EU Law with the Law of the Member States:
The use of the common constitutional traditions of the Member States as a source
of general principles points to the more general question of the relationship
between EU law and that of the Member States and the potential for conflict
between them. From the internal perspective of EU law, an unqualified, absolute
principle of the supremacy or primacy of EU law has been articulated by the ECJ
in a way that would avoid any conflict through a simple, strong lex superior
principle:
... the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State
cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental
rights as formulated by the Constitution of that State or the principles of a
national constitutional structure.78

However, the simple solution to the problem of potential norm conflict in the
above passage has been rejected by a number of supreme or constitutional courts
of the Member States, the most well-known being those of the German Federal
Constitutional Court. The potential for conflict arises especially in the context of
the problem of kompetenz-kompetenz,79 i.e. on the question of who has authority to
decide ultimately the competence of the EU vis-à-vis the Member States. The
Karlsruhe court has indicated in a series of cases that the validity of Community or
Union law in the German constitutional order depended upon satisfactory
compliance with human rights as protected by German constitutional law and that
the Federal Constitutional Court has competence to determine the compatibility of
the degree of transfer of competence to the EU with the German constitutional
order.80 On the kompetenz-kompetenz question, it required in its Lisbon Treaty
78
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English, last accessed 22nd January 2010). For academic commentary on the Lisbon Treaty
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judgment that increases in the competence of the Union institutions through the
use of passarelle clauses and the use of the enhanced flexibility procedure in the
Lisbon Treaty both require the prior approval of the two houses of the German
Parliament in order for Germany to agree to them, and the Karlsruhe court asserted
its own jurisdiction to determine the matter of kompetenz-kompetenz.
The constitutional courts of a number of other Member States, including both
old and new members of the Union, have expressed similar reservations to an
absolute, unqualified statement of the supremacy of Union law – for reasons of
space, only a few can be surveyed here.
In France, the situation is somewhat complicated by the various judicial
organs that have relevant jurisdiction, which are the Conseil Constitutionnel, the
Conseil d’État, and the Cour de Cassation.81 The Conseil d’État initially resisted
accepting the supremacy of Community law,82 but then relented to accept it in
practice.83 However, the basis of the Conseil d’État’s reasoning was that such
supremacy as Community law had was based on Article 55 of the French
Constitution,84 which concerns the incorporation of international agreements into
national law, and not on the nature of the Community legal order as identified by
the ECJ in Costa v. ENEL. The Conseil d’État thus apparently does not accept the
supremacy of Community law over the French Constitution, although it has not
stated this explicitly, but it has ruled that international agreements under Article 55
do not have supremacy over the Constitution.85
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The Conseil Constitutionnel or Constitutional Council has tended to base
its acceptance of supremacy on Article 88-I of the French Constitution, which
provides for the participation of the Republic in the EU, but the Constitutional
Council has ruled that a directive that is in conflict with an express provision of the
Constitution cannot be transposed and enter into force.86 The Constitutional
Council adopted the same general reasoning its approach to the Treaty of Lisbon,
basing its constitutionality on Article 88 –I,87 and stating:
When however undertakings entered into for this purpose contain a clause
running counter to the constitution, call into question constitutionally
guaranteed rights and freedoms or adversely affect the fundamental
conditions of the exercising of national sovereignty, authorisation of such
measures requires prior revision of the Constitution.88

More recently, the Constitutional Council has again refused to treat Union law as
supreme over national constitutional law, saying that the transposition of directives
was subject to the limit of not conflicting with any rule of principle inherent in the
constitutional identity of France.89
In Italy, the Constitutional Court in Frontini stated that it would subject
Community law to judicial review as to its compatibility with fundamental rights
and with the basic principles of the Italian constitutional order.90 In Granital, he
Constitutional Court further asserted jurisdiction to determine the kompetenzkompetenz question.91 In Fragd, it confirmed its willingness to subject specific
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rules of Community law to review on human rights grounds.92 Also from Southern
Europe, the Spanish Constitutional Court has denied absolute supremacy of EU
law in the Spanish legal order and asserted kompetenz-kompetenz, although it was
keen to state that the eventuality in which it would have to exercise its powers in
this regard were ‘scarcely conceivable’:93
In the scarcely-conceivable event that in the ultimate functioning of
European Union Law this Law were [as a] result [be] irreconcilable with the
Spanish Constitution, and without the hypothetical excesses of European
Law with regard to the European Constitution itself being remedied by the
ordinary channels provided for in the latter, ultimately the preservation of
the sovereignty of the Spanish people and of the supremacy of the
Constitution as it provides for itself could lead this Court to tackle the
problems that would arise in such a case, and which from the current point
of view are considered to be non-existent, by way of the relevant
constitutional procedures….This is aside from the fact that the safeguarding
of the said sovereignty is always ultimately assured by Article I-60 of the
Treaty [Establishing a Constitution for Europe] … which may not override
the exercise of a withdrawal, which remains reserved for the sovereign,
supreme, will of the Member States.94

The Constitutional Court went on to distinguish between supremacy and primacy,
indicating that EU law can take effect in priority to national law (i.e. EU law can
have primacy), but can not invalidate or nullify national law (i.e. EU law does not
have supremacy).95
In the UK, the question of supremacy was only confronted in the courts 15
years after accession, in the Factortame case.96 Having referred a preliminary
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reference to the ECJ on whether the UK courts were required to dis-apply a statute
in conflict with Community law, the House of Lords accepted the unsurprising
verdict of the ECJ that this was so. Different views resulted on the compatibility of
this with the strong UK tradition of parliamentary sovereignty; one eminent legal
commentary considered it a revolution.97 Another view is that as a result of
supremacy, Acts of the UK Parliament, in being simply dis-applied rather than
declared invalid, were not fundamentally compromised and that the acceptance by
the UK of supremacy was itself a consequence of an Act of Parliament,98 namely
the European Communities Act 1972 giving effect in UK law to UK accession to
the Communities. On this view, ultimate sovereignty remains since the 1972 Act
can always be repealed.99
Amongst the newer Member States, the Polish Constitutional Court has
been amongst the most inclined to assert a sovereignty reservation concerning EU
membership. It did so in its decision on the Polish Accession Treaty100 to the EU,
in “a clear refusal of supremacy of this Treaty over [the] national Constitution”.101
The Court stated that in the event of a conflict between the Constitution and
Community law, the conflict would not lead to the invalidity of the applicable
constitutional norms or to their automatic change: such a conflict “cannot be
solved by recognition of supremacy of Community norm towards the national
constitutional norm”.102 Also from the newer Member States, in its first judgment
on the Lisbon Treaty,103 the Czech Constitutional Court has asserted kompetenz-
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kompetenz, i.e. the power to determine if the Union institutions are acting within
conferred powers,104 though it has been suggested that in its second judgment on
the Lisbon Treaty,105 it was notably more positive toward the EU than the German
Federal Constitutional Court in the latter’s Lisbon judgment.106
The relationship between EU law and the law of the Member States in the
context of supremacy raises questions as to the fundamental values of the EU and
the Member States and how they relate to each other. This was well brought out by
the opinion of the Dutch State Council on the Lisbon Treaty, where it explained
why it considered the Lisbon Treaty did not have the constitutional character of the
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe:
EU terminology and symbols are apt to create expectations amongst
citizens, and form potential points of reference for the further development
of both EU policy, whose dynamics are inherent in the integration process,
and EU caselaw, with its characteristic emphasis on teleological
interpretation. In the past, treaty terminology and symbolism have played an
important part in the development of the EU. There is no reason to assume
that things will be any different in the future.
In this respect, the proposed reform treaty is perfectly clear. Unlike the
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, it provides no arguments for a
gradual expansion of the EU towards a more explicit State or federation.107

The Treaty Establishing a Constitution appeared to articulate a degree of EU selfidentity that is not shared amongst the Member States, at least as of yet; there is
thus a mis-match between a vision of integration as a linear narrative that must
take precedence ultimately over any other competing claim to political legitimacy
104
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and perceptions of the EU amongst the majority populations in the Member States.
This linear narrative is found especially in the first two decades of the Court of
Justice’s case in some of its leading decisions.
This tension or degree of cross-purposes between the EU’s self-articulation
and the degree of organic support for constitutionalisation in the Member States is
reflected in the caselaw on supremacy and its reception in the Member States, but
also in the broader question of human rights protection. Whereas the ECJ at times
tends to adopt a self-referential discourse, in which the integration imperative
prevailed above all, the fundamental values of the Member States had a broader
scope beyond the common market that threatened to undermine the legitimacy of
integration in the legal orders of the Member States. These developments, along
with the fuller articulation of political values in more recent Treaty amendments
(as discussed further in Chapter 3), “problematize...linear assumptions about
progress from a union of sates to an integrated polity”.108
This occurred especially regarding constitutional fundamental rights
norms, which were not articulated in Community law at all in most of its first two
decades.109 In response to the threat that this posed to the legitimacy of
Community law from a national perspective, the ECJ developed its own
fundamental rights jurisprudence in order to deflect criticisms from the legal
orders of the member States about the adequacy of rights protection at Community
level.110 Nonetheless, the broader question of how the integration imperative can
comfortably mesh with the values of the Member States remains. The imminent
accession of the EU to the ECHR as provided for the Lisbon Treaty111 may help
achieve a convergence between of values around its relatively minimal standards
and, thus, help ensure conflicts on fundamental rights between the EU and legal
orders of the Member States do not materialise.
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However, potential for conflict exists with respect to the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, also incorporated into EU law by reference in Lisbon Treaty
(Article 6(1) TEU). The EU Charter goes beyond the basic standards of the ECHR
in a number of respects and potentially on some points at least may conflict with it,
although for the most part it incorporates ECHR standards wholesale. Two sources
of conflict arise here: (a) between fundamental rights protection at EU level
compared to the Member States and (b) between the ECHR and the Charter. The
role of judicial interpretation in elaborating on the Charter will be decisive in
addressing the potential and actuality of conflict in this situation, given the
generality of rights clauses, an issue discussed more generally in Chapter 3 below
on conflicts of interpretative principles and in Chapter 5 discussing conflicts of
fundamental rights and values.
Ultimately, the potential for conflict exists between the competing
legitimacy claims of the Member States and the Union. In a way, tension between
the two is inevitable, since the integration principle must impact on and limit the
sovereignty of the Member States. The practical question is whether this potential
conflict can be effectively managed so that integration is accommodated within the
Member States without a ‘rupture’ or ‘revolution’ with their values and
traditions.112 As the competence of the EU increases beyond the core dimension of
the common market (difficult though it can be to conceptualise the limits of the
latter), the risk of a clash between the competing legitimacy claims increases. This,
in particular, arises in the context of the widely perceived democratic deficit of the
EU, which has been well articulated by Weiler as the problem of the absence of an
EU demos, or the absence of a shared loyalty and sense of identity leading to a
sense of unity and mutual relationship so as to enable a common European public
space within which citizens across the Union can participate so as to make
democratic debate and exchange meaningful at EU level.113 In the absence of such
a shared identity, questions as to the democratic legitimacy of the EU and thus of
its compatibility with the legal orders of the Member States, which since World
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War II have privileged democracy as a defining value, are likely to endure.114
Thus, the resolution of norm conflicts, both at the level of specific substantive
rules and at the systemic level of relating values of the Member States and of the
Union to each other in an effective and coherent way, is destined to remain
relevant for the foreseeable future.

2.2.7 The Interaction of EU Law with the Legal System of the Council of Europe:
The interaction of the EU with the legal system of the Council of Europe resents
both a considerable potential for conflict, but also the potential for conflict
avoidance, depending on how the relationship is managed. The existence of the
well-established and generally respected jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights on the ECHR offers the potential for a convergence of at least
minimal standards of fundamental values between the EU and the Member States,
as noted above. However, in other respects, the Council of Europe system
represents a source of considerable norm conflict. The potential for overlap
between these two entities has always existed. Although the focus of Council of
Europe activity has been human rights and the rule of law and the focus of EU
activity has been the establishment of a common market, the Council of Europe’s
formal statement of competences makes a general reference to ‘social and
economic matters’ and it has always had some involvement in matters outside
‘pure’ human rights and rule of law concerns, while the EU has greatly expanded
its competences beyond core common market activities.
The potential for duplication and overlap between the two organisations is
increased by the passing of the Treaty of Lisbon, which considerably extends EU
competences. The possibility of overlap, duplication and unnecessary complexity
is also accentuated by the similar terminology that is used to denote the respective
institutional frameworks of the organisations.115 The need for some kind of
114
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cooperation between emerging organisations for European cooperation116 was
reflected in specific provisions of the founding treaties of the EU, especially of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty. Article 49 ECSC Treaty
provided that the relations between the Council of Europe and the ECSC
institutions would be assured under the terms of an annexed Protocol. The Treaties
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic
Energy Community (EURATOM) both provided for “all appropriate forms of
cooperation with the Council of Europe” (Article 230 EEC Treaty, later Article
303 EC Treaty, and Article 200 EURATOM Treaty, now in Article 220 TFEU). In
1959, 1987 and 1996, an exchange of letters between the two organisations
reiterated the need for dialogue, consultation, and representation to each other’s
institutions. However, it was not until 2007 that formal Memorandum of
Understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union117 was
adopted between them and it remains to be seen how this will work in practice and
it for the most part restated the existing largely informal practices rather than
developing new means of cooperation.118

2.3 General Methodology
The study aims to offer a general account of norm conflict in the legal reasoning of
the ECJ. It cannot claim to offer a “sectorally nuanced examination”119 across all
or most major areas of ECJ caselaw, rather it examines a representative sample of
case studies across areas of EU law that are generally considered to be of
Council of Ministers (meetings of ministers of the Member States of the EU). Examples include: a
reference to the Council of Europe as the same entity as the European Council in Office of the
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constitutional importance: EU competence relative to that of the Member States
both as regards internal and external powers, the free movement principles, some
aspects of social law, and fundamental rights, and criminal law, and
‘constitutionalising’ decisions of the ECJ (e.g. on supremacy and direct effect).
The study understands the term ‘constitutional’ as the term has generally meant in
Western legal history: of or relating to the general structuring or ordering of
government and of public power, or relating to, in a general way, the relationship
between the individual and public power.120 The ECJ has long been widely
considered in the literature to act as a constitutional court121 and itself has
described the Treaties as a ‘constitutional charter’.122 The constitutional character
of EU from the point of view of the Member States is apparent from the
unqualified doctrine of supremacy articulated in ECJ caselaw, which has been
resisted by a number of national constitutional courts.123
The focus is on the judgments of the Court of Justice itself, but opinions of
the Advocate General are also discussed. Opinions of the latter are relatively
infrequently referred to in ECJ judgments, and their influence is difficult to
measure124 because the ECJ does not generally explicitly state the influence of an
Advocate General on its judgments. Its practice tends to refer to an Opinion on a
specific point, rather than adopt it wholesale. Nonetheless, statistical evidence
suggests a stronger implicit influence than is apparent on the face of ECJ
judgments. Carrubba et al conclude that, statistically, opinions of the AG “[have] a
systematic positive influence on ECJ decisions”.125 Lasser’s extended comparative
study of the ECJ with the US Supreme Court and the French Cour de Cassation
noted a bifurcated style of reasoning between the ECJ and the Opinions of
120
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Advocates General: following the French model, the ECJ tends to adopt a
magisterial, declaratory approach, in contrast with the more discursive and
dialectical method generally adopted by the Advocates General at the ECJ.126 The
latter can help flesh out the possible bases for the Court’s judgment where these
are not as fully discussed in the judgment itself. The Opinions of Advocates
General in this regard are comparable to the kind of detailed scrutiny that an
academic assessment of judgments might give, with the qualification that the
former are more influential in practice, even if the exact extent of that influence in
a given case may be difficult to measure.
A perspective often supported in literature on the EU and on the ECJ, in
particular, asserts the sui generis character of the EU as a political and legal entity,
the effect of which is to limit the scope for comparison with other legal and
judicial contexts.127 However, the focus of this study, legal reasoning, is regarded
by many scholars as necessarily having a universal or universalizable character,
which may have some particularities in the case of the EU, but the legal reasoning
of the ECJ does not differ fundamentally from legal reasoning in general:
… In other words, there is no special case of European legal reasoning, nor
anything particularly European about the way the ECJ proceeds to justify its
decisions. Rather, any general theory of legal reasoning…could account for
the ECJ’s decision-making. Obviously certain rearrangements would need
to be made in order to adjust the general theory to the different idiosyncratic
elements of the European legal system.128
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In this study, therefore, literature on the role of norm conflict in legal reasoning in
general, and in particular in relation to the WTO, is discussed and considered as
conceptually relevant for studying norm conflict in the legal reasoning of the ECJ.
In other words, the standard paradigm of comparison in comparative law –
functional equivalence129 – is one that applies equally to the context of the study of
norm conflict and of norm conflict in an EU context.130
In any study of legal reasoning and the caselaw of a particular court, a
preliminary issue is the justification of case selection. The latter in legal ‘science’
often proceeds on the basis of shared assumptions, without being explicitly
articulated, and there is always a risk that it is open to a charge of selectivity. To a
large extent, this charge can be met on qualitative grounds: if generalisations can
be made about methods of reasoning across a range of important, constitutional
decisions, the resulting conclusions are as generalisable as any study can be
without claiming to be a comprehensive description of every aspect and every case
of a given court’s legal reasoning, which would be largely impossible in the
context of a single work in any case. This is the approach implicitly adopted in
Bengoetxea’s The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice, where he
acknowledges not providing the account of substantive law found in other general
works on EU doctrine;131 similarly, Rasmussen did not explicitly address the issue
of case selection, taking leading cases, or those that were most significant in their
effects on the Community system132 Lasser’s important work on Comparative
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Judicial Deliberations133 has been criticised for not justifying case selection in its
study of the French Cour de Cassation. Zucca’s recent work on norm conflict of
fundamental rights discuses caselaw from a number of jurisdictions without
offering any systematic explanation of case selection.134
The approach in these works are consistent with the idea of the
univeralisability of legal reasoning, in other words, legal reasoning is not a casespecific phenomenon and has a fundamental character that transcends the
immediate context of a case. What this entails is that, in general, legal rules and
legal reasoning have certain formal characteristics that are independent of the
specific subject matter – they must be public, accessible to ordinary citizens, and
the subject of a shared understanding by all participants in the legal interpretative
community. Some variations exist across substantive areas, for example, strict
construction of criminal law or the degree of intensity of review and the judicial
recognition of a margin of appreciation, but in general legal interpretation
everywhere follows some basic principles, chiefly, the logical priority of ordinary
meaning and the conceptual necessity of clarity and accessibility.
One review of Lasser’s Judicial Deliberations in Comparative Perspective
suggests the comparatist must “go deeply into [the debates within a particular legal
system] and try to understand the other legal system on its own terms”,135
suggesting this as a ‘jurisprudential approach to comparative law’.136 The
universalizable character of legal reasoning would cast doubt on this at least in so
far as it applies to legal reasoning. Most legal theorists claim to offer general
accounts of law in a way that is not specific to any jurisdiction. Moreover, the
reference to a legal system ‘on its terms’ seems to hint at an uncritical acceptance
133
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of whatever standards have become institutionalised in that system.137 In the
present work, therefore, literature from other contexts and jurisdictions is cited in
so far as it helps understanding of the conceptual (i.e. non-empirical) character of
legal reasoning. To put the point in a practical way, almost all legal systems
require obedience of people within their jurisdiction and do not make exceptions
on the basis that visiting foreigners have not been able to immerse themselves in
the practice and mentalité of the local legal interpretative community.138 The
theory of legal reasoning relates to the formal, universalizable aspects of legal
reasoning that seem essential for law to make a general normative claim to
obedience for all people within a given jurisdiction.139
That law is thus inherently qualitative, rather than quantitative, follows
from the precedential significance that some cases have in a way that is far greater
than other cases. If this were not the case, law would amount to a mass of single
instances. It might be objected here that in order to know what cases are important,
one must first become familiar with the whole mass of caselaw. Yet this kind of
familiarity, apart from being impractical for a single study, is already achieved by
the accumulated doctrine and commentary in academic literature, which will have
as a collective exercise determined what cases are more important than others and
what cases constitute the ‘canon’ within a legal discipline or sub-discipline,
including through mutual criticism and self-correction. This ‘canon’ is likely to be
a much smaller body of caselaw than the total numerical mass.
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This process of the identification of a canon is not unique to law; it applies
across many disciplines, literature being a good example. It might be objected to a
study of Shakespeare (1564-1616 AD) that it represents a random focusing on one
of the many writers active in the 16th and 17th centuries and fails to establish his
supposed pre-eminence. However, the body of critical work in English literature
will have already established this canonical status to a degree that makes it
unnecessary for a new researcher in the field to re-establish that ab initio.
Similarly in EU law,140 there exists a well-established canon of cases, e.g. of
constitutional character, that are widely and frequently cited because of their
substantive significance and precedential effect.141
Perhaps the most obvious examples of canonical cases are those cases that
established the constitutional character of the EU, through the doctrines of
supremacy, direct effect, parallelism and pre-emption in external relations,
fundamental rights, State liability, and the extension of the free movement
principles to encompass non-discriminatory obstacles to market access.142 That
these cases are of constitutional character reflects a qualitative criterion of case
selection, i.e. the importance of the subject matter that is regulated. It is a matter of
looking deliberately, with a prior conception of what is important, for caselaw on
these issues, because they are important. This reflects a point made by Finnis about
the role of evaluation in legal theory: that in order to begin to consider what
matters and is worth theorising about, one must have some prior evaluative
understanding of what is important.143 In the context of case selection, what seems
important is a general familiarity with the working of legal systems and the
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concept of ‘constitutional’. This allows a choice and a narrowing selection to be
made amongst a mass of caselaw.

2.4 The General Theoretical Context of Norm Conflict in Contemporary
Anglo-American Legal Theory
2.4.1 Introduction
Norm conflict is significant because it entails a choice between prima facie valid
legal norms, i.e. rules or principles. The general extent to which norm conflict is a
feature of a legal system varies according to different understandings or
conceptions of law as a system. Two accounts in particular can be contrasted in
this respect, those of Ronald Dworkin and Joseph Raz, who represent opposing
positions, at least at face value. As with much legal theory, they do not generally
address the problem of norm conflict very explicitly or directly,144 but their work
seems to have clear implications for it.

2.4.2 Dworkin on Coherence
According to Dworkin, famously, all ‘hard cases’ have a right answer. Dworkin
reaches this conclusion by understanding moral evaluation to be part of how
judges reason.145 According to Dworkin, an analysis of how judges actually decide
cases shows that they do not always rely on determinate legal rules, which can be
applied syllogistically and neutrally, i.e. independently of moral choice or
evaluation by the judge, to reach a correct conclusion. Dworkin proposes that there
is much more disagreement146 among lawyers as to what the law means than
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Hart’s concept of rules147 as the decisive unit of legal normativity seems to
acknowledge and that judges do not claim to exercise discretion to make new law
to apply to the case when the existing determinate rules do not provide an answer.
Instead, judges in hard cases with no rule-bound conclusion rely on legal
principles that are already in the law as more or less implicitly abstract
propositions of legal normativity that underpin and explain the express body of
rules and the legal system overall, i.e. that are already part of the law, to reach a
correct outcome.
To find ‘the right answer’, Dworkin proposes a test whereby judges must
apply the available ‘legal principles’, understood as having a more abstract
character than relatively conclusive or all-or-nothing rules,148 to produce the most
coherent solution for the facts of a case in light of the values in the legal system
overall, the solution that ‘best fits’ with the political morality in the legal system149
(Dworkin seems also to use the term ‘integrity’ more or less interchangeably with
the notions of coherence and fit150). The emphasis of the ECJ on a meta-criterion
of integration is comparable to the role coherence or fit plays in Dworkin’s theory;
the Court is “at bottom … Dworkinian”.151
The difficulty with Dworkin’s position is that the standard of coherence or
fit is largely indeterminate and under-specified in his account of it. Coherence
(taken as going beyond a minimal concept of non-contradiction)152 is a
semantically ambiguous concept and is thus to some degree a subjective
element.153 Bertea argues that coherence should thus not be considered as selfsufficient and self-exhaustive source of justification, but a tool suitable for
reconsidering the results yielded by other argumentative techniques (i.e. it is a
147
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secondary type of justification),154 for example, textual techniques.155 Recognition
that Dworkin’s concept of best fit or coherence is not all that useful as a metacriterion of interpretation is quite widespread in the literature.
It has been labelled ‘fantastic’;156 Hart suggested that “there are no actual
legal systems where this full holistic criterion is used, but only systems like
English law and American law where more modest exercises of constructive
interpretation are undertaken…”;157 Schlag describes it as “not entirely empty, but
useless”;158 Tamanaha notes that there is no agreement on how the principles
Dworkin identifies at a general level are to be filled in;159 Waldron succinctly
states that Dworkin’s right answers thesis “is notable by its absence”.160 And
although Dworkin has acknowledged that no human judge could really accomplish
the feat of the mythical Hercules or judge who seeks to find the best fit,161 it is an
ideal to aspire towards. Nonetheless, this does not provide a clear answer, since the
ideal itself, global coherence, seems itself indeterminate.
A number of specific points of criticism in the literature help demonstrate
the subjective character of ‘coherence’ and ‘best fit’ as a stand-alone of metacriterion of adjudication. First, it was not initially clear in Dworkin’s account of
coherence or best fit whether coherence should be understood in global or local
terms, i.e. to take into account the entire legal system or just particular branches of
the law.162 This question can be related to the level of generality problem in legal
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reasoning.163 At what level of generality should coherence be identified: coherence
with a given law, with the surrounding body of laws on the same issue, etc.,
ranging up to coherence with the entire legal system?164 Dworkin has
acknowledged the local priority of interpretation, but considered in effect this was
only contingent in that global coherence might justify discarding entirely local
priority in the event that a local priority would be arbitrary or would go against
popular opinion or conviction.165 However, the test here, of arbitrariness or
popular conviction, for departing from the local priority of interpretation, seems
also unclear and potentially subjective; that legal rules can be dis-applied on the
basis of popular convictions is hard to reconcile with the rule of law values of
certainty and predictability, and raises the problem of how and why judges are to
measure such popular convictions.
A related articulation of the level of generality problem in the context of
coherence is the criticism that Dworkin fails to distinguish between tight and loose
versions of coherence: a tight requirement of coherence means that existing law
must entail a conclusion, whereas a looser requirement only requires that the
conclusion in the present case to be decided is not inconsistent with existing law,
as opposed to being a matter of necessary entailment. If the loose requirement is
all that is required for a relationship between existing law and a current judgment,
coherence can justify a result “quite new in itself”, this permitting judicial
extension of existing law.166 An additional difficulty that coherence presents is that
it may require a judge to take into account legal developments after the events
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being litigated, which also presents the problem of retroactivity.167 In an EU
context, it is worth noting here that the ECJ tends to a global approach in
addressing the question of coherence n EU law, i.e. it tends to sate the level of
generality problem at a high level, at the level of the Union’s legal system overall.
Further, the kinds of values taken into consideration in a coherence
analysis need to be unpacked168 or individuated. In the EU, among the relevant
meta-values are integration, Member State sovereignty, human rights, democracy,
and the rule of law: how does democracy relate to human rights, the role of
subsidiarity, the scope of the rule of law, national diversity, in that how are they to
be balanced and weighed against each other?169 Given the vagueness of coherence
as a standard, it is likely that several different lines of argument or conclusions in a
given case may be equally coherent, and thus something other than a consideration
of coherence must be used to decide the case.170
In light of all these criticisms, Schlag seems correct in characterising
Dworkin’s invocation of best fit as more a statement of the problem of legal
reasoning in hard cases than a solution to it.171 Or as Raz has put it, “coherence
does not provide courts with determinate guidance”.172
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2.4.3 Raz on Coherence
A contrasting view of the unity of law and thus of the problem of norm conflict is
that of Raz, who far from considering there to be a correct legal solution to every
case provided by a concept of best fit with the existing political morality of the
system, understands law to consist a of a rag-tag mix of conflicting aims and
purposes, as being the product of the rough-and-tumble of politics.173
The implication of this is that conflict of norms is to be expected to some
degree, though this may not be a problem. Presumably, Raz means here
incoherence stopping short of flat contradiction. Raz proposes that coherence
accounts in law take court decisions and legislative and regulatory acts as their
‘base’ and consider law to be the set of principles that makes the most coherent
sense of that base.174 He distinguishes (in a not altogether clear way175) between
‘epistemic’ and ‘constitutive’ accounts of coherence: whereas an epistemic
account of coherence considers coherence as a necessary and sufficient condition
of justified knowledge, constitutive coherence theories consider that coherence
provides an explanation of what makes a statement of law true.176 Raz’s position is
to reject both types of coherence as explanations of legal practice. In plain terms,
the difference seems to be that an epistemic coherence theory believes coherence
is a way of acquiring knowledge of the truth, but does not go further in stating
what the truth is, whereas a constitutive coherence theory proposes that coherence
is what provides access to the truth.
In Raz’s view, the role of coherence in adjudication must reflect the
vagaries of politics and the influence of political considerations on legislative and
judicial decisions, and the latter makes it unlikely that the settled law of a
jurisdiction will exhibit a strong coherence. Raz puts it as (see also the quote
above):
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... is the result of activities of a multitude of people, and the interactions
among them, over many years, sometimes over centuries. One cannot infer,
in a Davidsonian-style argument about radical interpretation, the coherence
of the activities, beliefs, or goals of all those whose activities make the law
what it is.177

As Dickson notes, the next stage in Raz’s conception of coherence is:
This being so, if we are to apply a coherence account in order to determine
how judges ought to decide cases according to law ..., then we should
assume a coherence-independent test to identify the settled law of a
jurisdiction first, and then bring in considerations of coherence at a later
stage, and hold that courts ought to adopt that outcome to a case which is
favoured by the most coherent set of propositions which, were the settled
rules of the system justified, would justify them.178

Thus, somewhat comparably to Dworkin’s notion of ‘pre-interpretive data’,179 Raz
considers that “... the adjudicative coherence thesis assumes a way of establishing,
free of coherence considerations, the content of the prima facie rights, duties and
powers created by law. Coherence comes into play at a later stage”180 (this seems
to escape the criticism made by Rodriguerz-Blanco of Raz’s constitutive
coherence account of law, because the coherence account of adjudication does not
claim to constitute the law181).
For Raz, coherence provides only limited guidance, in that noncontroversially it represents a requirement of intelligibility, but it is likely that
several different lines of argument may be equally coherent, given the variety of
legal sources and the prima facie valid legal reason that result from them;
coherence provides only some thus rather limited indication of how to decide
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between conflicting or alternative prima facie reasons.182 Raz thus identifies an
under-determination problem resulting from the in-commensurability of coherence
wedded to other values relevant in adjudication. Instead of conceiving of
coherence as a decisive meta-criterion, Raz’s way out is to consider that judges
should engage in moral reasoning to decide between alternative prima facie legal
reasons, i.e. to resolve prima facie or potential norm conflict.183Although rejecting
global coherence or strong monism whereby law is conceived as speaking with
one voice, he is prepared to accept the importance of local coherence, for reasons
related to predictability and ordinary rule of law considerations:184 “Thus, this is
another context in which coherence comes in to its own, another context in which
precedent acquires a natural force, where there is reason to follow it even in
countries which do not have a formal doctrine of precedent.”185
Some tensions seem to exist within Raz’s understanding of the role of
coherence in legal reasoning. Raz rejects the validity of global coherence applied
to law on the grounds that it underestimates value pluralism in legal systems (a
point which seems to have special force in contemporary pluralist Western
societies), and similarly global coherence undervalues the concreteness of
politics.186 Neither value pluralism nor the concreteness of politics permit as
credible a holistic conception of the law as speaking with one voice, as global
coherence as a conception of law suggests.187 Nonetheless, in the end, Raz himself
appears to endorse the view that judges must decide conflicts of norms on the basis
of moral reasoning, despite Raz acknowledging the central fact of value pluralism
(Raz’s views on innovative interpretation are further discussed in Chapter 4
below).
It seems unclear in this account how

judgments can thus have the

institutional authority188 Raz claims for them if they are based on moral reasoning
that, in the context of value pluralism, must have doubtful objective correctness or
182
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universal validity. The prominent role Raz attributes to moral reasoning in
adjudication thus seems to provide ‘exclusionary reasons’189 only in the weak
sense of reaching decisions instead of citizens would, but it seems without a judge
being able to claim to deploy superior epistemic resources to ground a claim for
the normativity of law beyond the need for someone to decide the resolution of
social conflicts. In other words, Raz’s account of the authority of law seems
substantially weakened by the claim that a judge simply decides the outcome of
norm conflicts according to his or her own moral conceptions (and it seems it must
be the latter in the context of moral pluralism, since unlike Dworkin, Raz does not
consider the law itself possesses a coherent political morality from which to
judge).
A second tension within Raz’s account of coherence exists between his
acceptance of local coherence within pockets of the law and his rejection of the
view that the lawmaker’s intention as to the meaning of an individual law should
be relevant for interpretation:
What we need is a way of regarding the law as the function of the activities
of legal authorities in general, that is, a way of seeing how its content is a
function of various activities, and layers of activities, in continuous
interaction, rather than as a function of a single act, fixed once and for all.
This authority-based view of the law will avoid the pitfalls of the intention
thesis, while preserving its ability to explain the institutional nature of the
law, something the coherence thesis fails to do.190

Here, Raz moves toward recognising the authority of law as operating in a global
sense, despite having rejected the possibility of global coherence and consistency.
Local coherence, in contrast, which Raz accepts, seems to point to the relevance
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and epistemic possibility of legislative intention in relation to specific legislative
acts.

2.4.4 General Remarks on Coherence, Dworkin and Raz
Both Raz’s and Dworkin’s accounts of coherence in legal reasoning - though
different in important respects in that Raz denies the law reflects global coherence
and treats coherence as but one aspect of legal reasoning in contrast to the decisive
role it is generally thought191 to have in Dworkin’s proposal of best fit as a metacriterion of adjudication - can be contrasted with a more traditional use of norm
conflict rules or maxims (lex superior, lex posterior, lex prior) prevalent both in
international and domestic legal systems. Despite the differences between
Dworkin’s and Raz’s explanation of the role of coherence in legal reasoning, there
appears to be a certain convergence in the effect or conclusion of their theories of
legal reasoning: both consider judges must engage in moral reasoning as to what
the law should be and not simply give effect to the concrete original intention of
the law-maker.192
Soper argues193 that theories of legal reasoning, and in particular, the
positivist/anti-positivist distinction, have little or no necessary implications for
theories of judicial restraint and thus for understanding discretion and flexibility in
adjudication.194 In cases where texts do not provide a determinate answer, it is
practically immaterial whether a judge conceptualises his or her response as the
making of new law according to the judge’s own perception of the best thing to do
in the case, as Hart’s positivist account proposes,195 or by invoking similar
considerations though considering them to be in the form of abstract principles that
are part of the law as it is, as Dworkin’s interpretivist account suggests. For Soper,
191
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the difference is just a matter of terminology.196 Much the same analysis can be
applied to Dworkin’s and Raz’s accounts of coherence. Though they assign
coherence different roles in legal reasoning, both argue judges must engage in
moral reasoning in adjudication, the difference being that Dworkin considers this
moral reasoning to be an exercise in finding and achieving legal coherence,
governed by the political morality (which is also, it seems, legal morality) that is in
the legal system, whereas Raz describes this moral reasoning as only partly
concerned with coherence.
Both Dworkin and Raz thus reject legal originalism in the sense of an effort
to recover the specific intention of the law-maker as a decisive way, e.g. in the
language of Raz, to solve indeterminacy in choosing between prima facie valid
legal reasons. In many legal systems, as mentioned above, norm conflict has
traditionally been addressed through a series of norm conflict rules or maxims that
arguably does more closely relate the resolution of norm conflicts (or
indeterminacy between prima facie legal reasons) to the original intention of the
law-maker: these are the maxims of lex superior, lex specialis, and lex posterior.
The use of and rationale behind these maxims can be related more generally to a
rule-bound conception of legal reasoning, a point developed in Chapters 2 and 3
below. Two fundamentally different alternative approaches to the problem of norm
conflict can thus be identified: 1) the invocation of political morality or morality
generally by judges (in different ways, Dworkin and Raz would support this
approach or 2) the application of a rule-bound framework.

2.4.5 Structuralist and Systems Accounts of Law
Another aspect of contemporary legal theory (though originating in continental
Europe, then finding its way into the Anglo-American world) that might also be
thought especially relevant to the study of norm conflict is structuralist theory. A
criticism that might be made of the idea of norm conflict as a framework of
analysis is that it is bound to a set of ‘binary oppositions’ that fails to do justice to
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the complexity of legal reasoning or alternative conceptions of norm resolution.
For example, the discussion of the differences between evolutive and conserving
or originalist/historical interpretation might be considered such an opposition. This
could be thought governed essentially by a binary structure:197 that legal doctrine
creates an impression of the inevitable and privileged status of these binary
oppositions when different understandings that do not fit into this framework are
eliminated from consideration even though they may be equally valid.
Structuralism seeks to explain culture, including legal culture if applied to
law, ‘in terms of the structures of the mind’, and a structural analysis would seek
to unearth these mind structures so as to more fully understand how they shape our
understanding of law.198 Structuralism conceives these structures to be controlling.
It is hoped that in this study (a) the focus of the work on the values underlying
norm conflict rules would help address any such controlling or limiting effects of
norm conflicts as a framework of analysis and (b) the discussion of the interaction
of norm conflict rules would give a fuller analysis than what might be criticised as
a simple scheme of opposites. The discussion seeks to demonstrate that there are
wide variations in how conflict can be addressed and thus the choice of norm
conflict resolution becomes practically very important. This degree of choice
suggests the importance of legal actors as agent, which is not consistent with the
structuralist analysis that minimises human agency in light of the controlling and
dominating effect of hidden or unconscious structures.199 It might be then objected
that the discussion of values is itself marked by binary oppositions and that they
thus remain controlling in a limiting way.200 To some extent, this would be a
criticism of law and political morality in general; the thesis does not claim to
197
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fundamentally challenge existing legal notions of norm conflict, rather it seeks to
theorise and contextualise in the context of EU law. Moreover, it is difficult to
frame all questions of norm conflict in terms of binary oppositions, since there are
subtleties and degrees of difference that are not straightforward oppositions.
Finally, the work of systems theorists seems to have a certain affinity with
structuralism, in positing the existence of social forms that emerge independently
of formal legal categories and hierarchies. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner propose
that traditional States are being supplanted by the emergence of functional
rationalities as distinct systems or structures, such as trade or the environment.201
These systems have their own distinctive rationality that international legal
hierarchy cannot capture or regulate, and thus conflicts between these systems also
escape any systematic attempt at legal resolution. However, courts can mediate to
some extent such conflicts through their caselaw by taking into account multiple
rationalities in their reasoning.202 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner thus:
...propose a radical break with a concept of international law and order
based on the autonomous will of Nation-States. Accordingly, legal
regulation does not only, if at all, emanate from Nation-States, but from a
panoply of other public and, mostly, private actors.203

Further, as Klabbers notes, this body of theory downplays and even eliminates
human agency.204 In its implications for legal reasoning, Fischer-Lescano &
Teubner’s approach tends to open up to courts policy and first-order or merits
concerns, under the guise or framework of ‘rationality’.205 Some elements of this
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body of thought seem quite open or unclear, especially concerning the normative
significance of functional rationalities. For example, Fischer-Lescano & Teubner
seem to infer a normativity or legitimacy, “on a sort of materialist theory”,206 from
the fact such rationalities exist.
As Paulus put it, “Systems of rules and norms constructed ‘bottom-up’, that
is, by a process of self-ordering of a particular issue area, cannot legitimize
outcomes”,207 and questions of legitimacy cannot be avoided “by pointing to a
miraculous ‘auto-poiesis’ of sub-systems that would automatically justify their
separate existence”.208 The extent to which different rationalities can share in a
common or universal set of values seems also largely left open on their approach.
They note consensus upon an accepted hierarchy of values is elusive and that
reference to a universal value community offers little assistance.209 On the other
hand, they make reference to a common legal code, although they note “...global
law can only be recognized as fragmented because the legal regimes use the same
code”.210 Here, they seem to envisage a greater role for agency in cooperation
between different rationalites, although the use of the term ‘structural coupling’211
again suggests an inherent process over which the actors are not in immediate
control. They see limits here to what law can do: it can only offer a kind of
damage limitation, as a ‘gentle civilizer of social systems’.212
The present work takes a largely opposing perspective: it argues that legal
reasoning has the tools, when addressing normative conflict, to much better reflect

... judicial instances must conceive of themselves as a part of a transnational legal
order and shift their horizons above nationally structured normative orders to
include a transnational law-making process within which NGOs, international
organizations and spontaneously coordinated societal actors are attempting to
establish the legitimacy of global law with reference to a variety of sources.
206
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the normative concerns and values of the Member States of the EU as articulated
in the EU Treaties, and that States can meaningfully act as agents in the EU.

2.4.6 Concluding Remarks to the Section and Chapter
As Klabbers notes, Lon Fuller emphasised that legal rules cannot be understood
independently of their purposes.213 Yet, legal rules and institutions do not operate
on a day-to-day basis by demanding deep reflection of their underlying purposes.
In Razian terms, rules do the thinking for us and are thus exclusionary reasons.
This character of legal rules seems to run out in the context of conflicting norms,
or at least prima facie runs out. Dworkin pushes this question back to global
coherence and a global morality in the legal system; Raz rejects the idea of global
coherence, instead he only acknowledges local coherence and generally endorses
innovative interpretation based on moral considerations (Raz’s views are further
discussed in Chapter 4 below). This study further examines to what extent legal
reasoning solves these situations of conflict and what values choices are reflected
in this process of resolution in EU law and the legal reasoning of the ECJ. It argues
that the theory of legal reasoning can provide fuller answers to the problem of
conflicting norms than either, for example, Raz or Dworkin’s general theories of
law would suggest. The study thus seeks to provide, first, a general conceptual
framework of norm conflict in EU law and legal reasoning; secondly, an account
of how this framework can helpfully explain existing EU practice coupled with an
argument as to how EU practice might be modified to better reflect the values the
EU itself professes.214
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Chapter 3: Conflicts of Norms in Legal Reasoning and Values in EU Law

3.1 Introduction
This chapter, first, seeks to present a framework or typology of norms and of
methods of norm conflict and, secondly, to relate different types of norm conflict
resolution to the values or rationales that underlie them. The chapter develops on
the discussion in Chapter 2 of the general treatment in contemporary legal theory
of the topic of conflicts or antinomies in the law and their resolution. The
approaches identified in Chapter 2 of Dworkin and Raz tend to offer a very generic
assessment of norm conflict: they identify the presence of disagreement and the
possibility (in the case of Dworkin) or impossibility (in the case of Raz) for global
coherence to be attributed to the body of law in a legal system. They adopt a metaperspective and tend not to address the classic, traditional means of norm conflict,
in the form of the rules or maxims of lex posterior, lex superior, and lex specialis.
The latter maxims have been more explicitly addressed in continental European
legal doctrine. The greater prevalence of statutory rules in the latter more
obviously presented the problem of conflict in the law, since in the common law
conflict could be partially mediated through common law development and change
in the law. Nonetheless, these maxims are to be found to a greater or lesser extent
in most legal systems, including the EU and international legal system.
Following discussion of the rules-principles distinction, the chapter first
examines Hohfeld’s typology of legal concepts. Hohfeld’s work seeks to achieve
conceptual clarity in analysing legal reasoning.1 It thus offers the potential to
analyse the problem of conflict more precisely, in that not all norms in conflict
have the same character, and an understanding of their relative character can
inform and clarify how to resolve conflict between them. A practical example in
EU law may illustrate this point. Under the long-standing practice of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ), exceptions to the founding Treaty principles of free
1
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89.
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movement or undistorted competition are restrictively interpreted.2 If exceptions
are treated as instances of norm conflict, they may consequently be differently
treated; in the practice of the ECJ, they are considered as contrary to the general
purposes of the Treaty and thus to be interpreted narrowly, whereas in general
public international law, the opposite has more often been the case in the case of
exceptions to treaties.3 Both the fact of conflict, and the determination of the
values underlying conflict, can have practical importance in legal reasoning. The
mere presence of a given substantive rule or clause in the Treaty text does not
determine the rule’s scope: this is a matter of interpretation.
The existence of different ways of addressing norm conflict raises the
question of choice and discretion in judicial decisions on norm conflict and the
substantive values that underlie those choices. The second part of the chapter seeks
to relate techniques and conceptions of norm conflict resolution to values. Early
caselaw from the ECJ tended to emphasise the importance of integration, and this
perhaps was natural in the formative years of the Union (or Community as it was
then termed); integration tended to be more strongly articulated than any other
values. However, since the Treaty of Maastricht, the self-articulation by the EU of
its values has broadened and deepened. Subsidiarity, democracy and respect for
human rights were first made explicit at Treaty level in the Treaty of Maastricht in
1992.4 The discussion of values in this chapter seeks to identify in a systematic and
explicit way how the resolution of norms conflict is affected by value choices and
how the articulated values in the EU treaties might be better reflected in norm
conflict resolution in the legal reasoning of the ECJ.
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3.2 Rules v. Principles in Legal Reasoning
The distinction between rules and principles is a long-standing one in legal theory.
Dworkin characterised principles5 as having a dimension of weight and
incommensurability that distinguishes them from the more conclusive character of
rules; the latter tend to dictate or require a result, whereas a principle is more like a
less conclusive guideline.6 Alexy distinguishes rules from principles on the basis
that principles are norms that require something to be realised to the greatest extent
possible given the legal and factual realities, and he thus describes them as
‘optimisation requirements’. For Alexy, rules are different in kind in that they are
either fulfilled or not; thus when the rule applies, all that is required is to do what
the rule states.7 Contrasting the two, Alexy suggests that principles posit an ‘idealought’,8 whereas rules “describe fixed points in the field of the factually and
legally possible”.9
Both

Dworkin

and

Alexy

thus

attribute

a

greater
10

incommensurability or abstractness to principles over rules.

element

of

However, theorists

have been less clear as to how legal reasoning can mediate and control or
determine the influence of principles in legal reasoning.11 Dworkin’s theory of
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‘best fit’ seems incomplete, as discussed in Chapter 1, because his account tends to
raise a number of further questions: when does local coherence give way to global
coherence, what values are relevant and what is to be given to them in a coherence
analysis? Dworkin’s coherence or best fit test is so open-ended, it seems to resolve
to a substantive yardstick of what is morally desirable. As Klabbers notes: “Yet
substantive yardsticks are awkward. They presuppose underlying agreement on the
values with which to tackle ... conflict, yet the problem is precisely that such
underlying agreement is lacking.”12 Alexy’s Law of Balancing is further discussed
in Chapter 5, and likewise seems to raise substantive moral choices being made by
individual judges that are not accounted for or explained by Alexy’s theory.
This question of principles contrasted with rules can be illustrated in EU
law with reference to the principles of effectiveness, of free movement and
undistorted competition, which form the core of the common market; the principle
of loyal cooperation in Article 4 TEU; and the principle of equality or nondiscrimination in Articles 2 & 3 EU Treaty. It is difficult to conceptualise the
limits of ‘effectiveness’ as a self-sufficient criteria of interpretation, i.e.
independent of specific Treaty rules; the question arises is anything that makes EU
law more effective therefore legitimately the subject of innovative interpretation?13
As Snyder has noted, the political nature of ‘effectiveness’ as a concept tends to be
forgotten in Community or Union discourse.14
The point is echoed by Herlin-Karnell more recently, noting that despite its
popularity in EU institutional discourse, effectiveness is far from a clear
yardstick.15 Similarly, the principle of loyal cooperation has an open-ended nature;
in Francovich, the ECJ based its innovative ruling on State liability on a
combination of arguments as to effectiveness and loyalty.16 Is anything that

397 (2007), 383-385 (policies may justify the restriction of rights and that policies may be the basis
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furthers integration within the purview of the loyalty principle? It is a ‘ubiquitous
notion’ resulting in a ‘catch-all provision’.17 Some caselaw has recognised the
limit of the principle in accepting that it works both ways, that the Union
institutions owe a reciprocal duty of loyalty to the Member States,18 a point that
has now been expressed at Treaty level post-Lisbon.19 That suggests, for example,
as a practical limit, that the loyalty principle cannot be invoked solely as a type of
presumption in favour of integration, and to the diminishment of Member State
competence, in any situation of interpretative doubt. Nonetheless, its exact scope is
not self-evident given its abstract character.
Conceptualising the ambit of the principles of free movement and of
competition is similarly difficult, since almost any national rules in the abstract
could be conceptualised as an obstacle to free movement or as a distortion on
competition (in the sense that cross-border movement could be said to be freer or
competition less distorted the fewer the differences are between the national laws
of the Member States, even if the actual effect on free movement20 or
competition21 was only potential or slight). This risk was identified by the ECJ
itself in Tobacco Advertising:
106. In examining the lawfulness of a directive adopted on the basis of
Article 100a of the Treaty, the Court is required to verify whether the
distortion of competition which the measure purports to eliminate is
appreciable (Titanium Dioxide, cited above,

paragraph 23).

whether general or particular, to ensure the implementation of Community law (see para. 36),
combined with an effectiveness argument (para. 33).
17
J. Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009), 4. Klabbers
concludes that the principle of loyal cooperation “cannot amount to a granting of carte balance
power. ... good faith alone cannot create obligations where otherwise none would exist”: ibid, 193,
citing, inter alia, J. Temple Lang, ‘Community Constitutional Law: Article 5 EEC Treaty’, 27
CMLRev 645-681 (1990), 647, stating that the loyal cooperation principle cannot be used to
“create new kinds of obligations for Member States”.
18
See Case 230/81, Luxembourg v. Parliament [1983] ECR 255 and more recently, e.g. Case
C-339/00, Ireland v. Commission [2003] ECR I-11757, paras. 71-72.
19
Article 4(3) TEU.
20
See, e.g. Joined Cases C-187 & 385/01, Gözütök & Brügge [2003] ECR I-1345, paras. 28-34,
where the ECJ departed from the literal meaning of a provision on ne bis in idem under the Third
Pillar, partly on the basis of an argument about enhancing free movement.
21
See, e.g. Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi and al Barakaat International
Foundation v. Council [2008] ECR I-6351, paras. 228-231, where the ECJ held that sanctions
against (on the facts a relatively small number of) individuals could be brought within Community
competence on the basis of a possible impact on competition (although the relevant Community
Regulations being interpreted themselves drew this link).
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107. In the absence of such a requirement, the powers of the Community
legislature would be practically unlimited. National laws often differ
regarding the conditions under which the activities they regulate may be
carried on, and this impacts directly or indirectly on the conditions of
competition for the undertakings concerned. It follows that to interpret
Articles 100a, 57(2) and 66 of the Treaty as meaning that the Community
legislature may rely on those articles with a view to eliminating the smallest
distortions of competition would be incompatible with the principle, already
referred to in paragraph 83 of this judgment, that the powers of the
Community are those specifically conferred on it.22

Likewise, the principle of equality of rights of citizens could in the abstract be
invoked to justify the extensive harmonization of citizens’ rights across the
Union.23 An extensive application of the equality principle so as to require
harmonisation could run counter to the principle of mutual recognition, whereby
Member States accept each other’s regulatory standards,24 and also counter to the
principle of respect for the diversity and constitutional traditions of the Member
States.25
The principles of free movement, competition, and equality can be defined
if subject to more specific Treaty rules detailing the extent to which they entail a
transfer of sovereignty by the Member States, e.g. lex specialis as a rule of priority
can substantially narrow the scope of principles broadly stated, a point developed
below. In contrast to an expansive principles-driven approach, which tends
towards lex generalis, conserving or historical/originalist understanding, which
tends towards lex specialis (i.e. the specific understanding of the law-maker), can
function as an interpretative rule. Generally, for the purpose of analysing the
resolution of norm conflicts by the tools of legal reasoning, a rule-bound method
acts as much more of a constraint. In the discussion below, traditional rules of
norm conflict resolution are examined (lex superior, lex posterior, lex specialis),

22

Case 376/98, Germany v. Parliament [2000] ECR I-8419, paras. 106-107.
For an argument tending toward this view, see, e.g. D. Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces:
European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship between Status and Rights’, 15(2) Columbia
JEL 169-195 (2009).
24
A concept developed by the ECJ itself in Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649.
25
See Article 4(2) TEU (post-Lisbon) and below sec. 2.3.2.1.
23
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following which the difference between various general interpretative approaches
are examined, in the context of the values that underlie them. First, the general
question of the values and normativity that should inform decision-making in EU
law is assessed in light of the values now articulated in the EU Treaties.

3.3 Values and the EU Legal System
3.3.1 Normativity in Law
In an attempt to map the concept of normativity in law, it may be useful to
distinguish between attempts to theorise normativity of law in general as a
universal or near-universal social phenomenon and a more specific treatment of
values in a given legal system. The former is a question that has been debated
throughout the history of legal theory and most centrally in the dispute between
positivist and anti-positivist understandings of law. It goes to the heart of much
legal theory seeking to answer the foundational question as to why there is a duty
to obey the law.26 Classic natural law relates law to the ends and purposes of
human existence understood as going beyond mere survival or the maintenance of
law and order in society and relates it to universally valid moral postulates with
which fully valid law must cohere. Positivism seeks to adopt a generally neutral,
non-evaluative understanding of law and generally relates normativity to social
practices.27
Here it may be worth distinguishing between strong and weak evaluation.
Classic natural law adopts a standpoint of strong evaluation in that it relates law to
the ultimate ends of human existence. Positivism seems suitably described as
entailing weak evaluation: some degree of evaluation is essential to any legal
theory, as Finnis observed, to even begin the enterprise of theorising the nature of
law; to do so, one must first make an evaluation of what matters and is worth
26

See, e.g. the collection of writings in W. Edmundson (ed.), The Duty to Obey the Law: Selected
Philosophical Readings (Rowman & Littlefield 1999).
27
Classic natural law thus conceives of normativity as prior to human practice, whereas positivism
generally looks within human practice for an explanation of normativity: S. Delacroix, ‘Hart’s and
Kelsen’s Concepts of Normativity Contrasted’, 17(4) RJ 501-520 (2004), 502.
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counting as law or within the province of law.28 But positivism seeks to ring-fence
the evaluation of law to this relatively low level of deciding a minimal purpose and
functionality of law, as expressed in Hart’s acceptance of the minimum content of
the natural law or:
Such universally recognized principles of conduct which have a basis in
elementary truths concerning human beings, their natural environment, and
aims, may be considered the minimum content of Natural Law …29

Hart goes on to explain these conditions as entailing human vulnerability,
requiring prohibitions to protect human survival (e.g. thou shalt not kill); the
approximate equality of men requiring some system of forbearance to contain
competition and conflict; limited altruism in human nature requiring some control
of human aggression; limited resources with which to sustain human survival and
which make the institution of some law of property essential; and limited
understanding and strength of will necessitating coordination of behaviour through
coercion and sanctions.30
For critics of positivism, this minimum content of natural law, or the brute
need for survival, does not adequately explain the duty to obey the law.31 The
difficulty is agreeing on such higher purposes and moral principles that could be
considered universally valid. Finnis could attract widespread agreement because
his theory is stated at a very high level of abstraction in identifying basic goods
and principles of practical reasonableness, but without identifying any hierarchy of
values between basic goods.32 Dworkin’s conception of law as entailing the
political morality of the society in which it exists seems a kind of anti-positivistic
constructivism.33
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Finnis (1980), op cit, chap. 1.
HLA. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press 2nd ed. 1994), 192-193.
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Ibid, 192-200.
31
See R. Epstein, ‘The not so Minimum Content of Natural Law’, 25(2) OJLS 219-255 (2005),
arguing that Hart was mistaken in ring-fencing natural law to minimal conditions of coexistence,
and for a reply, J. Allan, ‘Is You Is or Is You Ain’t Hart’s Baby? Epstein’s Minimum Content of
Natural Law’, 20(2) RJ 213-229 (2007).
32
Finnis argues that the basic goods are all equally fundamental: Finis (1980), op cit, 92-95.
33
See, e.g. D. Patterson, ‘Dworkin on the Semantics of Legal and Political Concepts’, 26(3) OJLS
545-557 (2006), 554. See also Delacroix (2004), op cit, 502.
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Beyond these views, the fact of moral pluralism poses a challenge for any
attempt to theorise the general normativity of law. However, this general debate is
more of a backdrop in the context of specific legal systems where the underpinning
values are expressly articulated in constitutional documents. In an EU context, the
Treaties now articulate the fundamental values of the Union, i.e. those values that
transcend specific areas of EU law and are meant to characterise it in general. In
more recent times, especially since the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU has been
much more explicit in how it articulates its central values, which both makes more
complex the question of how norm conflicts can be avoided, but also helps clarify
it. Following the Treaty of Lisbon, the following are the values that the EU
articulates as it being founded on in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU):
1. human dignity;
2. freedom;
3. democracy;
4. equality;
5. the rule of law;
6. respect for human rights.34
Nonetheless, the traditional debate over the ultimate normativity of law and the
implicit problem of agreement on fundamental values is also reflected in the EU,
where moral pluralism is also marked, despite this relatively explicit articulation of
values in the EU Treaties. Specifying the scope and application of the values
expressed above in specific contexts is much more challenging than their
articulation in the abstract.

34

Article 2 TEU.
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Much disagreement exists about the content of these various values and
how they are to be weighed against each other. The notion of contested concepts
can help to explain the complexity of reflecting on normativity in the legal system
of a modern, pluralist society, even when fundamental values are specified as is
now the case in the EU. Gallie identified seven characteristics, present in not
always exactly the same degree, of such concepts.35 Contested concepts are:
evaluative or appraisive, in delivering value judgments; internally complex and
diversely describable, in having more than one and maybe many possible
instantiation(s); open, in that their meaning may be reviewed in different or novel
situations; reciprocally recognised, in that parties acknowledge their contestedness;
and capable of exemplars or paradigm examples, which anchor the concept and on
which there is agreement. Such disagreement is not at the penumbra of the
concept, but rather at the core,36 although this is subject to the possibility of
anchoring.
The possibility of anchoring is important in deflecting the criticisms
directed at Gallie’s account that it results in conceptual relativism, whereby the
usefulness and determinacy of a concept is fatally undermined through the
possibility of interminable contestation.37 The possibility of anchoring through
exemplars allows a judgment to be made that some propositions are closer to the
core of a concept than others.38 This can provide a useful conceptual framework
for helping to identify the core of the values articulated by the EU.
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WB. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, 56 P Art Soc 167-198 (1956).
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3.3.2 Normativity in EU Law
3.3.2.1 Introduction
This section discusses in more detail the self-articulation of values in the EU. As
well as the core humanistic and individual-centred values identified in Article 2
quoted above, the preliminary provisions of the Treaty identify other core values.
Article 3 TEU expresses the values or aims that can be summarised under the
heading ‘integration’. In Article 3, integration is related to the unifying values of
equality, non-discrimination, and social solidarity, with some element of balance
or counterpoint introduced by the reference to respect for cultural and linguistic
diversity. The degree of balance or counterpoint is developed in Articles 4 and 5,
which adopt the principles of subsidiarity and conferral and squarely address the
central point of political cleavage or conflict that EU law must address: how to
balance the goal of integration with the continuing sovereignty of the Member
States.
Article 4 makes reference to the principle of conferral (repeated in Article
5) and goes on to state the Union shall respect the territorial integrity and national
security of the Member States, to refer to a duty of loyal cooperation to be
exercised reciprocally by the Union and the Member States, and to state the duty
of the Member States to refrain from activities that may jeopardise the goals of the
Treaties.
Article 5 confirms the principle of conferral and also to outlines the related
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Under the principle of conferral, “the
Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the
Member States in the Treaties … Competences not conferred upon the Union in
the Treaties remain with the Member States” (Article 5(2). The principle of
subsidiarity requires that:
… in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union
shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot
be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at
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regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of
the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level (Article 5(3)).

The principle of proportionality entails that the content and form of Union action
shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties (Article
5(4)).
Of the above provisions, Article 3 represents the strongest degree of
continuity with the founding Treaties. The Preamble of the Treaty of Rome 195739
referred to a determination to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among
the peoples of Europe; economic and social progress; the constant improvement of
the living and working conditions of the peoples of the Member States; steady
expansion, balanced trade and fair competition; the progressive abolition of
restrictions on international trade, solidarity, peace, and stability.
All of these values can be understood, for the purpose of legal reasoning, as
‘principles’. Taken collectively, these various principles present a very challenging
interpretative task; the problem of incommensurability seems to loom large. In
contrast, the aim of developing an understanding of norm conflict rules is to
address this prima facie incommensurability so as to give determinacy to norm
conflict resolution. Each of these values is now looked at in more detail.

3.3.2.2 Human Dignity
‘Human dignity’40 could be considered a prime example of a legal principle, in
that it has a particularly abstract character that is difficult to translate into an easily
operationalised rule.41 Few would deny the normative force of human dignity in
the abstract, yet its precise implications for legal rights and duties are not obvious.
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The European Economic Community Treaty, 298 UNTS 11.
For relatively recent general academic discussion of dignity as a legal value, see. e.g. D.
Feldman, ‘Human Dignity as a Legal Value – Part 1’, PL 68-702 (1999) and ‘Human Dignity as a
Legal Value – Part 2’, PL 61-76 (2000); G. Moon & R. Allen, ‘Dignity Discourse in
Discrimination Law: A Better Route to Equality?’, EHRLR 610-649 (2006).
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Article 1 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights42 states that “Human dignity is
inviolable. It must be respected and protected.” In Omega, Advocate General StixHackl observed that “[t]here is hardly any legal principle more difficult to fathom
in law than that of human dignity”, but that it forms the underlying basis and
starting point for all human rights distinguishable from it and is considered by
German theorists, for instance, as the ‘fundamental constitutional principle’ of
human rights.43
She contrasted it with a communitarian idea of rights, or the idea that rights
are determinable by the majority,44 instead associating it with the “idea that every
individual being is considered to be endowed with inherent and inalienable
rights.”45 She further links the concept of dignity to equality, conveyed in the
expression ‘égale dignité’ or equal dignity.46 On the issue of its justiciability, she
observed that the German Basic Law was exceptional in considering it to be a
justiciable principle in its own right, independently of other justiciable rules of
law.47 A contrast is then drawn between human dignity as a non-justiciable
principle and concrete guarantees of fundamental rights.48 On the facts of Omega,
which concerned a prohibition by Germany of a computer game simulating acts of
homicide and which was claimed to be a violation of the free movement principles
(freedom to provide services and free movement of goods), the Advocate General
suggested that human dignity had to be related to public policy under Community
law and based her decision primarily on the latter.49
42
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The evaluation of dignity as a non-justiciable principle in its own right, but
rather as providing conceptual underpinning for justiciable rights, seems valid,
given its incommensurable character and the difficulty in attributing a precise
weight to it. The travaux préparatoires of the EU Charter seem to endorse both
views, they state: “The dignity of the human person is not only a fundamental right
in itself but constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights”50 (since the passing of
the Treaty of Lisbon, reference to the travaux préparatoires in interpreting the
Charter is now a binding rule of law under Article 6(1) TEU, this issue is
discussed more generally in Chapter 3).51 What the content of the distinct right of
dignity is, however, remains unclear. Notwithstanding this ambiguity in the
travaux préparatoires, the contrast drawn by Advocate General Stix-Hackl
between human dignity as a non-justiciable principle and codified concrete
guarantees of fundamental rights has useful implications for rights adjudication in
general. For the most part, rights guarantees are themselves relatively
incommensurable and abstract, rather than being concrete in a way that human
dignity is not. Further, the invocation by Advocate General Stix-Hackl52 of a
Kantian conception of rights suggests the principle that a person cannot be
considered a means to an end, in the way an object or a thing can, and this has
implications for how rights are arguments are weighed against competing interests.
These issues are further addressed in Chapter 4 below.

3.3.2.3 Integration and Solidarity
Integration is the ‘meta-value’ that has been most strongly articulated in EU law
and is inherent in the whole scheme of the Treaties. As Rasmussen critically
observed, it has often dominated as a concern in the reasoning of the ECJ.53 It is
50
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most notably expressed in the commitment to an ‘ever-closer Union’ in the
Preamble of the TEU and originally contained in the Preamble of the Treaty of
Rome. The core principle of a common market and its accompanying freedom of
movement principles (freedom of movement of workers, freedom of movement of
goods, freedom of movement of services, freedom of movement of capital and
payments) and the principle of undistorted competition seem generally accepted as
inherent in the idea of a common market. Two points that are much more contested
are: (1) the boundaries of the free movement and undistorted competition
principles, since they have a conceptual pull that can draw within them almost any
diversity of national rules and thus of national competence, as noted in Tobacco
Advertising referred to above; and (2) the extent to which economic and monetary
union should be accompanied by deeper political integration. This contestation is
apparent from the ratification process of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe and of the Lisbon Treaty,54 for example.
.
3.3.2.4 Democracy and the Rule of Law
This section examines the values of democracy and the rule of law and what they
can be taken to mean in the context of the EU. They are considered together here
because they are perhaps the most widely or universally accepted principles of
political morality in the world and especially in Europe and, in addition, their
practical implications for legal reasoning seem to dovetail to a large degree. The
content of rights tends to be more contested than the normative content of
democracy and the rule of law.55 As ‘meta-principles of political morality’, thus,
democracy and the rule of law might be thought to have a less disputable relevance
for judicial interpretation, to the extent that they are relevant.
It may be questioned to what extent democracy and the rule of law have
always been central elements of the Community’s normative self-understanding.
They were not mentioned in the Treaty of Rome, and were only first explicitly
54

See generally Z. Bañkowski & E. Christodoulidis, ‘The European Union As An Essentially
Contested Project’, 4(4) ELJ 341-354 (1998).
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articulated in the 1990s.56 However, the Treaty of Rome was silent on such
normative questions; it was largely a technical document. This may well have been
because thicker normative questions of political morality were, in the 1950s,
primarily for the Council of Europe and its European Convention on Human
Rights57 to the extent that they were to be regulated at the European level. The
preamble to the Statute of the Council of Europe,58 of which all the founding
Member States of the European Communities59 were parties, declares that the
signatory States “[reaffirm] their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which
are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual
freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all
genuine democracy”. With the later development of Community competence
beyond the core idea of a common market, especially after the Single European
Act 1986,60 it became necessary for the EU itself to articulate its fundamental
values in a fuller way.
However, it seems misplaced to consider the Community was thus until the
1990s a ‘normatively empty space’ or that its only normative concern was with
integration, or with human rights to the extent the EC did later develop a human
rights jurisprudence.61 This would be to see the Community as some sort of radical
break or rupture with the legal traditions of the Member States, and it could be
thought illogical that the Member States would have accepted such a supranational framework without ever having articulated its radically different
normative

basis.

‘Constitutionalism

beyond

the

State’

requires

some

reconceptualisation, but it is hard to see that it can plausibly be considered to
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operate contrary to the established basic values of the Member States.62 Though
they may be operationalised in a new context, the same values are relevant.
Democracy and the rule of law might be taken as paradigm examples of
‘contested concepts’, and thus it might be objected that any account of them is just
one version amongst several that are equally valid.63 While it is important to note
the differing conceptions of democracy and the rule of law, it is a mistake to
believe them to be so contested that they have no fixed content. As Waldron has
argued, the core attributes of the rule of law, more fully brought out in Tamanaha’s
recent work, are fairly stable, settled, and subject to practical closure.64 Waldron
takes Fuller’s account as reflecting this settled core of the rule of law.65 Differing
perspectives on the rule of law tend not to relate to the core idea of formal legality,
but rather to its application in specific contexts.66 The rule of law has both settled
and contested aspects. Formal legality seems to represent its core and relatively
settled content. Tamanaha’s recent work seeks to bring out this core formal
legality as the correct understanding of the rule of law, which he contrasts with an
instrumentalised conception of aw as a means to an end in the hands of the
judiciary.67
Democracy has also been significantly contested as a concept, with one
study identifying over ten differing accounts of how a polity could be
democratic.68 An obvious example is a simple majoritarian model (as reflected to
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some degree in the UK tradition of parliamentary sovereignty) contrasted with a
consociationalist model69 that institutionalises ongoing minority presence or
representation in the executive branch. Nonetheless, as with the rule of law, it is
important to identify the core elements of democracy that are relatively
uncontested. Virtually everywhere a democracy exists, it is accompanied by a
parliamentary

system

meant

to

be

representative.

The

notion

of

‘representativeness’ only makes sense if it is possible for the representative body
to translate its collective decisions into law and if this process of ‘translation’ does
not break down between the promulgation and application or adjudication of the
law. As Tamanaha put it, such a breakdown would represent the evisceration of
democracy at its point of application.70
That is the element of democracy, namely, representation, that this study
draws on to understand the implications of democracy for legal reasoning; as with
the core of the rule of law, that aspect of democracy is relatively settled and not as
contested as say, the role of minorities within a polity. Of ten main models of
democracy identified by Held, none question the duty of courts, including supreme
or constitutional courts, to follow, in general terms, the interpretative
understanding of the law-maker or constituent power (whether there may be
situations when evolutive interpretation, departing from the intention of the lawmaker, is justified is examined below in Chapter 3).71
Addressing the commonly made critique of the EU as lacking democratic
legitimacy, Scharpf distinguishes between input and output-legitimacy. Scharpf
proposes that the absence of a sense of collective identity in the EU, i.e. the
absence of a demos and the shared political space facilitating political
communication and interaction given the parallel and mutually independent
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political and cultural systems in the Member States,72 means an input-oriented
concept of legitimacy is difficult to realise (i.e. legitimacy understood in terms of
the effectiveness of democratic input and participation in the process of political
decision-making),73 and instead an output-oriented concept of legitimacy is more
attainable. Despite thus seeming to offer a framework for moving away from the
premise of democracy as the touchstone of legitimacy in favour of legitimacy
being related to good outcomes, the determination of what amounts to a good
outcome itself must still be decided and represents the democratic dilemma.74 As
Wincott succinctly expresses this view, the definition or determination of what is a
desirable output itself requires democratic input to be legitimate.75
In Tamanaha’s statement of the link between democracy and the rule of
law, judges’ ‘following of the law’ is necessary to give effect to democratic
intention. This notion of following the law entails predictability in the law.76
Predictability entails relatively clear, shared criteria of interpretation. Thus, the law
maker can be relatively certain how the judiciary will interpret the law and how
the law will take practical effect. Without predictability, the significance of the
publication of laws and the prohibition on retroactivity77 breaks down: there seems
72
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Hauptzollamt Mainz [1979] ECR 69, at 84; and see generally, F. Snyder, ‘General Course on
Constitutional Law of the European Union’, VI Collected Courses of the Academy of European
Law 41-155 (Dordrecht 1998), 80 et seq.
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little difference between retroactive application of law and the clarification of the
meaning of a law only when it is adjudicated. This is an understanding of the rule
of law, linked with democracy, titled strongly towards its formal content. A
different, more instrumentalised understanding is also possible; here, there is an
internal conflict of value, i.e. a value itself is contested, as indicated above. In
order for the rule of law to be a value that can help resolve norm conflict, it is thus
necessary to make a choice as to one’s understanding of it; otherwise there is
simply a regress of conflict in values underlying norm conflict resolution.
Ultimately, an instrumental understanding of the rule of law seems problematic
because it is contradictory of its formal character. ‘Law as a means to an end’ as a
guide for interpretation or legal reasoning legal reasoning does not represent the
constraint on power and the subordination of power to the law that has always
classically been associated with the rule of law.78
Snyder notes the differing understandings of constitutional culture in the EU,
citing its highly instrumental understanding of law along with influence from
Western legal culture generally and the historical influence and story of integration
since the 1950s.79 One contradictory element is this highly instrumental concept of
law in light of the core understanding of the rule of law in European legal
traditions,80 although instrumentalism in legal thinking has become more
widespread in the 20th century.81 As EU constitutionalism matures and develops,
and as the competences of the EU expand, a recovery of a more formal conception
of the rule of law may enhance the legitimacy of the Union and its legal processes
and contribute to enhanced coherence between the legal systems and traditions of
the Member States.
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A number of related issues arise when considering democracy and the rule
of law: (a) the development of governance as a framework of understanding
relative to a traditional ‘rule of law’ approach, and (b) and the values of
transparency and accountability as aspects of democracy and the rule of law.
Further, these issues raise the question of a tendency in theorising the EU to
conceive of it in ‘sui generis’ terms, as at a basic conceptual level, deserving of
different treatment to normative concerns in other, national or international,
contexts. These issues are now considered in turn.
By ‘governance’ is meant the proliferation of actors and stakeholders in the
development of policy beyond the usual classic institutional actors in the executive
and legislature, the fragmentation and de-centralisation of law-making processes
away from a traditional hierarchical national model.82 The complexity of modern
life and of the administration of modern government requires extensive
consultation and input from various affected interests, and the resulting processes
of information management and policy determination represent a new site of
political involvement and power.
The proliferation of these dispersed and more complex layers of
governmental activity and engagement reflected in the concept of governance
generates a complexity that can undermine the traditional legitimacy of public
institutions by blurring lines of accountability and decision-making, contributing,
as the Commission itself has recognized,83 to a distancing between citizens Union
institutions and processes. Clear hierarchical lines of democratic and legal
accountability are at risk of being subsumed within a complex or ‘spread-out web’
of stakeholder networking.84 Governance can thus work toward a “destabilisation
of the traditional normative hierarchy”.85 Governance can be understood in output-
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oriented legitimacy terms as enhancing the quality of administrative or regulatory
results, through enhancing expert involvement.86 It privileges professional and
social accountability and thus has an élitist tendency.87 Broader, democraticallyoriented input-oriented legitimacy concerns tend to get sidelined.88
In dissipating traditional hierarchies, governance could be said to increase
the potential for norm conflict (but it is less concerned with this; rather the degree
and depth of stakeholder involvement is what counts, not the conceptual clarity or
coherence of norm conflict or of its resolution). For example, soft law can be the
product of governance forms, in the form of benchmarks and professional
standards, such as through the Open Method of Coordination. This may put
pressure on the institutions involved in hard law to play ‘catch up’, as hard law and
soft law increasingly diverge. A rule-bound orientation tends to downplay the
normative significance of soft law, thus transferring the question of conflict
between hard or ‘real’ law and soft law to the policy domain.
In the EU, a dissipation of a clear conception of normativity can manifest
itself, in particular, in normativity being defined in the self-referential operations
of the EU institutions.89 A tendency in some literature on the EU is to thus
effectively elide the is-ought distinction in political and legal theory90 and infer the
normative acceptability of a given posture on governance from the fact of its
adoption in a sui generis entity and its acceptance by élite actors,91 a tendency
made relatively explicit by Priban, for example:
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The replacement of rational action and/or institutionalist theoretical views
by the evolutionary epistemology of the autopoietic social systems of
European politics and law facilitates a more precise description of what has
been going on in European integration processes since the 1950s. First of
all, it eliminates the political and ideological contexts of neofunctionalist
theories because of the epistemological emphasis on operative rather than
normative aspects of functionalist social theory.92

The shift to multi-level governance has not been matched by the equivalent
development of accountability mechanisms and results in ‘normative leakage’.93
Governance and soft law seem to present a problem of drift, dissipation,
and dispersion of competences. One way of claiming back competence to hold to
account and control relatively autonomous agencies is an insistence on the priority
of the principal-agent relationship:94 not in the sense of ongoing interference, but
in ensuring that agencies act within conferred95 competences that are ultimately
legitimised by the decision of the constituent power, in this case, of the Member
States. The approach advocated here is not to suggest the irrelevance of
governance, 96 but it does accept the relative priority of clear, legal demarcation
lines and of power-conferring rules and their interpretation within a rule-bound
framework.97 This contributes to democratic representation that is closer to the
electorate as agent.
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Problems of drift in power and competence are closely related to the question
of accountability. ‘Accountability’ is a ‘golden concept’ that no one is against,98
and although it has a broad range of meaning, at its core it entails an external
authority calling a person or body exercising of power or responsibility to account
for that exercise.99 It thus has an important relationship with democracy; without
accountability by those elected to those who have elected them, democracy breaks
down.100 Accountability can be understood as either or both ex ante or ex post,
though an ex post conception is often more typical and in practice more feasible.101
In an EU context, the yellow card system whereby national parliaments can
request a reconsideration of the subsidiary implications of proposed legislation is
an example of ex ante accountability.102 Ex post accountability can take several
forms,103 including public holding104 to account through requirements for the
provision of open information and public deliberation (e.g. through participation in
parliamentary debate, such as appearances of public officials before parliamentary
committees105) and legal accountability through judicial review.106
A long-standing concern about a lack of accountability and democracy has
existed relative to the EU institutions.107 To some extent, this problem has been
98
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dominated by the absence of a demos in the EU that would make an effective
European-wide public space.108 Ultimately, accountability is linked with
responsiveness if the process of holding to account reveals inadequacies,109 which
may include a process of sanctions.110 Governance in the EU has tended to
privilege legal/constitutional and social learning accountability,111 which can be
seen as in tension with democratic accountability in that courts are nonrepresentative and social accountability tends to cater to mobilised élite
interests.112 However, by deferring to the intention of the law-maker or constituent
power, judicial review can be a means for effecting democratic accountability.
This can be two-fold: first, it respects the intention and wishes of those with
democratic or representative authority; secondly, it avoids politicians deflecting
blame on to the courts, who are largely immune from electoral pressures and could
thus allow themselves be used as safety valve for creatively developing new, but
controversial, law.113
Transparency114 is closely linked with accountability: power exercised in
an obscure, esoteric, or inaccessible way is more difficult to call to account.
Accountability can be understood further as linked to the rule of law in that the
rule of law has a shared, open, and public character that in an objective way binds
the exercise of power to determinate legal rules in so far as possible.115
Accountability goes further than the rule of law in implying a kind of
answerability and subordination to an outside political authority.
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Within this context of an input-oriented and process-oriented concern with
democracy and rule of law values, a central question for the role of the courts is to
what extent norm conflict techniques constrain the judiciary to an input-oriented
conception of legitimacy or conversely, do norm conflict techniques allow the
judiciary greater room for discretion and legal development according to a more
output-driven understanding of legitimacy?

3.3.2.5 Human Rights and Equality
‘Rights’ in a very general sense as legal entitlements and ‘rights’ as human rights
are better distinguished. The idea of legal rights, in the general sense of legal
entitlement, could always be invoked in a counter-majoritarian way, but this
arguably only has legitimacy where the rights in question are basic human rights.
The allocation of competences at different levels (between the Member State and
the Community level), for example is not generally a human rights issue. The
counter-majoritarian justification for constitutional review thus needs to be
carefully circumscribed: not any legal claim writ-large can justify countermajoritarianism, only those claim relating to such fundamental rights as are not
subject to majority determination, e.g. equality before the law.
The concept of equal respect or equality has been central to the discourse
of justification of human rights.116 Equality or equal respect could be considered a
conceptual framework in which more particular rights are specified. The
relationship between equality and democracy here becomes more complex. Often
rights are portrayed a counter-majoritarian: equality of respect for human rights
limits what a majority can validly do or sanction. In this way, human rights are the
obvious alternative to utilitarianism, or at least ‘crude utilitarianism.’117 The
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tension here is between ideas of equality related to substantive values and the idea
of equality of participation. Participation is itself a substantive value, but it has an
obvious procedural implication that is less contested than the substantive content
of rights in general. Here, equal participation and equal respect are not competing
principles, rather they interact – democracy is what seeks to optimize equal
participation on the basis of a premise of equal respect. Dworkin, for example,
tends to contrast the two, but his theory seems to allow the judiciary to declare
what amounts to equal respect in a way that is itself in tension with the principle of
equal respect because of the counter-majoritarian power it gives to judges through
the vagueness of Dworkin’s criteria of fit and coherence. This is especially so
given that almost any political claim can be conceptualised as a claim for equal
respect for the views of its proponent: in this way, equality can be an ‘empty
concept’ unless substantively defined; it is a derivative concept, not an
independent norm.118
Accepting this criticism, as a broad range of critics of Dworkin do,119 does
not mean having to accept Waldron’s preference of abandoning constitutional
review in favour of the UK system of parliamentary sovereignty, on the basis that
Bills of Rights underdetermine the content of rights to the extent that they leave a
great deal of discretion to the judiciary to determine the content.120 However, a
human rights jurisdiction in the context of contemporary moral pluralism and
disagreement can be exercised in a minimalist sense, for example, more in the
manner of the European Court of Human Rights (although the Strasbourg Court
can be innovative and creative) and as reflecting the understanding of rights
endorsed by the polity at the time of constitutional entrenchment.
On this view, in the context of pluralism, human rights are to be determined
by the polity and then to be applied by the judiciary. The role of the judiciary is
counter-majoritarian in that the judiciary are entrusted with the enforcement of
pre-determined rights, so that temporary political vicissitudes do not result in the
yourself) as a rule constraining utilitarian choices. See generally AW. Price, ‘Richard Mervyn Hare
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failure to apply the pre-determined rights, but it is problematic that the judiciary
should have a counter-majoritarian role in being entirely independent in
determining what those rights are (a perhaps awkward way of putting the point is
that the judiciary have a counter-majoritarian role in a counter-legislative sense,
not in the sense of making fundamental value choices for the polity).
So this approach does not deny the role of the judiciary in specific disputes as
protectors of last resort of human rights, rather it considers that the judiciary
should be wary of advancing avant garde notions of human rights or other legal
rights or claims and effectively imposing them on the polity. It suggests a
relatively conserving, minimalist approach to human rights protection, in contrast
to a Dworkinian, evolutive style of reasoning. In other words, an approach that
focuses on the anchoring of contested concepts and leaves more fundamental
innovation to the polity in general.121
Thus, human and rights and equality, as contested concepts, can be invoked
in contrasting ways as to the proper organisation of power in a polity, including as
regards the role of the judiciary. In an EU context, equality has a particular flavour
because from the foundation of the Communities, equality has become closely
linked to the application of free movement principles on the basis of nondiscrimination on grounds of nationality.122 In addition, the principle of equal pay
for equal work123 was important in advancing the equality of women in the
workplace and may have significantly contributed to the legitimacy of the
Communities in its earlier period.124
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Finally, the framework of norm conflict points to two types or levels of
conflict in the context of human rights: (1) conflicting approaches to filling out the
largely underdetermined content of rights (which generally have the character of
principles rather than rules) as set out in Bills of Rights (e.g. conserving versus
evolutive interpretation) and (2) conflicts between rights once their individual
general scope is specified. These issues are addressed in Chapters 3 and 4.

3.3.2.6 The Principles of Conferral and Subsidiarity: The Constitutional Values of
the Member States and their Enduring Sovereignty
The Treaty of Lisbon marks a new a departure in EU law in according a specific
status to the constitutional traditions of the Member States. Article 4(2) TEU now
states:
The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as
well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures,
political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government.
It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the
territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding
national security. ...

Previously, Article 6(1) TEU stated that the constitutional traditions of the
Member States were a source that could inspire the protection of fundamental
rights in the EU legal order, but those constitutional traditions themselves were not
independently expressed as values. The TEU pre-Lisbon also made a more generic
statement, in Article 6(3), that “The Union shall respect the national identities of
its Member States.” Thus, the increased competence that is formally accorded to
the Union is counter-balanced with a more explicit recognition of the
constitutional traditions of the Member States. This could be considered a clear
recognition of the potential for norm conflict between those constitutional
traditions and the newer polity of the Union and reflects an aspiration that conflict
is effectively avoided. It implicitly seems to support an idea of the normative
status and claims of the Union being consistent with those of the constitutional
94

traditions of the Member States. In that way, it might be thought to show the limits
of sui generis characterisations of the Union’s normative status,125 at least as it has
now developed, which tended to dominate in judicial and academic discourse in
the earlier period of the Communities’ or Union’s development. Pragmatically, it
also reflects a greater sensitivity that the future path of integration needs to avoid a
sense of rupture or radical break with those constitutional traditions.

3.3.2.7 Summary on the Values Articulated in the Treaties
Much potential for conflict exists in the values articulated above. The general
problem of the under-determination of rights by Bills of Rights is present, along
with the ever-present potential in the EU, because of its nature, for conflict
between the claims of Union law and those of national law, especially national
constitutional law. In the latter context, the equality principle, for example,
interacts with the question of EU competence: equality could provide a normative
or at least rhetorical underpinning for claims of Union competence to harmonise
the legal entitlements of citizens, in the interests of equality and its general
connotation of fair treatment. However, the Treaty itself seeks to address one of
the fundamental cause of conflict, the divisions of competences between the EU
and Member States, through the principles of conferral and subsidiarity, which are
examined further in Chapter 6. The general argument advanced in the remainder of
this chapter is that a rule-bound conception of norm conflict resolution can provide
a normatively appealing and effective way of mediating the clash of values and
broadly-framed principles in EU law.
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3.4 Conceptual Clarity and Legal Concepts – Hohfeld’s Analysis
Wesley Hohfeld’s work on legal concepts and their definition is not expressly
directed at the problem of norm conflict, but by clarifying the way legal concepts
interact with each other, can contribute to an avoidance of conflict due to
confusion as to concepts. It is important to address any conceptual issues early in
the discussion, to determine if and in what way the characterisation of norms
affects their application relative to other norms. The main benefit of a careful
typology of norm types is conceptual clarity, which may contribute to a clear
treatment of the problems of norm conflict. What Hohfeld aimed at was an
‘intensive and systematic’ treatment of ‘the nature and analysis of all types of jural
interests’, “at the very threshold analyzing and discriminating of the various
fundamental conceptions that are involved in practically every legal problem”.126
An understanding of how legal interests or concepts related to each other, though
more complex than a common tendency to treat legal interests individually, could
result in a clearer understanding of these interests overall, in “the right kind of
simplicity”.127
Hohfeld indicated that the context of his analysis was not just conceptual
clarity or neatness for its own sake,128 but that the correct characterisation at a
conceptual level of different legal interests could “control the decision of a number
of specific questions”.129 However, it is perhaps partly because looseness of
language in itself may not have a decisive outcome on the result of a case except in
a minority of instances that Hohfeld’s analysis has attracted and continues to
attract much more academic attention than judicial notice.130 This point can be
126
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illustrated by an example. In Hohfeld’s understanding of ‘jural concepts’, a right is
understood as correlating to a duty. This means that there is a duty to comply with
the exercise of a right. A privilege is weaker than a right, it is a freedom to do so
something, but does not entail a corresponding duty. Using the term right in place
of privilege gives a stronger sense of the legal interest involved, which may not be
accurate in a given context.
For example, one may have a right to social assistance from the State if one
has a low enough income, which means the State is under a duty to provide the
social assistance, whereas one merely has a privilege to receive social assistance
from non-State actors, who are not under a duty to provide social assistance.
Conflating the terms ‘right’ and privilege’ here could lead to a misleading
characterisation of the legal interests and entitlements involved, but it may not
matter much in practice. A person might state that he or she has a right to receive
social help or aid from anybody who offers, whereas, more properly, it should be
said that there is a privilege to receive it, but this would only matter if the other
party understood as right to entail a duty, whereas many people understand right in
the loose sense to mean ‘freedom’, i.e. so as to encompass both what Hohfeld
defined as a right and a privilege.
The key to Hohfeld’s analysis is the understanding that norms as concepts
are relational. Rights cannot be understood in an atomistic way, as free-standing.
Failing to see the relational character of legal concepts leads to conceptual
confusion in the use of language, which may in turn confuse and cloud the
substantive analysis of legal relationships. While in some or even many cases,
loose use of the language of legal concept, such as ‘right’, might not matter much,
it could matter if people understood the same terms to mean different things.
Hohfeld’s work seeks to address this by presenting legal norms as inherently
relational and suggesting a standard typology. For example, rights necessarily
entail duties, on Hohfeld’s analysis. It follows from this that differences in rights
Canadian JLJ 41-54 (2003); N. Lazarev, ‘Hohfeld’s Analysis of Rights: An Essential Approach to
a Conceptual and Practical Understanding of the Nature of Rights’, [2005] MurUEJL 9; A. Halpin,
‘Rights, Duties, Liabilities and Hohfeld’, 13(1) LT 23-39 (2007). Noting the ‘outpouring of
secondary Hohfeldian literature’, see H. Ross, Law As A Social Institution (Hart Publishing 2001),
151.
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entail a conflict of duties, and any coherent analysis of a conflict of rights must
take into account a conflict of corresponding duties.
From the foregoing and following discussion of Hohfeld’s typology, two
conclusions in particular can be derived for the present study: (1) differing levels
of rights protection do involve a conflict and cannot merely be tolerated as a nonconflictual divergence or difference, because different levels of rights protection
entail different corresponding duties (this can be a basis for critiquing the approach
to conflict of rights norms in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which treats
rights in an atomistic, rather than relational way) and (2) a competence exists
whenever there is a power to change legal relations, which can be used to critique
the assessment of competence issues in ECJ caselaw and to rebut claims that the
EU does not have competence in certain areas even though EU law has been held
to apply. These points are further discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, the
present section discusses Hohfeld’s work to provide the theoretical background to
these later conclusions.
Hohfeld began with the analysis of corporeal and incorporeal interests, noting
that only legal interests, not corporeal things, could be the subject of legal
relations, e.g. a transfer of interest, not of land or property.131 He then set out a
comprehensive scheme of types of legal interests, which related legal interests
with their opposite and correlative interests or concepts.132 Hohfeld first decried a
common tendency to reduce all legal relations to rights and duties, proposing that
these formed just two elements in a broader set of concepts that characterises all
legal relations.133 Individually, basic legal concepts were sui generis, and a full
understanding of them was only possible in relational terms, a point which
Hohfeld’s translates into a general scheme setting out their opposites and
correlatives.134 The scheme consists of the following:
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Jural:

rights

privilege

power

immunity

Opposites:

no-rights

duty

disability

liability

Jural:

right

privilege

power

immunity

Correlatives:

duty

no-rights

liability

disability

The opposite or negation of a term is self-explanatory; a correlative, for Hohfeld,
is an implication of a first legal interest’s characterisation for the understanding of
another legal interest or concept (other than the first legal concept’s opposite).
Thus, the opposite of a right is the absence of a right or no-rights, but its
correlative is a duty owed by others to respect the right.135
A privilege entails a freedom or liberty136 to do something, its opposite being
a duty, but its correlative being the absence of a right not to have the privilege
interfered with or prevented from being executed (if the latter was not a correlative
of a privilege, a privilege would be equivalent to a right).137 Therefore, a privilege
is a weaker type of legal interest than a right, with a corresponding reduction in the
resulting implications of a privilege for others than the implications of a right for
others.138 Thus, one may have the privilege of buying certain products, but this
does not entail a duty on others to do something that may prevent a person from
buying those foods in a non-forceful way, e.g. by buying them first. In contrast, a
right to purchase food would mean that someone else was under a specific duty to
provide it, which could be the case regarding the duties of a parent towards his or
her child or the duty of the State to its citizens where ‘socio-economic’ right were
given legal status. Where the parent has a duty to provide food for the child, the
child has a right to receive it. However, the adult child of parents does not have a
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right to receive food from his or her parents, though the child of course has the
privilege to receive if the parents choose to offer it. Simmonds clearly explain the
difference a liberty or privilege and a right:
A liberty [i.e. privilege] differs from a claim-right [i.e. right] in a number of
ways. Claim-rights held by X concern the actions of the other party to the
jural relationship, since they entail a duty on the part of that other party.
Liberties, by contrast, are concerned with the right-holder’s won actions:
they establish the permissibility (as against some other party) of the rightholder’s action. Thus X has a liberty to wear a hat, as against Y, when X
owes no duty to Y not to wear a hat. The liberty [i.e. [privilege] consists
solely in the absence of a duty owed to the other party, and the other party’s
consequent lack of any claim right against the right-holder.139

This example could be taken to indicate both the potential and limits of Hohfeld’s
analysis: a legal relationship could be mischaracterised as a right when it is really a
liberty not entailing a duty on anybody else. However, a liberty could be loosely
described as a right, while at the same time this being accompanied by a
recognition that it was not immune from interference, i.e. that it did not entail a
duty, in which case no conceptual problems would result. Thus, the use of
language in a way that does not accord with Hohfeld’s scheme does not
necessarily result in a mischaracterisation of a legal interest; it all depends how
words are related to each other in a given legal text and on the mutual
understandings of the relevant legal actors (legal actors may not be talking at
cross-purposes, even though not following Hohfeld’s scheme).
A power in Hohfeld’s scheme is the opposite of a disability, but as a
correlative entails liability on others to respect the exercise of power. A power
here is understood as “one’s affirmative ‘control’ over a given legal relation”.140
Thus, what distinguishes a power from other legal relations is the possible
139
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consequence of a change of legal relations resulting from the exercise of a power,
whereas other legal interests can be exercised, but cannot in themselves change
other legal interests. This understanding of power is equivalent to how the term
‘competence’ is often used (and as it is used in EU law, discussed further in
Chapter 6 below). Given this different character of the concept of power relative to
other legal interests, and given that it is especially important as a concept in EU
law in straddling the fault line between the status and role of the Member States
relative to the Union, it is treated in a separate chapter in this work. The opposite
of power is no power or disability, and the correlative of disability is immunity.
Hohfeld deals more briefly with the concept of immunity, but explains it
very clearly and summarises the general relations between his core concepts:
As already brought out, immunity is the correlative of disability (“nopower”), and the opposite, or negation, of liability. Perhaps it will also be
plain, from the preliminary outline and from the discussion down to this
point, that a power bears the same general contrast to an immunity that a
right does to a privilege. A right is one’s affirmative claims against another,
and a privilege is one’s freedom from the right or claim of another.
Similarly, a power is one’s affirmative “control” over a given legal relation
as against another; whereas an immunity is one’s freedom from the legal
power or control of another as regards some legal relation.141

Privilege and immunity may seem identical concepts when not understood in
Hohfeld’s relational terms, but a difference only becomes clear when placed in the
context of Hohfeld’s correlational scheme: a privilege is contrasted with a right,
and an immunity is contrasted with a power in similar ways.
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scheme and loosely, however, one could easily say that an immunity is also
contrasted with a right, i.e. someone who has an immunity has a right not to be
interfered with in some way.
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Hohfeld proposed that the eight legal interests he identified – rights and
duties, privileges and no-rights, powers and liabilities, immunities and disabilities
– represented a lowest common denominator of the law, thereby making easier
comparison and the discovery of fundamental similarities.143 The stronger
consequence, that the characterisation of a legal interest can affect the outcome of
a case, is also possible. This risk of this happening was well expressed by Justice
Holmes:
As long as the matter to be considered is debated in artificial terms there is a
danger of being led to a technical definition to apply a certain name, and
then to deduce consequences which have no relation to the grounds on
which the name was applied.144

Two general points seem to result from Hohfeld’s analysis for the study of
norm conflict. First, his work offers the insight that care with terminology may
solve or render more understandable some apparent problems of norm conflict.
Mainly, this arises through the use of the same term at cross-purposes in a variety
of legal texts: if the terms are understood as meaning the same thing in all texts,
then conflict may be more or less likely, whereas the possibility that the same term
is used to describe different legal interests can at least clarify if norm conflict is
actually present. Second, his work demonstrates the potential importance of
intention in legal drafting. Since the same word can, as Hohfeld demonstrates, be
plausibly used to mean or refer to actually different legal interests, attention to the
specific intention behind the use of the word can help illuminate what meaning the
word actually had as understood by those who authored the relevant specific legal
text. The role of intention in interpretation is addressed in more detail in Chapter 3.
In conclusion, what Hohfeld sought to do was to standardise mutual
understandings to avoid any conceptual confusion, but also his work does identify
some elements of legal concepts that are essential to understanding them. In this
regard, his definition of rights as entailing a correlative duty and of competence as
143
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being an amenity to change legal relations does offer practical guidance to the
consistent use of these terms in legal reasoning and discussion. As indicated
above, Hohfeld’s analysis can be used to criticise the use of the terms ‘right’ and
‘competence’ in some ECJ caselaw and EU legal provisions as inconsistent and
confused with regard to conflicts involving competence norms and rights norms
(see Chapters 4 and 5 below respectively). His definition of ‘privilege’ is perhaps
less useful, since the term is not very widely used in legal discourse, whereas the
terms ‘right’ and ‘competence’ are (‘rights talk’ being pervasive145). Hohfeld
managed to suggest how these two terms in particular could be used consistently in
a way that does offer conceptual clarity. Unfortunately, while Hohfeld’s work has
been much praised academically for this conceptual rigour and clarity, few go to
the trouble to use legal concepts as carefully as Hohfeld suggested.

3.5 Rules of Norm Conflict in Legal Reasoning
In this section, the three classic rules of norm conflict found in legal reasoning are
examined. An important preliminary issue is the definition of norm conflict, upon
which depends the application of norm conflict techniques,146 and this is examined
first.

3.5.1 The Definition of Norm Conflict
Although the term ‘contrapuntal’147 has been used by some scholars as evocative
of the tensions within EU law, in-depth assessment of norm conflict is largely
absent from EU scholarship until recently, which is perhaps surprising given that it
is a phenomenon that has for long attracted at least some comment by legal
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theorists. WTO scholarship in this area tends to be quite recent also.148 Apart from
the discussion of coherence in Chapter 1, in general legal theory, Kelsen and
several other German theorists, in particular, considered the problem,149 as did a
number of French scholars, chiefly Chaim Perelman,150 while in international law,
a standard point of reference is the work of Wilfred Jenks.151 Various other
scholars have also addressed it in journal articles.152 The issue has been engaged
most directly in EU law in the context of the competing claims of ultimate
legitimacy of the ECJ as opposed to those of several national supreme and
constitutional courts (as briefly surveyed in Chapter 1), rather than norm conflict
being addressed at a general conceptual level as a matter of legal reasoning.
The chief difference between broad and narrow approaches is a willingness or
not to recognise as one of norm conflict a situation where a permission conflicts
with a prohibition, given that a permission does not have to be exercised, thus
avoiding the conflict.153 Jenks154 and some of Kelsen’s writing155 suggested the
narrow view,156 in other writings Kelsen endorsed the broad view so as to
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understand this situation coming within the category of norm conflict.157 Hart, who
only briefly addressed norm conflict, also endorsed the broader view.158 The
reason the difference between the narrow and broad views matters is that the
narrow view excludes the operation of norm conflict rules in this situation, instead
by definition requiring the permission not to be exercised, thus favouring the
stricter or more demanding prohibition. This tends to resolve the situation only at
the cost of failing to adequately consider the justification for favouring
automatically the prohibition.159 It thus ignores the question of value choice,
treating coherence, and the quickest way to it, as an end in itself.
This approach, for example, downplays the significance of legislative or
constituent intention. Perhaps a permission was enacted precisely to limit the
scope of a prohibition; the narrow view of norm conflict simply shuts down the
issue by automatically applying the stricter norm, i.e. the prohibition.160 More
generally, norm conflict rules reflect the intentions of the parties on an objective
basis,161 because they in turn reflect objective conventions concerning legal
communication, e.g. in the case of the application of lex specialis as a norm
conflict maxim, the more specific provision is applied over more general ones
because more specific provisions reflect, as a matter of logic, more accurately the
will or the law-maker, a point discussed further below.
A broader view again considers that two permissions can conflict. Hart did
not think this a situation of conflict, though Hamner Hill and some others do.162
Hamner Hill considers this is a situation of conflicting policies in the law.163
Perhaps the most obvious example of a conflict of permissions is a conflict
between two rights, which can clearly arise, e.g. the grazing rights of a farmer over
common land that is also used by sportspeople or the right to life conflicting with
the right to privacy in the case of abortion. The later situation has arisen in EU
157
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law,164 where the substantive conflict is cut across by a jurisdictional and a
collateral conflict concerning the exercise of free movement, which can in effect
determine the balance between the two competing rights, and the example is
discussed further in Chapter 4. Hamner Hill terms a conflict of jurisdictions
‘normative competition’, and it commonly arises in private international law.165
The effect in EU law is different; it does not just create a competition of
jurisdictions, but can mean importing a right from one Member State to another or
limiting domestic rights.
A conflict between two permissions or rights may be one that is finely
balanced, and so formal rules of norm conflict resolution may only provide a
solution in giving access to the essentially political or moral decision that the lawmaker would have or did intend as regards prioritising them. Hohfeld’s typology
may be useful here, in that it distinguishes between a right and a privilege. A right
is normatively stronger, as noted above; it entails a duty on others not to interfere
with it, whereas a privilege does not entail such a duty. Two privileges do not
really conflict nor do a right and a privilege, since a privilege is contingent upon
factual freedom to do something and can be displaced by the right. Where two
rights are in conflict, as discussed further in Chapter 4, ‘balancing’, despite its
widespread invocation in the context of rights conflicts, does not really provide a
neutral, purely legal way of resolving straightforward conflicts of relatively
incommensurable moral values. If exceptions to a right are understood as part of
norm conflict, they also can give examples of this type of conflict, such as in EU
law a possible conflict between the right to free movement and the right of
Member States to limit free movement on grounds of public security.166
164
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Vranes has considered in most depth the reasons against adopting the
narrow view considering that a prohibition and permission cannot conflict, in
addition to the argument concerning the probable intentions of the contracting
parties. He points out that eliminating conflict through the non-exercise of
permission has the effect of rendering that permission of no useful value and is in
effect to attribute superfluity to the law-maker.167 This goes against a basic tenet of
an attempt to recover the law-maker’s intention, that the law-maker should not be
presumed to act in vain.168 More fundamentally, Vranes cites Jenks to the effect
that the strict definition of norm conflict has the effect of excluding the scope of
application of norm conflict rules from divergences in the law, divergences here
understood to be ways in which norms can achieve differing or conflicting results
once exercised:
… [such a divergence in the law] from a practical point of view be as
serious as conflict; it may render inapplicable provisions designed to give
one of the divergent instruments a measure of flexibility of operation which
was thought necessary to its practicability.169

Vranes rejects a test of conflict based on a test of joint compliance: is it possible
for the addressee of two norms to comply with the second norm, after having
complied with the first one. The joint compliance test excludes conflict which can
be avoided by refusing to exercise (a perhaps implicit) permission,170 and thus
resolves itself to the strict or narrow definition referred to above.
On the broad view of norm conflict, a conflict of norms exists “between
norms, one of which may be permissive, if in obeying or applying one norm, the
factual circumstances that there is such a conflict, or the two permissions may be conceptually
incompatible. In many cases, the resolution may come down to a simple personal choice, e.g. do I
drive or sell my car.
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other norm is necessarily of potentially violated.”171 Thus, what is decisive for
distinguishing the narrow approach from the broad approach is the broad approach
recognises that the (correct) potential application172 of a given norm, isolated
before its application from any consideration of another norm (i.e. prior to any
application of a norm conflict rule), would if so exercised result in conflict with
another norm. As Pauwelyn has noted, this allows the issue of norm conflict to be
addressed more fully.173 The present study seeks to develop this approach,
recognising a broad definition, to a fuller understanding of the connection between
norms conflict resolutions and the values that underlie them in EU law.
The wording of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969174 in
Article 30 raises a further issue of definition: when can rules be said to apply to the
‘same subject matter’ so as to generate the context of conflict?175 Article 30
provides for a lex posterior rule in the case of conflict between a later and an
earlier treaty that is not resolved explicitly by the later treaty. The presence of the
same subject matter is one of the two conditions for Article 30 to apply (the other
being the existence of successive treaties). As with the definition of conflict, a
narrow and a broad view exist on the application of Article 30: the narrow view
holds that a later treaty is not applicable when it “impinges indirectly on the
content of a particular provision of an earlier treaty”.176 It seems difficult to define
ex ante the scope of the concept of ‘indirect impingement’, but it seems this
narrow approach may be the only tenable one.
The broad view of ‘same subject matter’ accepts the applicability of two
treaties to the same subject matter whenever it is simply possible to apply them to
the same facts and considers Article 30 applicable to any such situation. Wolfrum
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& Matz177 accurately relate a broad view of ‘same subject matter’ to the level of
generality problem in legal reasoning: ultimately, since all treaties could be
considered to deal with ‘human welfare in a broad sense’, when stated at a high
enough level of abstraction178 a broad reading has the potential to render Article 30
universally applicable and thus render nugatory the qualifying conditions for its
application set out in its own wording.179
A number of authors express the view that explicit exceptions to a rule do
not constitute a situation of conflict.180 Once the scope of the exception is
determined, it carves out from the primary rule another rule; there is thus no
overlap and conflict. In the present work, exceptions to rules are considered
situations of conflict, as a logical implication of the view that interpretative norms
may conflict. In the case of an exception, there is a prima facie conflict until the
scope of the exception and the corresponding limit of the primary rule are clarified
by interpretation. Different interpretative approaches will yield a different outcome
to this task of clarification, and thus it may be considered a situation of conflict.

3.5.2 A Typology of Norm Conflict
In this section, substantive norms are first examined followed by an overview of
types of interpretative norm.

3.5.2.1 Types of Substantive Legal Norms
This section briefly outlines a typology of norm conflict with reference to Hohfeld
and Pauwelyn’s recent work on norm conflict. First, it is useful to refer to Hart’s
distinction between secondary and primary rules. Hart considered that all legal
systems were characterised by a union of these two types of rules: (1) primary
177
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rules, which were particular, substantive rules, e.g. rules of the road; and (2)
secondary rules, or ‘rules about or governing the operation of primary rules,
namely, rules of change, of adjudication, and the rule of recognition (the latter
being the fundamental rule determining the criteria by which other rules of law
could be recognised).181 This distinction is relevant for norm conflict in that
secondary rules have an inherent role in the legal system that gives them a degree
of priority over primary rules.182
Pauwelyn identifies six types of norms in his study of norm conflict in
international and specifically WTO law:
i. a command or obligation (in Hohfeld, a duty is the closest equivalent),
ii. a prohibition (in Hohfeld, a disability is the closest equivalent),
iii. a right (similarly termed by Hohfeld),
iv. a permission (in Hohfeld, a privilege is the closest equivalent),
v. an empowerment (similarly termed in Hohfeld as power),
vi. norms regulating other norms (these could be considered a sub-category of
power in Hohfeldian terms, while according to Hart, they are secondary rules).
Pauwelyn relates rights to obligations on others and vice versa (as does Hohfeld).
He notes some further distinctions, between conditional and unconditional norms
and between perspective and permissive components,183 but these elaborate or
notice possible aspects of the six norms set out above. Pauwelyn then outlines a
distinction between conflict stricto sensu and accumulation, the latter entailing the
supplementation or alternatively confirmation of one norm by another norm.
Accumulation involves norms that are ‘complementary’.184
Pauwelyn then examines situations where conflict arises, suggesting that
there can be no conflict if either the subject matter or the parties bound by the two
norms are completely different. The need for rules relating to the same subject
181
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matter seems self-evident and uncontroversial (though see above concerning
definition of the ‘same subject matter’ under Article 30 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties), but some doubt may be raised as to Pauwelyn’s view that
at least one party must be bound by both rules.
The latter, however, though perhaps likely in most cases, does not seem
essential: so long as the content of two norms conflict, a situation may arise from
the point of view of the legal system even if the parties to the norms are each only
bound to one of the norms. An example might be a right by one party, which if
exercised, interferes with a right of another party when the two rights have been
created by private law. It might be suggested here that both parties are bound to
accept a general duty to respect the right of each others, in which case both parties
are bound to both norms, but only in a weak sense. The latter view just begs the
question as to which right prevails. An example might be overlapping or
intersecting rights of way granted to two parties, the exercise of which by one
party in concreto renders the exercise of the right inoperable by the other party.
Another example may be situation in environmental law, where the right of an
industrial energy producer causes harm to the health of a citizen, even though the
energy producer is excising lawful rights.185 For this reason, it seems the more
important conditions for the existence of a conflict are overlap rationae materiae
and co-temporality.
Pauwelyn identifies four situation of conflict:
1. a clash between two commands, e.g. Y and Z are commanded to do two
things that are mutually incompatible or that are different;
2. a conflict between a command and a prohibition;
3. a conflict between a command and an exemption186;
4. a conflict between a prohibition and a right.
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Pauwelyn then distinguishes between necessary and potential conflict, identifying
situation 1. and 2. as necessary and 3. and 4. as potential. Situation 1. covers cases
both where there is a direct incompatibility between two commands and cases
where one command regulates something differently, but without such direct
incompatibility, e.g. one norm mandates a certain level of protection for a given
right, while another norm requires a higher level of protection. This is a situation
that is sometimes directly resolved in EU law through an express Treaty provision.
Article 52(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights187 is an example:
3. In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the
same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not
prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.

This might be thought to neatly resolve the norm conflict, by simply
allowing EU law to go further in protecting a right than does the ECHR, but it
raises a number of unresolved questions. In light of, for example, Hohfeld’s
characterisation of rights as entailing a correlative of a duty on others to respect
the right, rights cannot be taken in an atomistic or isolated way. For this reason,
Article 52(3) does not resolve conflict in that a given ECHR right X entails a
correlative duty on others to respect the right to the extent that the right is granted,
whereas more extensive protection for right X under EU law will entail more of a
correlative duty, thus resulting in a conflict between lesser and greater duties: the
ECHR will then require a degree of respect for right X as matter of legal duty that
does not go as far as the respect required or permitted by EU law or conversely EU
law will require more of a duty to respect right X than does the ECHR.
This is all the more so since expanding the scope of one right will have a
corresponding effect on potential clashes of rights. An enlarged right X under EU
law is more likely to clash with rights in general under the ECHR than is the
corresponding, more narrowly defined, ECHR right X. Article 52(3) thus seeks to
187
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regulate rationae materiae differing levels of rights protection in a way that seems
conceptually unworkable on Hohfeld’s scheme, which has much relevance in
recognising the inter-relatedness of legal concepts and rights and, here, specifically
the inter-relatedness of rights and duties.188 This reflects a point made by Fiss that
Bills of Rights entail indeterminacy because of their comprehensiveness in that all
the rights are simultaneously applicable. For these reasons, Article 52(3) seems
incomplete as a putative means of norm conflict resolution, since it fails to address
the problem of conflicts of the correlative duties of more and less extensive
formulations of rights, and an additional norm conflict technique is needed, a point
taken up in Chapter 4.
Pauwelyn’s 4 situations above cover most situations of conflict. They go
beyond the narrow definition to allow for conflicts that are avoidable, such as a
conflict between a right and a prohibition or command (in this situation, not
exercising the right will avoid the conflict). It does not cover conflicts between
two permissions. The present work follows Pauwelyn’s listing, except
acknowledges conflict between two permissions or freedoms or rights (or to follow
Hohfeld, a conflict between two rights, privileges, or immunities189) may also
occur, while also placing more emphasis on conflicts of interpretative norms.
Acknowledgment of a clash between permissions or freedoms or rights is
important, because such clashes are central to human rights adjudication.

3.5.2.2 Types of Interpretative Legal Norms
A recent general account of legal reasoning by Spaak190 distinguishes between
interpretative arguments (ways of attributing meaning to a text), interpretative
presumptions (e.g. presumption against absurd consequences), modalities of

188

See also A. Torres Perez, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union (Oxford Univ. Press 2009),
37, 60-62.
189
A conflict between two immunities seems unlikely in practice, since an immunity is a negative
type of legal interest to resist a power. An example in abstract terms is a conflict between an
immunity against a duty owed to another party.
190
T. Spaak, ‘Guidance and Constraint: The Action-Guiding Capacity of Neil MacCormick’s
Theory of Legal Reasoning’, 26(4) L and P 343-376 (2007), 346-349.

113

decisions191 (such as analogy), and conflict solving maxims (such as lex specialis,
lex posterior, and lex superior). In this section, interpretative norms are briefly
surveyed; in the next section, norms of conflict resolution are briefly overviewed.
The reasons or rationale for each approach are also briefly identified, before a
fuller discussion in Chapter 3 of a central cleavage in methods of legal
interpretation: whether a method is ‘conserving’ of meaning or innovative in its
effect.
An initial distinction is that between first and second order justification, as
articulated by MacCormick. First-order justification relates to deduction from clear
rules and can be related to the clear case of legal reasoning where meaning is
straightforward in that a readily applicable legal rule exists. Second-order
justification relates to the choice between different methods of interpretation, e.g.
when a textual approach on its own results in ambiguity.192 As Maduro has noted
in criticism of the ECJ, the Court is generally quite poor at second-order
justification, leaving its choices largely unjustified.193
a. ‘Literal’ or ‘ordinary’ or ‘textual’ or ‘plain language’ meaning: this approach
privileges the ordinary, everyday meaning of terms used in legal texts. It could be
said to involve, by definition given its ‘ordinariness’, the least amount of
interpretative effort by the interpreter, since it does not generally involve any
additional interpretative effort beyond the comprehension of language as is
required for ordinary everyday living. However, sometimes ordinary meaning may
be technical: it may be ordinary in a specific professional or vocational context,
though it may have a somewhat different meaning for most citizens. The reasons
191
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why this method of attributing meaning has priority in most legal systems, i.e. its
underlying values, were well summarised by Summers & Taruffo:
First, these types of arguments require for their construction the least by
way of materials. … The second … is that, when competing with other
arguments, the linguistic arguments are relatively more difficult to cancel,
or relatively less often subordinated pursuant to a mandatory rule or maxim
of priority, or relatively more difficult to outweigh, than other arguments.
Their superior comparative force is presumably attributable mainly to the
great weight of the substantive rationales behind them, including democratic
legitimacy of the legislature.194

b. Teleological or purposive: this approach is broader than the previous one in
identifying the purpose or aim underlying a provision as a primary interpretative
consideration and thus goes beyond the self-evident meaning at first reading.
Although it is often now associated with EU law, it is equivalent to the mischief
rule of interpretation at common law, whereby the problem that a statute was
trying to address could be examined as a way of supplementing the meaning
derived on the basis of the ordinary meaning approach.195 What is different about
EU law then compared to the traditional common law approach is not in having a
concept of purposive interpretation, but in the degree to which it influences
interpretation. Lasser has aptly described a distinct characteristic of the use of
purposive interpretation by the ECJ as ‘meta-teleological’.196 This means that
purposes are stated at a broad level of generality. Very often, the level of
generality issue is left unarticulated,197 which raises questions concerning choice,
discretion, and objectivity. The rationale underlying this interpretation is apparent
from the term used to denote it, i.e. it is to advance the purposes of a legal
provision.
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c. Consequentalist: This approach allows consideration of the consequences of a
particular interpretation to be decisive or important in legal reasoning. This relates
to an aspect of interpretation that arises anytime there exists interpretative choice,
it is thus a consideration that attaches to other interpretative considerations, rather
than being a free-standing one by itself, unless on the basis of consequentalism, a
judge entirely ignores an otherwise applicable legal text. The term ‘resultsoriented’ is also used. Purposive and consequentalist approaches may in fact
converge, especially depending on how broadly purpose is stated; the more
broadly purpose is stated, the more likely the reasoning can push toward pure
consequentalism.
d. Historical or originalist interpretation: This privileges the understanding of a
legal text prevalent at the time of its adoption (in US literature, the term
‘originalist’198 is more commonly used and is the term used in the present work).
Two types of originalist interpretation can be identified. One looks to the intention
of the authors or signatories or those who ratified legal texts, e.g. as evidenced by
preparatory or drafting materials. A more objective type of originalist
interpretation looks to the understanding that the legal terms had generally in the
legal system or body politic at the time of its adoption, as evidenced by legal
tradition. A text itself is objective evidence of historical intention, but it may result
in ambiguity, calling for reference to other legal materials to fill in the gap in
meaning. This is especially the case with human rights clauses. Evolutive
interpretation is the opposite of originalist interpretation, and the latter can also be
described as ‘conserving’.

3.6 Norm Conflict Rules
Earlier in this chapter, a distinction was drawn between a rule-bound approach to
norm conflict resolution and a more global or principles-driven approach. Though
less open and discretionary than principles, it is not the case though that these rules
entirely exclude questions of value choice in norm conflict resolution, for they
198
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themselves rest on certain values or logical preferences; but once posited and
given authoritative status of norm conflict rules in a legal system, they tend to preempt a variable application of values by different courts or judge, by disposing of
the question of choice according to their terms. This section examines the values
underlying the traditional norm conflict maxims of lex superior, lex specialis, and
lex posterior and seeks to relate the discussion to the articulation of values in EU
law discussed earlier in this chapter.
A preliminary issue concerns the status of norm conflict maxims as having
a prior validity or alternatively as a product of custom199 and thus contingent and
variable. A similar question arises with the theory of legal interpretation in
general, as referred to in Chapter 1.3, i.e. its universalisability. It is submitted that
the traditional maxims of norm conflict resolution have a similarly universalizable
character in that they are, to at least some extent, propositions of logic. In any legal
system, lex superior must apply to some extent, for the secondary rules must have
a more or less implicit superiority over substantive or primary rules in so far as the
former may be used to amend or abrogate the latter. Given the phenomenon of the
variability of levels of generality with which to characterise the scope of rules,
purposes, and rights in legal reasoning, some application of lex specialis seems
inevitable to produce some degree of consistency, coherence, and predictability.
Similarly, lex posterior seems to have a non-contingent status in so far as any legal
system must recognise the possibility to change the law and thus to give preference
to a more recent law.200 What may be more a matter of custom is the extent to
which these norm conflict rules have force and weight in legal reasoning. The
latter is the subject of this study and the argument is that the values in a legal
system have an important bearing on this force and weight.
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3.6.1 Lex superior
A lex superior rule is perhaps the simplest way of solving norm conflicts in law:
when two norms conflict, one has a higher status and thus applies. Its simplicity at
a conceptual level as a solution though belies the difficulty in determining if a
given norm should have superior status, a problem that is especially acute in EU
law given the strong supremacy claims of the ECJ and the resistance such
unqualified supremacy claims have encountered in national constitutional law, as
discussed in Chapter 1. In legal theory, the most elaborate explanation of the role
of a lex superior can be found in the theory of Hans Kelsen.201 He developed the
idea of a chain of norms, each norm itself deriving validity from a hierarchically
superior norm until eventually an originating ultimate norm or grundnorm could
be posited, from which all other norms derived their validity. Kelsen described his
theory as ‘pure’ in that unlike other positivist accounts and natural law account it
did not relate the theory of law to social facts or to moral postulates.202
In this account, a grundnorm, as an ultimate lex posterior, is inherent in the
notion of law. The grundnorm is a presupposition and could be described as
neither descriptive nor entirely normative.203 It provides theoretical understanding
of the relationship between norms in a hierarchically scheme, but does not provide
a strong account of normativity.204 This aspect of his theory, depending on how it
is viewed, could be considered either useful or inapplicable in EU law. Its abstract
character posits the existence of an ultimate norm, but says little about how to
identify it or decide between competing possible grundnorms, offering little hope
for clarifying the contestedness of the ultimate norm of EU law. This vagueness,
and the fact that the grundnorm is a presupposition, could alternatively be seen as
useful; it leaves open the question of the precise identity of a grundnorm, being
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satisfied with the presupposition.205 This could be taken to suggest that overall
phenomenon of a chain of norms is sufficient for the working of a legal system,
which could give a legal character to legal norms even where the specificity of the
grundnorm is disputed, as arguably it ultimately is in EU law.
Kelsen himself acknowledged the possibility of norm conflict in some of his
works, even given the importance he attributes to a chain of validity that seems to
exclude conflicts between two valid norms, although he has expressed differing
views on the issue.206 One source of conflict he recognised was the possibility for
the law-maker to will differing norms, the practical possibility previously
discussed (in Chapter 1.2.1.5) that seems to be inherent in any legal system where
the identity of the law-maker is variable over time.207 He also in some work
acknowledged that a competent organ might declare a norm valid even though it
did not satisfy the chain of validity208 and that a higher norm could implicitly
contain an alternative formulation so as to allow the organ of creation of the lower
norm to choose either to follow its explicit stipulations or depart from them.209
These views detract from the overall coherence of Kelsen’s theory, and Weyland,
for example, rejects them as unhelpful to Kelsen’s theory given their
incompatibility with his concepts of (a) objective validity and (b) of the legal
system, considering the latter logically presupposes lex superior.210
The ultimate status and application of lex posterior as a rule of norm conflict
is perhaps the most contested of all questions of EU law, especially when
presented in sharp terms as a conflict between the ultimate constitutional claims to
legitimacy of the EU and the Member States. However, the question also arises as
205

See generally I. Weyland, ‘The Application of Kelsen’s Theory of the Legal System to
European Community Law – The Supremacy Puzzle Resolved’, 21(1) L and P 1-37 (2002),
especially 23-24.
206
As noted by Duxbury, Kelsen in later life changed his views on two important parts of his
theory: norm conflict and the status of the grundnorm (Duxbury (2008), op cit, 52).
207
Se, e.g. H. Kelsen (1968), op cit, ii, 1429, cited in Vranes (2006), op cit, 399.
208
H. Kelsen, Hans Kelsen: Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy (Kluwer 1973), 244, cited and
discussed in Harris (1986), op cit, 215-216. See also I. Weyland, ‘Idealism and Realism in Kelsen’s
Treatment of Norm Conflicts’, in Tur & Twining (eds.) (1986), ibid, 254.
209
H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Harvard Univ. Press 1945), 156-157, cited and
discussed, e.g. in Weyland (1986), ibid.
210
Weyland (1986), ibid; Weyland (2002), ibid, 113. On Kelsen’s changes of views, see also
Harris, 201‘Kelsen (1986), op cit, 201, noting that “Whatever may be true of norms, no one surely
would claim that the principle of non-contradiction should be applied to Kelsen himself”, at 210211. See also Duxbury (2008), op cit, 52, 60-61; Paulson in Tur & Twining (1986), op cit.

119

regards the relationship between EU law and general international, and the
treatment of the question in that context by the ECJ can allow for a more
structured perspective on the question, linking it to both the status of EU law vis-àvis national law and international law. Kelsen’s idea of a chain of validity applied
this way raises the question whether there is any common grundnorm, in the form
of a ‘so long as’ principle of compatibility with basic rights, linking the
relationship between EU law and both national and international law.211 The
question has been most sharply raised in EU law in the context of protection of
fundamental rights. This issue is further explored in Chapter 4 below. Finally, it is
worth noting that lex superior abrogates lex posterior in favour of lex prior, in that
a later norm is invalidated if it conflicts with a hierarchically superior earlier norm.

3.6.2 Lex specialis
The general principle of lex specialis derog legi generali (‘lex specialis’)212 has
long been a technique of norm conflict resolution. The principle requires that the
more specific rule be applied over and above the more general rule.213 Ener de
Vattel, one of the fathers of modern international law, said lex specialis should
prevail “because special matter permits admits of fewer exceptions than that which
is general: it is enjoined with greater precision, and appears to have been more
pointedly intended”.214 The rationale for the principle can thus be said to have
several elements: (a) it reflects a rational principle that whatever is most
specifically stipulated is more wished for by the law-maker or States; (b) it
contributes to the efficacy of law by (i) removing the need for more ad hoc
211
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exceptions to the general rules of State responsibility and (ii) allowing for greater
precision; and (c) in transnational law, it is an expression of State sovereignty, in
that it permits States to adopt their own agreed rules for responsibility between
them.215
Though, there is a clear rationale for the rule in that it logically provides a
clearer way of expressing the intention of the law-maker, some issues need further
examination: in particular, how far does it go, in other words how to determine the
specificity? This is related to the more general problem of levels of generality in
legal reasoning.216 However, the principle lex specialis seems to answer this
potential problem itself, by indicating the most specific level of generality is the
appropriate one. This can be given a determinate content in practice looking to the
most relevant and specific legal tradition.217 Thus, two conceptions of lex specialis
might be identified:
i. A narrow understanding, as a straightforward conflict rule: if a specific rule does
apply, and so does a general one, the more specific rule is to be applied. The more
specific rule has a restrictive effect, since application of general principles tends to
215
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in, e.g. Case C-444/00 Mayer Parry Recycling [2003] ECR I-6163, paras. 51 and 57, where the
Court held that “Directive 94/62 must be considered to a special provision (a lex specialis) vis-à-vis
Directive 75/442, so that its provisions prevail over those of Directive 75/442 in situations which it
specifically seeks to regulate.” See also, e.g. Case C-252/05, R (Thames Water Utilities Ltd.) v.
Bromley Magistrates’ Court (Interested party: Environment Agency) [2007] ECR I-3883, paras.
39-41 (where the validity of lex specialis was recognised but held not to apply to the provisions in
issue).
216
This may be what Klabbers has in mind when he described the distinction between special and
general treaties as “itself hopelessly uncertain”, though he does not develop the point and notes
Lindroos’ positive appraisal of lex specialis: Klabbers (2009), op cit, 90, citing A. Lindroos,
‘Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis’, 74(1)
NJIL 27-66 (2005). Pru d’Homme interprets the decision of the ICJ in DRC v. Congo as completely
abandoning lex specialis, even though the Court stated “...some rights may be exclusively matters
of humanitarian law; some rights may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet other may be
matters of both these branches of international law”: Case Concerning Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo, ICJ Reports 116 (2005), para. 216. See N. Pru d’Homme, ‘Lex Specialis:
Oversimplifying A More Complex and Multifaceted Relationship’, 40(2) Israeli LR 356-395
(1987), 385. On another view, at most, the ICJ here seems to accept that the two branches of law
may accumulate, while implicitly seeming to accept one or the other may sometimes be lex
specialis.
217
See generally footnote 6 of the Judgment of Justice Scalia in Michael H. v. Gerald D., supra n.
197; Tribe & Dorf (1988), op cit, 21-23 et seq; Conway (2008), op cit.
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permit supplementation or extension of specific rules. If the existing specific rules
are treated as exhaustive, such supplementation is prevented.218
ii. A more general understanding by which lex specialis is an interpretative
consideration, and its rationale as noted above, relates to the recovery of the
intention of the law-maker, and which entails looking to the most specific relevant
legal tradition when interpreting ambiguous clauses or concepts.
A feedback effect may take place if lex specialis is consistently applied that may
minimise legislative inconsistency: if courts systematically adopt lex specialis, the
law-maker may also become attuned to the principle and the need for legislation to
deliberately reflect it.
Systemic interpretation is oriented toward lex generalis in that it relates
particular legal provisions to various surrounding provisions, and what is relevant
here under the concept of ‘systemic’ can vary in generality. In EU law, the highest
level of generality has tended to be that of enhanced European integration, for
example, the goal of ‘ever-closer Union’ stated in the Preamble of the Treaties.219
The manipulability of the level of generality used to determine what is relevant
creates a problem of uncertainty and indeterminacy. Bobbio commented that
everyone understood that amongst the various interpretive methods, recourse to the
spirit of the system or to general principles of law is the one to be deployed most
rarely and most cautiously, since it is the interpretive method most vulnerable to
personal preferences and the ideology of the judge.220 As Lindroos notes, questions
of relative importance are not resolved by lex specialis,221 but this is just to say
that the concept cannot do the work of substantive philosophy, which it does not
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International Law Commission/Koskenniemi (2006), op cit, paras. 89-92. For a contrary view,
see Pauwelyn (2003), op cit, 410-412.
219
Favouring the opposite of lex specialis, see: “Coherence criteria can look at many different
layers or levels of generality in the law all the way up to the very process of integration and the
single market which EC law is aiming to achieve”, in J. Bengoetxea, ‘The Scope for Discretion,
Coherence and Citizenship’, in O. Wiklund (ed.), Judicial Discretion in European Perspective
(Kluwer 2003), 69.
220
N. Bobbio, ‘Des Critères Pour Résoudre les Antinomies’, in C. Perelman (ed.), Les Antinomies
en Droit (Bruylant 1965), 240-241. See also Rasmussen (1986), op cit, 62.
221
Lindroos (2005), op cit, 44.
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have to claim to do. It is a formal tool, whose application may put the onus on the
law-maker for legal reform.

3.6.3 Lex posterior
Lex posterior derogat lege priori (‘lex posterior’) requires that the most recent
enactment ought to have priority over earlier enactments. As with lex specialis, it
reflects a rational principle: that which is willed most recently is willed more. Lex
posterior can be said to arise usually through inadvertence by the law-maker, since
it can be supposed that a law-maker will not deliberately or knowingly have
enacted or accepted the continuing enactment of contradictory laws and a later law
will normally explicitly repeal an earlier law that it contradicts. For reasons of
practicality, it is not always possible to achieve this, given the sheer number of
rules in any legal system and the regular need for new laws, meaning that a fully
comprehensive and exhaustive examination of all existing laws is not always
feasible when a new law is being enacted.
Although coherence or non-contradiction could be achieved by giving
priority to the earlier law,222 the later law represents the most recent will of the
law-maker,223 and in a democracy has an obvious justification as the most recent
expression of democratic consent. A legal system which has no means of
prioritising

between

successive

competing

and

contradictory

norms

is

unreasonable224 and impossible to comply with. An obvious limitation is that a
subsequent law cannot derogate from a prior norm at a higher level in the legal
hierarchy of sources, in which case lex superior prevails. The principle is
relatively unproblematic except when it applies to laws at the same level of legal
hierarchy, but where the first law deals with much more important matters, implied
repeal or implied derogation by a later law dealing with less important matters is
222

Paulson in Tur & Twining (eds.) (1986), op cit, 236.
Article 30(3) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra n. 174, applies lex posterior in
international treaty law to successive treaties where all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties
also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended. Under, Article 30(2) of
the Vienna Convention, lex prior may prevail if the later treaty is specifically subject to it.
224
H. Kelsen, ‘Reichgesetz Und Landesgesetz Nach Österreichischer Verfassung’, 32 Archiv des
Öffenlichen Rechts 202-45, 390-438 (1914), 206-207, as translated and cited in Paulson (1986), op
cit, 232.
223
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difficult to attribute to the law-maker. Given the hierarchy of sources in EU law,
where the Treaties are in effect the equivalent of a superior constitutional norm,
this problem does not really arise in EU law (though it does arise, e.g. in the
UK225).

3.7 Concluding Comments on Values in EU Law and Norm Conflict Rules
The various conflict-solving maxims interact, and it is thus necessary to establish
priority between them. Bobbio concluded that clearly hierarchy is the strongest of
the norm-conflict rules, i.e. that hierarchically superior rule or norm must prevail
over a more recent hierarchically inferior rule or norm or a more specialised norm,
i.e. where there is an irreconcilable conflict that cannot be resolved through
interpretation,226 because basic competence is obviously a more important and
fundamental criterion than succession in time.227 Bobbio further noted that the
relationship between more general and more specific provisions and as regards
chronology was uncertain, i.e. between a prior lex specialis and a later more
general provision.228 However, the rationale of lex specialis seems to hold true
whether or not the competing, more general rule is prior or subsequent to it, if the
lex generalis is in the form of a principle rather than a rule.
The sequence in time does not alter the degree of speciality or generality.
Thus, lex specialis should still prevail unless the subsequent more general norm
either expressly abrogates the prior more special one or establishes a new rule
clearly inconsistent with lex specialis. Similarly, lex specialis may also interact
with a lex superior that is also lex posterior and more general. Thus, a superior
norm of a more general character that is enacted later than lex specialis may by
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The issue has not yet been squarely confronted by the House of Lords (now the Supreme
Court), but the Administrative Court has suggested that a later, ordinary or non-constitutional Act
of Parliament can only repeal an earlier Act of Parliament of a constitutional nature by express
repeal: Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), paras. 60-67 (per Laws
LJ.).
226
The possibility of removing potential antinomies through interpretation is emphasised in C.
Perelman, ‘Les Antinomies en Droit: Essai de Synthèse’, in Perelman (ed.) (1965), op cit, 398, 403.
See further Chapter 4 below.
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Bobbio (1965), op cit, 254.
228
Ibid. See also Klabbers (2009), op cit, 139, suggesting lex superior prevails over lex specialis.
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implication abrogate or repeal it. However, the distinctions between contradiction
and accumulation and between rules and principles are also important here.229 If
there is no contradiction between the lex specialis and superior lex generalis, i.e.
the superior lex generalis does not expressly abrogate the lex specialis and does
not contain a rule clearly contradicting lex specialis, the rationale for the exclusive
application of lex specialis seems to remain. This can be related to the relatively
uncertain scope and reach of lex generalis, a point underscored by Advocate
General Stix-Hackl in her discussion of the non-justiciability of the concept of
human dignity in Omega. All that this means is that the onus is on the law-maker
or constituent power to formally abrogate the prior lex specialis in cases of
ambiguity.
The application of traditional norm conflict maxims constitutes a rule-bound
approach to norm conflict resolution. A focus on rules in legal reasoning can both
sharpen and help resolve conflict. Considering rules to be the primary operators in
a legal system limits interpretative discretion, since the rules are less susceptible to
judicial ‘maximisation’ or ‘optimisation’ to use Alexy’s term. On a rule-bound
approach, conflict cannot be avoided, therefore, through increasing the weight of
one rule over another, whereas principles, such as Dworkin’s best fit standard, are
more manipulable in this regard. Yet a clear application of norm conflict rules also
provides a systematic approach to norm conflict resolution, in a way that better
respects the appropriate institutional competences of the law-maker and the
judiciary compared to a more free-wheeling, principles-driven approach. The latter
tends to invite judicial involvement in determining the content of the law, and not
just its application.
The application of norm conflict rules and more generally of a rule-bound
approach to interpretation can be related to traditional normative hierarchies as
encapsulated in the ideas of formal legality, popular democracy (through a greater
orientation to recovering original intention of the law-maker), and a separation of
powers (through deference by the judiciary to the law-making authority or
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See International Law Commission/Koskenniemi (2006), op cit, 54-56.
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constituent power). Legitimacy is thus understood essentially in input terms.230
The question of interpretation is a key prior conceptual issue. Originalist
interpretation is naturally related to lex specialis, but the need for, and operation
of, the other norm conflict rules is dependent upon the nature of the prior
interpretation of substantive norms. Thus, interpretation, and the conflict between
differing interpretative norms, is the focus of the next chapter.
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This can be contrasted with the ‘governance turn’, at least in so far as the latter is presented as a
general normative framework for contemporary legality and tends to dissipate clear normative
hierarchies. Though the conception of stakeholders and involved actors in governance theory might
suggest a process-oriented approach, this tends not to be articulated in democratic terms.
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Chapter 4 - Conflicts of Interpretative Norms in the Legal Reasoning of the
ECJ

4.1 Introduction
The rules of lex superior, lex specialis, and lex posterior discussed in Chapter 3
will often be applicable when two norms are clearly in conflict. Prior to the
determination that there is a conflict, however, there must be an interpretation of
each norm in order to determine its content and thus to determine whether conflict
exists. Given that there are various methods of interpretation, it may be that one
method of interpretation may reduce or eliminate the potential conflict and so preempt the application of one of the norm conflict maxims. This possibility in turn
raises the question of an interpretative hierarchy, i.e. a ranking between the
different techniques of interpretation, and the issue of the extent to which it is
legitimate to vary methods of interpretation and their relative deployment or
ranking in order to avoid substantive conflict of norms. This question relates to the
normative scope of interpretation; differing methods of interpretation can be
related to different rationales or values. It might be thought that flexibility in
approaches to interpretation, allowing judicial choice as to what methods to adopt,
could provide an easier means of norm conflict. However, as Klabbers notes:
... Zuleeg also points out that the oft-preferred escape into harmonising
interpretation is, really, no escape at all but instead reproduces the problem.
For to argue that conflicting provisions in different treaties can be
harmonised will normally entail that one will be brought into line with the
other. But on what basis can an objective decision be made to interpret treat
A so as to accommodate treaty B, rather than the other way around?1

As noted in Chapter 3, the pre-eminent method of interpretation in most
legal systems is textual or ordinary meaning interpretation. This can be related to
values of the rule of law and democracy. It reflects democracy, in so far as the
1
J. Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009), 89, citing M.
Zuleeg, ‘Vertragskonkurrenz im Völkerrecht. Teil I: Verträge Zwischen Souveränen Staaten’, 20
GYIL 246-276 (1977), 271-274.
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public ascertainability of and comprehension of the law seems to rest on shared
linguistic criteria,2 and ordinary meaning does constitute a necessary criterion for
this purpose. The meaning is ordinary precisely because it is widely shared, and
this is what enables the shared, public space of communication in which coherent
democratic and deliberation can take place. Similarly, the rule of law, understood
in the sense of formal legality, presupposes the widespread comprehension of the
law by ordinary citizens, and ordinary meaning is thus necessary here too.3
Privileging ordinary meaning for these reasons is in general uncontroversial;4 what
is more controversial is the extent to which i. systemic arguments and ii.
arguments from original intention, which could be considered a conserving
interpretation,5 should be deployed.
The ECJ is characterised above all perhaps by a tendency to systemic
interpretation, whereby Treaty provisions are interpreted in light of the overall
goals and aims of the Treaties stated at a high level of generality.6 The concept of
lex specialis is relevant here as both a maxim of conflict resolution and a more
general principle of interpretation.7 Lex specialis points to a narrow interpretation
of a norm in the sense that it should be understood as specifically as possible

2

See R. Summers & M. Taruffo, ‘Interpretation and Comparative Analysis’ in DN. MacCormick &
R. Summers (eds.) Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study (Aldershot 1991), 481-482. The
principle of charity in interpretation associated with Wilson, Quine, and Davidson supports the idea
of a shared hermeneutic framework as a dimension of the rule of law: see generally, D. Davidson,
‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’, in D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective,
Objective (Clarendon Press 2001).
3
Tamanaha put it that “Above all else it is about predictability”: Tamanaha (2004), 119; M.
Kramer, Objectivity and the Rule of Law (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007), 116, referring to public
ascertainability of the law as a necessary condition of the rule of law and of any type of
governance.
4
Summers & Taruffo (1991), op cit, 481-482.
5
Justice Scalia of the US Supreme Court used the term ‘semantic intent’: A. Scalia, ‘CommonLaw Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws’, in A. Scalia & A. Gutmann (ed.), A Matter of Interpretation: Federal
Courts and the Law (Princeton Univ. Press 1998), 37-44. Scalia notes that the specific intentions of
the authors of a text are related to their objective use of language in a given context: Scalia, ibid,
44. Reliance on the specific intention of the authors or ratifiers of legal texts is in one sense not
conserving, at least in terms of the public record of the law, since it may be because the public
record, as evidenced by ordinary meaning, may be incomplete or ambiguous that resort to evidence
of original intention becomes necessary or useful in interpretation.
6
A. Bredimas, Methods of Interpretation and Community Law (North-Holland 1978), 179; J.
Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice (Clarendon Press 1993), vi; M.
de S.O. l’E. Lasser, Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and
Legitimacy (Oxford Univ. Press 2004), 288.
7
i.e. as not just a rule for determining a choice between two different norms, but as a rule of
interpretation of a given norm.
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consistently with its ordinary meaning (so it is not a question of straining language
to achieve greater specificity). There is a connection here between lex specialis
and original intention or understanding, since it is more likely that particular rules
are intended by the law-maker to be understood in a more localised way than more
general rules: that in a sense is the whole point of enacting a specific rule.
What this suggests is that an appeal to systemic interpretation should be a
secondary type of interpretative resort and that the application of lex specialis is
more consistent with originalist interpretation, whereas systemic interpretation is
goal-oriented in way that can justify evolutive or innovative interpretation. As
such, systemic and innovative interpretation are prima facie more flexible and,
therefore, seem to have greater potential for resolving conflict’ However, as
Zuleeg and Klabbers note, the problem of value choice and its justification
remains. The well known doctrine of ‘indirect effect’8 of EU law requires national
courts to interpret law to be compatible with EU law and thus invokes the idea of
harmonising interpretation. Nonetheless, as Pauwelyn notes, there are limits to
such interpretation, it cannot be contra legem or change the law to avoid conflict:
… interpretation must be limited to giving meaning to rules of law. It
cannot extend to creating new rules. Within the process of treaty
interpretation, other rules cannot add meaning to WTO rules that goes either
beyond or against the clear’ meaning of the terms’ of the WTO rule in
question. Interpretations contra legem are prohibited.9

The ECJ itself has stated interpretation cannot be contra legem.10 However,
this apparently clear limit on interpretation becomes much greyer and blurred as a
practical demarcating line between what is legitimate interpretation and what is not
when evolutive or innovative interpretation comes into play. Innovative

8

Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti [1979] ECR 1629; Case 14/83, Von Colson and Kamann
v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 189; C-106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial
Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135. In Marleasing, the ECJ held that the
requirement to construe national law in conformity with the Directive in issue precluded the
interpretation of the Directive to the effect that grounds of nullity other than those in the Directive
could be imputed to it.
9
J. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003), 245.
10
C-105/03, Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285, para. 47; C-268/06,
IMPACT v. Minister for Agriculture and Food [2007] ECR I-12327, paras. 100-101.
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interpretation could be said to just shed a new perspective on the legal source and
that its meaning is already there as part of the source, but in practice it can
substantively add to and thus change the law.11 Although a full consideration of
the limits of legitimate interpretation and what distinguishes interpretation from
law-making is beyond the scope of this chapter, the focus of the chapter on the
contrast between conserving or

originalist interpretation and evolutive

interpretation could be taken as a litmus test for the limits of interpretation more
generally. This chapter is concerned with the question of the scope or limits of
interpretation as a means of norm conflict resolution, and it does this through
examining the contrast between conserving or originalist interpretation and
innovative or evolutive interpretation.
The perspective argued for is that conserving or originalist interpretation is
both

epistemically

possible

and

normatively

preferable

than

evolutive

interpretation. The latter rests on essentially political preferences as to what is a
desirable outcome and is difficult to reconcile with the requirement of
predictability as a key feature of formal legality and with the democratic authority
of the law-maker (and the comparative lack of democratic or representative
legitimacy of the judiciary). In EU law scholarship, several authors have critiqued
the downplaying by the ECJ of textual interpretation.
The Court has interpreted Treaty provisions so as to take more power into
its own hands and to reduce the power of national courts. It has felt itself
entitled to fill gaps in the Treaty and generally to interpret legal provisions
so as to further its own vision of a harmonizing and fully effective
Community legal system operating throughout the Member States. In the
process the ECJ has been driven to adopt strained interpretations of the texts
actually agreed by Member States and it has introduced doctrines and rights
of action which cannot be found in the texts…12

11

J. Raz, ‘On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries’, in L.
Alexander (ed.), Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (Cambridge Univ. Press 1998),
186, suggesting innovative interpretation in small steps can lead to ‘radical’ change over time; R.
Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Harvard Univ. Press 2006), 123, noting that “Very often, however,
controversial decisions that seem novel do satisfy that test of fit”.
12
P. Neill, The European Court of Justice: A Case study in Judicial Activism (European Policy
Forum 1995). 2.
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The methods of interpretation adopted by the ECJ appear to have liberated
the Court from the customarily accepted discipline of endeavouring by
textual analysis to ascertain the meaning of the language of the relevant
provision.13

Hartley bemoaned what he identified as the “settled and consistent policy of
the ECJ” of “promoting European federalism”, whereby the Court refused to
accept “the natural meaning” of Treaty provisions and engaged in “judicial
legislation”.14 More recently,15 Stone Sweet proposed that the ‘constitutionalising’
decisions of the ECJ in Van Gend en Loos16 and Costa v. ENEL17 and the resulting
combination of supremacy, direct effect, and the workings of the preliminary
reference procedure under Art. 234 ECT conditioned the legislative process at EU
level and had far-reaching effects in national legal systems of the Member States.
This was a transformation in a way unintended by the Member States at the
founding, since the Treaties did not attribute direct effect or supremacy to
themselves, rather they represented ‘international law plus’, i.e. standard internal
law cooperation with the added feature of compulsory ECJ jurisdiction and the
particular role of the Commission.18 These criticisms tend to be implicitly
originalist in their approach, although originalism as a general approach to
interpretation applicable across the full range of substantive norms (including
human rights and competence norms) has been relatively little articulated in
commentary on the ECJ.
Interpretation of human rights norms presents what could be said to be a
special case because of the relative abstraction of norms. As a result, as mentioned
in Chapter 1, traditional norm conflict maxims do not generally apply unless the
human rights norms have been enacted at different times or at different levels of a
legal hierarchy (they are often enacted together in a single Bill of Rights or are
enacted as supplementations, with the same hierarchical status, to an existing Bill
13

Ibid, 47.
T. Hartley, ‘The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the European
Union’, 112 LQR 95-109 (1996), 95.
15
A. Stone Sweet, ‘The Juridical Coup d’État and the Problem of Authority’, 8(10) GLJ 915-928
(2007).
16
Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1.
17
Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585.
18
Stone Sweet (2007), op cit, 924.
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of Rights19). An appeal to ordinary meaning is generally insufficient, and in this
context the distinction between evolutive or innovative interpretation and
conserving interpretation takes on especial importance. In addition to evolutive
interpretation, the concept of balancing is often invoked as a means of determining
the relative scope of competing rights norms. These two issues in the context of
human rights norms are addressed in Chapter 4; this chapter focuses more
generally on the issue of evolutive versus conserving or originalist interpretation of
any legal norms, but especially of constitutional norms.
It has almost become commonplace to consider constitutions especially
appropriate for evolutive interpretation, yet the normative case for this view has
never been comprehensively identified in scholarship either on the EU or ECHR.
Such justifications as are offered tend to. The two leading works on the ECJ did
not address the issue,20 though Rasmussen’s work tends toward an originalist
perspective without strongly articulating it. In this chapter, the dominant
influences in contemporary legal theory that favour the acceptability of evolutive
interpretation, Dworkin and Raz (ostensibly coming from different perspectives,
but ending up with similar effects), are critically examined.
Although legal reasoning inevitably has to some extent both a retrospective
and prospective aspect,21 what is open to contestation is the degree to which
interpretation should normatively seek to recover the original intention of the lawmaker or source of the legal norm(s) being interpreted. The minimal inherent
prospective element of legal reasoning is that legal norms being interpreted must
be applied to the facts of a current case so as to determine future legal relationships
consequent on the interpretation of the norm. Where controversy exists in the legal
literature, it tends to focus on the degree to which judges should so far as possible

19

The numerous protocols to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), ETS no. 05, are
examples of the latter. Most of the Protocols to the ECHR supplement the standards in the ECHR
itself, rather than amend it. An example of an amending Protocol is Protocol No. 13 abolishing the
death penalty in all circumstances (ETS no. 187)
20
The two most recent and main works on the legal reasoning of the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) by Rasmussen and Bengoetxea did not address the issue of originalism in legal reasoning: H.
Rasmussen, On Law and Policy of the European Court of Justice (Kluwer 1986) and Bengoetxea
(1993), op cit, as noted by Weiler (1987), op cit, 575, and G. Gaja, ‘Beyond the Reasons Stated in
judgements’, 92(6) Michigan LR 1966-1976 (1994), 1975, respectively.
21
Dickson (2009), op cit.
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seek to interpret laws in accordance with the intention of the law-maker,22 or
conversely, should engage a more forward-looking innovative interpretation to
achieve a more fitting or suitable norm.23 From the perspective of norm conflict,
the possibility of original intention being discoverable would add to the potential
coherence of a legal system and thus could reduce norm conflict generally in a
legal system by allowing law-makers to be more deliberate in how they make the
law. This could potentially result in a greater intentional avoidance of conflict
between a draft law under consideration and the law in general. In contrast, if
group or legislative intention is generally not feasible as an epistemic possibility,
the intentional and purposeful avoidance of conflict diminishes.24 In the discussion
below, the argument is advanced that a dominant view in academic literature that
original intention is not recoverable is superficial and rests on a dubious epistemic
premise.
Raz suggests that disagreement on the scope of innovative as opposed to
conserving interpretation is always present, and appears to suggest that this
precludes a general normative preference for one over the other.25 However, few
questions of political morality would be resolved if the fact itself of disagreement
over them prevented a normative preference. Moreover, in its effect, Raz’s
approach is to sanction the most permissive option, since a narrower normative
approach is precluded by the mere fact of disagreement (a sceptic might note that
the result of this position coincides, in the example of interpretation, with Raz’s
own preference for innovative interpretation).
In an EU context, it may be wondered who these ‘original intenders’ are?
They are understood here to be the signatories whose political authority to bind a

22

Most famously, see generally R. Bork, The Tempting of America (Simon & Schuster 1990). More
recently, see, e.g. K. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent,
& Judicial Review (Kansas Univ. Press 1999).
23
See, e.g. J. Raz, ‘Intention in Interpretation’, in R. George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford
Univ. Press, 1996) (‘1996a’); J. Raz, ‘Why Interpret?’, 9(4) RJ 349-363 (1996) (‘1996b’); Raz
(1998), op cit; J. Raz, ‘Interpretation: Pluralism and Innovation’, in Between Authority and
Interpretation (Oxford Univ. Press 2009). See also W. Waluchow, A Common Law Theory of
Judicial Review (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007).
24
It is a possibility that a law-maker might intentionally enact a law that conflicts with another law
without formally repealing that other law, but it seems a rational legislature would not do so.
25
Raz (1996b), op cit, 361-3; Raz (1998), op cit, 180, 185.
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polity (the authorised representatives of a Member State, in the EU context).26 This
chapter thus examines the case for and against the use of evidence of original
intention of the Member States representatives in constituting or enacting EU law.
As mentioned, originalist interpretation has hardly been debated at all in
scholarship on legal reasoning in EU law. More generally, it is resisted by much
academic opinion, with one author even suggesting it is ‘disreputable’ in academic
circles, where it is the subject of ‘scholarly scorn’.27
In this chapter, the normative case for reliance on subjective originalist
meaning is discussed:28 the general case for conserving interpretation is examined,
taking Raz as a starting point for the discussion (as Raz is the most prominent
general legal theorist to have addressed the question directly). Problems attributed
to the idea of corporate intention, which underpins subjective originalist
interpretation, are then assessed. The argument is that (i) Raz’s argument for
innovative interpretation may not by fully persuasive; (ii) originalism can be
understood normatively as supporting the rule of law and democracy, though the
argument from democracy alone is the main justifying rationale for subjective
historical interpretation (whereas innovative interpretation is premised on a
conception of output legitimacy); and (iii) epistemic difficulties attributed to
corporate intention are sometimes over-stated in critiques of originalism. Existing
EU practice on the matter is then surveyed, followed by: an application of the
potential use of subjective originalist interpretation to one of the foundational
questions of EU law, namely, the doctrine of non-discriminatory obstacles to free
movement (in order to illustrate the theoretical arguments advanced concerning
group intention).

26

One of the problems attributed to originalism is that it may be difficult to decide who are the
relevant framers: J. Weiler, ‘The Court of Justice on Trial’, 24 CMLRev 555-589 (1987), 575; A.
Kavanagh, ‘Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional Interpretation’, 47 AJJ 255-298
(2002), 255; W. Sadurski, ‘Juridical Coup d’État – All Over the Place. Comment on “The Juridical
Coup d’État and the Problem of Authority” by Alex Stone Sweet’, 8(10) GLJ 935-940 (2007), 935936. In an EU context and international law context, it seems clear that they are authorised
representatives of the Member States.
27
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literature in support of it.
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latter relying on the understanding of a law prevalent in the body politic in general at the time of
enactment, the former relying on the specific intention of signatories of a law.
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This is followed by a more general survey of leading, mostly
‘constitutional’, cases from EU law in order to offer an overview of how the ECJ
addresses the issue of interpretative norm conflict in light of the theoretical
discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 and in this chapter. The focus is primarily on
constitutional interpretation, though the arguments can also apply to innovative
interpretation of the law in general mutatis mutandis (given what is often the
relative abstraction of constitutional norms and the relative ease of amendment of
ordinary or secondary legislation compared to constitutional rules, i.e. in the case
of the EU, amendment of the EU Treaties).

4.2 The Debate on Conserving versus Innovative Interpretation and its
Underlying Values
The very notion itself of evolutive or dynamic interpretation presupposes some
degree of stability of constitutional meaning such that a change in interpretation
can be identified as such.29 Although it has now become almost common place to
associate evolutive interpretation in rights adjudication with constitutional review,
the rationale for evolutive interpretation of constitutions by the judiciary does not
seem self-evident.30 As Klabbers succinctly notes, “change may not always be for
the better: that too is a matter for political judgment”.31 Evolutive interpretation32
seems inconsistent, for example, with the notion of entrenchment, which could be
thought to underpin the usefulness of constitutional review as a bulwark against
majoritarian tyranny: “It certainly cannot be said that a constitution naturally
suggests changeability; to the contrary, its whole purpose is to prevent change – to
embed certain rights in such a manner that future generations cannot readily take
them away”.33 The most common justification offered for evolutive interpretation

29

For a contrary view, see Raz (1998), op cit, 182, suggesting only the reasons for an innovative or
conserving interpretation can be known.
30
See generally J. Goldsworthy, ‘Raz on Constitutional Interpretation’, 22(2) L and P 22(2) 167193 (2003).
31
Klabbers, (2009), op cit, 92.
32
Or as it sometimes labelled, ‘dynamic’ interpretation.
33
Scalia (1998), op cit, 40; for an opposite view, see Raz (1998), op cit, 186, suggesting that
entrenchment justifies judicial innovation on a continuing basis to update it and prevent it
becoming ossified (even though Raz notes such cumulative small interpretative innovations can
effect radical change over time).
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is the need to ensure a constitution reflects the exigencies of contemporary society
and to escape ‘the dead hand of the past’.34 Underlying opposition to originalist
interpretation is an association often made with conservative politics, although the
absence of any such necessary link was well explained by Ely: “For one perfectly
well can be a genuine political liberal and at the same time believe, out of respect
for the democratic process, that the Court should keep its hands off the
legislature’s value judgements”.35
Raz suggests that the authority of constitutions cannot rest on their
founders’ intentions since laws must have satisfactory merit considerations, i.e.
considerations relating to moral desirability,36 justifying them, and that such
founders or authors could not plausibly be thought of as possessing moral
expertise to justify timeless principles of morality. Rather, only in its early years
should a constitution be interpreted with reference to the framers’ intentions.37
Although generally classified as a positivist, Raz here seems to tend strongly
toward anti-positivism in suggesting that any moral considerations can legitimately
influence a constitutional court: “But if it is an originating constitution, then the
question of its moral legitimacy cannot turn on the legitimacy of any other law. It
must turn directly on moral argument”. 38 This sets a context for an argument that
the authority of constitutions should not be understood as depending on their
authors’ intentions:
On the whole the case for the temporally limited authority of institutions
regarding laws of the second kind – those that allocate resources, burdens,
and opportunities fairly among people – is easier to establish. It seems
impossible to formulate these laws in was that do not necessitate frequent
revision. Given that lawmakers cannot make laws that remain good for long,
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their authority cannot be the reason for the authority of old laws that they
made.39

This understanding tends to suggest that legislative or constituent will
becomes redundant quite quickly and that a latter legislative or constituent
authority needs to readdress the issue directly, absent which the judiciary may
adopt innovative interpretation to update a law or constitution. Over time, Raz
suggests, the cumulative effect of such small interpretative changes may be
radical.40 Raz does not really address the issue of why the legislature or
constituent power is not better placed to effect such small changes or the
criteria, which presumably must have some objectivity, by which judges are to
evaluate when such, even small, changes to interpretation are needed. In this
respect, his position seems open to the criticism of ignoring the degree of
continuity in legislative or constituent powers. Though the personnel may
change, the possibility for legislative or constitutional change by succeeding
legislatures or constituent powers is constant, and the absence of deliberate
amendment could point to the possibility of continuing acquiescence and
support for the existing legal or constitutional position. It thus cannot be
assumed at least that continuing legislative or constituent support is absent
simply because of the passage of time; the passage of time without amendment
could indicate exactly the opposite, namely, the relative venerability of existing
law.
In an EU context, Möllers doubts the status of the Member States as a
democratically legitimate constituent power.41 He proposes two conceptions of a
constitution and its constituent power: first, a revolutionary or order-founding
conception, exemplified by the French revolution, relating legitimacy to a
creation of a fully new political order in a dramatic ‘constitutional moment’; and
secondly, an evolutionary concept of the constitution defining and limiting
39
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existing powers, which is a ‘power-shaping conception’.42 Respectively, these
could be characterised as normatively thick and thin conceptions of the process
of creation of a constitution, the thick order-founding conception being linked to
democracy (Möllers does not describe them in this way).
This thick notion of order-founding constituent power, Möllers proposes, is
not present in the EU because the intergovernmental process of Treaty change
lacks the character of a constituent power in a definable moment constituting a
new polity. The power-shaping conception “cannot claim a complete
discontinuity, a real new establishment that can be traced back to a democratic
act”.43 In the EU:
First, the Member States’ representation, according to the principle of
sovereign equality, must be distinguished from the citizens’ representation,
according to the principle of strict individual equality. Not only does the
original act – the actual act of a pouvoir constituent sans peuple – conform
to the first principle of representation, but also does the treaty amendment
law found in Article 48 TEU. The states’ representation disrupts democratic
equality. In the debate about international relations this problem has long
been recognised under the heading of foreign policy’s lack of democratic
coherence.44

Here, the sovereign equality of States is contrasted with the equality of citizens,
but why this is so is not really developed. The argument seems sustainable only if
the individual Member States were not themselves democratic, but all founding
and subsequent Member States have their own internal democratic legitimacy
respecting the formal equality of citizens. In Möllers’ discussion, it is not obvious
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at least why this internal democratic legitimacy is not externalised through the
process of intergovernmental representation and Treaty negotiation.45
One argument that might be advanced here is that a constituent authority,
whatever the formal status on paper, requires a demos, i.e. a shared political
identity and space of engagement.46 However, that a constituent power falls short
of its ideal form does not mean it is not a genuine constituent power: any political
entity must be constituted somehow, and as a concept, ‘constituent power’
captures the source of that formation.47 There seems no obvious analytical use in
positing the existence only of an idealised form, short of which the issue becomes
redundant, as if the process of coming into being of a legal framework no longer
really mattered. This approach seems to carry the risk of reducing itself to an endsjustifies–the-means argument (because the means lacked an ideal form) and purely
outcome-oriented legitimacy that fails to accord value to democratic process
(because the constituent power did not live to that of an ideal demos).48 In the EU,
while there is not a single, shared demos, there are sufficiently shared political
ideals to justify the claim of regional cooperation going beyond typical public
international law cooperation to form a complex treaty apparatus. In other words,
the fact a constituent power falls short of the political ideal does not need to be
seen as undermining its legal authority.
The common issue of a lack of parliamentary control over executive
foreign policy, referred to by Möllers in the passage above, does not seem
analogous to the process of Treaty adoption in the EU, which is far more
deliberative and long-term than regular foreign policy decisions taken by
executives with only ex post facto parliamentary scrutiny (which to an extent is
necessitated by the need for swift ad confidential action in foreign policy).49 This
45
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Context (Unpublished PhD thesis, EUI, 2005).
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Legal Order’, 37(2) Harvard ILJ 389-409 (1996), 390-394.
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seems especially so given that Treaty changes have to be ratified according to the
constitutional traditions of the Member States (now contained in Article 48
TEU50). The constituent power can be seen thus as the Member States acting
collectively and achieving convergence, but according to their own constitutional
traditions.
Walker criticises an originalist approach to constituent power for missing out
on ongoing democratic responsiveness.51 However, this criticism seems to suppose
that originalism reifies or fixes a constitution completely, which seems misplaced.
The criticism does not acknowledge the possibility of amendment, yet it seems
clear that an originalist does not need to see any difficulty in the constituent power
amending its prior constituent act. The argument then seems to become one about
process: democratic amendment or amendment by élite judicial actors or
especially engaged social and legal actors close to the process of a constitution
being put into action or effect.
The EU can be seen as having a constituent power in both a formal sense and
a thick normative or democratic sense, i.e. the Member States acting within their
constitutional traditions. In that context, interpretation disconnected from the
original intention of the constituent power seems to then bear a considerable
burden of persuasion, because of the prima facie normative pull of democracy.
One candidate as a basis for evolutive interpretation is that the judiciary would
seek to identify a contemporary consensus and interpret ambiguity in
constitutional or legal provisions to accord with that. This proposed solution runs
into its own difficulties, as noted by Ely. The problem is that the judiciary are not
obviously better representatives of consensus than parliaments, against whose

“the evolutionary development of legal principles on the basis of a case-by-case problem solving”,
but (somewhat unclearly) “for precisely this reason it is doubtful that the chosen path of
constitutionalisation is only considered legitimate because it was indeed chosen…”. The powershaping approach applied to the EU would be to “construct the integration process as …a
development that can neither be fundamentally changed nor democratically answered for”: ibid,
220.
50
The fact that the Member States are formally identified in Article 48 TEU as the amending
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States. This avoids the problem of infinite regression (see Walker (2008), op cit, 248-249) in
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enactments constitutional review is directed.52 Here, it may be objected that this
critique of consensus as a basis for identifying the content of the law undermines
an emphasis on democratic intent legitimising law. However, originalism favours a
more minimalist conception of rights according to which the judiciary protect
fundamental rights articulated at a polity’s founding or other ‘constitutional
moment’.53 On this view, a period when a polity defines its constitutional
framework, a defined constitutional moment,54 is arguably a more valid basis for
legitimating laws. This is especially so regarding the practical content of human
rights laws in the context of moral pluralism, when a considered majority opinion
or consensus at least provides some procedural legitimacy to the resulting rights
settlement, compared to the judiciary deciding ad hoc what is a prevailing
consensus for the purpose of filling out abstract constitutional clauses on a caseby-case basis.
In a recent contribution, Stone Sweet has posited that supreme or
constitutional courts can effect a ‘juridical coup d’état’55 and thus subvert the
constituent power. By the term ‘coup d’état’, he understands a “fundamental
transformation in the normative foundations of a legal system through the
constitutional lawmaking of a court”:
First, we must be able to infer, reasonably, that the constitutional law
produced by the transformation would have been rejected by the
founders had it been placed on the negotiating table. Second, the
52
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outcome must alter – fundamentally – how the legal system operates,
again, in ways that were, demonstrably, unintended by the founders.
The transformation will make it impossible for an observer to deduce
the new system from institutional design at the ex ante constitutional
moment. It will also imply a breach of pre-coup separation of powers
orthodoxy. Put differently, traditional separation of powers schemes will
fail to model, post-coup, the constitutional roles and limitations
conferred on the organs of the state.56

Stone Sweet argues that the ‘constitutionalising’ decisions of the ECJ in Van Gend
en Loos57 and Costa v. ENEL58 could be understood in this framework. They
brought about a transformation in a way unintended by the Member States at the
founding, since the Treaties did not attribute direct effect or supremacy to
themselves – rather they represented ‘international law plus’, i.e. standard
international law cooperation with the added feature of compulsory ECJ
jurisdiction and the particular role of the Commission.59 Noting the problem of
kompetenz-kompetenz, whereby the authority to decide the limits of the power of
the ECJ itself is contested as between the ECJ and the highest courts of some of
the Member States, Stone Sweet suggests that this conflict of approaches is
irresolvable in that the ECJ does not have the capacity to force national courts to
accept its strong assertion of supremacy. As a result, “In Europe, a great deal of
judicial governance proceeds on this absence of coercive authority, because it
proceeds in the absence of normative authority.”60 Stone Sweet notes that his
thesis raises more questions than it answers,61 but it successfully captures very
clearly the full drama of the question of constituent power in the EU, even if
provocatively expressed.
In reply, Walker62 suggests that Stone Sweet’s implicit originalism needed
fuller justification and that the transformation was a process, rather than the single
56
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event the concept of ‘coup’ suggested. Judicial development of a constitution
reflects “… what we can see is a progressive dance of adaptation to the problem of
incompleteness, with each judicial step both offering a way forward an also
exposing new gaps, for which the need for closure justifies yet further steps”.63
Stone Sweet responds that “The judges that instigated my coups conferred upon
themselves new expansive capacities to ‘complete’ constitutions, displacing
constituent authority as regulators of constitutional development”.64 In other
words, the question of completeness was itself judicially determined on Walker’s
approach, and so the concept of incompleteness did not answer the question of the
proper scope of judicial interpretative authority, it tended to raise the further
question of how to identify that a constitutional feature needed ‘completing’.65
Walker’s idea of ‘gaps’ here seems to raise more questions itself than it answers. It
has a rhetorical suggestiveness, but lacks conceptual clarity or persuasiveness. Can
any judicial amendment or change to the law be justified simply by attaching the
label ‘gap’ to the law as it is? Kelsen identified the rhetorical misuse of the term
‘gap’ to simply indicate that the author wished to change the current law: “The socalled ‘gap’, then, is nothing but the difference between the positive law and a
system held to be better, more just, more nearly right”.66
Innovative interpretation on the basis of prevailing ideas tilts toward ad hoc
adjudication, since prevailing ideas of justice may well change repeatedly and
continually. The adoption of a constitution is a moment of relative definiteness and
deliberation, when a polity’s representative institutions specifically direct
themselves to enacting, by pre-commitment, fundamental laws of a general
character. It is a moment when consensus deliberately manifests itself. In the
absence of acceptance of a defined natural law as the basis of, for example, human
63
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rights, a defence of originalism may argue that justiciable rights can only be
compatible with democracy if determined by the democratic process itself, and in
accordance with the conditions that inhere in democratic discourse and with the
rights the democratic process embodies. This view requires that the content of
rights is understood and determined so much as possible as it was generally
understood to be at the moment of democratic endorsement.67
Kavanagh proposes that arguments for originalism are best understood as
having direct or positive force or indirect or negative force:
The argument from democracy is not based on any claim about the special
role or status of the origination of what might be called the “affirmative
virtues of originalist interpretation”. Rather, it relies on the perceived
problems with other methods of interpretation and claims comparative
advantage over them. … Indirect arguments of the type discussed here are
arguments in favour of a class of interpretative methods rather than being
arguments which establish a direct or conclusive connection with
originalism…But these matters, important though they are, are not the focus
here… I will concentrate on direct arguments for originalism, i.e. arguments
based on the particular relevance of Framers’ intent to constitutional
interpretation.68

Kavanagh classifies the argument from democracy as ‘indirect’ because it relates
to a perceived problem with other methods of interpretation, and she further that
arguments that originalism promotes predictability, stability, objectivity, and less
discretion are all similarly indirect. She goes on to comment that a direct and
positive argument for originalism relates to the inherent connection between words
used and their authors’ intentions.69 This approach seeks to deflect the bite of the
anti-democratic critique of non-originalist interpretation, but it appears to be based
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on an artificial partitioning of arguments for originalism on the basis of an unclear
‘direct versus indirect’ distinction.
The argument from democracy is not really separate to the idea of intention;
it is an extension of it, since it is the intention of the founding authority that has
democratic authority and legitimacy. In that respect, the argument for originalism
from democracy is not just one possible justification shared by other interpretative
methods: any non-originalist method is arguably problematic on democratic
grounds. Tamanaha has noted a link between democracy and the rule of law: “…
the rule of law can exist without democracy, but democracy needs the rule of law,
for otherwise democratically established laws may be eviscerated at the stage of
application by not being followed.”70 Innovative or non-originalist interpretation
seems clearly not about following as closely as possible the meaning of
democratically pre-ordained law, but tends toward a developmental, creative
approach to law, i.e. it tends to law-making under the guise of interpretation. The
arguments against innovative interpretation based on the rule of law and
democracy dovetail: what is innovative cannot be predicted, nor therefore preordained democratically.
In a human rights context, Waluchow argues that courts are better suited
than legislators to dealing with rights issues, because rights issues are complex and
subject to disagreement and thus can attract the greater sensitivity and more casespecific attention in courts than the ex ante deliberations of legislatures can expect
to achieve.71 Waluchow here invokes the common law method of incremental
development to support this approach: the use of innovative or ‘living tree
interpretation’ in constitutional review allows judges to develop the law through
responses that are sensitive to particular cases, while achieving the degree of legal
certainty manifested in the common law.72 As Raz notes, more generally, over
70
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time, a series of small changes (which ties in with Waluchow’s point about
common law virtues) could make a radical change overall:
There is no objection to regular development of the law within existing
frameworks. Such modifications do not undermine continuity. By and large
they tend to enhance it. So far I have not distinguished between stability in
the law – that is, the absence of change in the law – and stability in the
social or economic effects of the law. Since the two often go hand in hand,
there was no need to distinguish between them. But they go hand in hand
only as long as the underlying social, political, or economic conditions do
not change. When they do, the law may have to change if it is to continue to
have the same social or economic effects. In such a case innovative
interpretations that modify the law prevent it from ossifying and getting
progressively less and less adequate to its task and requiring major reform.
Of course, the cumulative effect of small-change reform may well amount
to a radical change in constitutional law over the years. But stability is
consistent with slow change, whatever it cumulative effect. Therefore,
entrenching the constitution may be justified in that it secures extensive
debate and solid consensus behind radical constitutional change. But it also
means that it falls to the courts to take charge of continuous improvements
and adjustments within existing structures.73

Raz does not really develop reasons for the relative suitability of the judiciary
rather than the constituent power for effecting continuous improvements, and issue
Waluchow addresses in more depth.
A central argument Waluchow advances in favour of innovative
interpretation is that judges are also better trained than legislatures in reasoning
about speculative (in)-consistencies from a given hypothesis, which allows them to
fashion a general body of principles that is at the same time sensitive to individual
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cases.74 This argument seems vulnerable on a number of grounds. First, if rights
are as particular and sensitive to context as Waluchow suggests, as a necessary
inference from contemporary disagreement on rights, it is not clear how any
generalisation or entrenchment is achievable; rights seem to only emerge after the
fact. In that context, it is hard to see the relative superiority of constitutional
review to the traditional approach in the UK, for example, of parliamentary
sovereignty.75 Sadurski’s ‘fact sensitive’ analysis of the impact of constitutional
review suggests relatively little empirical support for the view that jurisdictions
with systems of constitutional review better protect rights than those that lack such
review.76 Secondly, the concept of speculative inconsistency necessarily involves
moving beyond the particularities of the case and reasoning with reference to
hypothetical cases in order to assess how much generalisation is possible if the
solution in a given case was to operate as a precedent. In other words, this involves
the type of ex ante deliberation that legislatures normally engage in. Moreover,
legislatures too can learn from experience and can adjust previous enactments to
reflect it; courts thus do not seem to have automatic superiority in this regard.
This is evidenced by the fact that in some jurisdictions the courts have used
the power of constitutional review to establish general principles of lasting
significance. In the US, cases such as Lochner v. New York,77 and Roe v. Wade78
established in their respective eras such principles. Lochner, in which the Supreme
Court struck down as an arbitrary interference with freedom of contract a New
York State law, was finally considered overturned, in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish,79 only after a prolonged struggle in which the Roosevelt administration
threatened to pack the Supreme Court with anti-Lochner justices if it did not
change its approach.80 The rule in the controversial abortion case of Roe v. Wade
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has remained largely the same in the period since the judgement.81 As Raz notes
above, even the cumulative effect of smaller changes introduced through
innovative judicial interpretation over time can itself be radical.82 Similarly, many
of the landmark cases of the ECJ have established highly general principles that far
transcend the immediate facts of those cases, including as obvious examples, case
law on direct effect,83 supremacy,84 State liability,85 and non-discriminatory
obstacles (the latter are examined later in this chapter), i.e. these cases involve
decisions that create general rules of lasting significance unrelated to the
particularities of the case in which they were formulated.86 It is in this regard that
they might be analogised to legislation.
Ultimately courts can only rule on or fashion general principles if ad hoc
judging is to be rejected. A case-specific understanding of constitutional rights and
requirements seems vulnerable to the criticism that it results in constitutional
provisions losing a stable core of meaning that seems essential for their normative
claim. As Schauer expressed this point in the context of rights:
… the only sensible way in which rights can operate in legal argument is by
way of being both temporally and logically antecedent to the particular case
in which a claimant’s success might be deemed to be the recognition of a
right…. The upshot of this is that an essential feature of rights is their
generality, for a right must be at least more general than any particular
result. … A maximally particular specification of a right loses its ability to
operate as a reason for a decision, and consequently loses almost all of the
characteristics that would lead people to use rights in legal, constitutional,
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political or moral argument or that would lead people to insert rightsdescriptions in statutes and constitutions.87

Unless law is to be conflated with ordinary practical reasoning, rather than the
subjection of disputes to determinable rules,88 an open-ended appeal to the
sensitivities of particular cases runs counter to the notion of a rule of law, namely,
that there are rules of general applicability that are set out in advance of their
application. It is in the nature of law as a distinct social phenomenon that it
subjects individual cases to such general, universalisable rules,89 which is a view
of law that disfavours ad hoc adjudication.
In the context of the EU, the caselaw of the ECJ law is marked by an
evolutive approach to interpretation; Bengoetxea observes many ECJ judges
favour such evolutive interpretation because of the dynamic nature of the
Community.90 This dynamic character is generally not related to fundamental
rights, to which Waluchow’s work seems primarily directed.91 As such, the
Courts’ jurisprudence in this respect lacks the rights-protecting, countermajoritarian context that Waluchow advances. The Court’s jurisprudence tends,
often though not always, to be motivated by ‘a certain idea of integration’ and
furtherance of the idea of ‘an ever-closer Union’.92
87
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Accepting the idea that a legal system is dynamic, it does not necessarily
follow that it is the judiciary who should do the changing, or that the views of the
judiciary on the normative value of dynamic interpretation should be thought
decisive. There exists a formal and democratic process of constitutional
amendment in most legal systems, and in the EU, normal rules of public
international law on treaty amendments apply,93 although national constitutional
traditions must all be satisfied for a new Treaty to come into effect. Goldsworthy
notes that an established procedure for amendment of the law prescribed in
exclusive terms and the fact that it has not been used ought to be a moral reason
for judges not changing the law.94 Bypassing the formal system of treaty
amendment in the EU in favour of de facto judicial amendment is thus open to the
criticism that it negates a basic feature of the institutional and constitutional
framework of the EU, in that the judiciary are assigning to themselves a power that
is for the Member States (in the case of Treaty amendments).95 This view seems to
have more force given the frequency of Treaty amendment within the EU since the
Single European Act 198696; as Hartley notes, it is hard to accuse the Member
States of inadequate attention to the issue.97
What this discussion suggests for norm conflict is that there are general
normative objections to innovative interpretation as a means of norm conflict
resolution and more generally as an interpretative method. A preference for
innovative over conserving interpretation amounts to a preference for particular
values. Innovative interpretation downplays traditional rule of law and democratic
objections to an ‘activist’ judiciary or ‘gouvernement de juges’.98 Its main
justification relates to consequentalist or output-oriented legitimacy. Conversely,
conserving or originalist interpretation privileges input-legitimacy, which dovetails
with a traditional rule of law emphasis on formal legality understood as requiring
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certainty and predictability in the law. This often implicit reliance on output
legitimacy, is, however, problematic, since the outcome that is claimed to be good,
enhanced integration, has no apolitical validity. It is in fact a highly contested
claim to political morality for Europe.

4.3 Specific Justification of Subjective Originalist Interpretation
4.3.1 Legal Texts and Intention
The general debate on evolutive and originalist interpretation was outlined above.
This section develops on that by focusing on the debate surrounding the specific
intention of ‘founding fathers’ as a guide to interpretation, by examining the
question of their collective or group intention.
Dworkin acknowledges the obvious intuitive appeal of attributing a
specific meaning to an enacted text and suggests that the authors of constitutional
texts deliberately use abstract language and avoid specific understandings of
constitutional requirements as, in effect, a type of delegation to the courts to decide
the most suitable concretisation in a specific or contemporary context.99 Pauwelyn
makes a similar point, writing about the WTO:
It may, indeed, be an indication that WTO members wanted these terms to
evolve with society and international law or, at least, should have realised,
that the vagueness of these terms would result in their meaning being open
to discussion and variation depending on the context and times.100
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On this view, evolutive interpretation almost flows necessarily from the abstract
nature of the text. Nonetheless, it also possible for abstract legal rules to be
interpreted in an originalist way, if (a) an intention can be plausibly attributed to
their law-maker or (b) if legal tradition indicates the way in which a right is to be
concretised. Some degree of abstraction in legal provisions is essential, since the
full range of factual circumstances to which they may apply cannot be enumerated
in advance. In that context, logically, it does necessarily follow from the fact of
abstraction of legal provisions that the law-maker intended an evolutive
interpretation to be adopted.
In the EU, the Treaties are notably detailed and specific for constitutional
texts, running to hundreds of pages. However, the EEC (now TFEU) Treaty has
been described as a ‘traité cadre’, in that it sets out broad principles and purposes,
as well as more specific provisions.101 Nonetheless, the attribution of the character
of a traité cadre to a treaty does not seem to dispose of the question of how and to
what extent matters of detail are to be filled in and developed and how abstraction
is to be addressed as a matter of interpretation; different approaches are possible,
e.g. contrast originalist or Dworkinian approaches. Article 6 of the TEU, since the
coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty, includes a directive that the rights
enumerated be interpreted in accordance with explanations given of their content
at the time of adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU,102 which
appears to be an explicit endorsement of interpretation based on original intention:
The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in
accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing
its interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations
referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions. (Text
of Article 6(1))

It could reasonably be assumed that the explanations referred to in the
Charter reflected the understandings of the Charter signatories, since these
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explanations were meant to represent the views of the signatories of the texts.103
These explanations can be quite clear and specific and do not appear to create
problems of uncertainty as to intention. An example was referred to in Chapter 3,
where the principle of human dignity was stated in these explanations to be nonjusticiable. Similarly, general objections to original intention as an influence on
interpretation on the basis of uncertainty may not be applicable to interpretative
declarations formally agreed by the Member States and attached to the EU
Treaties.104 The fact that they are not included in the instrument itself does not
mean they cannot affect the interpretation of it, since in the context of ambiguity in
the text, resort to considerations other than the text is inevitable.
Raz proposes that in general evidence of intention should not be taken as a
convention of interpretation.105 He identifies the argument that legislative intention
provides a democratic rationale for interpretation:
But [this argument] runs against one major problem. It applies only to
democracies (really only to democracies of a certain type). The law exists in
many non-democratic countries, and, as we are seeking to a general
understanding of legal interpretation of the law created by law-making acts,
this argument will not do.106

Raz proposes that such evidence of original, democratic intention should not be
used because such theory is not generalisable to countries that are not democracies.
It is widely accepted that law and legal reasoning have a requirement of
universalisability in order to justify the normative claim that they makes to
obedience, as noted in Chapter 1. MacCormick, for example, relates
universalisability to the requirement for rationality and to the idea of formal
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justice, which requires like cases to be treated alike on rational grounds.107
Universalisability of law is inherent in the rule of law notion that the law applies
equally to everyone in a given jurisdiction. Even if one did accept the proposition
that any valid theory of law must be universalisable in the different sense of being
compatible with all kinds of systems of government as Raz seems to use it above,
Raz’s own account of interpretation arguably runs into trouble because of the
severing of interpretation from original democratic intent as evidenced by the
ordinary linguistic meaning. The latter could be viewed as inconsistent with
democracy, and so in this regard does not seem to meet the standard of
generalisability that Raz himself proposes.
Raz himself rescues the argument from original intention in a way by
noting that the authoritative intention of the law-maker is a more general
formulation: “to the extent that law derives from deliberate law-making, its
interpretation should reflect the intentions of its law-makers” (which Raz refers to
as ‘The Authoritative Intention Thesis’108). This is consistent with democracy, but
it also applies to non-democratic systems, it is just that in the latter, the law-maker
is not democratically constituted. Stated at this level of generality, the argument
from original intention can be applied to all legal systems, it is just that the
‘original intender’ is differently constituted. Raz then goes on to reject the idea
that something other than the words of the legislation itself might be useful in
determining intention: only the words used can generally be taken as meaning, and
these are the words already in the legislation.109
107
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Recently, Raz adopts a position that seems in conflict with the idea of a
‘general understanding of legal interpretation’ he invoked in the passage quoted
above, by introducing the opposite idea of the local character of interpretation,
although he does not observe any change in his views:
There are no useful universal recipes for interpretation. Theoretical
reflection can help. But it helps in making us aware of the nature of
interpretation, and the diverse reasons for engaging in it, not by providing
us with recipes for correct interpretation. Sometimes, for example, in the
law, there are specific interpretive rules, but they are never exhaustive
guides and they are local rules liable to change.110

Further, Raz now argues that innovative interpretation result from the underdetermination of the meaning of texts. In somewhat ambiguous passages, he gives
an example of the performance of a play as an instance of this underdetermination:
Think, by way of illustration, of the theatre. Typically, first, there will be
various ways an actor can position himself, or move, various ways of
speaking his lines, which make a difference to the meaning of the action,
and a difference to the implied motivation and frame of mind of that
character at the time of speaking., and in general. And second, the meaning
case of unintentional spoonerisms). But it does not follow from this that when we
speak we first intend to say something and then attempt to say it, so that it is always
an open question whether one said what one intended. Rather, barring exceptions,
like those listed, one means what one says. There is no more to having meant to say
that p than that one said that p and none of the exceptions obtain….An exception is
any explanation of what went wrong which establishes either that one was trying or
had formed an intention to say something and failed, or that one did not mean what
one said even though there was nothing specific that one did intend.
Raz gives this as his essential reason for rejecting the Authoritative Intention Thesis, i.e. we only
need to look at the words used in the legislation. It seems correct to say as Raz does “But it does
not follow…” [from the examples of mistaken speech he gives] that we generally intend to say first
and then say it (accurately), but the examples of mistaken speech are hardly a good premise, and it
seem entirely implausible to suggest as a general proposition that people do not intend to say
something first and then say it (also, Raz’s meaning in this passage would be clearer if he had
noted how the verb ‘intend’ related to the verb ‘mean’). Apart from this, presumably there is some
coherent connection between legislative debate and legislative enactments, and legislative debate is
part of the recorded ‘words said’ from which legislative intent can be inferred in interpretation.
Moreover, in the passage above, what amounts to exceptions seems only to be so because there was
a failure to say what was intended, suggesting that the norm does amount to a correlation between
what was intended and said. As regards the last element in the quote above, it would not seem
surprising that one did not mean what one said if there was nothing specific that one did intend.
110
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of the character's action, his motivation, and frame of mind as portrayed by
the text of the play is indeterminate as to which way of performing the role
is correct. In such a case, given that to perform the play the actor has to act
in one of the ways not required by the text, and give that each such way of
acting will attribute to his character attitudes which the play itself does not,
whichever way the actor acts will constitute an innovative interpretation of
the play or parts of it.111

However, the analogy between a play and legal texts seems limited for one central
reason: what can differ in the articulation of a play is the emotional register of the
performance as expressed non-verbally (tone, gesture, look, intensity of manner).
This is also the case in everyday life,112 whereas law and written legal expression
lack this emotional register. Raz, however, suggests “the lesson of the theatrical
illustration can be stated in terms which apply generally. Broadly speaking,
innovative interpretations are inevitable where:
● aspects of meaning of the original are indeterminate;
● rules of meaning direct that various aspects of the interpretive statements
carry interpretive messages;
● such message-conveying aspects of the interpretive statements are
inescapable when interpreting the original, even though they

relate

to

indeterminate aspects of it meaning; and
● it is impossible for them to preserve the indeterminate contours

of

the

original.”113

The last point seems important and raises the issue of when a court can refuse to
declare the law to have a specific content, or in other words, can issue a non liquet
ruling. Raz acknowledges this latter possibility, but does not elaborate as to when
it can arise. In EU law, this question is related to the issue of EU competence,
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since, it is an organisation of conferred and not unlimited powers; this issue of
competence is taken up in Chapter 6 below on conflicts of competence norms.
Some ambiguity is also present in Raz’s discussion of the extent to which an
object has properties that control or limit legitimate innovative interpretation. This
essentially seems to relate to the realism-anti-realism distinction in philosophy:
whether the existence of objects is independent of human cognition and
expression, or conversely, our cognition or perception constitutes the world around
us. Realism posits the former, anti-realism the latter.114 Raz does not seem to come
down clearly on the issue:
A way of understanding any object of interpretation which was never
thought of before is a new way of understanding, and the interpretation
propounding it is innovative, simply because it was never thought of before.
The fact that the features of the play or the ceremony or whatever the
interpreted object is, which show it to be a good interpretation were there all
along does not matter. The contingency of socially dependent meanings
makes ample room for innovative interpretations which show new ways of
understanding their objects, and in so doing establish new meanings.115

Some of this passage suggests a realist assumption (the reference to features being
‘there all along’), whereas elsewhere it suggest anti-realism (interpretation
establishing new meanings).116
The reference in the passage above to contingent, socially dependent
meanings (which also suggest an anti-realist position) is amplified by a later
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comment in the same piece that “One important conclusion is that the constraints
on interpretation are always shifting.”117 It does not seem obvious, however, that
interpretation is as pervasively variable as this suggests. Ordinary meaning and
language are the prime means of interpretation for citizens in any legal system, and
sources of law that may be hundreds of years old are not unusual and can be quite
stable in their meaning.118 More prosaically, a foreign defendant who pleaded the
contingent and local character of interpretation, and on that basis claimed
entitlement to a differing interpretation of the law than the court as a reason for not
complying with the law, is unlikely to be unsuccessful in any legal system. Finally,
it might be questioned whether indeterminacy of texts necessitates innovative
interpretation as opposed to extra-textual interpretation. Reference to travaux
préparatoires can help elaborate on a text. This, however, is not really innovative;
it is a matter of retrieving a past intention that was not fully communicated in the
public record of the law. It seems innovative only in a weak sense of finding out an
existing meaning that is not clear from the text, rather than generating new
meaning.
Kavanagh is among authors who argue that looking to evidence of framer’s
intentions make sense because of the inherent connection between intention and
the act of making a constitution, as a speech act. Kavanagh then suggests that
going beyond the text subverts the distinction between what has been given force
to and what has not: it is only the enacted text that is the relevant speech act.119
However, this seems to overstate the potential of the power of the text to address
all problems of interpretation. Some degree of generality is necessary in a
constitutional document, in that it cannot explicitly address all possible factual
scenarios to which it applies. Looking beyond the text is thus inevitable in some
cases, even if a non liquet judgement120 can be issued in cases of strong
117
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indeterminacy.

Kavanagh suggests that it is for the courts to determine the

shortfall in constitutional intention and meaning as determinable from the
expressed intentions in the text:121 this goes to the core of the argument about the
relationship between democracy and originalism in legal reasoning, in that it
highlights the alternatives whereby courts determine the content of the constitution
rather than that content being pre-ordained in essentials by the constituent power.

4.3.2 Legal Texts and Corporate or Collective Intention
One of the chief difficulties associated with the attempts to define subjective
intention as an aid to interpretation is an attributed epistemic indeterminacy of the
collective intent that such interpretation depends on, i.e. the collective intention of
the law-maker; Waldron, for example, goes so far as to suggest that “one is
surprised to find it appearing again in anything other than a trivial form in
respectable academic jurisprudence.”122 The argument is made that there are many
different motivations and intentions behind legal or constitutional texts, making it
impossible to glean an identifiable single intention that might guide interpretation
where the text is ambiguous123 or ‘imperfect’.124 The objection to this line of
reasoning generally is that it goes against our daily social experience of the
possibility of shared intention. As with jurisprudence that tends to problematise
the practice of interpretation by basing theory on a generalization from hard cases,
such criticisms of the viability of corporate intent tend to over-generalise from
problematic cases.
It does not seem to follow from the fact that motivations are different that
the intentional understanding of the relevant actors of the text that was agreed
upon varied from each other, since motivation is not the same thing as intent.125
What is necessary for a group or ‘we’ intention is that participants mutually agree
121
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on a given course of action, not that they had the same motivation for doing so.
Diverse private motivation can merge to a shared intention based on discussion,
negotiation, or bargaining.126 Waldron suggests that the discoverable intention
ends with the text,127 but this tends to assume that there is almost no discoverable
connection between the prior discussion of the text, which seems clearly not the
case given that the text is the product of the discussion and debate and there must
be a coherent connection between the text and that discussion.
The text is thus primary evidence of intention, but the process of creating
the text is likely to display sufficient convergence of purpose and intention to
elaborate on the text. The essential objection to the critique of corporate intention
then is that it understates the possibility of purposeful coordinated action by a
group, and several possible responses are found in the literature. Ekins emphasises
the degree of convergence that assemblies seek by arguing that the central case of
legislative intent is better understood as similar to the intention of a sole legislator,
precisely because what legislatures seek to do is to coordinate their action so as to
act like a sole legislature.128
In literature on general philosophy,129 a broad acceptance exists that the
notion of a ‘we’ or group or collective intention seems necessary to explain
coordinated group behaviour.130 However, there is a recognition that the idea of a
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group mind is ‘ontologically suspect’,131 though not to the same extent as legal
literature on legislative intention suggests. In philosophical literature, the different
approaches can be broadly categorised as reductive or non-reductive.132 Searle
offers a non-reductive account whereby each individual in a group coordinating its
actions possesses a collective intention; it is non-reductive in not understanding
group intention as built from units of individual intention. Individual intentionality
is derived from collective intentionality, rather than the reverse:
The crucial element in collective intentionality is a sense of doing (wanting,
believing, etc.) something together, and the individual intentionality that
each person has is derived from the collective intentionality that they
share.133

In criticism, Chant and Ernst argue that this account is overly simple in
failing to explain the development of a network of beliefs that ground individual
intention related to collective intention.134 Reductive accounts relate group or ‘we
intentions’ more specifically to individual intentions and ground we or group
intention in individual intentions rather than the reverse:
But without a compelling argument in favour of the irreducibility of
collective intentions, considerations of parsimony favour an explanation of
collective intentions that appeals only to the intentional states of
individuals.135

Tuomela offers such an account, emphasising the requirement of mutual beliefs
amongst the participants in a collective action grounded136 on a ‘we’ or group
intention, which mutual belief requires a channel of communication or, to use
Tuomela’s metaphor, a ‘bulletin board’.137 This we intention can be transcribable
where a group is represented by an operative member,138 and although Tuomela
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does not speak specifically of political contexts, it seems clear that representatives
of States or lead members of political parties can be understood as such:
In the case of formal and structured groups the leaders’ relevant intentional
acting (viz., their intentional performance of their parts as parts of the joint
action) may suffice to make the joint action intentional (cf. Tuomela, 1984,
Chapter 5).139

Similarly, Bratmann notes that “In [shared cooperative activity] the fact that there
is this mutually uncoerced system of intentions will be in the public domain. It
will be a matter of common knowledge among the participants.”140
Ernst & Chant develop on this work to emphasise the interactive character of
the knowledge necessary to sustain the possibility of group intention. The
possibility of communication between groups is thus central to the formation of
group intention,141 and they discuss various scenarios where communication is
hampered so as to inhibit the formation of mutual, interactively generated beliefs
that enable intentional cooperation among a collective142 (for example, when
elements of risk are factored into decision-making about participating in group
action, interactively generated assessment of risk might inhibit cooperation143).
Transferring this analysis to the context of law-making, the institutionalised nature
of the latter process seems ideally suited to the generation of interactive
knowledge necessary for the formation of mutually understood and shared
intention through the ‘bulletin boarding’ of intention. It is precisely to generate
such knowledge that constituent and legislative assemblies are formed and
institutionalised, with structured debates. This can be related more generally to the
deliberative character of assemblies.

139

Ibid, 261, referring to R. Tuomela, A Theory of Social Action (Reidel 1984).
ME. Bratman, ‘Shared Intention’, 104(1) Ethics 97-113 (1993), 335.
141
Ernst & Chant (2008), op cit, 550-552, where they draw on the work of Robert Aumann: R.
Aumann ‘Interactive Epistemology I: Knowledge’, 28(3) International Journal of Game Theory
263-300 (1999) and ‘Interactive Epistemology II: Probability’, 28(3) International Journal of
Game Theory 310-314 (1999).
142
Ernst & Chant (2008), op cit, 552-556, 560-569.
143
Ibid, 560-564.
140

162

The view is sometimes argued that the circumstances of judicial decisionmaking are more deliberative and reflective, and thus more likely to produce just
outcomes, than are legislative debates.144 Without addressing the issue
comprehensively, Waldron’s argument seems persuasive in considering that courts
are no more deliberative than legislative assemblies. In some respects legislative
assemblies are more so: they are larger, more diverse in membership, have access
to a broader range of socio-economic data, can debate issues and cross-issues in
greater depth and length, and in their committee systems and in bicameral
assemblies have double or treble layers of debate and contestation that is at least
as deliberative as that of appellate courts.145 They are thus well-placed for the
generation of interactive knowledge whereby participants come to understand each
others’ motives and intentions so as to enable a shared intention to emerge through
mutual understanding and consensus on a course of action. In effect, participants
in legislative or constituent assemblies operate in exactly the bulletin boarding
conditions needed for a shared intention to emerge. Individual intentions are
communicated publicly in order to generate a shared intention reduced to a text.
Transferring this defence of the viability of corporate intention to the context
of Treaty negotiation relevant to the EU, the devices of interpretative declarations
can especially be the basis for attributing intention to a group of representatives of
the Member States.146 Further, formal statements read into travaux préparatoires
function similarly. The process of international treaty negotiation or of
deliberation in the Council of the EU is broadly comparable to negotiations and
debate at a national parliamentary level, with research suggesting that the main
differentiating characteristic of intergovernmental negotiations from parliamentary
assemblies is the relative lack of transparency of the former.147 However, this

144

See, e.g. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia Univ. Press 1996), 231-236; MJ. Perry, The
Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights: An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Constitutional
Policymaking by the Judiciary (Yale Univ. Press 1982); cf. Waldron (1999), op cit, 23-24 and,
comparing courts to legislatures, 69-87.
145
See generally Waldron (1999), op cit, 19-117.
146
I. Cameron, ‘Swedish Parliamentary Participation in the Making and Implementation of
Treaties’, 74(3-4) Nordic JIL 429-482 (2005), 435.
147
K. Goldman, S. Berglund & G. Sjöstedt, Democracy and Foreign Policy, the Case of Sweden
(Gower 1986), also noting that participants in international negotiations tend not to be directly
elected (this is less true of deliberations of the Member States in the Council of Ministers and
European Council EU, since all are democratically elected; Article 10(2) TEU explicitly recognises

163

relates to the access (or lack of it) to the process of outside observers at the time of
negotiation, rather than to the epistemic possibility of the participants forming a
collective intention.
For example, a Member State can successfully bulletin-board its intended
understanding by attaching a declaration to the Treaty. If there are no objecting
declarations or statements entered by any other Member State (and it can be
assumed that the other Member States’ representatives are aware of it, i.e. that
there is a ‘bulletin board’, so there is no absence of knowledge by the other
participating Member States who are free to object to a unilateral interpretative
declaration through a counter-declaration), so long as the interpretative declaration
or statement does not go against the conventional or objective meaning of the
Treaty, that declaration could be taken as representing the collective understanding
of the Member State representatives. That is the only purpose such a declaration
would have, and the conditions for interactive knowledge, through the formal
adoption of a declaration, seem very clear. The case for using such interpretative
declarations is stronger where they are issued, in the EU, by the Council or
European Council collectively, rather than by individual States.
The possibility for shared intentions to inform legal texts, and thus for
travaux préparatoires to be useful extra-textual gives to interpretation, enhances
the possibility for norm conflict resolution. It gives meaning to intentional
avoidance of conflict, since this is now a greater epistemic possibility.

of the joint basis of democratic legitimacy of the Council of Ministers and the European
Parliament) and that achieving accountability can be difficult; Cameron (2005), ibid, 435-436.
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4.4 Overview of Practice of the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts on
Evolutive Interpretation
In this section, the practice of the ECJ as to evidence of original intention is
examined. Further, the practice of the European Court of Human Rights is also
briefly surveyed, as the Strasbourg Court has a normative influence, which is only
like to increase with the imminent accession of the EU to the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) under Article 6 TEU as amended by the
Lisbon Treaty.
The ECJ does not usually rely on travaux préparatoires or seek to unearth
original understanding. As noted above, its interpretation, at least in a significant
number of substantial constitutional cases, has a prospective, systemic character.
In its submissions in the case of Commission v. Belgium,148 the Commission noted
that: “…originalist interpretation plays hardly any part in Community law it would
be futile to refer to the intentions of the authors of the Treaty”.149 The ECJ has in
some cases150 rejected as irrelevant to its interpretation of secondary legislation
any declarations by the Council (as opposed to individual Member States) of the
legislation, such as Reyners v. Belgium151and Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety.152
Later in Antonissen,153 the Court stated that such interpretative declarations could
only be accorded legal significance if referred to in the text of the legislative
instrument itself, i.e. if formally incorporated by reference (this might be
contrasted with its willingness to treat the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights154 as
a source or inspiration in EU law before its incorporation by reference into EU law
by the Treaty of Lisbon155). In The Queen v. Licensing Authority,156 the Court held
148

Case 149/79, Commission v. Belgium [1980] ECR 3881.
Ibid, 3890.
150
Senden (2004, 374-380).
151
Case 2/74, Reyners v. Belgium [1974] ECR 631, 666.
152
Opinion 2/00 Re Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety [2001] ECR I-9713, para. 22.
153
Case C-292/89, ex parte Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745, paras. 17-18. See, e.g. Case C-329/95,
VAG Sverige [1997] ECR I-2675, para. 23, and further references in Senden (2004), op cit, 375, n.
60.
154
OJ C 364/01, 18.12.2000, p. 1.
155
See, e.g. Case C-540/03, European Parliament v. Council [2006] ECR I-5769, where the ECJ
accepted the status of the Charter as being ‘of importance’ (para. 38, see also para. 58) in a case
concerning the degree of discretion Member States had pursuant to a directive to limit the right of a
cess of a person to enter the Member States to be with a family member.
156
Case C-368/96, The Queen v. Licensing Authority [1998] ECR I-7967.
149

165

that such declarations may be taken into consideration in as much as they serve to
clarify a general concept, rather than a particular provision,157 in a situation where
the legislative instrument itself was unclear (here the meaning of ‘essentially
similar material product’ was in dispute), even though the legislative instrument
did not refer to the declaration.158
The Court is less willing to refer to the travaux préparatoires of the
Treaties.159 However, especially with more recent Treaty amendments, travaux
préparatoires are now more readily available.160 Moreover, even the core body of
travaux préparatoires of the founding treaties have been in a published form since
1960.161 Similarly, the same point is applicable to the use of material from
deliberations of the Council in its legislative role, given that Article 16(8) TEU
requires states that the Council shall meet in public when it deliberates and votes
on a draft legislative act.
The Court’s tendency not to have resort to declarations made by a single
Member State is more understandable162 since such declarations could be
understood to lack the democratic implication of endorsement by the Council in
general, in that they might be thought just to reflect that particular Member State’s
157
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view. Nonetheless, the fact that such a decoration is authored only by one Member
State does not means that it reflects a unilateral understanding that cannot be
attributed to the other signatory States. In public international law, objections to
reservations are a feature of State practice, although the exact effect of such
objections is not settled.163 Nonetheless, the absence of any objections to an
interpretative declaration or reservation, or any countervailing interpretative
declarations, suggests that the reservation or interpretative declaration is not seen
by the other signatories as incompatible with the treaty or instrument, since it
would make sense for the other States not to risk, by not objecting to, a unilateral
declaration skewing the interpretation of a treaty or legal instrument contrary to
the expectations or desires of the other States. The ECJ itself recognised the
validity of this line of argument in Kaur, where it held that an interpretative
declaration by the United Kingdom as to the meaning of the term ‘national’ as
used in the Treaties should be taken into account in interpreting the Treaty,
notwithstanding that other Member States had not explicitly endorsed it164 (it is a
clear example of the generation of interactive knowledge through the kind of
‘bulletin board’ communication identified by Tuomela).
Although as noted in Chapter 1, the ECJ often does not make explicit its
interpretative methods or approach, it has occasionally been quite explicit about a
developmental, prospective orientation. In Opinion 1/03 Re Lugano Convention,165
the ECJ held that it was not necessary for the areas covered by an international
agreement and Community legislation to coincide fully for exclusive Community
competence in external relations (i.e. relations with third countries) to arise; that
163
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where the test of ‘an area which is already covered to a large extent by Community
rules’ is to be applied, the assessment must be based not only on the scope of the
rules in question, but also on their nature and content; and that it “is also necessary
to take into account not only the current state of Community law in the area in
question but also its future development, insofar as that is foreseeable at the time
of that analysis”166 (emphasis added). The approach here is to envisage future
development of the law as a basis for enhancing Union competence, rather than the
reverse. This might be taken as a good example of a linear narrative of increased
future integration informing interpretation. This contrasts to the WTO, which, as
Pauwelyn suggests, is “not the proverbial cyclist who needs to move on (i.e.,
further liberalise) in order to survive”.167 The approach of the ECJ, at least in a
case such as Lugano, tends to assume ever-increasing integration, almost
independently of authoritative acts by the constituent power in the form of the
Member States.
Schilling has been amongst the strongest critics of the implicit assumption by
the ECJ of a role for itself, in effect, as a constituent power in the Communities by
asserting the autonomy of the Communities compared to general international law.
In the latter, the Westphalian principle conceives of States as the decision unit and
of State sovereignty as normatively key to legal development. In contrast, the
autonomy claim of the ECJ concerning the nature of the Communities “[t]he single
most far-reaching, and probably most disputed, principle of the European
Community... its claim to a legal order autonomous from Member State law”.168 In
Schilling’s view, the Communities are logically a creature of the public
international law faculty of the Member States and thus cannot be severed from
public international law by judicial conceptualisation.169
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As mentioned, it is also useful here to refer to interpretation by the
European Court of Human Rights, given that the EU is shortly to accede to the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).170 This will in effect make the
Strasbourg equivalent to a final court of appeal on human rights matters
concerning EU law, and there is a clear possibility of divergence in the
interpretation of the ECHR by the ECJ and ECHR, especially given the possibility
that the EU Charter on Fundamental rights may differ from the ECHR.171 In its
interpretation of the ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights Court has at
times endorsed a ‘living tree’ or evolutive approach to interpretation, which may
be thought to indicate, in conjunction with the ECJ, a normative trend toward a
European judicial consensus against conserving interpretation. However, the latter
view risks treating as normative the mere fact that an evolutive interpretation has,
at times, been adopted by both courts. Moreover, the practice of the Strasbourg
court is not uniform in this respect. As there are minority or dissenting opinions in
its judgements, some debate has taken place within its judgements about this
issue,172 and there are differences between Strasbourg cases. In Soering v. UK,173
the European Court of Human Rights refused to adopt an evolutive interpretation
of Article 3 of the ECHR so as to encompass the death penalty within the concept
of ‘cruel and degrading treatment and punishment’, on the basis that a Protocol on
the abolition of the death penalty had been adopted by some of the Sate parties.174
Merrills observes, even though agreeing that evolutive interpretation of the
ECHR may be sometimes justified, that the evidence of the intentions of the
authors or contracting States of the ECHR must be of relevance to interpreting the
Convention unless the organs of the Council of Europe are to be understood as
having “absolute legislative autonomy” independent of the contracting States
170
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whose agreement is the basis of the legitimacy of the ECHR.175 This echoes
Schilling’s criticism of the much stronger autonomy characterisation of the
Communities preferred by the ECJ. In several cases, the travaux préparatoires of
Convention provisions have been used by the European Court of Human Rights to
clarify issues left ambiguous by the text.176 These variations in approach in the
Strasbourg jurisprudence, as with variations within ECJ caselaw discussed above,
raise the underlying normative justification for evolutive versus conserving
interpretation and suggest that evolutive interpretation has not achieved a natural
or inevitable status within the Strasbourg caselaw.

4.5 Case Study – Caselaw Doctrine on Non-Discriminatory Obstacles
It was the combination of the two doctrines of direct effect and supremacy with the
preliminary reference system that allowed the creation of a new legal system with
such far-reaching consequences for the Member States, a constellation that one
author describes as a “magic triangle”.177 The three combined empowered ordinary
private litigants as well as powerful corporate actors to pursue policies against
their own national governments in the hope that they would find support in EU
law, thus using private self-interest as a foil for reducing the power and autonomy
of the Member States. This is most easily illustrated with reference to caselaw on
free movement.178
175
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In Dassonville179 and Cassis de Dijon,180 the ECJ went beyond its previous
caselaw to hold that non-discriminatory obstacles to free movement were contrary
to the Treaty. Until that point, it was understood that only discriminatory rules in
this regard were contrary to the Treaties. Dassonville gave a very broad scope to
the free movement principle, since almost any diversity in national laws could be
interpreted at a conceptual level as an inhibition on free movement. In both
Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ invoked primarily the idea of the
effectiveness of Community law. The relevant Treaty text here was somewhat
ambiguous and tended to invite a consequentalist approach; Article 30 EEC Treaty
(now Article 35 TFEU) prohibited quantitative restrictions on imports from one
Member State to another and also measures having equivalent effects:
Article 30
Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent
effect shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited
between Member States.
Article 31
Member States shall refrain from introducing between themselves any new
quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent effect.
This obligation shall, however, relate only to the degree of liberalisation
attained in pursuance of the decisions of the Council of the Organisation for
European Economic Co-operation of 14 January 1955. Member States shall
supply the Commission, not later than six months after the entry into force
of this Treaty, with lists of the products liberalised by them in pursuance of
these decisions. These lists shall be consolidated between Member States.
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Adopting a brief, declaratory style of judgement (characteristic of the French
judicial system181), the ECJ stated:
5. All trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community
trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to
quantitative restrictions.182

In Cassis, the judgement is framed in similarly consequentalist terms.183
Given the limited textual guidance, the Court’s reasoning here might seem
not so open to criticism for departing from textual constraints, because the text
itself refers to an extra-textual standard of ‘equivalent effects’. However, the ECJ
did not seek to recover the original intention of the Member States, for example, as
to the meaning of what was an ambiguous provision. In the face of ambiguity,
more or less restrained approaches are always possible. The judgement adopts the
widest possible interpretation of ‘measures having an effect equivalent to
quantitative restrictions’, whereas it could have confined it to discriminatory rules,
and have left it to the Member States to fashion a broader rule.
The Court rowed back on the expansive effect of Dassonville184 in Keck,185
but only in holding that trading arrangements did not fall within the scope of
Community free movement rules (although Keck could possibly be construed as
creative in that there was no textual basis for singling out trading arrangements in
this way).186 The ECJ did not in Keck refer to this absence of explicit textual
support, rather it was explicitly consequentalist in noting the effects of the wide
interpretation in Dassonville:
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In view of the increasing tendency of traders to invoke Article 30 of the
Treaty as a means of challenging any rules whose effect is to limit their
commercial freedom even where such rules are not aimed at products from
other Member States, the Court considers it necessary to re-examine and
clarify its case-law on this matter.187

Barnard describes the wide reading in Dassonville in the following:
The potential breadth of the so-called Dassonville formula is striking. In
principle, measures having only an indirect, potential effect on trade fall
within its scope and therefore breach Article 28. Dassonville therefore tends
to support a reading of Article 28 as the basis for an economic constitution
for the EU…188

Did the Member States originally intend this? Did they signpost or bulletin
broad an understanding that reflects this or a different understanding? A reading of
the travaux préparatoires suggests that the ECJ went further than the Member
States intended in their use of the term ‘quantitative restrictions’ or ‘measures of
equivalent effect’. These terms were used in what were then Articles 30 and 31
EEC Treaty. Some travaux préparatoires have been published for both of them
(somewhat more material on Article 31). On Article 30, during the drafting
process, the term ‘quantitative restrictions’ was substituted for ‘quotas’, in order
that outright bans on imports would also be captured by the provision.189 This
change would seem redundant if the term ‘measures of equivalent effect’ were to
mean any obstacle to market access. So the Member States in agreeing the text
were concerned to avoid a very narrow interpretation that would permit bans,
which seems to exclude the possibility that they intended an interpretation that is
so wide as to encompass any obstacle to market access.
It was the Italian delegation that suggested adding the expression ‘or
measures of equivalent effect’, though no additional comments of explanation
were added in the travaux préparatoires on what the phrase meant. This seems to
187
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suggest it was not intended to elaborate or extend the meaning in a fundamental
way, rather it was there to copper-fasten the idea of ‘quantitative restrictions’ and
avoid a narrow interpretation that would exclude something as closely analogous
to a quantitative restriction as a ban.190 Nonetheless, there is some ambiguity still
as to what exactly could be a ‘measure of equivalent effect’.
The travaux préparatoires for Article 31 EEC Treaty, and also the text itself
of Article 31, tend to confirm a narrower original intention than is found in the
Dassonville formula. Article 31 EEC Treaty prohibited new ‘quantitative
restrictions’ and ‘measures of equivalent effect’. However, it expressly states that
the obligation only applied to the level or degree of liberalisation achieved within
the framework of the decision of the Council of the Organisation for European
Economic Cooperation (OEEC)191 at the date of 14th January 1955. This reference
to a particular level of liberalisation and to its consolidation is also redundant on
the Dassonville formula, since Dassonville equates quantitative restrictions and
measures of equivalent effect as encompassing any obstacles to market access,
which is beyond a particular level of liberalisation and requires more or less
requites absolute liberalisation. In the travaux préparatoires, it was formally stated
by the drafting committee that Article 31 was concerned with consolidating the
level of liberalisation achieved in the OEEC and that a further question was a reexamination of greater liberalisation beyond this level.192 Further, during the
discussion, two lines of thought emerged: a consolidation of the level of
liberalisation within the OEEC (supported by France and Italy) and a consolidation
by list of products (supported by Germany and the Netherlands).193
The French delegation supported by Luxembourg suggested removing all
reference to the OEEC, which would possibly point to a broader reading of
190
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quantitative restrictions and measures of equivalent effect than the specific level
achieved within the framework of the OEEC,194 but this was not eventually
adopted. The German delegation expressly stated that unanimity existed on
consolidating the level of liberalisation achieved within the OEEC and that
differences existed on whether the point of departure should be existing
liberalisation achieved or the liberalisation envisaged by the decision of the
Council of the OEEC of 14th January 1955.195 The text eventually adopted was a
reconciliation or joining of a French proposal to prohibit new restrictions
simpliciter and an Italian proposal to confine liberalisation during the transitional
period to that envisaged in the decision of the Council of the OEEC of 14th
January 1955.196 Thus, in the final text adopted, the Member States were required
to not introduce new quantitative restrictions or measures of equivalent effect, but
this was stated in the text of Article 31 itself not to create an obligation beyond
that contained in the decision of the Council of the OEEC of 14th January 1955.
In summary, it seems an absolute prohibition on all trading rules amounting
to an obstacle on market access was not envisaged under either Article 30 or
Article 31, especially when read together. Both use the same expressions
‘quantitative restrictions’ and ‘measures of equivalent effect’, which were the basis
of the decision in Dassonville. This is confirmed by the reference in Article 31 to a
list of products being notified to the Commission, a provision that the rather
absolute, all-encompassing formula in Dassonville renders redundant. It seems that
relatively little consideration was given by the drafters to the possibility of a very
broad reading of Article 30 in isolation from Article 31, but they could certainly
have done more to ‘bulletin board’ their intention. Rather the drafters were
concerned about the opposite possibility of a literalistic interpretation that would
permit outright bans if the term ‘quota’ was used; they understood ‘quantitative
restrictions’ and ‘measures having equivalent effect’ to refer to the specific level
of liberalisation achieved within the OEEC. They were, perhaps, unwise in not
considering the possibility of a very wide reading, but one of the reasons for this
may be because they considered such a reading of Article 30 was clearly not
194
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consistent with the specific level of liberalisation achieved within the context of
the OEEC as stated on the face of Article 31.
The danger of potential over-breadth as a result of the Dassonville formula
has by now been well noted in the literature.197 The ECJ itself, unusually, took this
on board to the extent of expressly overruling itself in Keck.198 However, as
Maduro has noted, “The Court has never clearly addressed the issue of which
interests should be balanced”.199 Keck was motivated by a desire to avoid a
conflict of norms, which conflict became inevitable given the potentially breadth
of Dassonville as a ground for invalidating diversity in national law. The approach
of the ECJ, however, glossed over the articulation of conflict and its implicit
demand for a careful normative unpacking of choice, instead the ECJ typically
favoured of the narrow, internal logic of enhancing the effectiveness of the
common market as the some constitutional value, without regard to the sensitive
constitutional dynamic of how common market overreach impacted upon the
competences and faculties of the Member States in ways that they did not seem to
intend or endorse. Though the ECJ retreated in Keck, it did not modify its
dominant conceptual apparatus and narrow normative perspective of the common
market as almost the only political value worth articulating in its caselaw. Keck
was framed in purely pragmatic or consequentalist terms, not as a decision calling
for a more refined and articulated conception of constituent power.200
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4.6 An Overview of Norm Conflict in Caselaw and Legal Reasoning of the
ECJ
4.6.1 Introduction:
The following part of the chapter surveys caselaw of the ECJ on norm conflict.
This initial section, 4.6.1, makes some introductory comments. The next section,
4.6.2, looks at the explicit articulation of conflicts or divergences of interpretative
norms by the ECJ. Section 4.6.3 examines the explicit articulation of conflicts of
substantive norms by the ECJ. Section 4.6.4 overviews major constitutionalising
decisions of the ECJ to analyse them from the perspective of norm conflict, while
section 4.6.5 examines caselaw on free movement. Finally, section 4.6.6 looks at
cases of conflict between different linguistic versions of norms.
The central role of the ECJ in the furthering of integration has been widely
acknowledged in the literature, with Shaw commenting that it “can hardly be
denied by lawyers”.201 More recently, Weatherill referred to “the (admittedly not
entirely inaccurate) caricature of the European Court as driven to act audaciously
in a manner apt to expand its influence and with it that of the other institutions of
the European Community”. Weatherill further noted that the decision in Tobacco
Advertising judgement,202 for example, was “out of line with the caricature of the
Court as (manically) pro-integrative”.203 Some commentators argue that the ECJ is
mischaracterised if just described as a teleologically oriented court in its
interpretation.204 However, what does appear to distinguish it is a tendency toward
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meta-teleological interpretation, as described by Lasser:205 more than other courts,
the ECJ engages in a purposive interpretation that understands purpose at a high,
systemic level of generality, which tends to favour enhanced integration.206 The
ECJ relatively rarely expressly articulates the interpretative method it adopts, to
explain why it has chosen one competing interpretative norm over another.
Tobacco Advertising is an example, where the Court did not note the lex generalislex specialis distinction implicit in its reasoning (see further Chapter 6 below).
This tendency and its contrast with the style of adjudication of another
international judicial tribunal, the Appellate Body of the WTO, were well brought
out by Ehlermann, a chairperson of the WTO Appellate Body and also a
Community law specialist:
42. According to Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, “a Treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose.” Among these three criteria, the Appellate Body has certainly
attached the greatest weight to the first, i.e. “the ordinary meaning of the
terms of the treaty.” This is easily illustrated by the frequent references in
Appellate Body reports to dictionaries, in particular to the Shorter Oxford
dictionary, which, in the words of certain critical observers, has become
“one of the covered agreements”. The second criterion, i.e. “context” has
less weight than the first, but is certainly more often used and relied upon
than the third, i.e. “object and purpose”.
43. For somebody having spent most of his professional life observing the
European Court of Justice in interpreting European Community law, the
difference in style and methodology could hardly be more radical. I do not
remember that the EC Court of Justice has ever laid down openly and
clearly the rules of interpretation that it intended to follow. What I do
remember is that among the interpretative criteria effectively used by the
EC Court of Justice, the predominant criterion was – and probably still is –
“object and purpose”. While the Appellate Body clearly privileges “literal”

205
206

Lasser (2004), op cit, 231.
Bredimas (1986), op cit, 561.

178

interpretation, the EC Court of Justice is a protagonist of ‘teleological’
interpretation.
44. Only in one respect, the approach of the Appellate Body and that of the
European Court of Justice converge. Both attribute little importance to the
“preparatory work of the Treaty” (Article 32 of the Vienna Convention).
However, the motives are probably not the same. For the Appellate Body,
the low value of the negotiating history results from the secondary rank
attributed to this criterion by the Vienna Convention, the lack of reliable
records, and the ambiguities resulting from the presence of contradictory
statements of the negotiating parties. For the European Court of Justice, the
reasons are probably a mixture of deliberate choice and technical difficulties
in determining the intentions of the authors of the text to be interpreted. …
47 …This choice has given clear guidance to members of the WTO and to
panels….The heavy reliance on the “ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty” has protected the Appellate Body from criticisms that its
reports have added to or diminished the rights and obligations provided in
the covered agreements (Article 3.2, third sentence, DSU). On a more
general level, the interpretative method, established and clearly announced
by the Appellate Body, has had a legitimising effect, and this from the very
beginning of its activity.207

In this passage, Ehlermann relates interpretative legitimacy to a close textual
reading and, in particular, the application of textual interpretation in priority over
purposive or teleological interpretation, which as he notes, is the opposite of the
approach the ECJ. In effect, the ECJ tends to invert the priority208 established in
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,209 which sets out the
general rules governing interpretation in international law. This is a generalisation
about the method of interpretation of the ECJ, and it does not always hold true, but
207

C-D. Ehlermann, ‘Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the WTO’,
Robert Schuman Centre Policy Paper No. 02/9 (2002), paras. 42-47.
208
Comment by Prof. Francis Snyder, 6th International Workshop for Young Scholars (WISH):
Evolution of the Community Courts, University College Dublin, 16th November 2007. See also PJ.
Kuijper, ‘The Court and the Tribunal of the EC and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
1969’, 25(1) LIEI 1-24 (1998), suggesting that the ECJ does not follow the order of priority in
Article 31 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 115 UNTS 331; Slotboom (2006), op
cit, 94.
209
Ibid.

179

as the following section seeks to demonstrate, many of the important decisions of
the ECJ do tend to reflect a broad, systemic or predominantly meta-teleological
and thus relatively creative approach.
The passage from Ehlermann also effectively invokes the contrasting
substantive values that underlie different approaches to interpretation. A narrower
textual approach is associated with input legitimacy, with democracy, with a
separation of powers in the sense of a clearly defined judicial role of applying
found law, not creating new law. Systemic interpretation can be related to a
conception of output legitimacy, with outcomes that fit with the purposes of a
system. The more controversial, and under-articulated, issue is exactly how to
characterise purpose, i.e. at what level of generality to characterise it and how to
justify the value choices implicit in varying the level of generality chosen. In this
sense, linking systemic, purposive interpretation to outcome legitimacy creates a
regress of questions as to what exactly constitutes a good outcome and how this is
to be decided. Originalism finds the answer in the constituent power.

4.6.2 Some General Comments on Conflict of Interpretative Norms in ECJ
Caselaw:
The early Opinions of Advocate General Lagrange210 and of Advocate General
Roemer were somewhat more explicit than the ECJ itself often is on matters of
interpretation. These Opinions could be said to have set the scene for the Court’s
emphasis on teleological interpretation and its general eschewal of historical or
originalist interpretation whereby interpretation is linked to the understanding of
the Member States’ representatives at the time of adoption of Community or now
Union laws. Advocate General Lagrange in France v. High Authority stated that
the approach of reading one Treaty provision in light of the Treaty overall “is
always legitimate”211 and in Fédération Charbonnière Belgique v. High Authority
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suggested that the ECJ may refer to travaux préparatoires, but had no obligation
to do so;212 in contrast, an originalist approach to interpretation would give
stronger weight to such material. Advocate General Roemer’s suggestion, in
Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium, that factors outside of the Treaty could
not be decisive213 might be understood to tilt toward a more conserving, less
creative approach. However, if the spirit of the Treaty and its objectives writ large
are considered part of the Treaty, this may not represent a strong constraining
factor. As Pauwelyn observes:
If the judge decides nonetheless to create his or her own conflict rule, he or
she is, moreover, unlikely to do so openly. A judge would then rather cover
this solution under the all-embracing approach of, for example, ‘teleological
interpretation’.214

Where the ECJ is explicit about questions of interpretation, it tends to avoid
any statement of hierarchy between the different techniques; in particular, it tends
to avoid attributing any priority to ordinary textual meaning. Consistently with
this, it generally does not articulate that differing interpretative approaches reflects
different underlying substantive values or can produce different results. For
example, in CILFIT, it stated:
Every provision of Community law must be place in its context and
interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole,
regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the
date on which the provision in question is to be applied.215
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In this passage, the emphasis is on context and object and purpose, with the
additional implication that interpretation may be evolutive. The ECJ does not note
here that objects and purposes understood evolutively might depart from the
intentions of the Member States, if specific original intention, such as evidenced
by travaux préparatoires, is invoked (rather than Dworkin’s abstract conception of
original intention as a type of delegation).
Similarly, in cases where the ECJ does emphasis the text more or does even
adopt a historical interpretation, it generally tends not to make any general
normative statement of interpretative preference that might be a useful guide for
other cases. In UPA,216 the ECJ observed that “… an interpretation cannot have
the effect of setting aside the condition in question, expressly laid down in the
Treaty, without going beyond the jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on the
Community Courts”. This seems to give priority to express textual meaning on the
grounds of a separation of powers, but this general point is not quite stated
explicitly. The inarticulacy in the caselaw is perhaps strategic. Failing to make
explicit interpretative assumptions makes inconsistency less readily apparent, thus
facilitating judicial choice and discretion. Greater articulacy on these matters
would represent a type of judicial accountability by increasing the burden of
persuasion when different cases take inconsistent approaches to the question of
delimiting substantive norms in a variable way by varying the interpretative norms
applied. In contrast, the framework of norm conflict calls attention to and requires
justification for the variable choice of applicable norms.
In its very first reported decision, the statements of the ECJ on
interpretation suggested a more conserving approach:
It is not for the Court to express a view as to the desirability of the methods
laid down by the Treaty, or to suggest a revision of the Treaty, but it is
bound in accordance with Article 31, to ensure that [in] the interpretation
and application of the Treaty as it stands the law is observed.217
216
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Here, interpretation is implicitly contrasted with Treaty revision. The review of
caselaw below suggests that this implicitly more conserving approach has often
been superseded by more expansive teleological interpretation, though sometimes
originalist interpretation does still feature in the Court’s reasoning. In the more
recent case of Kaur, for example, the Court indicated it would attribute a meaning
to a Treaty provision in accordance with the intention of the Member States at the
time of its adoption as indicated by a Declaration attached to the Treaty by the UK,
which is contrary to the suggestion of evolutive interpretation in CILFIT above:
23. Although unilateral, this declaration annexed to the Final Act was
intended to clarify an issue of particular importance for the other
Contracting Parties, namely delimiting the scope rationae personae of the
Community provisions which were the subject of the Accession Treaty. It
was intended to define the United Kingdom nationals who would benefit
from those provisions and, in particular, from the provisions relating to the
free movement of persons. The other Contracting Parties were fully aware
of its content and the conditions of accession were determined on that basis.
24. It follows that the 1972 Declaration must be taken into consideration as
an instrument relating to the Treaty for the purpose of its interpretation and,
more particularly, for determining the scope of the Treaty rationae
personae.218

This is implicitly originalist and in sharp contrast with many of the
‘constitutionalising’ decisions of the ECJ, but the Court does not attempt to justify
nor even mention such differences.

4.6.3 Explicit Articulation of Substantive Norm Conflict by the ECJ:
For the most part, the issue of substantive norm conflicts seems also relatively
under-articulated by the ECJ.219 The following excerpt from the Opinion of
218
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Advocate General Mayras in International Fruit Company220 both well articulates
the problem of norm conflict and underscores the extent to which it is understudied generally in law:
Moreover, at the time when the European Economic Community was
created, the member-States were already bound by juridical links, either
bilateral links with certain countries, or multilateral links, particularly in the
framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
In what way have these obligations been affected by the Treaty of Rome
and by the derived Community law? How, if conflicts arise, can they be
resolved? Can nationals of the Common Market meaningfully invoke, in
challenging certain Community acts, the alleged violation of certain
provisions of GATT?...
One aspect is that the conflict of norms can arise in the relations between
the Community and one or more non-member States over an agreement
binding the Community as a contracting party. In such a case, we do not see
that the dispute can be brought before you. In fact, the solution of conflicts
of this kind depends on modes of regulation under general international law,
most frequently by negotiation, conciliation or arbitration….
That is why Article 234 (2) provides that, in so far as prior agreements are
not compatible with the Treaty of Rome, the member-States must employ
all appropriate means to eliminate the incompatibilities noted, that is, by
negotiating to this effect, and, where necessary, must have recourse to the
traditional procedure for regulating conflicts of international law; in case of

norms’ (as did Advocate General Kokott in his Opinion), apart from noting the requirement for
national law to be compatible with Community law and dis-applied if not: ibid, at 679-680. The
facts concerned a claim for historic discrimination in a pension scheme for air hostesses compared
to air stewards. The case also concerned a practical consequence of a conflict of norms entailing
dis-application of a national norm, namely, the duty to compensate the party at a loss due to a
failure to enforce Community law. In previous cases, the ECJ has been willing to limit the temporal
effect of equality provisions so as not to prevent a serious risk of economic repercussions arising
from the large numbers of potential claimants involved: e.g. Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena
(‘Defrenne II’), at paras. 69-75. The Advocate General in Jonkman (ibid, at 672) referred to the
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need, these States must render one another assistance with a view to
attaining this goal, by adopting, where necessary, a common attitude.221

Here, the Advocate General makes the problem of conflict very explicit, but sees it
as a matter for political cooperation between States, rather than one to which legal
reasoning might at least make some contribution. This perhaps just reflects the
language and tenor of (ex) Article 234(2) EEC Treaty222 to which he refers, but
more generally the legally cognisable intentions of the parties and lex specialis are
both legal concepts, tools of legal reasoning, that can contribute to the process of
norm conflict resolution. In its brief judgement, the ECJ held it did have
jurisdiction under the preliminary reference system to test the compatibility of a
Community law with an international treaty to which the Community was bound,
but that the relevant international treaty provisions, Article XI of the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs,223 were not self-executing and could not be
invoked in court given the particular means of dispute resolution provided for224
(essentially the matter was non-justiciable).
More recently in Panayotova,225 the Advocate General Maduro adverted to
conflict of norms as a concept in the context of the compatibility of a Dutch law
with EU law. The Advocate General first noted the general doctrine that both
secondary Union law and national law should be interpreted to be compatible in so
far as possible with (other) EU law, restating the well established doctrine of
indirect effect, but noted that this cannot extend to interpretation contra legem:
[Consistent interpretation] is a rule that maximises the useful effect of
Community law and minimises potential conflicts with national law. It must
not however prejudice legal certainty and it must respect the autonomy of
national courts in the interpretation of national law. Although the Court is
the interpreter of Community law, it is not the interpreter of national law.
When the Court considers national law, it has to abide by the interpretation
221
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provided by the national court. In this case, it is very clear from the
reference for a preliminary ruling and also from the written and oral
observations submitted on behalf of the Netherlands Government that the
Netherlands legislation cannot be interpreted along the lines proposed by the
Commission. In other words, it could only be rendered compatible with the
Association Agreements through contra legem interpretation. This means
that the conflict of norms is unavoidable and the national judge must set
aside the conflicting national norm. Moreover, to leave such a norm in force
could lead to problems of uniformity and administrative practice.
(references omitted)226

Though this passage recognises that there are conceptual limits to how far
interpretation can go without contravening the law being interpreted, these limits
are not identified in the Opinion, while the ECJ in its judgment did not address the
issue. A narrow view of contra legem interpretation would equate it with a flat-out
contradiction of textual meaning. Apart from this, for example, how far can
evolutive interpretation go before being contra legem? The argument advanced
above in this chapter is that conserving interpretation is generally epistemically
possible and fits better with rule of law values (the legal certainty adverted to by
the ECJ in the above passage) and, in particular, democracy. On this argument,
evolutive interpretation in general, though stopping short of flat-out contradiction
of a legal text, could be considered contra legem to some degree.
The term ‘conflict of norms’ or ‘norm conflict’ tends to be avoided in the
caselaw.227 This might be thought an insignificant matter of terminology, in that
issues of compatibility, whether compatibility between laws or between actions
and the law, are inherent in all cases, and the term ‘incompatibility’ thus captures
norm conflict too. However, ‘conflict of norms’ has a stronger connotation and
intension than ‘incompatibility’; ‘conflict of norms’ emphasises the prima facie
valid character of the norms, and the need to choose between competing norms, in
a way that the looser term ‘incompatibility’ does not. This points to a greater need
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for justification228 in legal reasoning, since what is involved is a matter of refusing
to apply a norm that in general may be valid.229 Looser language can downplay
this need for justification, and this fits with the general tendency to a declaratory,
magisterial style of the ECJ (though to a lesser extent than the French judicial
style),230 in contrast to a more dialectical approach to justification.

4.6.4 Norm Conflict and ‘Constitutionalising’ the Community/Union:
This section examines some of the leading cases of the ECJ that have helped to
create a constitutional structure for the EU through the lens or framework of
conflict of norms. Caselaw on fundamental rights and on competence (in the
narrow sense231) are not included, as they are addressed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6
respectively.
Though the major ECJ cases ‘constitutionalising’ the Communities, by which
is meant those decisions that have contributed to the institutional edifice and
structure of the EU in contrast to substantive law,232 presented a potent context of
norm conflict, impinging as they did on the constitutional sovereignty of the
228
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Member States, the general issue of norm conflict tended not to be confronted. The
first of these judgements was Van Gend en Loos,233 where the ECJ held that
Community law had direct effect in the legal systems of the Member States. This
was not obviously supported by the wording of the Treaty, which appeared to only
attribute such effect to Regulations.234 The tendency of the ECJ to invert the
priority of wording over purpose and context is apparent from the statement in Van
Gend that: “To ascertain whether the provisions of an international treaty extend
so far in their effects it is necessary to consider the spirit, the general scheme and
the wording of these provisions”.235 On the wording of the relevant Treaty
provisions, the ECJ observed:
The wording of Article 12 contains a clear and unconditional prohibition
which is not a positive but a negative obligation. This obligation, moreover,
is not qualified by any reservation on the part of States which would make
its implementation conditional upon positive legislative measure enacted
under national law.236

So to infer the existence of a doctrine of direct effect, it was not necessary that the
text contained an explicit statement, rather it was enough that the text did not
explicitly exclude it.237 Hartley noted that the doctrine of direct effect could only
find textual Treaty support in relation to Regulations, and that the law-making
character of the holding in Van Gend en Loos238 of a general Community law
principle of direct effect was implicitly recognized by the decision to give a
233
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prospective ruling later in the case of Defrenne v. SABENA, where the doctrine
was applied to the equal pay principle.239
In Van Gend, the ECJ seemed to suggest direct effect applied to negative
obligations,240 but later in Lütticke,241 the Court held that (ex) Article 95 EEC
Treaty (now Article 110 TFEU) had direct effect even though it imposed a positive
obligation to remove discriminatory internal taxes on imports:
The first paragraph of Article 95 contains a prohibition against
discrimination, constituting a clear and unconditional obligation. With the
exception of the third paragraph this obligation is not qualified by any
condition, or subject, in its implementation or effects, to the taking of any
measure either by the institutions of the Community or by the Member
States. This prohibition is therefore complete, legally perfect and
consequently capable of producing direct effects on the legal relationships
between the Member States and persons within their jurisdiction. The fact
that this article describes the Member States as being subject to the
obligation of non-discrimination does not imply that individuals cannot
benefit from it.242

Here again it was enough that the text did not explicitly rule out direct effect for
the ECJ to extend the direct effect doctrine, but further, the significance of the
wording of the text in being expressly directed to the Member States was sidestepped with the brief observation that it did not imply the exclusion of direct
effect. The effect was to create a situation of norm conflict between a national rule
and a Community rule that was invokable before a court of a Member State by an
ordinary citizen. This distinguished Community from general international law
which traditionally considered that only States could be subjects and thus litigants
who could invoke norms of international law before a court.243 This is not so much
a case of direct conflict between Community and international law, but of
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accumulation:244 Community law supplemented the limitations of international law
on this point.
The direct effect doctrine was later further extended in Walrave & Koch by
rendering it applicable to cases between private individuals, i.e. where the
violation of Community law was by an individual (‘horizontal direct effect’),245
with the ECJ doing so again in relation to a Treaty provision that was explicitly
addressed to the Member States.246 Here, the ECJ did not make reference at all to
the text, but to consequences and effectiveness, arguing that Community law
would be less effective and unequal in application in the absence of such direct
effect being applied to a body, a sporting association, which did not have standing
in public law:
18. The abolition as between the Member States of obstacles to freedom of
movement for persons and to freedom to provide services, which are
fundamental objectives of the Community contained in Article 3(c) of the
Treaty, would be compromised if the abolition of barriers of national origin
could be neutralized by obstacles resulting from the exercise of their legal
autonomy by associations which do not come under public law.
19. Since, moreover, working conditions in the various Member States are
governed sometimes by means of provisions laid down by law or regulation
and sometimes by agreements and other acts concluded or adopted by
private persons, to limit the prohibition in question to acts of a public
authority would risk creating inequality in their application.247

The ECJ did not address, for example, whether it would be possible to achieve
effective and equal implementation of the Community obligation in question by
holding the Member States to be subject for an action for a failure to implement
Community law, as a procedural rule, instead of permitting the direct liability of
244

On accumulation, see Pauwelyn (2003), op cit, 161-164, 212-236 direct effect can be seen as an
example of contracting out of general international law.
245
See Case 36/74, Walrave & Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale, supra n. 83,
taken against a private bicycle association. See also Case C-415/93, Bosman, supra n. 182, taken
against a sporting association.
246
In Case 43/75, ‘Defrenne II’, supra n. 219, the ECJ held (ex) Article 119 of the EEC Treaty on
equal pay for equal work to have direct effect.
247
Case 36/74, Walrave & Koch, supra n. 83, at paras. 18-19.

190

private entities. Thus, alternative rulings that may have been more consistent with
the text were not addressed; in its judgement, the ECJ did not make explicit the
role of a text in interpretation and thus of conflict or of accumulation between the
text and its conclusion.
What Stein described as the most radical extension of direct effect came in
Franz Grad,248 where the ECJ broadened it to cover secondary legislation, and not
just Treaty provisions. The ECJ made two major arguments: first, the effectiveness
of binding measures would be impaired in the absence of direct effect; and,
second, the preliminary reference procedure implied individuals could exercise
their rights in national courts.249 The judgement here involved a Decision, whereas
only Regulations appeared to be attributed with such effect under the Treaty.250
The ECJ addressed this point, noting that the express attribution of direct
applicability to regulations did not mean that other measures did not have such
effect.251 This approach clearly tends to downplay the significance of specific
textual rules,252 avoiding “the customarily accepted discipline of endeavouring by
textual analysis to ascertain the meaning of the language of the relevant provision”.253

What really gave the direct effect doctrine its significance was its
combination with a new principle of the supremacy of Community law over that of
all the Member States, first set out in Costa v. ENEL.254 This decision similarly
resulted in a doctrine of fundamental significance, without explicit Treaty support,
and is one that at its core entails a conflict of norms.255 However, the Treaty of
248
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Rome had not actually explicitly addressed the issue of the relationship between
Community law and that of the Member States, which might tend to support the
view that the ECJ inevitably had to exercise a degree of discretion. In favour of a
more limited interpretation, however, it may be argued that a departure as
significant as the supremacy doctrine compared to general international law was
not intended by the Member States.256 In Costa, the Court had sought some textual
support by suggesting that the express provisions on derogation from the Treaty
carried the implication that they alone were the means by which Member States
could deviate from Community law and that a supremacy doctrine could be thus
inferred.257 However, this seems not a necessary inference, as many international
treaties contain explicit derogation rules without purporting to establish a
supremacy claim.258
In a later judgment, the Court confirmed that Community law takes
precedence over all national including constitutional law, relying on an argument
as to effectiveness and what could be described as a structural, rather than textual,
principle of uniformity259:
Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge the
validity of measures adopted by the institutions of the Community would
have an adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy of Community
law….Therefore the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a
Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either
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fundamental rights as formulated by the Constitution of that State or the
principles of national constitutional structure.

260

Here, the ECJ invoked an absolute lex superior principle for Community law.
Given the profound constitutional implications, the reasoning is disappointingly
short. The ECJ did not attempt to explain how the supremacy principle could be
related to the authority of the Member States as constituent power by justifying
such a far-reaching conclusion in the absence of explicit textual support. It is hard
to sustain the conclusion of such a far-reaching conflict rule as an absolute
supremacy doctrine if Member State intention and authority are to be taken
seriously. As Weiler wryly noted:
In 1957, neither the doctrine of direct effect nor the doctrine of supremacy
had emerged. If they were nascent, as the Court later claimed, they were
certainly very well hidden, and the introduction of these concepts involved a
series of daring acts of judicial activism.261

The Court further entrenched the supremacy principle at a procedural level,
holding in Simmenthal that a national court was required to dis-apply any national
legislation that conflicted with Community law and should not wait before making
a preliminary reference to the ECJ:
The effectiveness of [the preliminary reference procedure] would be
impaired if the national court were prevented from forthwith applying
Community law in accordance with the decision or the caselaw of the
Court.262

Again, the ECJ did not discuss in Simmenthal any argument concerning the need
for explicit textual support for interpretation: the reasoning was purely
consequentalist or effectiveness-based. Pure consequentalism in legal reasoning
always tends to open up the question (essentially un-addressed by the ECJ) of why
the judiciary are best placed to assess what is desirable as a consequence and how
260
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such reasoning is any different in substance to ordinary practical reasoning or
political decision-making.
There was no Treaty basis for the Court’s original human rights
jurisprudence,263 and the Court itself even held later that the Community did not
have the power to ratify the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),264
but is widely accepted that the ECJ was motivated primarily by a desire to support
the supremacy doctrine against human challenges. This prompted some of the
sharpest criticism of the ECJ in academic literature, with Coppel & O’Neill
pointing out this aspect of the Court’s motivation and accusing it of
instrumentalising human rights protection for the purpose of advancing
integration.265 More recently, the decision of the Court in Mangold266 that a ban on
age discrimination could be considered a general principle of EU law has been
sharply attacked by Roman Herzog,267 a former President of Germany and also
former President of the German Federal Constitutional Court, as an example of
unacceptable methods of interpretation. In its judgment, the ECJ stated that
various international instruments and the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States supported its conclusion.268 Herzog & Gerken, however, observed
that (in much less restrained language than appears in most academic literature):
… this ‘general principle of community law’ was a fabrication. In only two
of the then 25 member states – namely Finland and Portugal – is there any
reference to a ban on age discrimination, and in not one international treaty
is there any mention at all of there being such a ban.269
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A prohibition on discrimination on grounds of age had been included in Article II81 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,270 which has of course not
been ratified, a fact that tends to confirm the relative novelty of the Court’s
conclusion.
The ECJ also developed the doctrine of State liability in the absence of an
explicit basis in the Treaties. In Francovich,

271

the ECJ invoked primarily the

effectiveness of Community law and the principle of loyal cooperation in support
its decisions.272 Although these principles are certainly not inconsistent with the
doctrine of State liability, equally they do not necessarily entail it.273 In
Brasserie,274 the ECJ supplemented its reasoning by suggesting that many national
legal systems the essentials of the legal rules governing state liability have been
developed by the courts;275 however, in the EU, doctrines of State liability were
more often established by statute.276 More recently, the ECJ has extended the State
liability principle to encompass liability for the decision of the highest courts of
the Member States:277
In international law a State which incurs liability for breach of an
international commitment is viewed as a single entity, irrespective of
whether the breach which gave rise to the damage is attributable to the
legislature, the judiciary or the executive. That principle must apply a
fortiori in the Community legal order . . .

The Court went on to refer to the principle of the effectiveness of the remedies.278
Two issues seem to be posed by this: the political and empirical nature of
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effectiveness as a criterion of interpretation,279 and thus the difficulty in
conceptualising its limits; and secondly, the justification for the analogy with
international law in the context that the ECJ is more typically at pains to
distinguish the Community legal order from general international law, starting
with Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL.280 Here, a convergence of EU law
with international law norms helped justify a novel ruling, whereas in other cases
the asserted novelty of the Community order has been invoked to justify novel
conclusions.
Thus, norm conflict in an EU context has a bi-directional character and
dynamic: EU law looks both toward public international law and national law. The
potential de-legitimising effect of a conflict of norms between national and Union
law can be re-balanced in favour of Union law through compatibility with general
international law (see further Chapter 4 below). More provocatively perhaps, it
might be argued that the ability to justify new rules of law on either the contrasting
bases of likeness with or difference from general international law, of converging
or diverging norms in EU law relative to international law, seems potentially to
open up a large area of judicial discretion.

4.6.5 Free Movement Caselaw:
The development of the free movement principle to cover non-discriminatory
obstacles to free movement has been discussed above, where it was argued that the
ECJ in Dassonville seems to have gone beyond original intention in its
interpretation, though there was at least some textual ambiguity in Article 30 EEC
Treaty read on its own. Another clear example of extra-textual, consequentalist
reasoning by the ECJ was the creation of exceptions to the prohibition on nondiscriminatory or indistinctly applicable measures, the latter itself being a
development of the Court rather than of the Treaty. The Treaties themselves
provide for exceptions to the free movement principles, which the ECJ
279
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supplemented with its caselaw. Pauwelyn considers exceptions to rules to be
outside the scope of norm conflict theory: exceptions carve out a new rule.281 On
the approach in the present work, exceptions do fall within norm conflict theory
because they give rise to the application of differing possible interpretative norms.
In Bachmann, for example, the ECJ held that national rules allowing the
deductibility from income tax of various insurance and pension contributions only
if the contributions were paid in Belgium could be justified to ensure the cohesion
of the tax system, since the Belgian authorities could not be sure of the tax
regulations of other countries and compliance with them.282 The ECJ did not
examine the text of (ex) Article 48 ECT (now Article 45 TFEU) on the free
movement of workers and the express exceptions it creates to the free movement
principle.283 It did not bring this justification within the textually based categories
or grounds of public policy, public security or public health, which it could quite
easily have done given the open-ended nature of the latter. In Gebhard, the ECJ
affirmed that its caselaw created exceptions beyond those in the Treaty:
37. It follows, however, from the Court’s case-law that national measures
liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms
guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in
a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative
requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the
attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond
what is necessary in order to attain it (see Case C-19/92 Kraus v Land
Baden-Wuerttemberg [1993] ECR I-1663, paragraph 32).

In Kraus v. Land Baden-Wuerrttemberg , the ECJ had held that (ex)
Articles 48 and 52 of the EEC Treaty must be interpreted as meaning that they do
not preclude a Member State from prohibiting one of its own nationals, who holds
a postgraduate academic title awarded in another Member State, from using that
title on its territory without having obtained an administrative authorization for
that purpose, provided that the authorization procedure is intended solely to verify
281
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whether the postgraduate academic title was properly awarded, that the procedure
is easily accessible and does not call for the payment of excessive administrative
fees, that any refusal of authorization is capable of being subject to proceedings,
that the person concerned is able to ascertain the reasons for the decision, and that
the penalties prescribed for non-compliance with the authorization procedure are
not disproportionate to the gravity of the offence.284 The Court thus held that the
need to protect a public that will not necessarily be alerted to the abuse of
academic titles constituted a legitimate interest such as to justify a restriction of the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.285
In the above passage from Gebhard, the ECJ refers to paragraph 32 of Von
Kraus, which itself refers to Thieffry v. Conseil de l' Ordre des Avocats à la Cour
de Paris.286 The Thieffry case was applying principles relating to the recognition of
educational qualifications in the context of freedom of establishment, for which
the Treaty provides for the enactment of secondary legislation, but which had not
been adopted at the time of the facts in that case; in Gebhard the ECJ generalised
from the approach in Thieffry and went considerably beyond in specifying criteria
for the acceptability in general of exceptions to free movement, i.e. exceptions
other than the Treaty-based exceptions. In Thieffry, the ECJ was filling in a legal
gap in so far as secondary legislation has not been adopted even though required
by the Treaty as to the mutual recognition of professional qualifications of the selfemployed.287 In contrast, in Gebhard, it simply supplemented the Treaties. By
establishing a category of justified restrictions outside the Treaty-based categories,
the ECJ was establishing an alternative set of criteria to that established in
secondary legislation288 for the application of the Treaty-based exceptions.
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The willingness of the ECJ to recognise this caselaw-based category of
exception can be seen as a counter-example to the view that ECJ is always or
consistently pro-integration in its approach. On the other hand, the creation of such
exceptions could have been considered inevitable as a quid pro quo in order to
induce the Member States to accept the very broad definition of the scope of
Community law on free movement in Dassonville. What the broad reading of free
movement in Dassonville and the creation of caselaw-based exceptions to free
movement do is to create a situation of conflict between incommensurable values:
free movement versus, e.g. the coherence of a national tax system or educational
system. The weighing of incommensurable values in this way essentially involves
balancing. The Court tends not to articulate this question of degree or of weight
very explicitly. Balancing as a tool of norm conflict resolution is further examined
in Chapter 4 below. Overall, the effect of the broad reading in Dassonville and the
caselaw exceptions being subject to a balancing test is, on a critical reading, to
hugely enhance the jurisdiction and thus potential power of the ECJ itself: virtually
any divergences in national law are conceptually within the Dassonville formula,
while the Court then granted itself a (largely discretionary, if the determinacy of
‘balancing’ is assessed sceptically) power to exempt national rules from its newly
expanded jurisdiction.

4.6.6 Linguistic Conflict of Norms:
As discussed in Chapter 1, considerable potential exists in EU law for linguistic
conflicts of norms. This arises from the fact that EU laws are drafted and translated
into all the official languages. Progress can be made in avoiding conflict between
different legal traditions through adopting ‘autonomous’ EU law concepts, much
as the European Court of Human Rights has recognised under the ECHR. These
are free-standing concepts in the sense that they do not depend on the use of the
term in national legal traditions, their definition is a matter of transnational law.289
Nonetheless, it would seem implausible to divorce their meaning fully from the
289
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15(2) EJIL 279-305 (2004); G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on
Human Rights (Oxford Univ. Press 2007), chap 2., adopting a Dworkinian constructivist account of
adjudication by the European Court of Human Rights.
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legal systems of the Member States, rather they are not determined by the national
law of any Member States or particular Member State as a matter of a ‘margin of
appreciation’ accorded to Member or Contracting States, but autonomous concepts
necessarily seem to be an abstraction of a concept that plausibly can be applied to
any legal system of a Member or Contracting State. They are thus to an extent an
abstraction from the laws of the Member States, but without being tied in a
specific way to any of those laws in particular.
In contrast, the construction of an entirely new lexicon would be less likely to
reflect predictability, accessibility, and thus legitimacy of the law.290 As an
example of a typical or classic autonomous concept under the ECHR, Dijk et al
give Article 6(1) and its reference to ‘the determination of a civil right or
obligation’ or a ‘criminal charge’, which the Strasbourg Court has interpreted
independently of national qualifications of proceedings as, for example,
administrative in nature (a classification found in civil law systems that is
distinguishable from a classification as criminal or penal).291 The ECJ has invoked
the idea of autonomous concepts in several cases, for example, concerning the
terms ‘management’ and ‘disability’ in Directives.292
The need for definition and thus translation of autonomous norms,
however, means the possibility of linguistic divergence or conflict represents itself.
Maduro suggests that textual ambiguity resulting from linguistic norm pluralism293
290

See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Matscher, Özturk v. Germany [1984] 6 EHRR 409: “…
autonomous classification … must never go too far – otherwise there is a danger of arriving at an
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disagreement a more marginal feature of law; Letsas tends to mainstream disagreement as
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P. van Dijk & GJH. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human
Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 1998), 77-79, citing, inter alia, Engel & Ors v. The Netherlands,
judgement of 8th June 1976, Series A no. 22, p. 34; [l976] I EHRR 647.
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justifies the teleological interpretation of the ECJ.294 However, linguistic variation
where it exists does not inevitably entail a failure of textual interpretation. Few if
any of the more creative decisions of the ECJ are strongly or significantly related
to linguistic variations in the different language texts, and the issue is quite rarely
discussed in judgements.295 A tendency to generalise in favour of more creative,
teleological interpretation in the face of variations in different language versions of
a legal text raises obvious questions of certainty and predictability in the law. This
line of thinking can be debunked if it is applied in reverse to the question of
citizen’s adherence to the law when that law is found in linguistically diverse
sources. Should citizens be entitled to refuse a textual interpretation of the law and
thus to circumvent liability? There is a kind of epistemological asymmetry in the
argument that linguistic variations can have a general impact on judicial
interpretation, while at the same time citizens throughout the Member States are
called to uniformly296 adhere to EU law and judgements in various languages. 297
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Similarly, see recently F. Jacobs, ‘Approaches to Interpretation in a Plurilingual Legal System’,
in M. Hoskins & W. Robinson (eds.), A True European: Essays for Judge David Edward (Hart
Publishing 2003), 304. See generally, K. McAuliffe, ‘Enlargement at the European Court of
Justice: Law, Language and Translation’, 14(6) ELJ 806-818 (2008); E. Ioriatti, ‘Linguistic
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It can be argued, therefore, that if textual indeterminacy is pervasive because
of linguistic diversity, the oft-stated doctrine of the ECJ that EU law must be
interpreted in a uniform manner throughout the Member States298 seems itself to
be undermined. In other words, if ordinary linguistic interpretation can work for
the Member States, it can also be expected to work, in general, for the ECJ in its
approach to interpreting Treaty and other norms, thus casting some doubt at least
on the inevitability of broadly framed teleological interpretation as a necessary
response to conflict of linguistic norms. An alternative approach is that problems
of translation confronting the ECJ, which seem inevitable given the large number
of official languages now in the EU, be addressed through fact-finding in careful
comparative translation of texts. This kind of comparative linguistic assessment
was suggested by the ECJ itself in its decision in CILFIT:

To begin with, it must be borne in mind that Community legislation is
drafted in several languages and that the different language versions are all
equally authentic. An interpretation of a provision of Community law thus
involves a comparison of the different language versions.299

Further, if different language versions cannot be reconciled in this way, the
ECJ is left with a choice between a narrow interpretation and a broad
interpretation, depending on which language versions apply. It is not inevitable
that a broad or expansive reading be adopted in this scenario: a conflict of possible
interpretative responses is present. The ECJ could adhere to the narrower reading
not affected by translation problems, out of respect for the prerogative of the
legislature or constituent authority to amend the law if needed. As in other
instances, a broad approach tends to appeal to outcome legitimacy and systemic
298

In a US context, Levinson argues for pervasive linguistic indeterminacy as a feature of law: see
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values (in the official discourse of the EU institutions, this tends to resolve itself to
enhanced integration), whereas a narrow approach appeals to judicial deference to
the law-making role of the legislature or constituent power. What follows from this
is a need for full justification of the choice of interpretative responses to linguistic
divergence or conflict, which a simple equation of varying linguistic norms with
teleological interpretation fails to achieve.

A recent example of linguistic variation entailing a conflict of norms is
easyCar (UK) Ltd. v. Office of Fair Trading.300 The question was whether the
hiring out of cars came within the expression ‘contracts for the provision of transport
301

services’. The ECJ held that Article 3(2) of Directive 97/7/EC

on the protection

of consumers in respect of distance contracts is to be interpreted as meaning that
‘contracts for the provision of transport services’ can cover all contracts governing
services in the field of transport, including those involving an activity which does
not include, as such, the carriage of the customer or his goods, but which is aimed
at enabling the customer to perform that carriage. That concept thus includes
contracts for the provision of car hire services which is the making available to the
consumer of a means of transport. The reasoning of the ECJ provides an example
of a restrained approach to dealing with the issue of linguistic divergence. The ECJ
first noted that the term ‘carriage’ is used in a narrower sense in the legal systems
of the Member States, indicating that the use of the term ‘transport’ thus conveyed
a broader meaning.302 It went on to note that the broader meaning was supported
by several of the language versions and by ordinary meaning:

25. That interpretation is expressly supported by several language versions
of Article 3(2) of the directive, namely the German, Italian and Swedish
versions, which mention, respectively, ‘Dienstleistungen in den Bereichen
… Beförderung’ (‘services in the transport sector’), ‘servizi relativi … ai

trasporti’ (‘services relating to transport’) and ‘tjänster som avser …
transport’ (‘services which concern transport’).

300
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26. In everyday language, ‘transport’ refers not only to the action of moving
persons or goods from one place to another, but also to the mode of
transport and to the means used to move those persons and goods. Making a
means of transport available to the consumer is thus one of the services
involved in the transport sector.

Here, there is an absence of broad, systemic teleological reasoning in favour of
reasoning based on comparative linguistic assessment and ordinary usage.

4.7 Conclusion
The caselaw surveyed in this chapter demonstrates that conflicts of interpretative
norms and substantive norms can arise in a range of situations in ECJ caselaw.
Both the degree of conflict and of choice in legal reasoning that results tends to be
under-articulated. The ECJ often simply adopts a particular approach to
interpretation, without actually explicitly identifying it, though this is not always
the case. The tendency to under-articulation of choice has important implications
for justification in legal reasoning and thus for legitimacy. At the formal level, it
can given an impression of inevitability in the argument and conclusion, but in
substance merely conceals a choice and the thinness or superficiality of the
reasoning.303
Under-articulated choices are by almost definition not fully justified, since
articulating choice necessarily presents the question why one interpretation or
approach to reasoning is favoured over another. This is an issue that arises within a
case, but also across cases. The ‘constitutionalising’ decisions referred to above
adopt a prospective, systemic, teleological interpretation, whereas Kaur and
easyCar are much more constrained in focusing on conserving meaning and
recovering legislative or constituent intention. By not explicitly articulating this
difference, the inconsistency in approach across the caselaw is less obvious. This
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may enhance the superficial impression of legitimacy, but at a deeper level merely
postpones it.
The present work argues that the framework of norm conflict is a fruitful
one for understanding this dynamic of choice in the caselaw of the ECJ.
Ultimately, the choice relates to substantive values and to ‘political morality’.
Different choices reflect different political moralities. In the above chapter, two
poles on a spectrum were emphasised: on the one hand, output legitimacy
understood as enhancing integration, and one the other hand, a more conserving
approach to interpretation and legal reasoning, where the text and legislative or
constituent intention feature more prominently, reflecting input legitimacy. The
choice of cases is necessarily selective, but what this choice of cases does show is
that judicial interpretation can have far-reaching and innovative effects. It relates
to cases where the ECJ has established quite new rules, as opposed to giving a
broad interpretation of existing rules.304 As Arnull has observed, “the Court’s
general approach to questions of interpretation … attracts little criticism in
technical and routine cases”.305 Nonetheless, it seems an incomplete answer to the
issue of choice and the normative context of interpretation and legal reasoning to
observe that the Court varies in the degree of creativity in which it engages.306
Such variations beg the underlying question of the normative basis for the different
approaches, a point made clear by the framework of norm conflict.
In general, the ECJ fails to address norm conflict with a degree of
articulacy that can be considered satisfactory. Its reasoning tends to be superficial,
creating an impression of inevitability, but in substance simply concealing choices.
This could be understood critically as reflecting the self-interest of courts as
institutional actors: failing to articulate choice gives the impression that courts
engage in reasoning that is substantively different from political and policy actors.
The conceptual framework of norm conflict suggests this impression is misleading.
Important choices, varying between input and output legitimacy, are being made,
304

An example of the latter is the interpretation by the Court of the term ‘worker’ in Article 39 EC
Treaty (now Article 45 TFEU): see, e.g. Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982]
ECR 1035; Case 139/85, Kempf v. Staatsecretaris van Justitie [1986] ECR 1741.
305
Arnull (2006), op cit, 620.
306
Defending the ECJ on this basis from charges of ‘activism’, see, e.g. Albors-Llorens (1999), op
cit; Arnull (2006), op cit, 607, 620-621.

205

with the ECJ typically referring, when it does offer justification, to output
legitimacy concerns, usually in the form of an effectiveness argument linked to
integration. This inevitably calls into question the broader institutional legitimacy
of courts making such political and policy choices (‘policy’ in the sense of not
being bound to legal rules) and whether the failure to articulate such choice is an
implicit acknowledgement that it would be difficult to overtly justify the role the
ECJ seeks to assign to itself.

On a critical reading, the insights of political

scientists that courts, including the ECJ, are strategic and self-interested
institutional actors307 seem reflected in the superficiality of the reasoning of the
Court used as a possible means to limit the obviousness of its political power.
In the following two chapters, the broad scope of the method of legal of
reasoning preferred by the ECJ is assessed concerning two specific types of norms
of central importance in any legal system: human rights and competence norms.
These norms relate to the fundamental values underlying a legal system, both as
regards the individual citizen (human rights norms) and the definition of powers or
the institutional, political morality of the system (competence norms).
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Chapter 5 – Conflicts of Fundamental Values in EU Law and Legal Reasoning

5.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 3, human rights clauses present a particular problem for norm
conflict theory and legal reasoning because of their relative interpretative indeterminacy.
Rules of lex posterior and lex specialis may not be that helpful.1 Rights provisions are
usually all enacted simultaneously, meaning lex posterior does not provide a solution. Even
if rights were enacted at different times, their normative status as inherent ‘goods’ makes
questionable any lex posterior rule. Lex specialis is unlikely to be helpful in many cases of
rights as they tend currently to be drafted because these rights clauses have a relatively high
degree of generality, and indeed some degree of generality is necessary.2 Since such rights
apply across all public law, it is very difficult to enumerate them in considerable detail
relative to the circumstances of their application (detention and trial rights may be something
of an exception under current practice3), i.e. competing rights claims in abstract Bill of
Rights may not be resolvable on grounds of specificity, since they may be expressed in
equally general terms. However, the articulation of rights claims at a very high level of
generality is not inevitable, as the trial rights example demonstrates.
The question of specifying rights in more detail than abstractly phrased Bill of Rights
currently tend to do, termed specificationism, is one of two approaches to conflicts of rights
norms addressed in this chapter. By clarifying the relative scope of respective rights,
potential overlap and conflict are reduced through a specificationist approach. Apart from the
avoidance ex ante of conflict in this way through specification, the most obvious potentially
applicable norm conflict rule is that of lex superior: can some rights be considered superior
to others, so as to form a hierarchy of rights? Such a hierarchy to some degree seems
inevitable, since very many rights claims will entail a clash of rights claims: the absence of
1

E-U. Petersmann, ‘Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of
Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration’, 13(3) EJIL 621-650 (2002) (‘Petersmann
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Fallacy?’, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 02-09 (2009), 486.
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any hierarchy thus has the potential to render rights adjudication almost entirely ad hoc, dealt
with on a case-by-case basis. This is the second and related issue addressed in the chapter.
The two issues of specificationism and hierarchy interact, since specificationism makes
easier the elaboration of a hierarchy.
The general issue of conflicts of rights has been surprisingly under-discussed until
quite recently, and it seems generally to have been assumed that conflicts of rights did not
occur or did not merit attention.4 A motivation for avoiding the question of conflict of rights
might be, as Waldron notes, a dislike of the connotation of trade-offs between rights that
conflict suggests, given that rights discourse has been contrasted with the utilitarian tendency
to sacrifice or trade off individual interests for greater overall utility.5 This dislike, however,
merely avoids a full articulation of the conceptual issues inherent in conflict of rights and in
the reality of such conflict. It also leads to a lack of judicial accountability in this most
important of normative areas; failing to clearly identify conflict amounts to a fudging of
issues and a failure to justify choices in adjudication. This chapter argues that in the EU, this
can be seen in the ambiguous way that the ECJ relates traditional or classic rights to the goal
of integration.
The first part of this chapter examines how human rights relate to other legal interests in
EU law and the legal reasoning of the ECJ, in particular, the status of human rights relative
to systemic concerns with integration and with economic goods. This is a prelude to the
discussion of a hierarchy of rights. Clashes of rights occur in EU law both conceptually, in
that many legal disputes about rights entail competing rights claims (e.g. in the context of
abortion, the right to life competes with the right to privacy and/or bodily autonomy6), but
additionally clashes of rights occur because of the phenomenon of multi-level governance. In
the EU, rights are protected at national constitutional level, at regional level in the form of
the European Convention on Human Rights7 (ECHR) and the EU Charter of Fundamental
4
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Rights,8 and internationally through the United Nations (UN). The EU thus provides a prime
case study of how rights interact with multi-level jurisdictional and systemic questions. The
accession of the EU to the ECHR will help reduce conflict between the Charter as interpreted
by the ECJ and the ECHR as adjudicated by the European Court of Human Rights, but the
issue of conflicts of rights will remain the same relating to EU law and national
constitutional law.9
There exist thus two vertical dimensions to human rights concerns in the EU: the
relationship between rights protection at Union level and (a) at national level and (b) at
international level. As discussed in Chapter 1, the national-EU relationship has witnessed
perhaps the strongest legal challenge to the integration process in the form of conditional
acceptance by national constitutional courts of the supremacy of EU law, represented best in
the ‘solänge’ caselaw of the German Federal Constitutional Court. From the perspective of
the latter, acquiescence in integration by the national legal order is conditional upon adequate
human rights protection and adequate democratic safeguards (the latter condition being
emphasised especially in the more recent Lisbon judgment10) in the exercise of Union
competences. From the opposing perspective of the ECJ, human rights protection in its
caselaw was conversely conceived as a way of meeting this qualified acceptance and
resisting the challenge that it posed to EU legitimacy.11 In a broad sense, EU human rights
protection has been instrumentalised to at least some extent to protect the EU polity by
ensuring a uniform standard of rights.12 Rights in an EU context therefore are part of a multilevel dialectic, or more sceptically, multi-level power struggle. That dynamic potentially
poses a threat to the notion of rights as having inherent value, independently of systemic or
political considerations or power or competence struggles. A stronger articulation of
individual rights and of their relative status and scope may help counteract the risk of rights
being subject to arbitrary or partial definition in inter-court struggles.
8
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As discussed in Chapter 3, one way of concretising in adjudication the scope of rights,
including of the relative scope of competing rights, is to look to history or tradition: how has
the practice of a legal or constitutional community polity traditionally prioritised competing
rights? This approach may have its limits as new human rights contexts arise,13 but it in
general suggests a minimalist judicial role in rights protection, as a safeguard against State
totalitarianism, but it leaves innovation on the constitutional balance between rights to the
process of formal constitutional amendment. It provides a more empirically grounded and
self-evident source of conflict resolution.14 This grounding can also provide a basis for
greater specification of existing Bills of Rights.
In contrast to history as a template for rights resolution, ‘philosophy’ makes
competing claims,15 and this is best reflected in the work of Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin sees
judges as the political philosophers of modern legal systems, whose job it is to fashion the
best solution to hard cases according to a constructivist method of finding what ‘best fits’
with the prevailing political morality reflected in the constitutional system. In Chapter 2, the
limits of this account and the questions it tends to further pose were discussed, but it can be
clearly contrasted with an emphasis on history and tradition as the source of resolving
conflicting rights. In the context of the limits of ‘best fit’, Zucca notes that Dworkin glosses
over the possibility of two rights, i.e. two non-utilitarian arguments, competing.16 Dworkin
has only briefly acknowledged that it may be necessary to override a given right when this is
necessary to protect the rights of others.17
As Waldron notes, the conceptual account or definition of rights that a person adopts
affects both the existence of conflict of rights and its resolution.18 In Chapter 3, Hohfeld’s
conception of rights as relational was outlined. He understood rights as correlating to duties
and being opposed to no-rights (a duty in turn is opposed to a privilege). Taking rights to be
correlated with duties, Waldron suggests “When we say rights conflict, what we really mean
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is that the duties they imply are not compossible”.19 The correlation between rights and
duties is widely accepted and is the understanding adopted in this chapter. Waldron
emphasises here the duty aspect of rights as being at the core of conflict. Conflict of rights is
also impacted by the conception of a right, not just the acceptance of a correlating duty.
Different conceptions of rights are possible, i.e. different views exist as to what does it
means to say a person has a right (as opposed to discussion of the content of specific rights).
Hohfeld’s work is just one contribution in numerous attempts to explicate the concept
of a right (Hohfeld’s work is broader in accounting for legal concepts or relations in general,
not just rights).20 Bentham understood rights as benefits, in that they entailed an obligation,
imposed by law, to be respected and thereby conferred a benefit.21 Hart proposed the notion
of immunity as useful in thinking about rights and which led to the idea of rights as legally
respected individual choices,22 an idea later taken up by Steiner who suggested the idea of a
domain of individual sovereignty free from State interference.23 A right gave the bearer a
measure of control, a domain in which free will could be exercised.24 Among the difficulties
with a will theory is that the content of rights seems unpredictable and also to lack
objectivity.25 It is hard to correlate the right to duties, since the exercise of rights seems to be
essentially within the control of the individual.
In further criticism of the will theory, MacCormick proposed an interest theory,
which posits that someone has a right if the interest is important enough to require a right and
19

Ibid, 206.
See, generally, e.g. J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights (Oxford Univ. Press 1984); L. Wenar, ‘Rights’, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2007 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
< http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/#5.2 > (last accessed 17thth May 2010); Zucca (2007), op cit, 30-42,
55-60.
21
See the chapter ‘Legal Rights’, in HLA. Hart, Essays on Bentham (Clarendon Press 1982), 162-193, for
original references (as Hart notes, ibid, 162, Bentham’s comments on rights were scattered throughout his
works). Bentham distinguished between rights grounded in an obligation and liberty rights in which a
corresponding obligation is absent.
22
Ibid, 190-193.
23
H. Steiner, ‘Working Rights’, in M. Kramer, N. Simmonds & H. Steiner (eds.), A Debate Over Rights
(Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
24
The latter echoes the distinction between positive and negative liberty proposed by Isaiah Berlin: negative
liberty is the freedom to live free from interference by others or especially the State, positive liberty connotes
the freedom to do or carry out particular acts: I. Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in I. Berlin, Four Essays on
Liberty (Oxford Univ. Press New ed. 2002) (original edition 1969) (based on his 1958 inaugural lecture). For an
accessible overview, see I. Carter, ‘Positive and Negative Liberty’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Winter 2007 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
< http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative/ > (last accessed 17thth May 2010).
25
Besson (2005), op cit, 422.
20

211

corresponding duty to fulfil it. He suggested the limits of a choice theory by the example of
the right of a baby: a baby can have rights, but does not exercise will or choice.26 The interest
theory is potentially broader than a choice theory, depending on what is considered within
the idea of ‘interest’, and also seems more paternalistic. On the other hand, it does not seem
to account for the idea of individual autonomy that is often strongly associated with rights.27
The status theory of rights is the furthest from utilitarianism as a conception of rights:
it is the least ‘instrumentalised’ notion of rights in attributing rights on the basis of the
inherent nature of persons as human beings28 or their worth.29 A similar idea is conveyed by
the notion of rights as grounded in human dignity.30 It is thus the most consistent with a
Kantian view of rights precluding treating individuals as a means to an end.31 Oberdiek
proposes that any account of rights that considers rights to relate to some more fundamental
account of reasons is an instrumentalist account of rights, as rights are now understood as
means to fulfilling the underlying reasons, and this point also applies to the status theory.
The underlying reasons thus are the primitive, not the rights themselves. However, this
seems instrumentalist only in a weak sense, since status is an underpinning concept, but not a
distinct interest for which rights can be subverted:
That rights are predicated on some more fundamental consideration or set of
considerations does not entail that rights must be pursued as goals. It means only that
there is a more basic reason of some kind that justifies any particular right.... One need
not reject an instrumental account of rights, then, to avoid what Nozick calls a
‘utilitarianism of rights’ or what Kamm more pointedly calls ‘futilitarianism’.32
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Thus, even the status conception of rights is instrumental in the weak sense that rights are
means to fulfil, or exist in virtue of, the status of e.g. autonomy or dignity that a person
possesses. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights seems to endorse a status conception of
rights in that Article 1 states that “Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and
protected” and the Explanations officially promulgated that accompany Charter state that
“The dignity of the human person is not only a fundamental right in itself but constitutes the
real basis of fundamental rights”.33 However, there is also considerable ambiguity in the
Charter on the status and priority of human rights, as discussed further below.
An additional theoretical distinction in conceptual accounts of rights is between
positive and negative rights: freedom from interference by others, rather than freedom
entailing positive duties on others. Nozick’s account of rights as side constraints, as the
prohibition of interference from others,34 limits the duties that correlate rights much more
than a positive account of rights, and thus Nozick’s account minimises conflict.35
None of these conceptual accounts necessarily says much about the substantive
content of rights,36 and it also may be wondered what they say then about conflicts of rights.
Though these accounts are generally analytical or conceptual, they may be thought to have at
least some normative dimension or implication37 (although a full substantive account of the
limits of rights might be needed to fully establish such an implication). For example, Zucca
suggests that Hart’s will or choice theory favours a right to end one’s own life.38 The most
obvious implication seems to stem from the status theory: that suggests that only other
human rights may justifiably restrict a right, and it thus has an obvious anti-utilitarian
connotation, i.e. the status theory tends to suggest more strongly the priority of rights over
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other legal interests, in contrast with the interest theory.39 This is demonstrated by Zucca’s
recent discussion of how to frame the issue of physician-assisted and the right to life. Zucca
proposes that this should be understood as a conflict of fundamental rights, between the
fundamental right to life and the fundamental right to decisional privacy. Two alternative
ways of conceptualising this situation can be envisaged:
In other words, I see a conflict between the FLR [Fundamental Legal Right] to life and
the FLR to decisional privacy. Few people agree with this view. Many think that the
only conflict is between the interest in self-determination of the individual, and the
state interest in the protection of life. Framing the question that way is deeply
problematic, especially if we hold a strong conception of FLRs, as it equates a FLR to
decisional privacy to a simple interest. Then, it opposes the state interest in the
protection of life to the simple interest aforementioned. This characterization of the
conflict debases the importance of FLRs in constitutional adjudication. This is because
the interest embedded in the FLR does not seem to have any specific priority in relation
to the interest protected by the State.40

The significance of a status-conception of rights, therefore, is to weigh much more strongly
in favour of rights as opposed to a general interest, i.e. it is the conception of rights most
opposed to utilitarianism.
The passage just quoted also points to another aspect of rights adjudication, namely,
the descriptive characterization of rights. Is there a right to ‘decisional privacy’? Zucca’s
formulation derives from a specification of a more general right to privacy.41 What this
specification does, in Zucca’s presentation, is implicitly lend more weight to the status of the
right in the specific situation. This is related to another approach to dealing with rights
conflicts noted above, namely, specificationism, which seeks to identify rights in as much
detail and specificity as possible in advance of their application and to ex ante minimise
conflict (in other words, a substantive definition of rights is detailed as much as possible
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prior to their application). This approach is discussed further below in the second part of the
chapter, but it is worth noting at this stage that it could be considered the application of the
lex specialis principle in the context of rights adjudication. Finally, it can be noted here that
the status conception of rights also suggests rights have an objective character, which seems
to point to the possibility of an a priori hierarchy of rights.
In the discussion so far, inherent rights have been contrasted with instrumental rights.
However, there are degrees of instrumentalisation of rights, as Oberdiek discussed above
identified: Dworkin contrasts rights with collective interests through his principles versus
policies distinction and his exclusion of external preferences from the domain of principles
(i.e. preferences related to other people, rather than to oneself) supporting rights,42 but his
definition of rights is subject to the test of ‘best fit’ with the political morality of the system.
The test of best fit seems to re-inject collective interest into the definition or discovery of
rights. It may be best, therefore, to see a spectrum between a strong status conception and
highly instrumentalised conception of rights, rather than a sharp opposition. Dworkin’s
position is thus somewhat ambivalent overall, despite seeming close to a status theory in
relating rights to principles.43 The interest theory of rights seems to accommodate utilitarian
concerns quite easily, as it does not fundamentally or necessarily distinguish between rights
and other interests, such as collective goals.44 It is also possible to see rights as consisting of
various interests45 to a sufficiently strong degree that they crystallise into something
normatively stronger, which again blurs the distinctiveness of rights theories relative to
utilitarianism.
Finally, it is worth noting that the various conceptual accounts of rights are not all
mutually exclusive. It is possible to combine the interest and status theories, for example, as
well captured by Besson:
A status-based filter on rights… permits the application of the interest theory to be
finessed to prevent cases of infringement of rights that would deny any status to the
right holder. According to the modified interest theory of rights, then, most rights are
42
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based on interests, but some aim at recognising a person’s status and inviolability
which lie at the foundations of her interests. This is clearly the case of most
constitutional or fundamental rights.46

In other words, rights consist of a core relating to the status of the holder as a human being,
but the exact scope and contours is subject to interests, which, implicitly, may be limited or
traded off. An alternative conceptualisation of constitutional or fundamental rights that
Zucca supports and which is found in previous writings47 is the idea of immunity as
characteristic of them, in that they amount to a limit on State power, in particular48 (although
rights also have a horizontal dimension in that not just the State is obliged to respect them).
This idea of immunity could be attached to any of the theories. It is also possible to combine
the will or choice theory with the interest theory, if choice is considered a pre-eminent
interest to be protected.
A full conceptual account of rights may need to combine several elements. In this
chapter, Besson’s status-based filter of rights is adopted, along with a recognition of i. choice
or autonomy as an underpinning principle and ii. the correlation between rights and duties.
This points towards a (relatively) irreducible core of rights protecting individual autonomy in
virtue of a person’s status as a human being and points against utilitarianism or more vaguely
defined interests. Identification of this minimalist account could facilitate the development of
a hierarchy of rights as a means of rights conflict resolution or avoidance.49
The remainder of this chapter begins by addressing the actual state of EU law and the
normative status currently accorded human rights in ECJ caselaw. It does so through
examining a well-known debate in the literature between Coppel & O’Neill and Weiler &
Lockhart on the extent to which the ECJ instrumentalised human rights in its caselaw in
favour of increased integration.50 This reflects a debate in international law on the
46
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relationship between trade and human rights and the extent to which human rights are freestanding with a higher normative status than other competing elements in adjudication. This
concerns a clash between rights and other legal interests. The chapter them moves on to
examine some recent caselaw from the ECJ, to assess whether the somewhat ambivalent
normative status of human rights in earlier caselaw has been replaced in favour of a more
articulated account of the normative weight of human rights, and concludes that a certain
ambivalence in characterising rights relative to other interests (particularly the concern with
increased integration) is still found in some of the caselaw. Reflecting its exaltation of
integration as a value, even in the human rights sphere where rights are normally thought to
trump other political concerns, the ECJ seems reluctant to identify rights as the ultimate
normative goods in EU law.
Finally, the chapter discusses the concepts of a hierarchy of rights and
specificationism in rights’ definition as a means of avoiding the trap of ad hoc adjudication
that the incommensurability of competing rights claims presents. This reflects the concern in
Chapter 4 and well articulated by Schauer that “the only sensible way in which rights can
operate in legal argument is by way of being both temporally and logically antecedent to the
particular case in which a claimant’s success might be deemed to be the recognition of a
right”.51 This part concludes that such a hierarchy is to some extent workable and is reflected
in the relatively detailed explanatory materials specifying the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights and can help overcome the somewhat unsatisfactory way in which the ECJ relates
rights to other interests.

5.2 Reprising the Coppel-O’Neill v. Weiler-Lockhart Debate
In the 1990s, a well known debate took place in the literature between Coppel & O’Neill,
who claimed the ECJ instrumentalised fundamental rights in its legal reasoning to enhance
its own role and power and encourage further integration, which prompted a detailed
51
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response from Weiler & Lockhart defending the ECJ.52 This section will first review this
exchange, including with reference to a somewhat similar and more recent debate between
Alston and Petersmann on how international trade law should relate to human rights.53 It will
then examine more recent human rights case law to see how the ECJ conceptualises rights
relative to other legal interests in the Union legal order. In a forthright and provocatively
worded piece, Coppell & O’Neill began by noting their purpose was to question the easy
assumption that the use of the language of fundamental rights by the ECJ translated into the
actual protection of rights within the then EC. The motivation of the ECJ in its early rights
caselaw was, they noted, beyond question about securing its own supremacy claims rather
than rights per se,54 while a reading of its more recent caselaw suggested an ‘offensive’ use
of rights to extent the influence of the EC over the Member States (as opposed to a defensive
use to maintain supremacy), in other words, rights were being to enhance integration at the
expense of Member State autonomy.55
First, Coppel & O’Neill noted that the ECJ had begun to apply Community rights norms
directly to national legal acts, instead of confining them to Community law. Rutili56 signalled
this trend in referring to the ECHR as a limit on the derogation by Member States from the
free movement of workers principles. The ECJ noted that the exceptions in the Treaties to
free movement were to be determined by Community law and reflected the limitations
permitted in the ECHR under Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11.57 The first case where the ECJ openly
assessed the validity of an act of a Member State on the basis of fundamental rights
considerations was Wachauf v. Federal Republic of Germany.58 On the facts, German law
required the consent of a landowner for a farmer to be able to surrender to and claim
52
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compensation from the State for his milk production quota, which quota was provided for
under Community secondary law.59 The ECJ held that this violated a fundamental right of
the farmer concerned, in depriving the lessee, without compensation, of the fruits of his
labour and of his investments in the tenanted holding, and that the Member States must, so
far as possible, implement Community law in accordance with the protection of fundamental
rights in the Community legal order.60 The ECJ went on to note that the Community law in
question could have been implemented so as to comply with fundamental rights; in effect,
therefore, the problem lay with implementation.61 The view that national implementing
measures had to comply with Community fundamental rights was confirmed in ERT.62
Coppell & O’Neill identified this and other caselaw63 as a trend of assessing Member Sates’
public policy derogations from the standpoint of Community law protection of fundamental
rights.64
ERT65 seemed to go further, however, in holding that fundamental rights are a standalone basis for assessing national implementation of derogations, rather than, as in Rutili,
being invoked as echoing general principles of Community law:66 “… The national rules in
question may only benefit from the … exceptions insofar as they are compatible with
fundamental rights, the observance with which the Court ensures”.67 In contrast, Weiler &
Lockhart argue that ECJ jurisdiction over derogations was inevitable to ensure some
consistency in the matter.68 They suggest that a proportionality standard of review of national
derogating measures relative to restrictiveness on trade, which review was required to ensure
some review of derogations, involves just as much a value choice as human rights review.69
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Further, even if the latter were more intrusive, a degree of latitude might still be left to the
Member States.70
The significance of ERT could be assessed by contrast with the decision in Cinéthèque,
where the ECJ seemed to set clear jurisdictional limits to its role regarding fundamental
rights:
Although it is true that it is the duty of this Court to ensure observance of fundamental
rights in the field of Community law, it has no power to examine the compatibility with
the European Convention of national legislation which concerns, as in this case, an area
which falls within the jurisdiction of the national legislature.71

The operative question though in light of this statement is what amounts to ‘the jurisdiction
of the national legislature’. Coppel & O’Neill identified a subtle change in formulation in
Demirel, which suggested a more expansive notion of Community jurisdiction:
The Court has no power to examine the compatibility with the European Convention on
Human rights of national legislation lying outside the scope of Community law.72

Implementation acts, for example, seem to fall within national jurisdiction, but Demirel
paved the way for Wachauf to apply Community law standards to this implementation. In
ERT, the EC confirmed this expansive approach, stating that it had jurisdiction to assess any
national implementation “as soon as any such legislation enters the field of application of
Community law”.73 The potential of this line of caselaw was revealed, Coppel & O’Neill
suggest, in the SPUC v. Grogan case, which concerned a challenge to a provision of the Irish
Constitution prohibiting information on abortion as being contrary to free movement and
where the Advocate General stated:
In Cinéthèque, … it was stated that the Court’s power of review did not extend to ‘an
area which falls within the jurisdiction of the national legislator’, a statement which,
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generally speaking, is true. Yet once a national rule is involved which has effects in an
area covered by Community law (in this case Article 59 of the EEC treaty) and which,
in order to be permissible, must be able to be justified under Community law with the
help of concepts or principles of Community law, then the appraisal of that national
rule no longer falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national legislature.74

As discussed further in Chapter 6 on conflicts of competence norms, the scope of
Community law principles of free movement and undistorted competition is virtually
limitless, at least in the abstract, so Coppel & O’Neill seem correct in noting the
jurisdictional potential of the formula in this passage as to a national rule ‘having effects’
(undefined) in an area covered by Community law.75 In SPUC v. Grogan, the ECJ classified
abortion as a service and held that Ireland could prohibit the provision of information in
circumstances where such provision was not part of an economic activity. Coppel & O’Neill
criticised this as an avoidance of the human rights issue involved, which was instead dealt
with as a matter of technical classification.76 Instead of relating to the issue of abortion in
terms of “a profound moral dilemma”, that “abortions are carried out for money… is the only
relevant factor for the Court”.77 In defence of the ECJ, Weiler & Lockhart note that the
preliminary reference was itself framed in technical terms, asking the question ‘Does the
organized activity or process of carrying out an abortion…come within the definition of
‘services’ … [in] Article 60 of the Treaty…’78 and that the broader rights issue was moot on
the facts and did not need to be addressed.79
74
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Coppel & O’Neill then went on to situate the issue in the context of the normative
status of human rights, as being at the top of the normative hierarchy in legal reasoning:
We suggest that fundamental rights are commonly regarded as being at the peak of the
normative hierarchy of laws against which other rules of law are to be measured. This
is, in essence, the basis of the European Court’s claim to national courts that it could be
relied upon to protect fundamental rights, implicit in the Court’s original adoption of
fundamental rights discourse. … Legitimate action by Community institutions was to
be limited by the higher standard of respect for fundamental rights.80

However, per Coppel & O’Neill, rights have generally been used in the Community legal
order to challenge or attack national implementation, the ECJ has hardly ever invalidated a
provision of Community law on fundamental rights grounds. This trend:
… follows directly from an instrumental manipulation of the nature and importance of
the concept of fundamental rights protection. In each case the Court has manipulated
the usage of fundamental rights principles, endowing these principles with just enough
significance in Community terms to allow for the triumph of the Community will.81

In Wachauf, for example, fundamental rights were treated as simply an interpretative
principle:82
The fundamental rights recognized by the Court are not absolute, however, but must be
considered in relation to their social function. Consequently, restrictions may be
imposed on the exercise of these rights, in particular in the context of a common
organization of a market, provided that those restrictions in facts correspond to
objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and do not constitute, with
regard to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference impairing the
very substance of those rights.83
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This approach subordinates human rights to the social function of achieving Community
objectives84 (although in defence of the ECJ against this criticism by Coppel & O’Neill, it
could be said that the last line of this passage seems to salvage at least some pre-eminence
for rights). In response, Weiler & Lockhart argued that too much was read here into the
phrases “as far as possible” and “general interest”.85 On the former expression, it simply
connoted the principle of consistent interpretation;86 on the latter expression, it simply
connoted the need to balance individual rights with the common good, a balancing exercise
familiar to all courts.87
Finally, Coppel & O’Neill go on to cite ECJ caselaw equating the free movement
provisions of EU law with fundamental rights. In Heylens, for example, the ECJ stated:
Since free access to employment is a fundamental right which the Treaty confers
individually on each worker of the Community, the existence of a remedy of a judicial
nature against any decision of a national authority refusing the benefit of that right is
essential in order to secure for the individual effective protection for this right.88

This seems to consider that there is no hierarchical distinction between the free movement
market principles and human rights and thus:
… it is difficult to see any foundation for the European Court’s claim that it will
measure the specific enactments of Community law against some pre-eminent standard
of respect for and protection of human rights.89

Coppel & O’Neill conclude that evidently the ECJ sees economic integration as its
fundamental priority and by using the term ‘fundamental right’ in such an instrumental way,
refuses to take fundamental rights discourse seriously.90 In response, Weiler & Lockhart
contend that this criticism makes an unjustified leap from lexical equivalence to normative
84
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equivalence: that the fact the ECJ uses the term ‘fundamental’ to describe two things, human
rights and free movement, does not have to mean both are equally important.91 In reply to
this latter point, it remains the case, however, that the ECJ did not attempt to offer any
explanation of the normative priority between the interests. It might be questioned why the
Court should describe two things in a ‘lexically equivalent’ way, if it did not mean to treat
them as equal. Commentators can only go by the language used by the ECJ.
Though noting an “all too small corpus of critical academic writing about the Court”,92
Weiler & Lockhart set out, for the most part, to systematically rebut Coppel & O’Neill’s
criticisms.93 Weiler & Lockhart responded with three main counter-claims: that the motive
analysis they engaged in was neither verifiable nor falsifiable94 and that in any case human
rights do not have to be seen as in conflict with integration;95 that the claim of competence
overreach was wrongly attributed to the ECJ and was really the fault of the Community
legislature, with the ECJ largely trying to follow suit by developing an applicable human
rights framework for this competence;96 and that the broad scope of the empirical claims
Coppel & O’Neill made as to the lack of invalidation of Community measures on human
rights grounds was not supported by ECJ caselaw.97 They thus generally reject the claim that
human rights were instrumentally manipulated to advance integration.98 Their responses to
Coppel & O’Neill’s criticism of specific cases are outlined above. Apart from these cases,
Weiler & Lockhart identified a series of cases where the ECJ found against Community
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legislation on human rights grounds,99 whereas Coppel & O’Neill had suggested such cases
almost never arose.
On the criticism that the ECJ had illicitly extended the jurisdiction of the ECHR to EU
law and thus into the legal system of the UK, for example, which at that time had not
incorporated the ECHR, Weiler & Lockhart note that incorporation was desirable in itself100
and that national human rights review could suffer from the defect of over-sensitivity to local
practices in the painful tension between the universal and particular in rights adjudication.101
On this point at least, they do not address Coppel & O’Neill’s essentially process-based point
about the suitability of the Community judicature as agents for ECHR incorporation on its
own terms, rather they make a more consequentalist defence based on the argument that the
UK legal system needed supplementation in the area of rights protection. In this respect, the
protagonists to the debate were at cross purposes in invoking input- and output-legitimacy
respectively.
Generally, however, Weiler & Lockhart do acknowledge the brevity of the reasoning
of the ECJ.102 And looking at the debate overall, it could be said to focus on the difference
approaches the authors took to this relative brevity: Coppel & O’Neill here were willing to
read into the suggestiveness of the caselaw normatively dubious motives and implications,
on which they did not give the ECJ the benefit of the doubt. In contrast, Coppel & O’Neil did
give the ECJ this benefit. The point about the brevity of the Court’s reasoning has often been
made in the literature,103 but it seems to offer only a partial defence. Even if doing so only
briefly, the ECJ could have quite easily clarified the relationship it understood to exist
between human rights norms and the kind of systemic concerns with effectiveness and
99
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integration that are to be found in its caselaw. Apparently implicitly accepting to some
degree Coppel & O’Neill’s descriptive claim that the ECJ attributed a high normative
priority to the goal of integration, Weiler & Lockhart sought to offer a more articulated
defence of this normative preference:
But should one not treat with the respect due to a serious moral position the view that
in the European Community, ensuring the free movement of information across
national boundaries, including “commercial” information, is to be viewed as going
beyond the Community objective to ensure free movement of factors of production?
That it may relate to an understanding of a deeper ethos of the Community – say, its
ability to tame the excesses of the nation State. The Community represents a challenge
to a nationalist ethos which would regard the State – any State – as the final arbiter on
all matters of value. Part of the Community ethos, in our view, lies in the important
civilizing effect resulting from the manner in which the Community forces individuals
and States to confront and become tolerant of the Other. Part of that civilizing
confrontation is achieved through the intended ability of the Member States, practical
and legal, to screen off different social choices, legally sanctioned, in other Member
States.104

The notion of the ECHR as a minimum standard might be seen as a way out for the
EU, by acceding it could provide its human rights bona fides.105 As noted in Chapter 3,
however, this does not remove the problem of conflict because higher standards of rights
entail higher correlative duties. The problem of conflict may not be removed by the
supposition of a mere enhancement of an existing right, as opposed to contradiction with it.
The correlative106 duty is greater with the ‘enhanced right’, thus reducing the privilege or
freedom of the duty bearer relative to the less exacting standard of rights.107 It may be
objected to this line of reasoning that an articulated right has a stronger normative claim than
an unarticulated, ‘left-over’ space in which a privilege or freedom consequently exists, and
104

Weiler & Lockhart (1995b), op cit, 604. Applying this framework to the case of SPUC v Grogan, they note
that they “would not present those who are wiling to entertain the notion of abortion as a legitimate commercial
activity as outside the realm of moral discourse”: ibid, 605.
105
Article 6 TEU post-Lisbon provides that the Union shall accede to the ECHR.
106
As discussed in Chapter 3, a fuller understanding of the relativity of rights and of legal concepts is
attributable to Hohfeld, whose work Zucca describes as ‘very valuable’: Zucca (2007), op cit, 29.
107
For an example of such a conflict, see Weiler & Lockhart (1995b), op cit, 614, discussing the contrast
between Wachauf and Bostock, on whether the absence of a right to compensation ought to prohibit
compensation.

226

that, therefore, the ‘enhanced right’ must prevail as matter of norm conflict resolution.
However, in the context of the existence of value pluralism about rights, this technical
solution seems to lack normative depth and it is also contingent on the absence of any
competing right as a cause of conflict.
Echoing the debate above, Petersmann has proposed that human rights need to be
integrated into a system of liberalised and regulated trade. He makes explicit the fundamental
character of trade rules that Coppel & O’Neill attributed to the ECJ and for which they
criticised the Court, while Weiler & Lockhart both questioned the extent of the Court’s
attributed link-up between trade and rights and also defended the concept of Community free
movement as a civilising force with its own normative weight or claim. For Petersmann,
economic freedoms have a fundamental character in light of their social function and their
real importance in day-to-day lives of citizens: people spend most of their time on their
economic freedoms.108 In contrast with international law, in which has developed
organisations with specific competences and without an overarching constitutional
framework:
Regional integration … has moved towards a different ‘integration paradigm’ linking
economic integration to constitutional guarantees of human rights, democracy and
undistorted competition.109

Petersmann’s view is that the collective supply of public goods that international
economic regulations seeks to achieve may not be attainable unless part of a broader
package110 linked to what can be described as a thick understanding of constitutionalism,111
understood as entailing the rule of law, the limitation and separation of government powers,
democratic self-government, human rights, social justice, and the role of international law in
ensuring the supply of public goods.112 On this understanding, human rights are understood
as having important instrumental functions: enhancing personal access to information widely
dispersed; setting incentives for saving, investments, and the division of labour; promoting
108
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the effective resolution of economic conflict; and enabling decentralised enforcement of
rules.113
There are thus functional interrelationships between economic and political order and
human rights.114 Within the EU, Petersmann notes the judicial protection of market freedoms
and the non-discrimination principle as fundamental individual rights,115 though he also
notes that the ECJ avoids human rights language for the common market freedoms, for the
right to property, and the freedom to pursue a trade or business.116 On this account, human
rights are functionally related to the securing of market freedoms and the effective supply of
public goods. The relative normative status of human rights and economic freedoms are not
really differentiated. On the contrary, Petersmann advocates “a holistic human rights
conception by granting equal importance to economic, social and cultural rights as to civil
and political rights in their realm of protection”.117 This is presented as an ‘integration
paradigm’ linking trade liberalization and its adjustment to problems with the promotion of
economic and social human rights and joint financial ‘burden sharing’ (as in European
integration).118
In a comprehensive refutation of Petersmann’s position, Alston argued that while it
raised issues of clear importance, Petersmann dis-moored human rights law from its root or
foundations in human dignity in favour of an instrumentalised conception whereby human
rights were understood as having a social and economic function. This presented individuals
as the objects, not the holder, of rights.119 To cross-reference the discussion above, this
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echoes the critique by Coppel & O’Neill of ECJ caselaw as being ambivalent about the
normative status of rights, with Coppel & O’Neill attributing an integrationist agenda as the
motive for the ECJ approach. Petersmann also seems motivated by the same integration
concern, making reference to ‘worldwide integration law’.120 For Alston, this more
instrumentalised conception of rights marked a radical departure from the existing
understanding of rights, which Petersmann did not duly acknowledge. Further, Alston
critiqued Petersmann’s suggestion that the EU offered a bottom-up example of citizen-driven
linkages between social and economic rights and classic civil and political rights, noting that:
... only…since the crises surrounding the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty … [had
the EU] begun to demonstrate awareness of the need to move away from the early
functionalist elite-driven model of European integration to a more constitutional
approach which consciously reaches out and seeks to involve civil society proper.121

Citing Peers, Alston noted that the ECJ had generally not equated freedom to trade with
a human right.122 On the free movement principles, the Court’s approach is open to many
different interpretations.123 Here, he cites Weiler:
On the one hand they have a de-humanizing element in treating workers as ‘factors of
production’ on [par with goods, services and capital]. But they are also part of a matrix
which prohibits, for example, discrimination on grounds of nationality, and encourages
124

generally a rich network of transnational social transactions.

More critically, Alston noted that minority rights were marginal to the EU’s own
arrangements and “virtually absent from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”.125
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What comes through Alston’s critique specifically on the EU and ECJ is an enduring
ambivalence on the part of the EU institutions about the status of rights in the EU legal order.
Free movement provisions are treated as being fundamental and having a ‘quasi-human
rights status’,126 but the relationship with the general law of human rights tends not to be
made explicit. In at least one case (post-dating Coppel & O’Neill’s critique), the ECJ has
described free movement of goods as a ‘fundamental right’.127 The suspicion occasionally
voiced that human rights have been invoked opportunistically to enhance the ECJ’s own
legitimacy rather than because of a concern with human rights protection per se is more
understandable in that context, even if the criticism may sometimes be over-stated or to a
degree speculative. In 2001, Besselink commented: “... it is not difficult to analyse the
caselaw of the ECJ on human rights in terms of the predominance of (economic)
fundamental rights over the classic human rights”.128 In the following section, some of the
more recent leading decisions from the relatively small body of ECJ caselaw on human
rights and free movement are analysed to determine to what extent this remains the case. The
sample of cases cannot claim to be exhaustive, but it does reflect the ‘mixed’ nature of this
body of caselaw in the sense that sometimes free movement has trumped national human
rights law and sometimes the reverse has been the outcome.129
First, it is worth briefly recalling (1) International Handelsgesellschaft,130 which
established the supremacy claim of the ECJ over all national constitutional law inclusive of
national human rights laws, and (2) the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights adopted in 2000.
The International Handelsgesellschaft judgment might be thought to have generated some
ambiguity about the normative status of rights by predicating the interpretation human rights
norms on structural concerns: “...the protection of such rights, while inspired by the
constitutional traditions common to the member states, must be ensured within the
framework of the structure and objectives of the Community”.131 The ‘framework and
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structure’ of the Community is such an open-ended concept that the limitations permissible
could be interpreted very broadly.
Similarly, the EU Charter could be considered quite ambiguous on the status of
human rights relative to other interests. Article 52.1 on the scope of guaranteed rights states:
Any limitation on the exercise of rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must
be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to
the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to
protect the rights and freedoms of others.

This paragraph recognises the possibility of conflict i. between rights and ii. between rights
and the general interest and for rights to be limited in order to resolve the conflict. Two
conflicting tendencies can be discerned from the wording. On the one hand, the wording,
echoing the formula in Wachauf, that rights have an essence that may not be impaired at all
points to a strong, status-oriented conception of rights. However, this essence is not
identified. Moreover, there is a vague reference to a ‘general interest’ as a ground for
limiting rights.132 The Explanations to the Charter elaborate on the meaning of ‘general
interest’ and state:
The reference to general interests recognised by the Union covers both the objectives
mentioned in Article 2 [of the European Community Treaty] and other interests
protected by specific Treaty provisions such as Articles 30 or 39(3) of the EC Treaty.

Weiler has noted, regarding the concept of general interests in ECJ caselaw, that “it is clear
that in assessing what is in the general interest …, the Court makes reference to the
Community general interest and not to an aggregate or cumulative Member State interest”
(emphasis in original).133 Given, however, the Treaty change since this observation to the
effect that the TEU (in Article 4(3)) now recognises that the principle of sincere cooperation
between the Member States and the Union is a mutual one and that the Article requires the
132
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Union to respect fundamental political and constitutional traditions of the Member States,
this more one-sided approach seems problematic.
The reach and scope of the limitations on rights is thus very unclear, since both the
general objectives of the Treaty as set out in Article 2 of the European Community Treaty
(ECT)134 and now Article 3 TEU135 and (it seems) any specific provisions can be justifiably
involved to limit rights. Further, the balance between the Union interest and Member States
interest has also to be addressed in any assessment. However, the way in which the Charter
and accompanying Explanations adopted ECHR standards works to limit the potential overreach of this limitation clause (discussed further below). Paragraph 3 states:
Insofar as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said
Convention.136

Caselaw since the adoption of the Charter also sheds light on the relative normativity of
rights in EU law.
In Schmidberger,137 the facts concerned a protest mounted on an Alpine road route
over which Austrian authorities had control. The aim of the protest was to demand from
national and Community authorities a strengthening of the various measures designed to
limit and reduce heavy goods traffic on the Brenner motorway and the pollution thereby
caused.138 The effect of the protest was to prevent the passage of trucks operated by the
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plaintiff, Schmidberger, which was a German transport undertaking of modest size. The
firm’s vehicles did not breach environmental guidelines. The Austrian authorities considered
that they had to allow the demonstration to go ahead because the demonstrators were
exercising their fundamental rights of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly under
the Austrian constitution.139 Schmidberger complained of a breach of free movement.
The Advocate General noted that this appeared to be the first case in which a Member
State had invoked the necessity to protect fundamental rights to justify a restriction of one of
the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty.140 The Advocate General proposed that in such a
case the Court should follow the same two-step approach as it did in analysis of the
traditional grounds of justification such as public policy or public security which are also
based on the specific situation in the Member State concerned: it was therefore to be
established: (a) whether Austria was, as a matter of Community law, pursuing a legitimate
objective in the public interest capable of justifying a restriction on a fundamental Treaty
freedom; and (b) if so, whether the restriction in issue is proportionate.141 The Advocate
General noted:
It must moreover be borne in mind that despite a basic consensus reflected in the
European Convention on Human Rights about a core of rights which must be regarded
as fundamental, there are a number of divergences between the fundamental rights
catalogues of the Member States, which often reflect the history and particular political
culture of a given Member State.
It cannot therefore be automatically ruled out that a Member State which invokes the
necessity to protect a right recognised by national law as fundamental nevertheless
pursues an objective which as a matter of Community law must be regarded as
illegitimate.142

This sets up a situation of clear conflict between a fundamental right at national level and
Community law in the form of free movement and suggests that such a fundamental national
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provision must give way to the Community interest in the event of conflict. The Advocate
General went on, however, to state that the present case was more straightforward:143 as the
Community itself recognised freedom of expression, it followed that the objective pursued
by the Member States was legitimate.144 On the proportionality issue, the Advocate General
held that where it is for a Member State actively to protect a fundamental Treaty freedom
from interference from private individuals the Member State concerned unquestionably
enjoys a margin of discretion.145 Further, the Advocate General made three points: the
restriction on freedom of movement was limited in that it was for a short duration, measures
were taken to limit the disruption, and some disruption was necessary in order for the right to
be effectively exercised at all.146
The ECJ followed similar reasoning, though contrasted the rights in issue here to
non-derogable rights:
... unlike other fundamental rights enshrined in that Convention, such as the right to life
or the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which
admit of no restriction, neither the freedom of expression nor the freedom of assembly
guaranteed by the ECHR appears to be absolute but must be viewed in relation to its
social purpose.… In those circumstances, the interests involved must be weighed
having regard to all the circumstances of the case in order to determine whether a fair
balance was struck between those interests. The competent authorities enjoy a wide
margin of discretion in that regard. Nevertheless, it is necessary to determine whether
the restrictions placed upon intra-Community trade are proportionate in the light of the
legitimate objective pursued, namely, in the present case, the protection of fundamental
rights.147

Here, the ECJ invoked a classic balancing metaphor to solving rights conflicts, discussed
further below. It avoided making any claim that either human rights or free movement
prevailed, but its methodology in effect creates an exception out of free movement on the
basis of human rights. Klabbers suggests that this rhetorically places human rights and free
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movement on a par, but that if human rights were stated as the general principles and free
movement the exception, it would be much more difficult to sustain a conclusion favourable
to free movement:148 “...Schmidberger suggests, [human rights] are afterthoughts to the
process of market integration; at best, they may come to justify exceptions to the free
movement of goods”.149 On the proportionality of the restriction, the ECJ adopted very
similar reasoning to the Advocate General, additionally noting that the demonstration
complied with national formal requirements and the disruption was isolated.150 The case
might be taken to suggest a reasonably robust view of the status of human rights in its result,
but not as robust as Klabbers would prefer, and it avoids any general statement confirming
this through clarifying the relationship between fundamental market freedoms and human
rights.
In Omega,151 the German police had made an order forbidding Omega from operating
a ‘playing at killing’ game on the ground that the act of simulated homicide and the
trivialisation of violence engendered was a violation of human dignity. In Germany, the
protection of human dignity is a constitutional principle.152 As the equipment was lawfully
made in the UK, Omega argued that the order breached its rights under the EU principle of
freedom to provide services. The Advocate General expressly addressed the issue of the
ranking of human rights relative to the fundamental freedoms, but she notes that the ECJ
does not rank them more highly than the Treaties or fundamental freedoms:
Clarification would appear to be required with regard to the order of precedence that is
to be afforded to fundamental rights as general principles of Community law. It is
particularly questionable whether there is in fact any order of rank between the
fundamental rights applicable as general legal principles and the fundamental freedoms
enshrined in the Treaty.
It is significant in this context that the Court of Justice should defend fundamental
rights as general legal principles of the Community on the basis of Article 220 EC and
148
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Article 6(2) EU. They are to be considered part of its primary legislation and therefore
rank in hierarchy at the same level as other primary legislation, particularly
fundamental freedoms.153

The Advocate General went on to suggest that the fundamental freedoms could be equated
with fundamental rights:
However, fundamental freedoms themselves can also perfectly well be materially
categorised as fundamental rights – at least in certain respects: in so far as they lay
down prohibitions on discrimination, for example, they are to be considered a specific
means of expression of the general principle of equality before the law. In this respect,
a conflict between fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaty and fundamental and
human rights can also, at least in many cases, represent a conflict between fundamental
rights.154

However, somewhat ambiguously, the Advocate General went on to doubt the
appropriateness of weighing fundamental rights against fundamental freedoms:
Even though the Court of Justice interprets the aforementioned restrictions on
fundamental rights, in substance, in a particular manner tailored to the needs of the
Community, it appears to me to be significant that in cases such as this the necessary
weighing-up of the interests involved ultimately takes place in the context of the actual
circumstances in which the particular fundamental rights are restricted. The need ‘to
reconcile’ the requirements of the protection of fundamental rights cannot therefore
mean weighing up fundamental freedoms against fundamental rights per se, which
would imply that the protection of fundamental rights is negotiable.155

Here, the argument seems to be that in concreto application of fundamental rights and
fundamental freedoms is best addressed in the framework of limitations of rights, not in
terms of weighing or balancing them. However, the apparent suggestion here of sensitivity to
the facts does not resolve the problem of conflict. The suggestion is that fundamental rights
are non-negotiable, but the Advocate General does not rule out their limitation, which
153
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appears to somewhat fudge the issue. If rights can be limited, they are to that extent
negotiable.
In a later paragraph, the Advocate General noted the interaction of Community and
national human rights norms:
However, if such an examination should show that the restrictive national measure
concerned is based on an evaluation of national protection of fundamental rights that
reflects general legal opinion in the Member States, a corresponding requirement of
protection could (also) be inferred from Community protection of fundamental rights –
which would mean, methodologically speaking, that it would no longer be necessary to
examine whether the national measure is to be considered a justified, because
permissible, exception to the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaty, but,
according to the formula in the Schmidberger judgment, ‘how the requirements of the
protection of fundamental rights in the Community can be reconciled with those arising
from a fundamental freedom enshrined in the Treaty’.156

This is a subtler and more nuanced account of the interaction of the Community and national
legal orders than the linear integration narrative found in the Court’s constitutionalising
decisions in Van Gend, Costa, Internationale Handelssgesellschaft and others. It seeks to
relate the legal orders of the Member States with the EU, without either order entirely
subsuming the other, whereas other caselaw presents a one-dimensional Community
imperative superseding any other consideration. On this approach, general legal opinion of
the Member States grounds Union fundamental rights. The above passage, however, does not
identify how conflict between human rights and the fundamental freedoms is to be
addressed, rather it just poses the issue.
In an Opinion that is much more explicit on the deeper foundations of human rights
legitimacy in EU law and perhaps the most thorough discussion of it in all ECJ caselaw,157
Advocate General Stix-Hackl developed her discussion to examine the foundation of rights
in the Community legal order, not in jurisdictional terms, but in philosophical terms, in
156
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relating it to human dignity as a value (see the discussion of dignity in Chapter 3 above).
This is a status conception of rights and, as such, suggests that there are inherent limits to the
extent to which rights can be qualified or limited. Having noted the inchoate nature of human
dignity as a value, i.e. that it lacked enough specificity to translate into an immediate result,
the Advocate General observed the general need for a balancing exercise, subject to the
limitations in the caselaw on the invocation of derogations by the Member States.158 The
caselaw requires the existence of a ‘genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the
requirements of public policy affecting one of the fundamental interests of society’, the
exclusion of purely economic ends, and a requirement that individual conduct give rise to
punitive measures or other genuine and effective measures intended to combat that
conduct.159
Showing some deference to individual Member State autonomy (rather than just to
the Member States as an aggregate), the Advocate General noted that “the finding that a
fundamental interest of society has been affected is determined in the light of national value
judgments,”160 but national restrictions were then to be subject to a Community
proportionality test.161 On the facts, she concluded the German prohibition should be
accepted and that mention should be made that it caused public displeasure and of the
rejection of conduct or services glorifying or promoting violence, such rejection being based
on the protection and observance of human dignity.162 The application of proportionality to
the facts is, however, extremely brief, the Advocate General simply asserted that
proportionality had not been breached given the fact of public displeasure and given the
concept of or concern with dignity. The limits or contours of ‘public displeasure’ or ‘dignity’
are not identified in any conceptual terms, meaning it would be difficult to predict how the
application of this approach would play out on future facts.163
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In a much briefer judgment that failed to take up the opportunity to offer a stronger
conceptual framework for norm conflict reasoning in EU law, given the relatively extensive
discussion of the Advocate General, the ECJ noted the balancing exercise between
Community and national competence:
The fact remains, however, that the specific circumstances which may justify recourse
to the concept of public policy may vary from one country to another and from one era
to another. The competent national authorities must therefore be allowed a margin of
discretion within the limits imposed by the Treaty.164

In concluding on the facts, the ECJ stated:
… according to the referring court, the prohibition on the commercial exploitation of
games involving the simulation of acts of violence against persons, in particular the
representation of acts of homicide, corresponds to the level of protection of human
dignity which the national constitution seeks to guarantee in the territory of the Federal
Republic of Germany. It should also be noted that, by prohibiting only the variant of
the laser game the object of which is to fire on human targets and thus ‘play at killing’
people, the contested order did not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain the
objective pursued by the competent national authorities.165

This amounts to the application of a proportionality test upon an acceptance by the ECJ of
the requirement of human dignity in German law, which is similar to the Advocate General’s
approach. The exact boundaries of discretion in more general terms are left unclear, but it
seems obvious that it would require a quite idiosyncratic national constitutional provision to
of itself fall foul of the ECJ approach here. Neither did the ECJ seek to impose the German
standard on the Community as a whole.166 In that respect, the ECJ decision shows a high
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degree of deference to German and national law,167 but without articulating this explicitly.
Generally in Omega, the nature of balancing and proportionality as tools of conflict
resolution are left unclear. There is no attempt to unpack the concepts of balancing or
proportionality and no attempt to identify and examine the problem of weighing that both
present. This point is taken up further in the next section on specification of rights.
The Kadi case involved the opposite vertical relationship than the caselaw above:
namely the relationship between the Community and Union legal order and international law,
in the context of human rights claims.168 This offers an interesting way of testing the depth of
a status-oriented conception of rights in Community law, since the latter would suggest a
symmetrical approach to rights protection irrespective of competing jurisdictional claims, be
they from national or international legal sources. Such a symmetrical approach was implicit
in the reasoning of Advocate General Maduro in Kadi,169 whose approach mirrored the
German Federal Constitutional Court’s qualified acceptance of EU supremacy, except here
applied to the reception or relationship of EU law to international law. The facts related to
the adoption by secondary legislation in EU law of measures against individuals resulting
from requirements posed by UN Security Council resolutions. The Advocate General held
that the EU could accept the direct application of UN Security Council resolutions in the EU
legal order, so long as equivalent human rights protection as reflected in EU law was to be
found in the UN system.170 Thus, systemic questions appeared subordinated to human rights
one, at least at the level of explicit motivation or justification. This priority was also reflected
in a different way in the judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI).
167
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Whereas the Advocate General was prepared to subject the EU implementing
measures to judicial review, the Court of First Instance accorded an automatic priority to UN
Security Council resolutions, excluding judicial review save for violations of jus cogens.
Nonetheless, here too, human rights, even if only in the narrow category of jus cogens,
prevailed implicitly over any systemic concerns that the EU needed to protect its own
autonomy from international law. In contrast, the ECJ reached a similar conclusion to the
Advocate General in subjecting EU implementing measures to fuller judicial review, but the
systemic concern with autonomy was much more manifest in its reasoning.171 Before looking
in a bit more detail at the judgment, the background and facts are summarised. Kadi is also
important for the way in which the issue of competence was addressed, but in the discussion
below, the focus is on how human rights protection was conceptualised relative to other legal
interests or concerns.
In Kadi,172 the main issue was the competence or otherwise of the EU to impose socalled ‘smart sanctions’ on individuals, in this case arising from Resolution 1267 (1999) and
Resolution 1333 (2000) of the UN Security Council requiring such sanctions to be imposed
on Usama bin Laden and named individuals associated with the Taliban of Afghanistan. The
applicable Regulation (EC) No. 881/2002 related to individuals rather than to the Taliban
and Afghanistan as a regime or State of a third country. The plaintiff, Kadi, was one of the
persons named or blacklisted as a result of legislative provisions, and in his action sought the
annulment of Regulation (EC) No. 881/2002 and No. 2062/2001 (the latter specifically
listing him as an individual to whom Regulation (EC) No. 881/2002 applied).173 The
applicant’s argument concerning competence was that the acts were adopted ultra vires, in
that the defendant institutions adopted these regulations on the basis of Articles 60 EC and
171
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301 EC, whereas those provisions authorise the Community to interrupt or reduce relations
with third countries, but not to freeze individuals’ assets.
The CFI in Kadi held that the non-exclusion in the text of the Treaty of the possibility
of sanctions being effected against individuals was enough to justify reliance on Articles 60
and 301 ECT. It went on to hold that Articles 60 and 301 ECT were not themselves a
sufficient legislative basis for Community action by Regulation (EC) No. 467/2001, Articles
60 and 301 ECT requiring as they did a factual link with third countries, and the addition of
the general provision of Article 308 ECT was a necessary basis for individual sanctions.174
On jus cogens and human rights, the CFI stated:
It must therefore be considered that the resolutions of the Security Council at issue fall,
in principle, outside the ambit of the Court’s judicial review and that the Court has no
authority to call in question, even indirectly, their lawfulness in the light of Community
law….
None the less, the Court is empowered to check, indirectly, the lawfulness of the
resolutions of the Security Council in question with regard to jus cogens, understood as
a body of higher rules of public international law binding on all subjects of
international law, including the bodies of the United Nations, and from which no
derogation is possible….
Furthermore, the Charter of the United Nations itself presupposes the existence of
mandatory principles of international law, in particular, the protection of the
fundamental rights of the human person. In the preamble to the Charter, the peoples of
the United Nations declared themselves determined to ‘reaffirm faith in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person’. In addition, it is apparent
from Chapter I of the Charter, headed ‘Purposes and Principles’, that one of the
purposes of the United Nations is to encourage respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms.175
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Here, there seems to be a mix of pure human rights consideration and systemic concerns, or a
compromise between them. While wishing to show strong deference to the UN and the role
of the Security Council, ultimately jus cogens violations could be judicially reviewed.
However, logically, the reference to fundamental human rights in general (and not just jus
cogens) in the subsequent justifying paragraphs would point towards more expansive review
based on any human rights violations.
The ECJ upheld the decision of the CFI, but differed in its reasoning. Having decided
the competence issue in favour of the Community, the Court stated that the Community was
an autonomous legal system with respect to international law176 and that “the obligations
imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the
constitutional principles of the EC Treaty”.177 The Court declared that UN rules could not
have priority over:
…the principles that form part of the very foundations of the Community legal order,
one of which is the protection of fundamental rights, including the review by the
Community judicature of the lawfulness of Community measures as regards their
consistency with those fundamental rights.178

The ECJ further held that the guarantee of fundamental rights in the Community, inspired by
the constitutional traditions of the Member States and the European Convention on Human
Rights,179 formed part of the very foundations of the Community.180 The ECJ held that it thus
did have jurisdiction to determine the validity of international legal norms within the
Community legal system, which did not entail any challenge to the primacy of (in this case)
the Security Council resolution in international law.181 The ECJ noted the special importance
of UN Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,182 but de Búrca
notes “The judgment is striking for its treatment of the UN Charter, as least insofar as its
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relationship to EC law was concerned, as no more than any other international treaty”.183 For
de Búrca, the ECJ judgment appeared to have expressed “important parts of its reasoning in
chauvinist and parochial tones”, in contrast with the concern professed by the EU to be a
‘virtuous actor’ in international law.184
On the facts, the ECJ held that the appellant’s rights of defence185 and his right to
property were breached.186 The approach of the ECJ might be thought a victory for human
rights over more instrumental concerns, and the judgement was welcomed for affording
greater human rights protection than had the CFI.187 However, the exact normative status of
human rights remains under-discussed. In particular, it is not clear that human rights have the
highest normative status, since they were assimilated into a broader category of
constitutional principles making up the character of the EU as a legal system. The ECJ did
not address the issue of jus cogens at all. This could be considered an example of what
Coppel & O’Neill described as the defensive use of human rights: human rights helped
support an argument about the autonomy and independence of the EU legal system from
international law, thereby enhancing the status and legal power of the EU relative to
international law. The ECJ emphasised the particularism of the EU legal order to an extent
that suggests human rights per se was not the primary motivation, since human rights
protection could have been articulated differently, in a more dialogic way that reflected the
Solange principle that emerged at the end of Advocate General Maduro’s Opinion:188 the
ECJ could have stated it was willing to presume compliance by the UN with human rights
norms, but which presumption would not be unchallengeable in the Community system.189
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Recently, the decisions in Viking and Laval190 again provided the opportunity for the
ECJ to clarify the status of human rights relative to the free movement principles. The
judgments stand in contrast to the deferential approach to national human rights protection in
Omega, surprisingly so given the greater sensitivity of the factual context of the cases
namely, the right to strike in national law and its relationship to free movement. The Laval
and Viking judgments also suggest continuing ambivalence as to the exact normative status
of traditional human rights compared with the economic freedoms in the EU legal order. The
cases, which are more fully discussed in Chapter 6 below, concerned the relationship
between free movement and the right to strike as protected in national laws. Despite the
specific exclusion of the rights to strike from the social competence of the Union by then
Article 137(5) ECT (now Article 153(5) TFEU)), the ECJ held that national rules permitting
strikes where such strikes has the effect of being an inhibition to the posting of workers from
one Member State to another were contrary to Community law.191 This could be considered
as simply a limitation on the right to strike, and as such unremarkable given that few rights
are absolute.192 However, it was more significant in its broad scope, in entirely excluding
strikes in this situation, and in subordinating the right to strike to free market freedoms,
despite the saving clause for strikes in the Treaty.
In summary, the ECJ has yet to articulate a clear model of norm conflict resolution in
the area of fundamental rights. It is unclear exactly what their normative status is relative to
the market freedom and systemic constitutional principles of the Union. In specifics, the
caselaw varies in approach, from an apparently deferential attitude to Member States’ human
rights norms (and thus an implicit downplaying of competing Union systemic concerns), to a
notable willingness to strike down or override a fundamental national human rights norm on
grounds of free movement. The ECJ has not fully dispelled doubts reflected in the criticisms
190
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of Coppel & O’Neill and of Alston about linking trade to human rights and thereby
instrumentalising human rights in the particular context of the EU legal system. Kadi does
not really resolve the ambiguity. A balancing approach has been suggested, but no clear rules
of priority or hierarchy.
In effect, the ECJ sees to treat integration as having some kind of natural normative
status, as if integration were to supplant the older idea of natural law as an inherent and
ultimately dominant normative value in the EU legal system. Several commentators have
remarked critically on this approach, which is still found even in the more recent caselaw
discussed above. Rasmussen approvingly cites the following passage from a 1975 work by
Blok:
If integrative progress for one reason or another is not achieved by Council decision,
the Court must live with that. Integrative progress in the Community is not an objective
law of nature; regard to progress does not legitimize judicial law creation in areas of
public policy of high political relevance.193

Similarly, Schilling comments that:
In contrast, integration viewed as a socio-economic law has no inherent morality, but is
simply a question of cause and effect. As such, it does not necessarily serve any good.
Such a law must rely on its own methods of enforcement, presumably on the political
decisions of the legally competent bodies to proceed with the integration process.
Although the functionalist theory of integration assumes that the inevitability of
integration is expressed by the political actions of human actors, it could also be
expressed by the ECJ’s application of a law of integration absent any basis in positive
law. Within the boundaries of any legal order, however, one cannot argue for judicial
decisions that exceed the discretionary powers of the courts. As such, the question of a
socio-economic law of integration becomes irrelevant in the present context. Thus,
neither view of natural law provides a feasible foundation for the autonomy of the
European Community. (references omitted) 194
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Finally, Klabbers accurately concludes that the ECJ “remains silent about the possible
conflict of norms created” by concluding international agreements, such as the ECHR.195 The
next section examines how such rules of priority or hierarchy can be justified in general
terms and then applied to the above cases.

5.3 Hierarchy and Specification of Rights
The notion of a hierarchy of rights relates different rights to each other in a scale of ranking,
as an a priori technique of norm conflict resolution or norm conflict avoidance. The notion
has been resisted in light of the concepts or vocabulary often associated with human rights of
‘indivisibility’ and ‘interdependence’.196 However, some conception of hierarchy or ranking
or of the ‘relative stringency of rights’197 seems inevitable. Without any hierarchy, if rights
were generally thought equally ranked in the abstract, how to prioritise rights in the cases of
clashes or conflict would necessarily be ad hoc and determined on a case-by-case, in
concreto basis only. Rawls suggested that rights discourse should focus on a small number of
essential liberties, as otherwise, the result is the “indeterminate and unguided balancing
problems we had hoped to avoid by a suitably circumscribed notion of priority”.198 Rawls
argued that historical experience of practical institutions and reflections on constitutional
design suggest that a scheme or working of the basic liberties is possible in which they do
not conflict with each other. In effect, Rawls here is suggesting a kind of consensus around
Western liberalism and a ranking of values on that basis.199 Rawls proposed that freedom of
conscience and thought and civil liberties generally are ranked first and that political liberties
could be seen as instrumental protection for them, but he nonetheless stated political liberties
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can still be considered basic liberties as they are important enough as essential institutional
means to preserving other liberties.200
Balancing rights on a case-by-case basis is in contrast with the notion of a hierarchy,
but the use of balancing is contested on the grounds of its indeterminacy: “No plausible
balancing procedure has ever been put forward”.201 By plausible here is understood the idea
of a workably objective procedure of balancing. The most influential account of balancing is
probably that of Robert Alexy, who proposes the existence of a ‘Law of Balancing’. On
Alexy’s account, balancing can be divided into three stages:202 first, establishing the degree
of non-satisfaction of a first principle; second, establishing the importance of that principle;
and third, establishing the relationship between the first two elements.203
Following on this structure of balancing, Alexy contends that: “[The] judgment raises
a claim to correctness, and it can be justified as the conclusion of another inferential scheme
in a discourse.”204 Correctness here seems a matter of relative coherence, rather than any
external standard that could be a basis for challenging the relative weights of competing
principles overall. It seems that the exact degree of importance is still to be established.
Another way of putting it is necessary to make a moral argument as to which ones takes
priority and to what extent it takes priority. The outcome of our moral argument then dictates
what is permissible and where the balance is to correctly drawn,205 not the law of balancing
itself. While Alexy’s ‘Law of Balancing’, therefore, provides some logical and rationale
structure to the process of balancing, it is doubtful that it provides an answer as to what
200
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moral priority to give to competing rights; it seems more a statement of the problem, albeit
perhaps a very articulate one, rather than the solution. Habermas, criticising Alexy, related
this problem to the question of goals or purposes in Alexy’s scheme:
If principles manifest a value that one should optimally realise, and if the norms
themselves do not dictate the extent to which one must fulfil this optimisation
prescription, then the application of such principles within the limits of what is
factually possible makes a goal-oriented weighting necessary.206

As argued in Chapter 4, following Schauer, the claim that rights have to normative
superiority over more utilitarian interests seems to require that their content and status is
known in advance of their application, in contrast to an ad hoc priority. Similarly, classic
rule of law values, predictability and certainty, require such fore-knowledge of the operative
content and effect of rights clauses in advance of their application. Oberdiek further argues
that unspecified rights, i.e. general rights stated in the abstract without further specification,
are philosophically weak because they fail to state the reasons for rights:
... the general conception of rights reifies rights, and erroneously invests special moral
significance in an intermediate conclusion about what it is permissible to do instead of
in the final conclusion about what it is permissible to do....Specificationism instead
maintains that a right should be designated only after the final interaction of all of the
reasons bearing upon the justifiability of a given action. Specificationism, in this way,
makes rights themselves context-sensitive.207

However, a tabular form of ranking or hierarchy, comprehensively relating each right
to every other, right seems unworkable. Some generality is thus necessary, but on a
specificationist approach, it is minimised. Some gaps will arise and be exposed by necessity
circumstances,208 these gaps are a space where the right does not exist as yet defined, but
which was not specifically foreseen in the prior definition of the right. A right is not, on this
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view, balanced and negated in a particular case: once it exists it necessarily trumps any
competing consideration, if in some cases (i.e. cases of gaps) this may only become clear
after the fact.209 The challenge, therefore, is to specify the content and inter-relationship of
rights to a degree that makes their adjudication substantially predictable and determinate and
that accounts for the full normative scope of a right in its definition so as to exclude as much
as practicable the possibility of conflict with another right.
This may be easier than might be assumed on the basis of knowledge of caselaw,
since typically only hard cases go to appellate courts. Many rankings of rights may be
reflected in an unproblematic way in daily practice. For example, a general conception of
liberty is obviously curtailed in the use of the road and public transport through common
rules of behaviour adopted in the interests of the common good and the individual welfare
and rights of citizens, including the right to life and the rights to bodily integrity.210 The
difficulty arises more in achieving a general and relatively comprehensive ranking of rights.
An example that well illustrates the difficulty is the clash between the right to life and the
right to privacy. Few people would disagree with an abstract statement that such two rights
exist, yet disagreement is profound on how they are to be prioritised and related to each other
in the context, for example, of abortion and euthanasia. In other words, abstract identification
of values does not determine ranking,211 yet it is ranking that is practically necessary in
resolving hard cases.
Besson proposes a formal hierarchy of rights as an internal or endogenous type of
conflict resolution in legal reasoning.212 It entails a formal hierarchy, prioritising some rights
over others on an a priori or ex ante basis. A material hierarchy does not establish a general
ordering of rights, but privileges the content of some rights to some extent: it is reflected, for
209
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example, in the idea of a core of rights;213 it seems in effect a type of less pronounced
hierarchy. This idea is arguably reflected, for example, in the statement of the ECJ in
Wachauf that any limitation on rights must not entail a disproportionate and intolerable
interference impairing the very substance of those rights,214 which suggests a limit on the
instrumentalisation of rights in EU law, even if the idea has not been developed in
subsequent caselaw.
Finnis’ re-working of natural law theory, which is amongst the most influential
contemporary theories of values in the law, posits that seven basic goods could be identified
as self-evident215 essential for human flourishing: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience,
sociability (friendship), practical reasonableness, and religion.216 These could be elaborated
through principles of practical reasoning, including, for example, requirement to live a
coherent life and to not demonstrate arbitrary preferences amongst persons or values.217
Finnis, however, does not believe that the goods could be ranked, they are all equally
incommensurable and thus resist ranking.218 Despite this emphasis on the difficulty of
ranking, which renders Finnis’ theory of less practical significance than it would otherwise
be, several attempts to develop a hierarchy of rights are found in the literature.219 Moreover,
actual practice supports the idea of ranking to some extent: Meron, for example, identified a
“trend toward graduated normativity”220 in international law.221
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Jus cogens is generally accepted in international law as a category of priority,222
though it has been over-used in some literature223 and seems best confined at present to its
most un-controversial or un-contested content, primarily the prohibitions on genocide,
slavery, and racial discrimination.224 In human rights instruments, some rights are specified
as non-derogable, in contrast to other rights whose limitation on grounds of common
interests is accepted.225 Under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),226 these
are the right to life excepting death resulting from lawful action in war (Article 2); the ban on
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3); the prohibition on slavery or servitude
(Article 4(1); and the prohibition on retroactive criminal penalties (Article 7). The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights227 identifies the prohibition on torture
(Article 7), the prohibition on retroactive criminal penalties (Article 15), and recognition of
every person as equal before the law (Article 16) as non-derogable. Meron observes that in
the Barcelona Traction case the International Court of Justice gave currency to the idea of a
hierarchy by suggesting that “basic rights of the human person (droits fondamentaux de la
personne humaine) create obligations erga omnes”.228 However, Meron goes on to note the
lack of agreement on what amounts to jus cogens outside of, in particular, the prohibitions of
slavery, torture, genocide229 and further notes the differences in formulations of nonderogable rights between various international instruments.230
The existence of certain basic, physiological needs can ground some minimal
hierarchy. Thus, Brockett argues that Maslow’s hierarchy of needs231 provides a basis for
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identifying a ranking of human rights. Maslow’s theory identified five basic needs:
physiological, safety, love and belongingness, esteem, and self-actualisation. Selfactualisation is the highest kind of need and fulfilment, and the other needs must be fulfilled
to varying degrees in order for this to be achieved.232 This approach points against Finnis’
view that all basic goods are equally ranked in that life seems to have some general
priority.233
The European Court of Human Rights has recognised the principle of hierarchy in
describing the right to life as “the supreme value in the hierarchy of human rights”.234 After
life itself, physiological and safety needs, which can be partially satisfied to sustain life, can
posit very minimal requirements of safety and nutrition, but not, for example, a wellbalanced diet, or anything like comprehensive social welfare in general.235 The right thus is
the minimum, beyond the minimum is a matter of policy.236 Basic health care for children
and police protection against violence are other rights or implications of the right to life.237
Safety obviously requires protection from torture as a minimum, but also from arbitrary
detention and exercises of force. This implies both due process and a minimal notion of
equality before the law.238 The complexity of human needs and self-actualisation implies
variety and choice in the roles people can fulfill, which suggests a right against servitude or
against enslavement.239 Any meaningful kind of self-actualisation implies relative freedom of
information exchange in society, to inform people’s life decisions.240
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One of the chief criticisms of Maslow’s approach is that it seems to commit the
naturalistic fallacy by inferring an ought proposition from a fact.241 However, in defence of
it, such an inference is in a very limited way and only with respect to basic, ‘existential’
rights, not a full theory of ethics. Any theory of ethics must contend with basic factual
considerations, i.e. with the factual circumstances of the human condition.242 Addressing this
criticism of Maslow, Brockett noted:
If it is accepted ... that people have innate needs and that the healthy development of
the individual depends on the gratification of these needs (while deprivation inhibits
development and can even lead to sickness), then it is clear that the human organism
posits its own values.243

So long as Maslow’s theory does not claim to be a comprehensive theory of ethics or of
rights, it does not seem to fatally fall foul of the naturalistic fallacy. 244 What this suggests,
nonetheless, is that Maslow’s approach may help sustain only a minimalist hierarchy of
human rights.
Brockett’s account based on Maslow does not distinguish civil and political rights
and social and economic rights, the latter usually being considered more contestable and
therefore less justiciable.245 The minimalist conception of rights in Brockett’s account seems
to make this unnecessary. This minimalist conception might be mistakenly related to the idea
241
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of negative rights or freedom.246 In this regard, Waldron criticises the suggestion that there is
a category of welfare rights whose satisfaction in poor countries is impossible and that,
therefore, that they are not really rights, making the point very clearly:
... For any inhabitant of these [poor, where industrialisation has hardly begun] regions,
a claim might sensibly be made that his interest in basic welfare is sufficiently
important to justify holding the government to be under a duty to provide it, and it
would be a duty that the government is capable of performing. So, in each case, the
putative right does satisfy the test of practicability. The problems posed by scarcity and
underdevelopment only arise when we take all the claims of right together. It is not the
duties in each individual case which demand the impossible (as it would be for
example, if we talked about a right to happiness); rather it is the combination of all the
duties taken together which cannot be fulfilled. But one of the important features of
rights discourse is that rights are attributed to individuals one by one, not collectively
or in the aggregate.247
…If we accept, however, that rights mark the way in which interests generate duties,
then the picture is likely to appear much less tidy than this [i.e. than the negative versus
positive rights distinction suggests]. A duty to refrain from interfering with someone’s
freedom is likely to be accompanied by a ‘positive’ (and therefore costly) duty on other
agents to protect people from such interference….This means that it is impossible to
say definitively of a given right that it is purely negative (or purely positive) in
character.248

Brockett notes that the idea of rights correlating with duties needs to be clarified. The
relationship is not a dualism, involving just two parties: everyone must respect a right, and
this can translate into society’s duty to organise itself adequately to provide, for example,
minimal nutrition.249 This account of a hierarchy is not as minimalist an account as, for
example, Nozick’s idea of a right as a side-constraint, as entailing a negative obligation on
the other to not interfere with it. Nonetheless, the rights that can be identified on the basis of
246
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the above scheme are relatively limited.250 So a more detailed hierarchy may draw on
existing experience,251 and not just a conceptual or a priori ranking.252 A more
comprehensive approach to rights definition, seeking to account as fully as possible a priori
for the content of rights, is referred to in the literature as specificationism, which as Oberdiek
notes, is an under-appreciated conception of rights.253
The multiple character of the duties that can result from a right prompts Waldron to
the view that duties are “likely to play havoc with any tidy sense of the priority that the right
has over other moral considerations”.254 Specificationism is an opposing view. It holds that
all rights are absolute, because they are defined in such a way that what might otherwise be
considered exceptions are not actually carved out from the right, but are separate to it.255 The
most obvious criticism of this approach is that no rights can be wholly specified in advance
of their application to an unpredictable myriad of possible circumstances, as noted above,
gaps can emerge in a highly specified account of rights. Shafer-Landau responds that the
approach still has merit though rights may not be fully knowable, i.e. in effect, that
specificationism should be taken as far as it will go. Specificationism does not require
exhaustive detail:
But the specificationist might instead insist that the relevant exceptive clauses be
relatively few in number and couched in terms of repeatably instantiable kinds of
exceptions. There might, for instance, be a small, finite number of kinds of
circumstances that represent exceptions to one’s right not to be killed.256
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Further, that such rights may need further specification in light of experience simply means a
specificationist has to accept a method of reflective equilibrium, i.e. reasoning back and forth
from general principles to particular instances or experiences until a satisfactory equilibrium
is achieved, which is unproblematic given widespread acceptance of this method.257 A
specificationist can accept moral loss and tragedy258 in unusual cases of conflicts of rights
and thus can accept the need to modify the exceptive clauses to a right.259 In sum, as ShaferLandau expresses it, specificationism retains maximum stringency for rights, while reducing
their scope.260 Understood in these terms, specificationism seems hard to object to. While all
rights have some degree of generality, they must at least be meaningful so as to be
predictably applied. Specificationism simply amounts to elaborating on the likely
circumstances of application. In this regard, “[s]pecificationism is normatively neutral; it …
is a theory about the structure of rights and an explanation of putative rights conflict. It is not
a substantive theory [of rights]”.261
A specificationist approach ought to be more attainable in a regional context where
there is greater homogeneity of values relative to the international system, but more difficult
to achieve than in a national context.262 Specificationism in a regional European context
would likely only sustain a minimalist approach to human rights protection, focusing on
what is common the Member States, much as the ECHR does. It could begin by adopting a
hierarchy of rights. For the EU, this would involve, for example, establishing priority
between traditional rights and the new trade-related rights of free movement. As Kirchner
notes:
… it has to be made clear … that Human Rights and the prohibition on the use of force
take precedence over free trade etc. Otherwise states could, e.g. attempt to balance the
to some degree). Contrast Zucca, ibid, 74, seeming to suggest judicial practice determines hierarchy, but see
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right to free trade against the prohibition of the use of force and use force to gain access
to markets.263

In other words, the conceptual reach and looseness of free trade (or undistorted competition)
risks sidelining other, more concrete rights unless a priority of values is established in favour
of the latter. However, though the EU and ECJ need to clarify the role of economic values
relative to classic or core human rights, the EU arguably has gone a long way toward
specificationism in its approach to adopting the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights by
incorporating the ECHR standards built up over several decades.
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights offers a mixture of quite detailed
specification of rights in parts and under-determination of rights in other parts, but is greatly
elaborated on through accompanying Explanations formally promulgated by the
signatories.264 The text of the Charter itself is notably under-specified in several places,265
while some novelties are addressed specifically that are not found in other Bills of Rights,
notably in a prohibition on eugenics and reproductive cloning266 and a right of access to a
placement service.267 Some provisions are very brief and do not even mention the issue of
the limits on a right or the grounds on which it may be permissibly restricted. However,
Article 6(1) of the Treaties works toward specification by providing that the ‘rights,
freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the general
provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and application and with
due regard to the Explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those
provisions’. The reference to the Explanations or Notes from the Praesidium268
accompanying the text of the Charter appears to endorse a degree of originalist
interpretation. Article 6(1) states that the rights shall interpreted with due regard to the
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Explanations accompanying the adoption of the Charter (Article 6(1) further cautions against
expansive interpretation by stating that ‘the provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any
way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties’).
The Explanations that accompany the Charter refer in a wholesale way to ECHR
standards to flesh out the bare essentials contained in the Charter itself (although as
discussed in Chapter 4, the ECHR is itself subject to evolutive interpretation by the European
Court of Human Rights). In many instances, the Explanations start by stating that the content
of the rights is the same as the equivalent provisions of the ECHR. At the end of the
Explanations, 12 provisions are listed as corresponding with the ECHR,269 while the clear
implication from this list (and from Article 52 of the Charter stating there is correspondence
between them) is that caselaw from Strasbourg also applies to EU law, which could be
inferred from the statement in the Preamble that the Charter reaffirms, inter alia, the
ECHR,270 and which the Explanations confirm is the case.271
The mere fact of a reference to the ECHR standard does not indicate a full-blooded
specificationism whereby rights are exhaustively defined to remove all conflict ex ante.
However, the fact over 50 years of caselaw has now built up a recognisable body of
standards272 goes a long way to achieving determinacy in cases of conflict, even though unanticipated conflict will still arise and notwithstanding that the Strasbourg Court uses the
open-ended language or test of proportionality in resolving conflicts of rights cases.273 More
generally, Article 53 of the Charter states in effect that it is without prejudice to human rights
protection under international law and national law. The actual wording states “Nothing in
269
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this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting...”. At first glance this
would seem to subordinate the Charter to all other existing human rights instruments to
which the Member States are bound, but the Explanations state that it is just intended that the
Charter is to maintain the level of protection already existing.274 The problem of conflict
between higher levels of protection, therefore, remains.
As an example of under-specification in the EU Charter itself, no hierarchy is
established between more traditional rights and the free movement principles. The free
movement principles are converted into the language of rights, in the form of a freedom to
choose an occupation and right to engage in work (applicable to any EU citizen in any
Member State) (Article 15) and the freedom to conduct a business (in accordance with
Community law) (Article 16). However, the Explanations seem to reflect the doubtful
normative strength of trade-based rights (as well articulated in Alston’s critique of
Petersmann, and apparently contrary to the tenor of ECJ caselaw) by stating that Article 16
may be subject to the limitations in Article 52.1 of the Charter and that Article 16 is “Of
course...to be exercised with respect for Community law and national legislation.”275 Article
52.2 provides that “Rights recognised by this Charter which are based on the Community
Treaties or the Treaty on European Union shall be exercised under the conditions and within
the limits defined by those Treaties.”
Thus, trade-related rights and the rights in the Charter in general are subject to other
Treaty rules, rather than other Treaty rules being subject to the rights recognised in the
Charter, and in the case of Article 16 are subject even to national legislation (and not just
national constitutional law and tradition). This is different to other, more traditional or
classical rights in the EU Charter. For example, the right to a trial in the EU Charter is
subsumed under the very general wording of Article 6, which simply states that ‘Everyone
has the right to liberty and security’. It is then further dealt with more specifically under
Article 47 (of the EU Charter) on the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial and under
Article 48 on the rights of the defence. The Explanations of these Charter provisions go into
much more detail, stating that the right in Article 6 of the Charter are the rights guaranteed
274

Text of the Explanations relating to the complete text of the Charter, supra n. 33, 50 (35, which states more
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by Article 5 ECHR and going on to quote its much more detailed provisions. At no point
does it state that Article 5, 47 or 48 of the Charter are subject to other Community rules or
national law.
As regards the right to strike, for example, rather than stating that it can be limited
subject to national law, the Explanations to Article 28 of the EU Charter state that the right to
strike is governed by national law.276 This ties in with the question of the division of
competences between the Union and the Member States, further discussed in Chapter 6
below. From a human rights angle, it seems hard to reconcile the decision in Viking and
Laval with any of these provisions of the Charter. Whereas the Charter seems not to accord
the right to freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work (applicable to any
EU citizen in any Member State) (Article 15) and the freedom to conduct a business (Article
16) any pre-eminent status and to establish the priority of national law on the right to strike,
the ECJ in Laval and Viking seemed to suggest that free movement principles trumped any
national rules on the right to strike.277
The EU has thus adopted a specificationist approach based largely on the experience
of the ECHR, with some additional elements that are specific to the Community acquis or
that are novel.278 This approach has the advantage of securing rights with a relative degree of
certainty and with largely acquired legitimacy through acceptance amongst all the Member
States of the mostly minimalist standards of the ECHR. In contrast, the suggestion has been
made that the ECJ might engage in future activism developing a jurisprudence linking the
rights of EU citizenship and the principle of non-discrimination in order to develop a sense
of European identity contributing to a Europe-wide demos so as to invest the EU with
sufficient political legitimacy.279 It remains to be seen to what extent the ECJ will in its
jurisprudence mirror or not the more cautious approach or move in a more activist direction,
276

Ibid, 27.
As noted above, Article 52.3 of the Charter seems to work in the opposite direction to other provisions of the
Charter in permitting a very broad category of limits on rights based in ‘the general interest’. The ECJ treated
the clash between the right to strike and free movement implicitly as one of competence, rather than as a
conflict of rights.
278
For example, as the Text of the Explanations relating to the complete text of the Charter, supra n. 33, 41
(29), note, Article 48 on the right to a fair hearing goes further than Article 6(1) ECHR in not, for example,
being applicable only to disputes relating to civil law rights and obligations.
279
J. Bengoetxea, ‘The Scope for Discretion, Coherence and Citizenship’, in O. Wiklund (ed.), Judicial
Discretion in European Perspective (Kluwer 2003), 72-74.
277

261

Laval and Viking certainly suggest the latter is possible,280 but it is doubtful that decisions
like the highly contested Laval and Viking cases will do much to create a European-wide
sense of demos.
The decision to adopt wholesale ECHR jurisprudence helps address the complexity of
rights in light of the varying duties that attach to them, i.e. given that the complexity of
different levels and types of duty stemming from the same right makes lexical priority of one
right over another more difficult: “Some rights and duties take lexical priority over others
before a certain threshold is attained and this threshold may change from one right or duty to
the next.”

281

ECHR jurisprudence has worked out on a case-by-case basis how different

elements of different rights relate to each other and what such thresholds are. For example,
the scope of the right to liberty under Article 5 has been interpreted in a minimalist way to
permit investigative detention on quite broad grounds. This particular example is perhaps to
the objection of being too minimalist, in that a period of almost four years of pre-trial
detention has been held compatible with Article 5 of the ECHR.282 It would not be difficult
to further specify this right relative to investigative detention by providing for a maximum
shorter period and for periodic judicial review of detention, for example. Caselaw from
Strasbourg has clarified the relationship between the individuals’ right to a good name,
protected under the Article 8 guarantee of a right to privacy, and the right to freedom of
expression under Article 10, by requiring a higher burden of proof to demonstrate a factual
basis for a statement the more defamatory a statement is,283 a point which could be included
in a more specified formation of Article 11 of the EU Charter.
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In the most sensitive cases, where rights seem to be in direct conflict and of equal
weight,284 such as the situation where abortion is considered necessary to save the life of the
mother, the ECHR285 and the EU286 have not been involved by the contracting States or
Member States. Minimalism of rights standards thus permits specificationism to a degree that
is likely to achieve acceptance in the context of value pluralism across Europe. This points to
an underlying question of institutional rules of conflict resolution, i.e. who should decide on
conflicts of rights, courts or representative assemblies. The ECHR and its doctrine of a
margin of appreciation suggest an acceptance of the view that “… democratic and
epistemological reasons justify vesting most of the competence for controversial conflict
resolution in a large assembly of representatives like the legislature”287 at least to the extent
that the most controversial questions of rights are left to national polities. In this regard,
Torres Pérez accurately notes divergences in rights protection can result from different ways
of resolving conflicts between rights and the general interest and, in that context, increasing
uneasiness with ECJ rights discourse given much less interaction between the ECJ and
representative organs in the EU compared to national constitutional courts addressing
conflicts of rights.288 The institutional question, therefore, is linked to the lack of
development of a mature polity and demos in the EU that would enhance the legitimacy of
ECJ adjudication.

5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has addressed two aspects of the conflicts of rights in the EU: (1) the
relationship between human rights concerns and other interests in the legal reasoning of the
ECJ, specifically the free movement principles and the concern with increasing integration,
and (2) the possibility for a more detailed hierarchy and specification of rights in the EU. It
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appears that there is a certain ambiguity in the Court’s approach to the normative status of
rights, or at least that there is certainly scope for a stronger articulation of the essentially
status-based nature of rights and of their special normative status in light of that. This is
surprising in some degree, because in Omega, the Advocate General addressed this general
issue in a relatively comprehensive way, yet the Court in a very brief judgment avoided
characterisation of rights. Moreover, criticism of the ECJ’s approach relates as much to what
it does not say as it what it has said. In that regard, to an extent it is difficult to generalise
about the approach of the ECJ, because there are some marked differences in the caselaw.
Even in Wachauf, which has been criticised for extending ECJ jurisdiction in a very
forthright way into national implementation of EU law, including of derogations from EU
law, the ECJ referred to the essence of core of rights that cannot be transgressed.
Schmidberger suggests a strong procedural deference to the national margins of discretion at
least in defining the interests relevant to determining the scope of rights, which points to an
additional concern, namely the relationship between EU rights protection and that at both
national level and at international level. Although perhaps it is unsurprising given its own
institutional self-interest, the ECJ has asserted an unqualified supremacy claim that sits
uneasily with the ‘Solange’ logic that it itself adopted in Kadi conditioning its acceptance of
UN Security Council Resolutions, and the inconsistency could only fuel the kind of
scepticism articulated by Coppel & O’Neill that the ECJ is more interested in promoting
integration than protecting human rights.
On the other hand, in Laval and Viking, the ECJ entirely avoided the question of the
relative status of free movement principles and human rights, in the specific context of the
right to strike and in a situation where the result of the case suggests free movement
principles may have higher status than human rights norms. Some presumptive priority for
the right to strike seems justified given the reserve of competence in this area to the Member
States, but also because there is no obvious or compelling reason articulated in the caselaw
as to why workers’ rights should be subordinated to free movement of businesses. The
conceptual looseness of the economic freedoms has the potential to substantially curtail the
scope of other rights. The priority of other rights over the economic freedoms could be
achieved, for example, by requiring that only a very substantial impairment of free
movement could call into question (e.g. if all of the ports of Member States were blockaded,
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as opposed to a single business) rights reserved to national sovereignty. More generally, a
more absolute priority of some rights over others, such as of the right to life (and of a right to
minimal nutrition, if this interest were articulated independently of a right to life), can be
justified a priori. Other rights that could be articulated with a more absolute character
include all those described as non-derogable under the ECHR. On the other hand, some
rights may not need specification in the EU, at least at present, because their substance is
outside EU competence, such as a right to basic healthcare and familial rights.
The question of conflicts of rights is difficult for any court, because of the relative
incommensurability of rights. The second part of the chapter developed the idea of a
hierarchy and specification of rights so as to achieve a more stable and predictable
prioritising of rights. This can be seen as a particular application of the rationale of lex
specialis, which this thesis has stressed as an important principle for addressing norm
conflict in a way that achieves predictable results through relatively certain rules, while also
reflecting input legitimacy since it can be traced to the law-maker or constituent authority.
This more rule-bound approach ties in with accountability and transparency concerns: rights
conflicts are not resolved on an ad hoc basis, but as much as possible through prior
deliberation. It also furthers democratic legitimacy in the determination of rights. Although
often conceptualised as counter-majoritarian, rights determination cannot be wholly removed
from democratic influences, though the democratic definition should be particularly
deliberative. It is preferable to avoid resorting to under-specified concepts of weighing and
balancing and instead to adopt explicit substantive rules of priority, which was done to an
extent in Kadi, for example, in the determination that ‘smart sanctions’ are necessarily
subject to some human rights review and the general interests of the effective application of
UN measures could not prevail over such review. Further, the proportionality test should be
carefully related to questions of fact, Schmidberger being a good example of this approach
being put to good effect, rather than being another term for simple balancing.
On balance, the analysis in this chapter supports the contention of Coppel & O’Neill
that the ECJ does not always take rights seriously as independent normative values that in
general outright to have normative priority in the EU legal system. The ECJ is still
ambiguous about their relationship with the principles of the common market, and in some
cases, quite flagrantly so, such as in Laval and Viking. Thus, a suspicion must remain that the
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Court may be motivated to a greater degree by enhancing integration than with the protection
of rights. In that context, accession by the EU to the ECHR, as provided for by the Lisbon
Treaty, and the subsequent jurisdiction of the Strasbourg court in human rights matters in the
EU is welcome as a potential corrective to the institutionalised tendency of the ECJ to
privilege integration as the supreme value of the EU legal system.
Finally, a deeper, symbolically more significant, moral accountability is involved in
all these cases: conflicts cases inevitably involve some degree of moral loss, of tragedy.289
Failing to articulate moral loss, by failing to identify fully the conflict of rights, does not
capture the moral drama of rights and of their demand for justice. Finally, given the
complexity and difficulty of rights conflicts, it is argued that it is important for the lawmaker or constituent power to make substantive choices to address conflicts of rights as
much as possible, rather than leaving the matter solely to the judiciary, who are faced with a
relatively difficult interpretative task when basing decisions on very abstract catalogues of
rights with no priority rules.290 Originalist interpretation may be able to resolve the issue, but
in so far as possible, specification can be used to clarify the extent of rights and to develop
narrowly drawn exceptions.291 In an EU context, specificationism may be easier because of
the pre-existing national protections of human rights and also the already agreed ECHR level
of protection. This approach has been adopted to a substantial extent in the drafting of the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, even if the latter is still unfortunately ambiguous on how
rights relate to the general interests and objectives of the Union. This last question of the
‘general interest and objectives’ of the Union links in with the question of what the EU is for,
i.e. what are its competences and powers relative to the Member States and how should legal
reasoning treat the interpretation of competence. This is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 6 – Conflicts of Competence Norms in EU Law and the Legal Reasoning of the
ECJ

6.1 Introduction
The phenomenon of competence creep and the difficulties of identifying the limits of
Community/Union competence have been well noted in the academic literature:1 “There is a
school of thought that no opportunity should be missed of moving the Community caravan
forward, if necessary by night marches”.2 The same author goes on to observe:
… there was a time when it would have been considered impolite in Community circles
to talk about drawing lines at all. That has changed; and I believe the change is healthy,
and evidence of the growing maturity of the order.3

The risk to Member State competences from overreach by the Union was recently
highlighted in an unusually sharply worded critique of the ECJ by Herzog and Gerken, who
claimed:
Judicial decision-making in Europe is in deep trouble. The reason is to be found in the
European Court of Justice (ECJ), whose justifications for depriving member states of
their very own fundamental competences and interfering heavily in their legal systems
are becoming increasingly astonishing. In so doing, it has squandered a great deal of
the trust it used to enjoy. 4
1

See in particular MA. Pollack, ‘Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European Community’,
14(2) Journal of Public Policy 95-145 (1994); S. Weatherill, ‘Competence Creep and Competence Control’, 23
YEL 1-55 (2004), 5-12.
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A. Dashwood, ‘The Limits of European Community Powers’, 21 ELR 113-128 (1996), 113.
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Ibid, 128.
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R. Herzog & L. Gerken: ‘[Comment] Stop the European Court of Justice’, EU Observer.com, 10th September
2008: < http://euobserver.com/9/26714 > (last accessed 21st July 2010). Roman Herzog is a former President of
the German Federal Constitutional Court and also a former President of Germany. See K. Hänsch, ‘A Reply to
Roman Herzog and Lüder Gerken’, 3(2) ECLR 219-224 (2007). Hänsch argues in defence of the EU
competence regime that competences need to be flexible to deal with common problems (in reply to this
perspective, it might be argued that flexibility is already provided by the inherent faculty of States to cooperate
under general international law and that Union competence needs to be justified more specifically by showing
an added benefit). Writing in 1995, Weiler et al commented that there had been a practical eruption in the
hitherto dormant question of Community competences and powers around the time of the Treaty of Maastricht,
which marked a decisive growth in Community competences beyond the core common market (albeit subject to
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The exact extent of Community powers and of their limits relative to the powers of the
Member States were not stated in a systematic way in the Treaty of Rome founding the
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957,5 instead specific legal bases6 were set out
for particular Community policies. Neither did the Treaty of Rome or the other two founding
Treaties address the possible reversibility of the transfer of competence from the Member
States to the Communities, now Union. Characteristically, the ECJ asserted irrevocability,7
but constitutional principle (according to which the Member States are understood as
‘Masters of the Treaties’) and Member State practice tends not to support that view. 8 Article
50 TEU provides for Member State withdrawal, which tends to support the view that in
principle repatriation of powers could be permitted subject to the normal Treaty amendment
process. Despite the centrality of competence to the character of the EU,9 there has thus
always been a certain ambiguity about the question of competence.10
A lack of clarity in the definition of the powers or competences of the Union is at odds
with its self-articulation since the Treaty of Maastricht as an entity of conferred powers. This
principle of conferral captures the notion of the Member States as ‘Masters of the Treaties’,
i.e. as being able to control the activities of the EU through prior definition of the
competences it is to exercise. Notwithstanding the ease with which the principle can be
stated, EU institutional practice renders the whole issue mush more difficult and less clearthe Pillar system): JHH. Weiler, U. Haltern & F. Mayer, ‘European Democracy and its Critique’, 4(3) WEP 2433 (1995) also published as EUI Working Paper Robert Scuhman Centre No. 95/11 (1995), at 41 of RSC paper.
Apart from the introduction of subsidiarity and gradual de-pillarisation from Amsterdam to Lisbon (but with
remnants of intergovernmentalism even after Lisbon), relatively little has changed in the overall competence
framework since that time.
5
R. Schütze, From Dual To Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure Of European Law (Oxford Univ.
Press 2009), 130.
6
The variety of which has been described as an ‘archipelago’ by former Italian Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister Lamberto Dini: CONV 1234/02, 19th June 2002, at 6, as cited in S. Weatherill, ‘Competence and
Legitimacy’, in C. Barnard & O. Odudu (eds.), The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Hart Publishing
2009), 19.
7
See, e.g. Case 7/71, Commission v. France [1971] ECR 1003, at 1018 (para. 20). See also Case 6/64, Costa v.
ENEL [1964] ECR 585, where the ECJ described the transfer of sovereignty to the Communities as ‘permanent’
(at 594).
8
See D. Obradovic, ‘Repatriation of Powers in the European Community’, 34 CMLRev 59-88 (1997).
9
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more general discussion. For the most part, references are to provisions of the European Community Treaty
(ECT) (replaced by Lisbon with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or TFEU) and Treaty on
European Union (TEU) pre-Lisbon, as the Treaty of Lisbon has only come into effect since 1st December 2009
and so must caselaw pre-dates it (the Article numbers as amended by Lisbon are also generally given for ease of
reference).
10
ZC. Mayer, ‘Competences – Reloaded? The Vertical Division of Powers in the EU and the new European
Constitution’, 3(2) IJCL 493-515 (2005), 493, noting it is a recurring issue in EU law.
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cut. This chapter examines whether the legal reasoning of the ECJ, in its treatment of
competence norms, can be re-calibrated to more accurately respect normative self-expression
of the Union, which goes beyond merely establishing a common market and ever-closer
integration.
What distinguishes the ECJ is avoidance of reliance on specific competence provisions,
in favour of more generic bases relating to the idea of a common market, often married to an
effectiveness argument. However, effectiveness teds to be conceptualised solely with
reference to enhanced integration as a value. On the approach of the ECJ, any national matter
that potentially restricts freedom of movement or distorts competition falls within the
competence of the EU, regardless of whether, as a matter of the centre-of-gravity of the
issue, it falls into a domain that is outside the scope of Union competence. The Dori case
provides a good example.11 Here, the ECJ held that the equal pay provision in the Treaty, a
general principle of EU law and which originally was a principle associated with the
common market (hence the Treaty focused on the issue of ‘pay’), precluded discrimination
on grounds of sex within the German military, notwithstanding that the EU has no
competence in military matters.
There exists, therefore, a kind of conceptual spillover (to borrow the term of Haas and
other neo-functionalists12) that can make it very easy to link the common market with almost
any aspect of national or Member State sovereignty. The focus of this chapter is the varying
ways in which competence norms can be mediated in legal reasoning and how these
variations tie in with the principles that the EU articulates as its core constitutional identity
beyond the more technical principle of the creation of a common market: the principle of
conferral, the principle of subsidiarity, the rule of law, and democracy. The argument is that
a consistent application of lex specialis, and the related idea of originalist interpretation,
better respects the principle of conferral and the underlying constitutional principle of the
Member States as ‘Masters of the Treaties’, much more so than the meta-teleological
approach that dominates the Court’s caselaw.
11
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1964), 48. A-M. Burley & W. Mattli., ‘Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Integration’, 47(1) IO
41-76 (1993), 55 et seq.; A. Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (Oxford Univ. Press 2004), op
cit, 243; G. de Búrca, ‘Rethinking Law in Neofunctionalist Theory’, 12(1) JEPP 310-326 (2005), 317.

12

269

The Treaty of Lisbon makes some attempt to delineate different types of
competences, by distinguishing between those that are exclusive, shared, or supporting.13 A
clearer delineation of, in particular, vertical competence boundaries between the Member
States and the Union has been on the political agenda at least since the Declaration of Laeken
in 2001.14 Horizontal competences, i.e. between the institutions, have become less prominent
as a concern since co-decision has become the norm,15 compared to the period after the
Single European Act 1986 (SEA). Following the SEA, a variety of different legislative
procedures prevailed, according different competences to the institutions and mainly to the
European Parliament, thus making the choice of legislative basis and differentiation of
competence a matter of practical institutional importance.16 Horizontal competences are
governed by the principle of ‘institutional balance’ and are outside the scope of this chapter,
which is concerned with the vertical competence relationship between the Member States
and the Union.17 Most caselaw from the ECJ on competence concerns this issue of legislative
basis; the ECJ has hardly ever held that the Community or Union lacks competence
simpliciter, though it has quite often found the wrong legal basis has been adopted.
A substantial challenge to the competence of the Member States came from the two
general competence clauses in the Treaties: that relating to the common market, in (ex)
Article 95 ECT and now Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU), and the general gap-filling competence clause in (ex) Article 308 ECT and now
Article 352 TFEU.18 A tendency toward ‘competence creep’ can be seen, for example, in the
extensive use by both the Council (of Ministers) of (ex) Article 308 ECT and that of the
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European Court of Justice (ECJ) to extend institutional competence beyond that expressly
provided for in the Treaties.19
Article 308 ECT/Article 352 TFEU is a residual powers clause allowing the Union to
adopt measures necessary for attaining Treaty objectives when no more specific legal basis is
available.20 Despite “reassuring (and late appearing)” words from the ECJ that (ex) Article
308 ECT could not be used as basis for widening Community powers beyond the general
framework of the Treaty,21 “… there has been widespread concern, in particular amongst the
Länder [states of Germany], that this article was used by the Council as a basis for the
surreptitious erosion of Member State powers”.22 Prior to Lisbon, Article 308 read as
follows:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the
operation of the Common Market, one of the objectives of the Community, and this
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European parliament, take
the appropriate measures.23

On the question whether the requirement for unanimity by the Member States for the use of
Article 308 ECT could be thought a guarantee against competence creep and its over use,
“The ignoble answer is that there all kinds of ways of bribing and coercing delegations in a
minority of one or two [in the Council of Ministers] on a matter to which the unanimity rule
applies”.24 Weiler described the potential scope of Article 308 in the following: “… it
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Secretariat.
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became virtually impossible to find any activity which could not be brought within the
‘objectives of the Treaty’”.25 This is because of the generality with which the Treaty
objectives can be described: anything that enhances integration is consistent with the
preamble’s exhortation to ‘an ever-closer Union’.26
This chapter argues that the theory of norm conflict can provide a conceptual
framework for a clearer understanding and delimitation of competence in the EU, especially
by articulating the significance of the lex-generalis-lex specialis distinction in the context of
competing competence claims. As a matter of practice, to date, the distinction has not
generally been drawn. Up to 2002, about 700 legislative measures were adopted under
Article 308 ECT.27 Relating this to rules of norm conflict, the institutions, both the Council
and the ECJ, have been quite willing to resort to the lex generalis of ex Article 308 ECT in
the absence of competence norms constituting lex specialis.28 Meanwhile, the ECJ rarely
makes explicit the nature of its reasoning on competence issues, a point that can be well
illustrated by caselaw on Article 95 ECT (ex Article 100a ECT and now Article 114 TFEU).
Caselaw on Article 95 ECT illustrates the approach of the ECJ. Article 95 ECT (now
Article 114 TFEU), the other most general Treaty competence provision, has also been used
extensively by the Council.29 It provides for the approximation of laws relating to the
establishing or functioning of the internal market.30 For its part, the ECJ expansively
25

JHH. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, 100(8) Yale LJ 2403-2483 (1991), 2445-2446 (in contrast
with (ex) Article 308 ECT/now Article 352 TFEU, (ex) Article 95 ECT/now Article 114 TFEU does not require
unanimity).
26
T. Schilling, ‘Subsidiarity as a Rule and a Principle, or: Taking Subsidiarity Seriously’, New York University
Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 10/1995 (1995), 13, 17, noting that there are no limits to Community
competences because they are expressed in terms of ends.
27
Ibid, 217. Schütze notes that the extensive use of the provision runs the risk of subverting the idea of
enumerated powers: (2009), op cit, 134.
28
Although Article 308 ECT (now Article 352 TFEU) has hardly ever been articulated officially or in academic
discussion as a fallback from lex specialis, Dashwood noted that “There has never been any doubt that the
absence of a specific legal basis in the Treaty is a legal condition precedent for recourse to Article 235”, citing
Case 242/87, ERASMUS [1989] ECR 1425: Dashwood (1996), ibid, 123.
29
See de Búrca & de Witte (2002), op cit, 215-216. As mentioned above, unlike Article 308 ECT, Article 95
did not require unanimity in the Council (though as Dashwood, quoted above, indicates, the extent of unanimity
as a restraint on Union ‘enterprises of ambition’ is questionable). This remains the case with their successor
provisions, Articles 114 and 352 TFEU respectively (though now Article 352 TFEU is subject to co-decision
with European Parliament, as Article 95 ECT had been and Article 114 TFEU continues to be). See further
generally, HG. Krenzler & C. Pitschas, ‘Progress or Stagnation? The Common Commercial Policy after Nice’,
6(3) EFAR 291-313 (2001); Schütze (2009), op cit, 143-151.
30
See, e.g. discussion in Schütze (2009), op cit, 143, relates ‘establishment’ to the elimination of obstacles to
trade and ‘functioning’ to the removal of distortions on competition.
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interpreted it in caselaw, of which Spain v. Council is perhaps the high point. The ECJ held
there that the harmonization power relative to the internal market in Article 95 could be used
to prevent even any future obstacles to trade or a potential fragmentation of the internal
market,31 although later caselaw clarified that such future obstacles must be likely and the
measure in question must be designed to prevent them.32 As almost any diversity of national
laws could be understood as an obstacle to free movement, they could be brought within this
framework. This general point is succinctly reflected in the following passages from the
recent Metock judgment, where the ECJ states that once an obstacle to free movement exists,
the Member States no longer have exclusive competence (though Metock did not concern
Article 95 ECT):
64. The refusal of the host Member State to grant rights of entry and residence to the
family members of a Union citizen is such as to discourage that citizen from moving to
or residing in that Member State, even if his family members are not already lawfully
resident in the territory of another Member State....
66. Consequently, the interpretation ... that the Member States retain exclusive
competence, subject to Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty, to regulate the first access
to Community territory of family members of a Union citizen who are nationals of nonmember countries must be rejected.33

However, the ECJ took a different approach in Tobacco Advertising,34 a case that
well illustrates diverging approaches to defining competence norms. In this case, the ECJ
adopted both a qualitative and quantitative restriction on the internal market competence of
the Community. As noted in Chapter 1, the ECJ rejected the view that the mere fact of
disparities in national law could justify the use of competition competence, instead the ECJ
31

Case C-350/92, Spain v Council [1995] ECR I-1985, para. 35. The facts concerned the creation of a
supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products, in the context that the Community did not have a
general power to harmonize patent law. See discussion in Schütze (2009), op cit, 144-146; see also N. Foster,
Foster on EU Law (Oxford Univ. Press 2006), 107, noting that the Commission tries to introduce as much
legislation as possible under Article 95 ECT/Article 114 TFEU.
32
See, e.g. Case C-217/04, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-3771, paras. 60-64; Case
C-58/08, Queen (Vodafone & Others) v. Secretary of State for Business, judgment of 8th June 2010, para. 33.
33
Case 127/08, Metock v. Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform [2008] ECR I-6241, paras. 64, 66. See
N. Nic Suibhne, ‘Margins of Appreciation: National Values, Fundamental Rights and EC Free Movement
Law’, 34(2) ELR 230-256 (2009), 235, noting that in Metock, the ECJ applied its now “familiarly expansive
interpretation of ‘obstacles’ to the exercise of free movement”.
34
Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419.
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proposed a de minimis or quantitative threshold of ‘appreciable impact’, noting that
otherwise the competence of the Community legislature would be virtually unlimited.35
Moreover, the ECJ in Tobacco Advertising stated that limitations on competence in one
Treaty provision could not be circumvented by reliance on another Treaty provision:
77. The first indent of Article 129(4) of the Treaty excludes any harmonisation of laws
and regulations of the Member States designed to protect and improve human health.
78. But that provision does not mean that harmonising measures adopted on the basis
of other provisions of the Treaty cannot have any impact on the protection of human
health. Indeed, the third paragraph of Article 129(1) provides that health requirements
are to form a constituent part of the Community's other policies.
79. Other articles of the Treaty may not, however, be used as a legal basis in order to
circumvent the express exclusion of harmonisation laid down in Article 129(4) of the
Treaty.36

This is an implicit invocation of lex specialis: the specificity in the matter of public health of
Article 129 ECT could not be circumvented by relying on the more general internal market
power in Article 100a/95 ECT to harmonise on purely health grounds. It suggests a
qualitative, centre-of-gravity approach to legal bases, seeing Article 95 as a residual clause,
not as a general power to regulate the internal market.37 On the facts, the ECJ held that a
blanket ban on tobacco advertising and sponsorship in the Community, subject to a few
exceptions, was beyond the Community’s regulatory competence. In contrast, a more limited
and general kind of restriction could have been based on Article 95 (along with the free
movement competence in (ex) Articles 57(2) and 66), in so far as this could more obviously
contribute to free movement. On the facts, for example, the Court noted that the Directive

35

Ibid, paras. 106-107.
This reasoning is in sharp contrast with that which prevailed in Laval and Viking, discussed further below.
37
Schütze describes the test as one of ‘a centre of gravity’: (2009), op cit, 150. Tridimas & Tridimas described
the judgment in Tobacco Advertising as “one of the most important ever delivered by the Court on the
competence of the European Community” where the ECJ “gave for the first time a restrictive interpretation” to
Article 95 ECT: G. Tridimas & T. Tridimas, ‘The European Court of Justice and the Annulment of the Tobacco
Advertising Directive: Friend of National Sovereignty or Foe of Public Health’, 14(2) EJLE 171-183 (2002),
171-172.
36
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related to matters that did not enhance free movement and, further, it did not ensure free
movement of goods in conformity with its provisions.38
Tobacco Advertising has been generally interpreted as placing important limits on the
Community’s harmonization power,39 yet the full significance of the judgment can arguably
only be explained within a framework of norm conflict theory. It is because lex specialis has
a limiting effect that the case represented a “new judicial wind”40 in contrast to the lex
generalis of teleology dis-moored from particular Treaty provisions.41 Tobacco Advertising
though is not typical, despite being offered as evidence that the ECJ now takes the limits of
competence seriously.42 In the recent Kadi decision, for example, the ECJ held the
Community had competence to impose sanctions on individuals, though the most specific
Treaty provisions, then Articles 60 and 301 ECT, only related to sanctions with third States,
and the ECJ did not mention the ‘appreciable impact’ standard in relation to Article 308.43

38

Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council, supra n. 34, paras. 99-101.
Tridimas & Tridimas, ibid; Mayer (2005), op cit, 501; Dougan (2008), op cit, 654; Schütze (2009), op cit,
144-151.
40
As described by Dougan, ibid.
41
Article 352 TFEU, which replaces Article 308 ECT, expressly prevents its use to circumvent specific
exclusions of harmonization. It provides in paragraph 3 that ‘[m]easures based on this Article shall not entail
harmonization of Member States’ laws o regulations in cases where the Treaties exclude such harmonisation”.
See Schütze (2009), op cit, 150-151, at n. 91.
42
Mayer (2005), op cit, 501; Dougan (2008), op cit, 654.
43
Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council,
judgment of 3rd September 2008, paras. 211, 213, 216, 222-227, 229-230. See generally M. Karayigit, ‘The
Yusuf and Kadi Judgments: The Scope of the EC Competence in Respect of Restrictive Measures’, 33 LIEI
379-404 (2006); M. Cremona, ‘EC Competences, ‘Smart Sanctions’ and the Kadi Case’, in M. Cremona, F.
Francioni & S. Poli (eds.), ‘Challenging the EU Counter-Terrorism Measures through the Courts’, EUI Working
Papers AEL 2009/10 (2009); A. Dashwood, ‘Article 308 EC as the Outer Limit of Expressly Conferred
Community Competence’ in Barnard & Odudu (eds.) (2009), 41-42. Dashwood suggests that the extension of
measures from States, as envisaged in Articles 60 and 301 ECT, to individuals, as provided by the contested
measures in Kadi, amounted to the enhancement of an existing mechanism and thus did not go beyond the
general framework of the Treaties (the limits of the sue of Article 308 ECT identified by the ECJ in Opinion
2/94, see further below Chapter 6). However, given the punitive effect of the sanctions, their novelty as legal
instruments, and the significant qualitative difference with sanctions imposed on States, a stricter approach to
construction might have been warranted. Cremona is more critical on this point, commenting that “on any view
the Community was here acting at the limits of its conferred powers”: ibid, 83. The ECJ held the measures
involved did touch on the common market. As Cremona notes, if an internal market element was present, there
was really no need to rely on Article 308 ECT, which the ECJ proceeded to do: Cremona (2009), 92. The ECJ
grounded competence on Articles 60, 301 and 308 ECT cumulatively. On the Article 308 ECT connection, the
ECJ was very brief and used a criterion of ‘efficiency’, as well as two formal criteria, namely, that (a) the
measure was necessary to fulfil an objective of the EC Treaty and (b) it was adopted in the course of the
operation of the common market:
226. Inasmuch as they provide for Community powers to impose restrictive measures of an
economic nature in order to implement actions decided on under the CFSP, Articles 60 EC and
301 EC are the expression of an implicit underlying objective, namely, that of making it
possible to adopt such measures through the efficient use of a Community instrument.
39
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Similarly, the Viking and Laval decisions relating to strikes represent an important opposing
tendency to Tobacco Advertising and are discussed in more detail below. Moreover, Tobacco
Advertising is ambiguous in some respects. The exclusion of Article 95 as a legal basis was
mostly related to the facts, as despite stating in paragraph 79 of its judgment that “other
articles of the Treaty may not, however, be used as a legal basis in order to circumvent the
express exclusion of harmonisation laid down in Article 129(4) of the Treaty”, the ECJ stated
in another part of the judgment that Article 95 could be used in conjunction with the free
movement provisions even if public health was a decisive factor in the choices to be made
“provided that the conditions for recourse to Articles 100a (later Article 95), 57(2) and 66 as
a legal basis are fulfilled”.44
On the appreciable impact standard, as Tridimas & Tridimas note:
... whether the distortions which arise from the lack of harmonisation are appreciable is
a question of degree and, as such, difficult to determine. One would have thought that
empirical evidence is here of crucial importance. Little concrete empirical evidence,
however, appears to have been presented to the Court.45

Moreover, the ECJ does not generally require such evidence, and instead tends to make
rather generic statements of appreciability that denude the standard of substance. In the
recent case of The Queen (Vodafone & Others) v. Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise
and Regulatory Reform, for example, it simply stated that the divergences of national laws
governing prices of mobile roaming would cause ‘significant’ distortions of competition,
without offering any empirical assessment or describing the nature of ‘significant’ as a
threshold or relating it to ‘appreciability’.46 Moreover, as Tridimas & Tridimas note, the ECJ
has not applied any de minimis standard to the fundamental freedoms.47

227. That objective may be regarded as constituting an objective of the Community for the purpose of
Article 308 EC.
See Cremona, ibid, 88-89.
44
Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council, supra n. 34, para. 88. Case C-58/08, Queen (Vodafone
& Others) v. Secretary of State for Business, supra n. 32, para. 36.
45
Tridimas & Tridimas (2002), op cit, 175.
46
Case C-58/08, supra n. 32, para. 47.
47
Tridimas & Tridimas (2002), op cit, 175; see also Schilling (1995), op cit, 23. The ECJ rejected a de minimis
approach to free movement in, e.g. Joined Cases 177 and 178/82, van de Haar and Kaveka de Meern [1984]
ECR 1797, para. 13 (noted in Schillling, ibid, and n. 284).
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The creation by the ECJ of the doctrine of parallelism was an obvious historical
example of extension of Community competence by the ECJ, based on the general scheme of
Treaties or principles abstracted from a number of specific Treaty provisions (rather than
either of the general competence clauses in now Articles 352 and 114 TFEU). Under this
doctrine, the exercise of an internal Community competence gives rise to external
Community competence that pre-empts Member States exercising an equivalent or
overlapping competence.48 This was the first time exclusive competence was expressly
introduced into Community law.
It seems it can be safely concluded that the caselaw that established that nondiscriminatory obstacles to free movement came within the remit of the Treaties49 and the
broad reading of ‘distortion of competition’ discussed above, which together make up the
common market whose objectives Article 308 was to further,50 has greatly expanded the
competence of the EU to the point that it is now difficult to say that any matter is entirely
outside of Community/Union competence.51 These are prime examples of legal principles
whose scope is potentially wide-ranging and hard to limit, in contrast to specific competence
rules. Such was the breadth with which specific competences were interpreted, Article 308
ECT may not be considered decisive as a basis for extending competence. Thus, as Davies
has noted and as quoted at more length in Chapter 1: “Alas, as every Community lawyer
knows, there could hardly be more open-ended and ambiguous competences that those

48

Case 22/70, Commission v. Council (Re European Road Transport Agreement) (‘ERTA’)) [1971] ECR 263,
paras. 17-19, 28-31. The principle has been clarified and developed considerably in subsequent caselaw: see
5.6.2 below.
49
Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paras. 5-9; Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG
(Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649, paras. 8-14.
50
Dashwood suggests that the term ‘internal market’ should be preferred in (ex) Article 235 European
Economic Community (as Article 308 ECT was numbered pre-Maastricht) Treaty to the “notoriously opentextured concept” of a common market: Dashwood (1996), op cit, 123. It might be thought that internal market,
for instance, would seem not to obviously include, on the surface, external relations. However, as the ECJ has
drawn a link between internal and external powers through the doctrine of parallelism, the drafting change
might not make much difference in practice, though it seems worth making in principle. By comparison, Article
352 TFEU, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to replace Article 308 ECT, refers to neither the common market
nor internal market and instead simply refers to ‘the policies defined in the Treaties’, which is possibly broader
still than ‘common market’.
51
See also Weatherrill (2009), op cit, 19-20, noting that the likelihood of preventing obstacles to free
movement as a basis for legislative competence “is so lacking in precision and predictability that … one may
readily regard the Court’s stance as now more concerned with ‘competence-enhancing’…”.
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assigned to the Community.” 52 The effect is that it is “disturbingly easy to touch upon EC
[EU] law”,53 as Klabbers put it. Torres Pérez remarks:
Arguing that state measures that distinguish between nationals and non-nationals might
hinder free movement, the ECJ has extended its power to monitor state action, even of
there is no clear connection with the field of EU law.54

She gives the example of Bickel and Franz, where the ECJ held that criminal proceedings
against a German and an Austrian national charged with criminal offences in Italy should be
in the language of the accused in order to comply with the Community law requirement of
non-discrimination, so as not to constrain free movement.55 Torres Pérez thus remarks that
the EU competence regime acts as a “loaded gun that a binding Charter [of fundamental
rights] might contribute to shoot…regardless of the kind of state action under review”.56
Similarly, Davies comments that common tax rules, a common contract code,
harmonized education systems to ease migration of persons, a single language are all
arguably within the conceptual reach of the overarching principles of the common market.57
Yet Article 5 TEU clearly defines the EU as an organisation of conferred and not unlimited
competence. There thus exists a conflict between the explicit self-articulation by the EU and
by the Member States of EU competence and the reality of institutional practice within the

52

G. Davies, ‘Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, In the Wrong Place, At the Wrong Time’, 43 CMLRev 63-84
(2006), 63, 65. See also P. Craig, ‘Chap. 12: Competence and Subsidiarity’ in EU Administrative Law (Oxford
Univ. Press 2006), 40-44; Von Bogdandy & Bast, ‘The Union’s Powers: A Question of Competence. The
Vertical Order of Competences and Proposals for its Reform’, 38 CMLRev 227-268 (2002), 238; Soriano
(2007), op cit, 329; J. Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009), 115;
A. Torres Perez, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union (Oxford Univ. Press 2009), 16-21.
53
Klabbers (2009), ibid, 205.
54
Torres Pérez (2009), op cit, 20.
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are entitled to use their own language in administrative and judicial proceedings.
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Davies (2006), op cit, 63-65. Nic Suibhne (2009), op cit, 241, n. 51, points to some purely internal situations
that clearly fall outside EU law, e.g. Case C-144/95, Criminal proceedings against Maurin [1996] ECR I-2909,
where the ECJ held that Community legislation did not regulate the sale of foodstuffs complying with its
requirements in respect of labelling and did not, therefore, impose any obligation on Member States where there
was a sale of products which comply with the directive but whose use-by date has expired, with the result that
the offence with which Mr. Maurin had been charged, relating to the sale of goods after their sell-by date had
expired, involved national legislation falling outside the scope of Community law. See also Foglia v. Novello
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EU system whereby the conceptual pull of the concept of ‘internal market’ or ‘common
market’ make defining the limits of EU competence very difficult.58 Remarkably, almost 50
years after the founding of the Union, Mayer notes that at the Convention on the Future of
Europe, many delegates may not have understood the scope of the Community’s internal
market power.59
This reflects a continuing debate as to who are the ‘Masters of the Treaties’.60 As Mayer
suggests, competence can be thus seen as a codeword for the future of European
integration.61 The principle of conferral,62 the explicit rules on Treaty change,63 and the
possibility for Member State withdrawal64 all point to the Member States as ultimately
Masters, who have control over the pace of Treaty change. They would no longer be the
Masters only if the Union itself, independently of the Member States individually and
collectively, could effect constitutional change.65
Nonetheless, institutional practice tends to push in the other direction and suggests a
logic and momentum for integration that is not entirely within the control of the Member
States. This reflects more generally a tension between Westphalian and more integralist
views of international law, discussed in Chapter 1. The flipside of the question of who is
Master of the Treaties is the question of kompetenz-kompetenz: who has authority to decide
the limits of Union, and thus the extent of Member State, competence? The issue is not
explicitly addressed in the Treaties, although Treaty provisions concerning the principle of
conferral or enumerated powers,66 Treaty amendment, and withdrawal at least cast doubt
58

Tridimas & Tridimas (2002), op cit, 177.
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2 BvE 2/08, judgment of 30th June 2009, available at:
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accessed 6th April 2010), para. 235.
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over the implicit claims of the ECJ that it alone has jurisdiction and authority to decide the
issue. In other words, how competence is understood turns on the constitutional perspective
applied to it,67 and thus it directly impacts upon the issue of values underlying competence
norms and their treatment in legal reasoning.
Given the centrality of competence to the questions of defining and legitimising the EU,
it has been surprisingly under-discussed at a conceptual level in EU scholarship. The
approach in this chapter is to first analyse competence as a legal concept before explaining
how it can be differently treated in legal reasoning. Institutional practice suggests that the EU
is sometimes and even often greater than the sum of its parts as represented by the Member
States and their individual consent to competence norms in the Treaties. The definition of
competence is, therefore, an important fault-line in understanding the character of the EU as
a constitutional and political entity. This chapter thus examines differing or conflicting
approaches to defining EU competences in legal reasoning and seeks to relate the different
approaches to the different substantive values discussed in Chapter 3. It first looks at
analytical jurisprudential writing on the concept of competence, both Anglo-American and
Continental, which helps understanding of the application and interpretation of competence
norms. The general approach in this chapter is consistent with the idea of the
universalisability of legal reasoning: namely, that an ex ante, general understanding of the
interpretation of competence norms is possible. In other words, it is possible to systematise
their interpretation, which does not consist of a ‘wilderness of single instances’ made on a
case-by-case basis.68
The normative argument is that given how the EU self-articulates as a polity in the
Treaties (and not just in the official discourse of the institutions, which almost invariably
privileges the value of integration), competence needs to be treated more carefully in the
legal reasoning of the ECJ, in particular, through an application of lex specialis and
Relationship Between the Member States and the European Union’, 41 CMLRev 355-381 (2004), 357-358) is
circular and thus transgresses the is-ought distinction in philosophy. However, the absence of kompetenz–
kompetenz could be understood as an inherent implication or alternative formulation of the principle of
enumerated powers, rather than a derivation of it. The principle of conferral itself could be considered a
postulate established by the Member States, not a derivation as a matter of EU law (ultimately it might be
argued to derive from the sovereignty to States).
67
Mayer (2005), op cit, 512.
68
Suggesting that competence claims will necessarily differ from case to case, see Craig (2006), op cit, 404.
See also Soriano (2007), op cit, 325.
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originalist interpretation. This is necessary in order to respect the principle of conferral,
which is arguably inherent in the very idea of a competence norm. Further, the principle of
susbsidiarity can be operationalised to a much greater degree in the approach of the ECJ by
interpreting it as requiring proof of jurisdictional suitability at EU level; this would, in effect,
involve reconfiguring abstract ‘effectiveness’ arguments linked to integration into
empirically grounded assessments of EU claims to superior competence. The chapter
concludes with several case studies to illustrate the arguments.

6.2 Competence as a Legal Concept
Competence as a legal concept, described as important yet elusive by Bulygin,69 entails a
power to change legal relations.70 Hohfeld described a power as the opposite of a disability.
As a correlative, it entails liability on others to respect the exercise of power. He understood
it as “one’s affirmative ‘control’ over a given legal relation”.71 Bulygin identified nullity as a
distinctive feature of competence, in that an absence of legal competence entails a legal
nullity. Hart had distinguished a nullity from a sanction, the latter being a consequence upon
failure to comply with a rule.72 With a power-conferring or competence-conferring rule,
there is no consequence as such for its breach, just the absence of a defined legal
69
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relationship. In this way, competence as a concept can be understood as entailing a more
fundamental failure of legality, as entailing basic invalidity, not just, e.g. illegality or disapplication of one norm due to a conflict of norms valid on their own individual terms.73
Invalidity is thus an important consequence of the mis-application of a competence norm, in
contrast to other norms. Competence is thus linked to legitimacy in a very direct way.74
A central issue in literature on competence is the extent to which competence norms are
free-standing norms in their own right or ‘fragments’ of other norms. Kelsen favoured the
view that they are fragments of other norms and not fully norms, which Hart criticised. For
Kelsen, a legal norm properly understood was “a primary norm which stipulates the
sanction”.75 Hart first noted there is some truth to the view that legal powers are related to
legal rules in general, but he argued that that failed to capture the full reality of the
distinctiveness of power-conferring rules:
Further, it is important to realize that rules of the power-conferring sort, though
different from rules which impose duties and so have some analogy to orders backed
by threats, are always related to such rules; for the powers which they confer are
powers to make general rules of the latter sort or to impose duties on particular persons
which would otherwise not be subject to them.76

Hart goes on to reject the idea that nullity is a concept common to both powers and other
rules. Nullity resulting from a lack of legal recognition is very different to the sanction that
results from breach of a criminal law, for example, in that there is no punitive consequence
or character to the nullity.77 Hart criticised the idea that orders to officials to apply sanctions
embody true norms, of which other norms (such as competence norms) are fragments, as
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failing to capture the social, rule-like character of laws in general. Laws, for Hart, are not
reducible to the notion of sanctions.78
The idea of legal powers or competence rules as fragments of other rules reflects more
generally two contrasting approaches to understanding competence norms: on a reductive
view, competence norms are reducible to other norms, usually, to norms of conduct, i.e. a
command or a permission.79 The contrasting position is that of Hart, namely, that
competence norms are fully norms in their own right, which cannot be reduced to another
type of norm. From the perspective of norm conflict theory, this is important in relating
competence norms to other norms. To what extent are they free-standing, as norms that in
effect can impose or apply themselves, so that understanding these norms does not depend on
the mediation of other norms? Hart’s criticism of the association of norms with sanctions
seems accurate as failing to capture the full range of legal norms and what is commonly
understood as a norm. Thus, the prohibition on murder is itself a norm, rather than, as on the
reductive view, the application of a sanction for murder being the norm to which the
prohibition on murder is related as ‘a fragment’. Similarly with competence norms, the
ability to change legal relations is a norm itself, even though failure to exercise a competence
norm does not detail a sanction. Kelsen’s (reductive) view “purchase[d] the pleasing
uniformity of pattern to which [it] reduce[d] all laws at too high a price: that of distorting the
different social functions which different types of legal rule perform”.80 Law is not just about
dealing with ‘bad men’ so as to be related in essence to sanctions: the “law is used to control,
to guide, and to plan life out of court.”81 Power-conferring rules are thought of or understood
in ordinary social life in different ways than rules conferring duties: power conferring rules
“confer a huge and distinctive amenity”.82
It can be concluded thus that power-conferring or competence norms are distinctive
in creating an amenity, i.e. the capacity to change legal relations. To understand them more
fully though, it is necessary to understand how they relate to other norms. This interaction
with other norms is what is relevant for norm conflict theory (understood, as it is in this
78
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work, as including differing interpretative norms). An adequate conceptual understanding of
competence or power is needed to understand systematic interpretation,83 as well as to
understand the notion of validity and invalidity when norms clash. When one norm
invalidates another, it is because the maker of the latter norm acted ultra vires or outside its
competence. To assist with this conceptual understanding, a basic question might further be
briefly addressed: what exactly constitutes a ‘norm’ to begin with, apart from the general
understanding in this work thusfar that a norm is a legal rule or principle that has some legal
valence or force.
Spaak follows Hart & Raz in answering this question by considering a norm to be a
reason for action, which he argues has implications for our understanding of norms related to
competence.84 The idea of reasons for action as providing an account of norms is appealing
because it supports the claim that law makes in social life to be a supreme reason for
action.85 Von Wright understood norms as prescriptions, being norms issued by a norm-giver
to one or more norm-subjects because the norm giver wants the norm subjects to act in a
certain way.86 In Spaak’s view, this understanding of a norm facilitates a formal distinction
to be made between competence norms themselves87 and norms that confer competence,88
which is also implicit in Hart’s discussion of power-conferring norms referred to above.
Competence norms are not themselves full norms, and in this regard they can be compared to
merely technical norms: “duty-imposing norms but not competence norms are (complete)
norms in the sense they give (complete) reasons for action”.89 Norms that confer competence
are addressed to legal officials and impose a duty on legal officials to recognise the conferral
and exercise of competence.90 On this view, norms that confer competence are a fuller type
of norm than the competence norm itself.
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In reality, it seems these two types of norms will generally coincide. The actual
exercise of a competence presupposes the norm conferring the competence. As Hohfeld
explained, a power entails a correlate liability to recognise its exercise.91 Spaak’s distinction
seems to explain two different perspectives, that of the exerciser of competence and that of
legal officials. Ultimately, Spaak concludes that norms conferring competence are dutyimposing norms (the duty being on legal officials to recognise them), whereas competence
norms are technical norms in providing a means to an end, but they do not provide reasons
for action in a full sense and are fragments of duty-imposing norms conferring competence.92
Article 86 TFEU could be considered both a norm conferring competence and a competence
norm. It both creates the legal basis for the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor
(EPP) (in this respect it is a norm that confers competence on the Member States to do so
within the EU legal system), but it also defines the competence of the EPP to some extent
(e.g. by stipulating its jurisdiction relates to crimes against the financial interests of the
Union).
Spaak seems correct in describing competence norms as technical norms or
subsidiary norms that are a means to an end, although it may be going too far to say they are
not full norms, given Hart’s argument about the social use and reality of the term ‘norm’.93
Competence norms are created by other competence-conferring norms for specific ends or
purposes. Here, there seems a regress as to the exact origin of constitutional competence
norms, which perhaps ultimately is determined by brute politics, rather than legal theory. A
norm creates a power or competence, but the norm creating the power or competence
presupposes a power or norm to create such competence conferral, and so on. Ultimately,
there is an original or primitive norm in the form of the constituent power.94 Competence
norms thus need to be interpreted in light of the constitutional framework determining what
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the ‘origins’ and ‘ends’ are of competence. In other words, there is a chain of validity, one
norm creates another norm (and each of these norms has to be interpreted).
The idea of a chain of validity of competence norms points to a constitutional
anchoring of competence norms, which can be related to the principle of conferral in EU law.
Differing approaches to interpretation in light of this principle of conferral are possible:
should systematic interpretation be related to lex generalis or to lex specialis? Here, there is a
link between originalist interpretation and lex specialis, since lex specialis logically more
closely reflects the will of the law-maker or constituent power. How do specific attributions
of competence relate to the more general competence of the EU? For example, specific
Treaty provisions on the extent of EU competence in the matter of a right to strike can be,
and have been in the caselaw of the ECJ, related to the general competence of the EU to
achieve a common market. Whether lex specialis or lex generalis should be preferred in a
scenario like this can be related to the idea of competence norms entailing a chain of validity
back to constitutional norms. This final part of the chapter seeks to explain how differing
approaches of relating to competence norms reflects differing underlying substantive values
through a series of case studies.
Related to a conceptual understanding of competence or power is the idea of implied
powers. Two broad approaches to this can be identified, and here again different substantive
values underlie the differing approaches. Hartley identifies the narrow approach in the
following terms:
According to the narrow formulation, the existence of a given power implies also the
existence of any other power which is reasonably necessary for the exercise of the
former; according to the wide formulation, the existence of a given objective or
function implies the existence of any power reasonably necessary to attain it.95

Thus, the narrow view relies on the idea of necessary implication: the implied power
must be considered to exist, indispensably, in virtue of the express power.96 The wide view is
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looser: it relates to a reasonable assessment of the achievement of an objective or function.
Relating power to the achievement of objectives could be further related to the issue of levels
of generality in legal reasoning: how broadly is objective or purpose to be stated?97 The lex
specialis-lex generalis distinction thus arises here too. A view of the constraint applicable
here as just one of ‘reasonableness’ to achieve any Treaty objective gives considerable scope
to a doctrine of implied powers. As Ely observed in the context of US constitutional law,
‘reasonableness’ as a constitutional standard is empty in that (good) reasons and the good
exercise of reason can only connect premises with conclusions, but cannot justify the values
implicit in the premises.98 A broad approach to implied powers as relating to the ‘reasonable’
achievement of objectives points to output legitimacy, whereas the narrow approach ties in
with rule of law and accountability concerns through clearly delineating public power99 (the
connection with output legitimacy is suggestive only: the qualification of ‘reasonable’ says
little about the content of the implied powers that might result, they could be wide or narrow,
depending on the interpreter). The broad approach clearly risks sliding into competence
expansion based on policy, rather than pre-determined rules of law. It allows the judiciary to
further the overall purposes and goals of a legal system through teleological interpretation.
Hartley identifies the narrow approach to implied powers being adopted as early as
1956,100 and that a wide view is apparent in the Germany v. Commission101 decision in 1987.
However, though not expressed in terms of implied powers, many of the constitutionalising
decisions surveyed in Chapter 4 developing new constitutional doctrines (e.g. direct effect,
powers would not be consistent with the principle of attributed or conferred powers. On the role of implication
in law generally, see L. Claus, ‘Implication and the Concept of a Constitution’, 69(11) ALJ 887-904 (1995),
also distinguishing between broad and narrow approaches and linking a narrow approach to democracy.
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supremacy, parallelism in external relations,102 State liability) rest implicitly on a broad
conception of implied powers.
A further conceptual distinction of types of competence is that between negative and
regulatory competences, as suggested by Mayer.103 A negative competence is a power to
prevent the exercise of power or competence by another party. A regulatory competence
enables the adoption of positive rules stipulating how legal relations are to operate. The
distinction is similar to that between a prohibition and a permission. A negative competence
is a power to exclude something from being done or a power to prohibit something, a
regulatory competence is a power or permission to positively determine, in a more general
and comprehensive way, legal relations and legal change. Analytically or linguistically it
may be possible to frame a negative power in positive terms and vice versa. The distinction
may thus be one of degree.
An example of a negative competence concerns a prohibition on gender
discrimination in EU law and the Dori case referred to above. Somewhat controversially, the
ECJ held that this prohibition extended to employment in the German military, even though
EU competence was traditionally considered inapplicable to military and defence matters.104
Though the EU could not purport to regulate the military in positive terms, a general
prohibition on employment discrimination could apply in virtue of EU law. The prohibition
could be framed in positive terms as a stipulation requiring the employment on equal terms
in the military of men and women. However, it is a very confined and specific type of
competence that in no way extends to a general military EU competence, and thus the
articulation ‘negative competence’ seems to more accurately capture its scope. The
distinction is useful in EU law, as further indicated below, because the term ‘competence’ is
sometimes confined in EU discourse to legislative or regulatory competence, whereas in ECJ
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practice, the competence of the EU may often, as Mayer notes, extend further to a negative
or prohibitive scope.105

6.3 Conflicts of Competence Norms in the EU and the Principle of Subsidiarity
Consistently with a tendency to adopt a pro-integration interpretation in questions of
competence, the ECJ has made limited use of the principle of subsidiarity,106 which was
intended it seems to counter an assumption that integration of competences was necessarily
desirable as an end in itself.107 Introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the principle
requires, in essence, that it must be demonstrated that action can be better achieved at
Community or Union level to justify the exercise of competence.108 It is concerned with the
exercise, rather than the existence of competence, and only applies to non-exclusive
powers.109 In Germany v. European Parliament and Council,110 the Court held that it was not
necessary of Community measures to refer to the subsidiarity principle. In a later decision,
the Court set a threshold of review that would render the subsidiarity principle of very
limited legal significance as a limit on Community action, by suggesting that a diversity of
105
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national rules could of itself create barriers to the common market and that harmonization
thus satisfied subsidiarity:
With regard to the principle of subsidiarity, since the national provisions in question
differ significantly from one Member State to another, they may constitute, as is noted
in the fifth recital in the preamble to the PPE Directive, a barrier to trade with direct
consequences for the creation and operation of the common market. The harmonisation
of such divergent provisions may, by reason of its scope and effects, be undertaken
only by the Community legislature.111

However, as noted already, given that almost any diversity of national rules could be
conceptualised as a potential obstacle to a common market, on this approach, harmonization
is almost necessarily rendered consistent with subsidiarity at a conceptual level.112 Amongst
academic analyses, Estella’s assessment is consistent with the view that subsidiarity does not
permit of a clear allocation of competence between different levels:
The truth of the matter is that attempting to define ex ante criteria of a general abstract
character for the purpose of limiting central intervention stands little hope of success.
The reasons for this limitation are functional and can be found in the nature of modern
regulatory problems. The functional interconnection between regulatory areas… makes
the task of establishing clear dividing lines difficult. Even in those areas in which there
seem to be clear reasons in favour of national, or even regional or local regulation … it
will always be possible to argue that due to the close relationship between these areas
ad the development of the single market, some Community intervention will always be
necessary.

Subsidiarity is not a straightforward or simple concept. However, the ECJ could adopt some
threshold of scrutiny, such as a requirement for reasons or justification for the exercise of
Union competence going beyond an assertion that national divergences of laws are
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necessarily less compatible with the common market than harmonization.113 Kumm has
proposed the following layered series of rule-like criteria to form a specific test to give teeth
to the principle as a tool of judicial review: federal or Union intervention has to further
legitimate purposes, has to be necessary in the sense of being narrowly tailored to achieve
that purpose, and has to be proportionate with regard to costs or disadvantages relating to the
loss of Member States’ regulatory autonomy.114
Kumm’s approach seems the most explicit and specified in the literature and is the
focus of the discussion below. Of the very large body of literature, most commentators agree
the ECJ has made relatively little use of the concept.115 This may change to some extent with
the ‘yellow card system’ under Lisbon, whereby national parliaments have the power to seek
a review of a legislative proposal on subsidiarity grounds.116 Davies recently suggests that
ECJ aversion to the principle may be justified because subsidiarity assumes shared objectives
between different levels in a federal entity, which is not the case in the EU. Instead, Davies
proposes the three-pronged proportionality standard entailing a test of effectiveness (or
suitability), necessity, and proportionality in the narrow sense of striking a balance between
the means and the end.117 However, it is not clear that this proportionality standard is any
less incommensurate in content or more sensitive to Member State autonomy relative to
supranational claims and thus how it might better substitute the current approach of the
ECJ.118
In contrast, Schütze suggests the two standards of proportionality and subsidiarity are
equivalent, that subsidiarity is proportionality in a federal context: proportionality applies in
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the sphere of individual rights and subsidiarity in the public or collective sphere.119 In
comparison, Kumm’s approach seems to have the advantage of structured specificity through
factoring in the importance of Member State autonomy as a constraining consideration. This
is so because proportionality on Kumm’s test is related to a more empirical factor of
jurisdictional suitability, i.e. which jurisdiction is bested suited to exercising competence. It
is not about weighing incommensurable qualities against each other, as is the case with
proportionality as a tool of the definition of rights and of their limitations.120 The more
empirical jurisdictional context of proportionality as an element of subsidiarity can be
procedurally supported by requiring hard evidence of jurisdictional suitability. Further, by
requiring competence claims to be weighed against Member State autonomy, it creates a
presumption against the exercise of competence at a higher level and an empirically-bound
burden of proof to justify any higher competence claim. Kumm’s approach thus conceives of
subsidiarity as having significant exclusionary force because a competence claim must be
presented as the optimal solution to a collective action problem: “It excludes as besides the
point, for example, arguments concerning what the Court of Justice calls the effet utile of
furthering integration”, because integration is no longer an end in itself.121

6.4 The Competence of the Member States Distinguished from the Competence of the
EU Institutions
The reference above to the Member States as Masters of the Treaties points to the distinction
between their powers as States and the powers of the Union institutions as organs of an
international organisation. The Westphalian conception of a State posits few limits on the
powers of States. They may now, however, be considered limited by jus cogens (which could
be understood as a modern articulation of the idea of natural law limits on political power,
whether by a State or otherwise) and by exclusive powers accorded to the UN under the UN
Charter. Beyond these limitations, the contractual freedom of States appears not to have any
defined limits in international law (although in the area of criminal jurisdiction, some debate
has occurred as to whether principles of jurisdiction are prescriptive and exhaustive of all
119
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States’ possible jurisdiction or just statements of State practice that do not suppose limits on
jurisdiction122).
Pauwelyn suggests that because of this general conception of the power of States, the
lex specialis principle should not be understood to apply to the acts of States creating
international organisations, but only to the acts of the international organisations
themselves.123 This, however, appears to confuse the potential general (and largely unlimited
powers) of States in theory, with their actual exercise of it. The fact that States have such
general powers does not take from the specificity of their exercise and thus the importance of
applying lex specialis to the interpretation of the exercise of States’ powers. Pauwelyn’s
views on this are somewhat surprising given his emphasis on the contractual freedom of
States as one of a ‘holy trinity’ of principles that provides the framework of norm conflict
resolution in international law.124 Lex specialis can be seen as respecting States’ exercise of
power through creating international organisation with specified powers. Not adhering to the
degree of specification, which is what lex specialis seeks to do, of the attribution of powers
by States to international organizations arguably undermines the contractual freedom of
States by permitting international organizations to expand upon their powers independently
of States. Thus, the present work argues that lex specialis should apply both to legal acts of
international organizations (Pauwelyn supports its application here125) and legal acts of
States creating those international organisations as a practical solution to the phenomenon of
levels of generality in legal reasoning and the characterisation of legal interests.
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The others being the principle of pacta sunt servanda (States are bound to agreements to which they have
consented) and pacti tertiis (States may not be bound to agreements to which are third parties): see, e.g.
Pauwelyn (2003), op cit, 436.
125
Thus, Pauwelyn seems to consider that lex specialis would apply to resolve any conflicts between two or
more legal acts of an international organization (ibid, 416). Though describing at one point lex specialis as
‘widely acclaimed’ (ibid, 396), Pauwelyn’s approach overall tends to downplay the role and importance of
speciality: he considers it subordinate to lex posterior (ibid, 392-393, 405-409) and inapplicable to the exercise
by States of their legal powers (ibid, 416) and concludes in favour of the view that international tribunals
should apply all relevant international law rules, not just those particular to their founding instrument (e.g. he
considers that WTO dispute settlement bodies should apply not just WTO ‘covered agreements’) (ibid, 463472).
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Central to the question of competence discussed in this chapter is the breadth of the
interaction of Member State and Union competences. To briefly recall, the TFEU
distinguishes between three categories of competence: that exclusively exercised by the
Union, that shared with the Member States, and that involving a complementary or
supporting role only for the Union.126 In general, shared competences give priority to the
Union, in that Member States only exercise competence to the extent that the Union has
not,127 and the term ‘conditional competences’ might thus be more suitable. Schütze has
recently argued that in practice, all competences are shared, in that the exclusive
competences of the EU have been restrictively interpreted by the ECJ in Opinion 1/94128 and
subject to re-delegation back to the Member States by the Council.129 As a concept, exclusive
competences were introduced by the ECJ, rather than by the Member States, in its judgments
in the ERTA130 line of cases on external relations.131
The question then becomes to what extent the Union has exercised competence, in
other words, it is primarily a matter of legislative pre-emption by the EU and also for the
ECJ as a matter of interpretation. On the interpretation issue, spillover tends to occur. For
example, it seems that criminal competence cannot, in the view of the ECJ, be effectively
severed from other competences, as demonstrated in Ship Source Pollution.132 Given this
126

Article 2 TFEU. For background discussion, see, e.g. de Búrca & de Witte (2002), op cit, 208-213; Mayer
(2005), op cit, 494-503; Schütze (2009), op cit, 266, noting the contours of complementarity have been largely
unexplored, but that they operate as a constitutional corset around federal competences (ibid, 279 and further
279-284 discussing the example of public health).
127
Article 2(2)(f) TFEU.
128
Opinion /94 Re World Trade Organisation Agreement [1994] ECR I 5267, para. 46, excluding services from
the scope of the Common Commercial Policy on the grounds that free movement of services was governed by
its own specific provisions (this is implicitly to consider free movement lex specialis).
129
See Bieber (1988), 148; Obradovic (1997), op cit, 64-65, distinguishing repatriation from re-delegation. See
further generally Schütze (2009), op cit, 167-184. Opinion 1/94 Re WTO Agreement [1994] ECR I 5267,
excluding services from the scope of the Common Commercial Policy is an example of restriction of exclusive
competence (see also Soriano (2007), op cit, 326), although it has been superseded to an extent by Treaty
amendments bringing nearly all services within its scope: see Krenzler & Pitschas (2001), op cit, 302. The ECJ
accepted the legality of delegating legislative powers back to the Member States in Case 41/76, Donckerwolke
al. v. Procureur de la République au Tribunal de Grande Instance, Lille et al [1976] ECR 1921. See further,
e.g. Case 174, Bulk Oil (Zug) AG v. Sun International Limited and Sun Oil Trading Co. [1986] ECR 559,
discussed in Schütz, ibid, 176-177. Schütze gives the example of Regulation 2371/2002/EC, on the
conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy, OJ L
358/59 of 31.12.2002: Schütze (2009), op cit, 183-184.
130
Case 22/70, Commission v. Council (Re European Road Transport Agreement) (‘ERTA’)) [1971] ECR 263;
Cases 3, 4 & 6/76, Kramer [1976] ECR 1279.
131
See Schütze (2009), op cit, 158-167.
132
Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, supra n. 101, where the ECJ held that the Community had
competence to require criminal sanctions for breaches of Community environmental law in order to ensure the
effectiveness of Community law.
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approach, it may be difficult in practice to respect the boundaries of supporting competences.
Spillover may also occur because of the way the different sub-categories of each competence
are described, noted further below. Supporting competence entails a supporting or subsidiary
function for the EU. To the extent that EU competences are only supporting or
complementary, it could be said that they do not entail any disability on the part of the
Member States. Supporting competences are perhaps better described, in Hohfeldian terms,
then as a privilege, assuming that their exercise does not pre-empt the competence of the
Member States.133
The provision in EU law since the Treaty of Maastricht for so-called ‘variable
geometry’ or flexible cooperation reflects the principle of the Member States as Masters of
the Treaties and of the notion of the specificity of State power in the context of European
integration.134 With flexible cooperation, some Member States can pursue intensified
cooperation in which other Member States do not have to participate. An example is
contained in Article 86(1) TFEU, which provide for nine or more Member States to establish
an EPP (see further below).135 In the context of flexible cooperation, accession by a new
Member States does not entail automatic acceptance of every feature of EU integration,
rather States retain residual powers in some important areas that they may exercise in favour
of further integration if they so wish (the most obvious example to date being participation in
the single currency136).

6.5 The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
The Lisbon Treaty does not change the general competence paradigm within the Union. The
free movement and undistorted competition principles, with the conceptual logic of cross133

See Dashwood (1996), op cit, 114.
See Title IV TEU on enhanced cooperation. On the other hand, as a matter of secondary law, the Member
States would be bound ‘complementary’ legal instruments, so in that sense complementary competences could
be seen as Hohfeldian powers.
135
One ambiguity in Article 86 TFEU concerning flexible or enhanced cooperation relates to the provision that
Member States that did establish an EPP could extend its competence beyond crimes against the financial
interests of the Union to serious crimes having a cross-border dimension. Article 86(4) TFEU provides for an
extension of competence by an EPP to cover the latter, but requires unanimity – it is not specified whether this
requires unanimity from the 27 Member States or just those that have proceeded with flexible cooperation.
136
See Articles 127-144, 282 TFEU. See generally, e.g. J. Usher, ‘Enhanced Cooperation or Flexibility’ in
Arnull & Wincott (eds. (2003), op cit.
134
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border impact and the competence creep that entails, remain intact.137 The only general
difference Lisbon has made to the definition of competences is the introduction of categories
of competences, but it, for the most part, merely codifies existing caselaw to identify three
categories of competence, as noted above: 1. exclusive,138 2. shared competences,139 and 3.
supporting competences.140 The main specific change relates to what previously were Third
Pillar matters, which are now ‘Communautarised’ brought within the Area of Freedom,
Security, and Justice.141
On the categories of competences, one of the rationales for their introduction was to
enhance clarity and thus safeguard competences remaining with the Member States, in
particular, by defining competences that were not exclusive. Lisbon set out two nonexclusive categories, shared and complementary. However, as noted, ‘shared competences’
as a term may be something of a misnomer and better considered as ‘conditional
competence’: the exercise of EU competence precludes Member State competence, only one
may act over a given sphere of activity at any given time.142 Overall on Lisbon, Schütze
comments that:
In many ways, by way of conclusion, the chance to enhance the constitutional clarity of
the European Union’s federal order of competences will be missed. Worse, the Lisbon
Treaty – if it ever enters into force – may represent a serious step backwards. Instead of
three clear-cut competence categories, the Reform Treaty would give us three official
and a number of ‘unofficial’ competence types, none of which impresses by defined

137

On free movement, see Articles 43-37 (free movement of goods), 45-66 (free movement of persons, services
and capital), 101-103 (competition) TFEU.
138
Article 3 TFEU.
139
Article 4 TFEU.
140
Article 6 TFEU, using the terms ‘support, coordinate, or supplement’, and the term ‘complementary’ is also
sometimes used (though not in the Treaty). For a generally clear and more detailed discussion, see R. Schütze,
‘Lisbon and the Federal Order of Competences: A Prospective Analysis’, 33(5) ELR 709-722 (2008). Schütze
questions some of the details of the Treaty, such as whether there was any need to expressly state exclusive
competence for the customs union (Article 3(10(a) TFEU) and whether there are any competition rules that can
be distinguished from ‘rules necessary for the functioning of the common market’ (see Article 3(1)(b) TFEU):
ibid, 712.
141
Articles 67(3), 82-89 TFEU. Some intergovernmental elements remain, such as the emergency break
procedure: see Articles 82(3) and 83(3) TFEU re judicial cooperation in criminal matters and the definition of
criminal offences and sanctions.
142
Schütze (2008), op cit, 715, describes this as a ‘bewildering conception of shared competences’.
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contours. Nor will there be any clearer distinction between different types of
competences.143

On ‘unofficial competences’, Schütze suggests the competences in Article 4(3) TFEU
(Article 4 is the provision on shared competences, Article 4(3) relates to research,
technological development, and space) should not really be there, since paragraph three
effectively provides for something different to shared competences by stating that the
Member States do not lose their competence when the Union exercise its competence. Thus,
Schütze suggests, the term ‘parallel competence’ might be better. Article 4(3) raises the
possibility of conflict between Member State and Union action in this area, which will
presumably be resolved by applying the supremacy principle. The second ‘unofficial’
category Schütze identifies144 is ‘coordinating competences’, referred to in Article 2(3)
TFEU, which states “The Member States shall coordinate their economic and employment
policies within arrangements as determined by this Treaty, which the Union shall have
competence to provide” (see Also Article 5). Given that the same term ‘coordinate’ is also
used in Article 6 on supporting competences, it seems unclear why they were not simply
included in that provision.145
Conflict may arise in determining what kind of action falls into which category, as some
activities could be considered to come within either shared or coordinating competence. For
example, ‘economic, social and territorial cohesion’ is listed under shared competences and
seems to contain in it the kind of cross-border all-embracing conceptual scope of free
movement or undistorted competition. As a result, it could be used to regulate matters that
come under supporting competences in Article 6, such as industry, culture, and tourism.
Here, a presumption of strict construction in favour of Member States’ competence could be

143

Ibid, 721. Dougan observes that “the underlying legal framework governing the existence and exercise of
Union competences has not changed; the Treaty of Lisbon’s amendments affect only the detailed application”:
Dougan (2008), op cit, 654.
144
Schütze (2008), op cit, 717-718.
145
Schütze, ibid, suggests (citing Craig (2004), op cit, 338) that these particular coordinating competences may
best be considered on a spectrum between shared and coordinating competences, with the practical implication
that some minimum harmonisation may be permitted. Joerges uses the term ‘diagonal’ to describe situations
where the Union does not have exclusive competence and may need to rely on the Member States’ competence
for the effective exercise of its own competence: C. Joerges (with comments by D. Chalmers, R. Nickel, F.
Rödl, R. Wai), ‘Rethinking European Law’s Supremacy’, EUI Working Paper Law 2005/12 (2005), 16; C.
Joerges, ‘The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist Perceptions, True Conflicts and a
New Constitutional Perspective’, 3(4) ELJ 378-406 (1997), 398-399.
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inferred from the principle of subsidiarity and so as not to circumvent the limitations and
specificity of Article 6 on Union competence.146
The Lisbon Treaty could be thought to actually increase the likelihood of competence
creep in criminal matters previously governed by the Third Pillar through including the
whole Area of Freedom, Security and Justice within the scope of the mop-up clause of
Article 352 TFEU (pre-Lisbon, the Third Pillar was not subject to its predecessor Article 308
ECT; Article 352 TFEU now only excludes the Common Foreign and Security Policy). In
addition, the wording of Article 352 TFEU is broader than its predecessor in referring to
Union objectives in toto, not just to the common market as had Article 308 ECT.147
The Lisbon Treaty also reforms the legal bases for sanctions, providing an explicit legal
basis for sanctions against individuals. There are now two provisions on sanctions, one under
the Area of Freedom Security and Justice in Article 75 TFEU and one under the part of the
Treaty on Cooperation with Third Countries and Humanitarian Aid in Article 215 TFEU. As
Cremona notes, there appears to be some overlap between these provisions and the exact
relationship between them is unclear.148

6.6 Case Studies: (1) An Example from ‘Social Europe’, (2) External Relations, (3)
Criminal Law

6.6.1 An Example from ‘Social Europe’
Although explicitly economic in orientation at the Treaty of Rome, what is now the Union
always had at least some competence in what can be considered ‘social Europe’149 through
146

R. Schütze, ‘Subsidiarity After Lisbon: Reinforcing The Safeguards of Federalism’, 68(3) CLJ 525-536
(2009), 534, citing EA. Young, ‘Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary
Tales from American Federalism’, 77(6) NYULR 1612-1739 (2002), 1717. See also Schilling (1995), op cit, 19.
147
Although as noted above, Article 308 ECT had been interpreted so broadly anyway this may not matter.
148
Article 75 TFEU is more defined in relating to capital movements and payments and is restricted to
individuals, but Article 215 TFEU can also apply to individuals (as well as to third countries): see Cremona
(2009), op cit, 97 and for more detailed discussion, ibid, 96-98.
149
See generally, recently, e.g. A. Giddens, P. Diamond, R. Liddle, Global Europe Social Europe (Polity Press
2006); B. Bercusson, European Labour Law (Cambridge Univ. Press 2nd ed. 2009), 5-12; C. Joerges & F. Rödl,
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the inclusion of the provision for equal pay for equal work. This provision was broadly
interpreted by the ECJ to further gender equality150 and was significant more generally in
developing a sense of progressive legitimacy for the Community. This section considers a
more recent development in the social field, namely, the question of differing approaches to
competence norms in the area of strike action by employees within the Union.
In Viking151 and Laval,152 the ECJ brought strikes within the scope of the free
movement principles and thus within the competence of the EU, despite the limitation on
Union competence contained in the then EC Treaty on the issue of strikes. Article 137 EC
Treaty provided for the introduction of directives on, inter alia, working conditions,
information and consultation of workers, the representation and collective defence of the
interests of workers and employers, and equality at work between men and women. The text
of Article 137(5) ECT stated specifically that its provisions shall not apply to pay, the right
of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs. Article 137 here can be
understood as lex specialis indicating the nature of Community competence in labour and
employment law.
‘Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the ‘Social Deficit’ of European Integration: Reflections after the
Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’, 15(1) ELJ 1-19 (2009), 1-2, describing ‘Social Europe’ as “the
ensemble of European social and labour law and policy and social rights…. A wide and opaque field of such
complexity that generalists in European law… tend to shy away from”. See also generally J. Shaw, J. Hunt &
C. Wallace, The Economic and Social Law of the European Union (Palgrave 2007).
150
See Case 80/70, Defrenne v. Belgian State (‘Defrenne I’) [1971] ECR 1-445; Case 43/75, Defrenne v.
SABENA (‘Defrenne II’) [1976] ECR 455; Case 149/77, Defrenne v. SABENA [1978] ECR 1365 (‘Defrenne
III’) interpreting Article 119 EEC Treaty (now Article 157 TFEU). Defrenne III defined equality as a general
principle of Community law. This approach paved the way for an expansive interpretation of Article 119, e.g. in
Case C-262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990] ECR I-1889, applying it to
occupational pension schemes (a Protocol to the Maastricht Treaty later sought to limit its potential effect by
stating Barber did not apply to individuals who joined a pension scheme before the judgment).
151
Case C-438/05, The International Transport Workers’ Federation and The Finnish Seamen’s Union v.
Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779. The facts concerned collective action taken by
a Finnish trade union and by the International transport Workers’ Federation against a Finnish ferry operator,
which reflagged a vessel from Finland to Estonia in order to reduce labour costs. The ECJ held that whether
such a restriction on the freedom to provide services could be justified in the circumstances was a matter for the
national court (ibid, para. 81 et seq) according to the test established in previous caselaw for such restrictions
(ibid, para. 75).
152
Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareföbundet [2007] ECR I-11767. The
facts concerned collective action taken by a Swedish trade union against a Latvian company, which had a
Swedish subsidiary to which workers were posted to provide a building service in Sweden, in an attempt by the
trade union to enforce the provision of a Swedish collective agreement concerning minimum pay. For
(generally critical) academic discussion of Viking and Laval, see, e.g. ACL. Davies, ‘One Step Forward, Two
Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ’, 37(2) ILJ 126-148 (2008); A. Hinarejos, ‘Laval and
Viking: The Right to Collective Action versus EU Fundamental Freedoms’, 8(4) HRLR 714-729 (2008); N.
Reich, ‘Free Movement v. Social Rights in an Enlarged Union – The Laval and Viking Case before the ECJ’,
9(2) GLJ 125-161 (2008); R. Zahn, ‘The Viking and Laval Cases in the Context of European Enlargement’, 3
Web JCLI (2008); and from a constitutional perspective, Joerges & Rödl (2009), op cit.
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This conceptual potential153 of the free movement principles to encompass almost any
national legal diversity is reflected in the following passage from Viking:
… In that respect it is sufficient to point out that, even if, in the areas which fall outside
the scope of the Community’s competence, the Member State’s are still free, in
principle, to lay down the conditions governing the existence and exercise of the rights
in question, the fact remains that, when exercising that competence, the Member States
must nevertheless comply with Community law…, even if, in the areas which fall
outside the scope of the Community’s competence.154

In effect here, the Court stated that EC law may have effect even outside the scope of
Community competence. This, conceptually as stated by the ECJ, seems contradictory. The
application of EU law changes legal relations, and it makes little sense, if the term
competence is to have the specific meaning generally attributed to it in legal reasoning, to
say that the requirement to comply with Community law does not involve competence. The
change in legal relations here related to the validity of the claimed right to strike or
otherwise. In Hohfeldian terms, this amounts to a power or its synonym, competence. What
the ECJ is really saying is that negative EU competences may exist in the absence of a
regulatory competence. This passage is clearly different in approach to that quoted above
from Tobacco Advertising, where the ECJ noted that if any impact on competition was
sufficient to render national rules rationae materiae within Community competence, the
Community legislature’s competence would be unlimited155 (and the ECJ thus set a threshold
of appreciable effect or impact).
The ECJ could have held similarly in Viking and Laval that a substantial negation of
free movement was required before the right to strike could be limited by Community
provisions, but as the judgment stands, it is difficult to conceptualise the limits of Union
competence now in labour and employment law.156 The effect of the ECJ decision in Laval
153

The scope of free movement has also recently become a point of contention in the context of the rights of
spouses of EU citizens from third countries: see White (2004), op cit; S. Peers, ‘Free Movement, Immigration
Control and Constitutional Conflict’, 5(2) ECLR 173-196 (2009).
154
Case C-438/05, Viking, supra. n. 151, paras. 39-40. See also the Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in
Viking, at paras. 23-28; Case C-341/05, Laval, supra n 152, paras. 87-88.
155
Case 376/98, Germany v. Parliament, supra n. 34, paras. 106-107. See, e.g. Dougan (2008), op cit, 654,
referring to the ‘new judicial wind’ on competence issues in light of Tobacco Advertising.
156
Criticising the vagueness of the ECJ criteria in Laval and Viking, see Zahn (2008), op cit.
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was to prevent Sweden from permitting trade union action in order to pressure an employer
to provide a minimum wage greater than that provided for by Community secondary
legislation,157 which does not obviously seem to entail a substantial impairment of free
movement in general.158
The reasoning in the Albany159 case on competition, rather than free movement, is
also in contrast with that in Viking and Laval concerning the exclusion of strikes or collective
action from the scope of the common market. In Albany, strikes were held to be excluded
from the scope of Community competition law. Advocate General Maduro in Viking sought
to distinguish the reasoning of the ECJ in Albany:
Moreover, the underlying concern in Albany appears to have been to avoid a possible
contradiction in the Treaty. The Treaty encourages social dialogue leading to the
conclusion of collective agreements on working conditions and wages. However, this
objective would be seriously undermined if the Treaty were, at the same time, to
prohibit

such

agreements

by

reason

of

their

inherent

effects

on

competition. Accordingly, collective agreements must enjoy a ‘limited antitrust
immunity’. By contrast, the Treaty provisions on freedom of movement present no
such risk of contradiction, since, as I pointed out above, these provisions can be
reconciled with social policy objectives.

This difference identified between the scope of the competition and free movement
principles here appears to be that the bringing of strikes or collective action within the
competition principle would automatically render them unlawful, whereas the scope for
exceptions under free movement prevents this overreach. However, this reasoning would be
more persuasive if Article 81 EC Treaty (now Article 101 TFEU) on competition
157

Case C-341/05, Laval, supra. n. 152, para. 70.
Case C-341/05, Laval, ibid, the ECJ held that free movement principles might legitimately be restricted by
the fundamental right to strike (para. 57), but that “… however, as regards the specific obligations, linked to
signature of the collective agreement for the building sector, which the trade unions seek to impose on
undertakings established in other Member States by way of collective action such as that at issue in the case in
the main proceedings, the obstacle which that collective actions forms cannot be justified with regard to such an
objective” (para 108). Compared to Viking, the ECJ decision in Laval seems to leave national courts with less
autonomy or discretion in balancing the free movement principle with legitimate exceptions (e.g. compare para.
65 in Viking).
159
Case C-67/96, Albany [1999] ECR I-5751, paras. 59-64. The facts concerned a collective agreement between
organisations representing employers and workers setting up a sectoral pension fund to which affiliation was
made compulsory.
158
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competence had permitted of no exception, whereas it does provide for exceptions relating
to, inter alia, “improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or
economic progress”. The right to strike could be considered to come within the concept of
economic progress, since it relates to the welfare of workers which could be considered a
prerequisite for such progress.160
The caselaw thus reflects differing approaches to the lex-generalis-lex specialis
distinction. Applying the distinction, Article 137(5) ECT ought to have resulted in the
opposite conclusion being reached in Laval and Viking. The ECJ does not, however, as a rule
explicate its judgments in these terms. Norm conflict is not explicit. The practical importance
and import of the distinction is apparent from the very different conclusions that can result
from its application or not. As noted in Chapter 4, this inarticulacy is perhaps strategic, in
that failing to make explicit interpretative assumptions makes inconsistency less readily
apparent, thus facilitating judicial choice and discretion. Advocate General Maduro in Viking
made some effort to distinguish Albany, but on a ground that is unpersuasive. It would have
created a further problem of justification if the ECJ had to explain why it was not applying
lex specialis here, but did apply it in effect in Tobacco Advertising and Albany. This is an
example of how greater articulacy on the methods of legal reasoning adopted would
represent a type of judicial accountability, by highlighting inconsistencies and intensifying
both the burden of justification and grounds for critique in the absence of satisfactory
justification. The application of lex generalis in Viking and Laval seems clearly open to the
criticism of denuding the principle of conferral of any significance, apart from the conceptual
confusion as the use of the term ‘competence’ in the judgments. Further, the conceptual
confusion stems from the generally superficial treatment of the modalities and methods of
legal reasoning, including in the definition and use of the basic concept or ‘building blocks’
of legal reasoning, such as the concept of competence. Even the express exclusion of Union
competence by the Member States, i.e. a statement of negative competence, can be
circumvented through the encompassing scope of the free movement principles161 and
without this being fully identified, still less carefully justified.
160

For a broad view as to the scope of (ex) Article 81 EC Treaty, suggesting that factors other than purely
economic in the narrow sense should be considered relevant, see R. Whish, Competition Law (Butterworths 5th
ed. 2003), 152-155.
161
See, e. g. Joerges & Rödl (2009), op cit, 17-18, criticising the decision on this ground and noting that
Advocate General Mengozzi in Laval negated too the effects of Article 137(5) ECT (ibid, n. 78) (despite saying
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Joerges & Rödl have recently argued that supranational conflict of laws provides a
framework for understanding the EU legal system. Their approach is a broad contextual
account of EU law and constitutionalism, and it bears out the potential for conflict as a lens
for analysing the dynamics of EU law. On Laval and Viking, they note the fundamental
character of the conflict between the economic freedoms envisaged in the Treaties and the
national constitutional orders:
… [European particularity] was underlined at the beginning, namely the sectoral
decoupling of the social from the economic constitution – and the difficulties involved
in the establishment of a European Sozialstaat. The ECJ’s argument implies that
European economic freedoms, rhetorically tamed only by an unspecified social
dimension of the Union, trump the labour and social constitution (Arbeits and
Sozialverfassung) of a Member State. In view of the obstacles to the establishment of a
comprehensive European welfare state, the respect for the common European legacy of
Sozialstaatlichkeit seems to require both the acceptance of European diversity and
judicial self-restraint whenever European economic freedoms come into conflict with
national welfare state traditions. … [The ECJ] is not legitimised to reorganise the
interdependence of Europe’s social and economic constitutions, let alone replace the
variety of European social models with a uniform Hayekian Rechtsstaat.162

The approach in the present work suggests adding to this analysis by explaining what
occurred at the level of legal reasoning to result in the judgments in Laval and Viking, which
was to give priority to lex generalis of free movement over the lex specialis of the exclusion
of the right to strike from Community competence. What this offers is an understanding of
how future such cases might be decided. In other words, the potential for results like Viking
and Laval that seem to overcome the principle of conferral can be avoided where the lex
specialis principle informs legal reasoning. As mentioned above, the nature of EU
at one point in his Opinion that that it should not be negated): see Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, 23rd
May 2007, para. 57, stating “If the effectiveness of Article 137(5) EC is to be upheld, the Community
institutions could not of course resort to other legal bases in the Treaty in order to adopt measures designed to
approximate the laws of the Member States in this field.” The Advocate General effectively relied,
notwithstanding Article 137(5) ECT, on the idea of a negative Community competence (see ibid, para. 54 et
seq) (‘negative Community competence’ in the sense proposed by Mayer (2005), op cit, 494, 508-509, as
contrasted with regulatory competence; Article 137(5) itself could be considered a negative competence of the
Member States in seeking to exclude, albeit not very successfully given the caselaw, Community or Union
competence from the issue of strikes).
162
Joerges & Rödl (2009), op cit, 18.
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competence as revealed in Viking and Laval could be considered a negative competence: the
EU could not regulate generally how strikes were to operate in the Member States, but it
could prohibit their use in particular instances, namely, where strikes inhibit free movement
between Member States. This can suggest how future Treaty amendments might more
effectively delimit EU competence, by expressly stating, for example, that ‘no EU law may
have the effect of restricting the right to strike’.163
A final comment concerns subsidiarity. There was no discussion in the judgments of the
cost or weighing of Union competence relative to Member State autonomy on the matter of
industrial action. As Joerges & Rödl note, strikes and industrial action are part of the delicate
balance of social welfare at the Member State level. The Union, in contrast, lacks the sense
of a demos that would enable the development of a European-wide welfare system.164 That
points toward caution and restraint in any claim for Union competence and would suggest a
lack of empirical support for the jurisdictional suitability of the EU in industrial relations.165

6.6.2 External Relations
6.6.2.1 The General Law of External Relations
The role of the ECJ has been especially central in the development of the Union’s external
relations law, and this section examines some of the leading judgments of the CJ on the
general power of the Union in external relations. The ECJ has been instrumental here chiefly
through the development of the doctrine of parallelism, whereby it held that the exercise of
an internal Community competence gave rise to external Community competence that preempted Member States exercising an equivalent or overlapping competence, i.e. that
Community could be exclusive.166 The founding decision in ERTA on the parallelism
163

Currently, Article 153(5) TFEU (ex Article 137(5) ECT) states that “The provisions of this Article shall not
apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs.”
164
Joerges & Rödl (2009), op cit, 15, and referring to “European usurpation of Member States’ labour
constitutions”.
165
Another significant effect of Laval and Viking was to extend horizontal direct effect to trade unions: see ibid,
13-15; Hinarejos (2008), op cit, 722.
166
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doctrine was one that went considerably beyond the text of the Treaties, as is apparent from
the judgment:
12. In the absence of specific provisions of the Treaty relating to the negotiation and
conclusion of international agreements in the sphere of transport policy – a category
into which, essentially, the AETR falls – one must turn to the general system of
Community law in the sphere of relations with third countries.
…
15. To determine in a particular case the Community’s authority to enter into
international agreements, regard must be had to the whole scheme of the Treaty no less
than to its substantive provisions.
16. Such authority arises not only from an express conferment by the Treaty – as is the
case with Articles 113 and 114 for tariff and trade agreements – but may equally flow
from other provisions of the Treaty and from measures adopted, within the framework
of those provisions, by the Community institutions.
17. In particular, each time the Community, with a view to implementing a common
policy envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules,
whatever form these may take, the Member States no longer have the right, acting
individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with third countries which
affect those rules.

In these passages, the ECJ considered that the absence of express provisions conferring a
general international legal capacity or power to conclude international agreements did not
prevent a conclusion it held such a power. Systemic arguments then provided a basis for the
conclusion of the Community general external power. The Court decisively established the
significance of its ruling, concluding that this implied power was exclusive and pre-empted
that of the Member States where common rules were adopted (instead of concluding, for
example, that its general treaty-making power was concurrent, as suggested by the
Commission167).

sought to be attained, although it seemed to place more weight on the latter requirement in Opinion 1/94 Re
WTO Agreement, supra n. 128.
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Neither the existence nor the exclusivity of this treaty-making power with third
countries was expressly to be found in the text. There were some textual contra-indications in
that the express attribution of treaty-making powers to the Community in specific matters
may be taken to imply the exclusion of such a general power, since the specific provisions
attributing treaty-making power were rendered redundant by the attribution of a general
power. This latter approach is reflected in traditional interpretative maxim of ‘expressio
unius est exclusio alterius’, i.e. to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of
another, or of the alternative, which is related to the more general principle that the lawmaker should not be interpreted to act in vain unless there is some indication that the words
were meant as ‘mere surplusage’, i.e. as simply an elaboration of and subsidiary to other
words.168 The ECJ did refer to one textual support, namely that the Treaty attributed legal
personality to the Community. However, this does not entail the conclusion of a treatymaking power; the Community may have legal personality as an entity that can be sued or
can sue, for example, which does not necessarily sustain the conclusion of pre-emption or
exclusive competence.
The general style of the above passage is a good example of what Lasser calls the
magisterial or declaratory style of judgment in which dialectical reasoning is minimised;169
there is little discursive analysis weighing up each side of the argument. In particular, the
passage does not show in any detail how the general scheme of the Treaty necessitated the
Court’s conclusion by showing a chain of validity linked to the idea of conferral. At that
stage of the development of the Community, the principle of conferral had not been
articulated in the Treaties, though it could be considered implicit170 in the fact that the
Member States authored the Treaties qua States through exercising the secondary rules of
international law.171
Differences emerged in the caselaw on the question of the exercise of internal powers
as a pre-requisite for the existence of parallel external powers: Kramer suggested there must
168

See, e.g. B. Simma & D. Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International
Law’, 17(3) EJIL 483-529 (2006), 505, 507.
169
M. de S.-O.-L’E. Lasser, Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and
Legitimacy (Oxford Univ. Press 2004), 103-115.
170
Dashwood (2004), op cit, 357.
171
See generally B. de Witte, ‘Rules of Change in International Law: How Special is the European
Community?’, 25 NYIL 299-333 (1994).

306

first be internal exercise of competence,172 Inland Waterways suggested the opposite.173
Later in Opinion 1/94, the ECJ clarified Inland Waterways by stating it applied only where
external competence could not be realistically be exercised without the initial exercise of
external competence.174 Later cases further clarified that this competence only became
exclusive after the exercise of competence when the area of competence in question is
“already covered to a large extent by Community rules progressively adopted … with a view
to achieving an ever greater degree of harmonization”;175 when internal measures become
sufficiently harmonised to have the effect of pre-emption is not fully clear.176 Exclusive
competence arises where international action by the Member States, individually or
collectively, would affect internal rules or distort their scope:
The Court has already held, in paragraphs 16 to 18 and 22 of the AETR judgment, that
the Community's competence to conclude international agreements arises not only from
an express conferment by the Treaty but may equally flow from other provisions of the
Treaty and from measures adopted, within the framework of those provisions, by the
Community institutions; that, in particular, each time the Community, with a view to
implementing a common policy envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying
down common rules, whatever form these may take, the Member States no longer have
the right, acting individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations towards
non-member countries which affect those rules or distort their scope; and that, as and
when such common rules come into being, the Community alone is in a position to
assume and carry out contractual obligations towards non-member countries affecting
the whole sphere of application of the Community legal system.

177

Perhaps the high point of the creativity of the Court on competence involved the issue
of the proposed creation of a new court for wide economic integration under the European
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Economic Agreement (EEA). In Opinion 1/91,178 the ECJ held that the creation of such a
court was contrary to Community law:
3. ... Although, under the agreement, the Court of the European Economic Area is
under a duty to interpret the provisions of the agreement in the light of the relevant
rulings of the Court of Justice given prior to the date of signature of the agreement, the
Court of the European Economic Area will no longer be subject to any such obligation
in the case of decisions given by the Court of Justice after that date. Consequently, the
agreement's objective of ensuring homogeneity of the law throughout the European
Economic Area will determine not only the interpretation of the rules of the agreement
itself but also the interpretation of the corresponding rules of Community law.
It follows that in so far as it conditions the future interpretation of the Community rules
on the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital and on competition the
machinery of courts provided for in the agreement conflicts with Article 164 of the
EEC Treaty and, more generally, with the very foundations of the Community. As a
result, it is incompatible with Community law.179

Shaw observed that here “[the ECJ] intervened directly in the exercise of sovereign will by
the Member States”.180 Constantinesco suggests that what the ECJ did was to give priority to
some constitutionally expressed principles over others, where a discrepancy occurs between
them; that it engages in what he terms ‘super-constitutionality’, which may mean one
constitutionally expressed rule cannot be applied or fulfilled.181 In Opinion 1/91, the ECJ did
appear to act as a supra-constitutional body, since it ruled out the apparent adoption by the
constituent power of the EC, i.e. the Member States, of a body with overlapping competence
with the Community. This suggests that although the Community originated in an act of the
Member States, the Member States are no longer ‘masters of the Treaties’.182
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It seemed to consider the restrictions it placed on the power of the Member States to be
inherent in the very nature of the Community, as to rule out entirely the Member States
agreeing to an international organization that might touch upon Community competence, but
without such an express exclusion of Member State competence being found in the Treaty
texts. Despite the remarkable nature of the powers it was attributing to itself, effectively
setting itself up alongside the Member States as a co-constituent power, the ECJ did not
make any attempt to justify its institutional competence. More recently, the Court confirmed
that exclusive competence may arise where not expressly conferred, but where it results from
the from a specific analysis of the relationship between the matter in question (the facts
concerned an international agreement) and Community law and further, that the development
of Community law, in so far as it could be foreseen, should be taken into account in applying
the test in Opinion 2/91 of ‘an area which is already covered to a large extent by Community
rules’.183 The latter confirms the prospective, developmental character of teleological
interpretation employed by the Court, in contrast to a retrospective, originalist analysis.
If Opinion 1/91 represents the high point of Union claims to competence, Opinion 2/94
represents one of the most explicit articulations by the ECJ of its limits. The ECJ refused in
this case to identify the protection of human rights as one of the objectives of the Community
so as to enable the Community to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights184
under Article 308 ECT (the latter provision had been invoked to justify accession by the
Community given the absence of any express provision in the treaties for accession). The
ECJ qualified the scope of Article 308 as follows:
That provision, being an integral part of an institutional system based on the principle
of conferred powers, cannot serve as a basis for widening the scope of community
powers beyond the general framework created by the provisions of the Treaty as a
whole and, in particular, by those that define the tasks and activist of the Community.
On any view, [Article 308] cannot be sued as a basis for the adoption of provisions
whose effect would, in substance, be to amend the Treaty without following the
procedure which it provides for that purpose.185
183
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Thus, as Schütze observes, the ‘constitutional identity’ of the Union places a limit on the
external powers and of Article 308 ECT.186 The ECJ implicitly suggested that the lack of an
express clause stating that human rights were a Treaty objective precluded it from deciding it
was such an objective, i.e. that there was not a specific enough provision of the Treaties
empowering the EU to join the ECHR by vesting it with a general human rights competence.
Nonetheless, outside the specific context of Article 308, it seems hard not to note that the
ECJ has hardly consistently applied throughout its history the notion of substantive
amendment as a limit to its interpretation of the scope of the Treaties, given its origination of
the doctrines of, for example, supremacy, direct effect, parallelism, and fundamental rights,
and it decision Opinion 1/91 above. However, the case does perhaps illustrate, at least to
some extent, the risk of very brushstroke characterisations of the role of the ECJ purporting
to describe its role over 50 years of integration: its caselaw is not always “manically prointegrative”187 (although a sceptical reading of the decision suggests that it may have
primarily reflected a desire of the ECJ not to submit itself to a superior jurisdiction by the
European Court of Human Rights188).
The argument in the present work for a greater role for lex specialis as a tool of norm
conflict resolution might be thought open to challenge where overlap exists between
competences and one is not clearly more specifically tailored. The exclusive application of
lex specialis in that situation runs counter to ECJ caselaw recognising that more than one
competence may be at stake in the adoption of a law or international treaty. Reflecting the
difficulty of the issue, there are in fact somewhat differing tendencies in ECJ caselaw, a
difficulty exacerbated by the fact that the ECJ does not articulate the lex generalis-lex
specialis distinction. In Opinion 1/94 Re World Trade Organisation Agreement,189 the ECJ
implicitly invoked lex specialis in relating the CCP to the treatment of nationals of nonmember countries on crossing external frontiers:
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46. As regards natural persons, it is clear from Article 3 of the Treaty, which
distinguishes between ‘a common commercial policy’ in paragraph (b) and ‘measures
concerning the entry and movement of persons’ in paragraph (d), that the treatment of
nationals of non-member countries on crossing the external frontiers of Member States
cannot be regarded as falling within the common commercial policy. More generally,
the existence in the Treaty of specific chapters on the free movement of natural and
legal persons shows that those matters do not fall within the common commercial
policy.190

Schütze described as ‘strange’ the implication that all those sectors covered elsewhere
in the Treaty were excluded from the scope of the Common Commercial Policy and
comments that the Court later “corrected the unfortunate wording”.191 In support, Schütze
here cites Opinion 2/00 Re Cartagena Protocol,192 from which the following seems the most
relevant passage:
23. If examination of a Community measure reveals that it pursues a twofold purpose
or that it has a twofold component and if one is identifiable as the main or predominant
purpose or component, whereas the other is merely incidental, the measure must be
founded on a single legal basis, namely that required by the main or predominant
purpose or component (see the Waste Directive judgment, paragraphs 19 and 21, Case
C-42/97 Parliament v Council [1999] ECR I-869, paragraphs 39 and 40, and Spain v
Council, cited above, paragraph 59). By way of exception, if it is established that the
measure simultaneously pursues several objectives which are inseparably linked
without one being secondary and indirect in relation to the other, the measure may be
founded on the corresponding legal bases (see, to that effect, the Titanium Dioxide
judgment, paragraphs 13 and 17, and Case C-42/97 Parliament v. Council, paragraph
38).

This passage, however, does not exclude lex specialis as a tool for resolving norm conflict or
accumulation, rather it notes the possibility that laws may overlap and still be applicable, but
that one may be preponderantly relevant and thus be the main legal basis. Lex specialis or the
190
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principle of speciality is actually reflected in the idea of preponderance and thus underpins
the choice of legal basis, unless different provisions are equally relevant. The question of
‘equal relevance’ seems one of fact rather than generality in legal formulation, and this
shows that lex specialis does not always provide a basis for a choice between two norms, but
this does not exclude its application in so far as it does. In other words, multiple, quite highly
specific legal clauses may not admit of lex specialis as an explanation of their relationship
with each other. The most practical solution to this issue seems to be careful legislative
drafting so as to make the choice of legal basis, and reasons for it, explicit.
The law-making, result-oriented, integration-enhancing character of the reasoning of
the ECJ in external relations is shown particularly clearly in the area of mixed agreements,
which arise in the case of shard competence between the Union and the Member States. The
practice in this situation is for both the Member States and the Union to become parties to the
agreements, and the question has arisen in caselaw of the extent of the exclusivity of ECJ
jurisdiction over these agreements, as opposed to the correct legal basis for their adoption,
the latter being the issue in the cases discussed above. Applying the logic of uniformity and
effectiveness often present in its constitutionalising decisions, the ECJ in MOX Plant has
held that it has exclusive jurisdiction over such mixed agreements, thereby precluding a
Member State from bringing proceedings in an international tribunal.193 The case represents
an interesting example of the interaction of lex generalis and lex specialis, because the
Treaties contain a provision that quite specifically addresses the question of the extent of
exclusivity of ECJ jurisdiction. Article 292 ECT (retained as Article 344 TFEU following
Lisbon) provided that the Member States undertake ‘not to submit a dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of the Treaty to any method of settlement other than those
provided therein’.
In MOX Plant, Ireland brought proceedings before a tribunal under the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.194 The ECJ decided the issue on the basis of
teleological arguments. It noted that “a breach [of Article 292] involved a manifest risk that
193
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the jurisdictional order laid down in the Treaties and consequently the autonomy of the
Community legal system may be adversely affected”.195 The concern identified here was
with a result (declared to be manifest), rather than the text. The literal wording of Article 292
did not seem to be dispositive of the question, for, first, as Ireland, argued, the initiation of
proceedings before an arbitral tribunal constituted a method of dispute settlement provided
for in the EC Treaty, within the terms of Article 292 EC, since the Community was a party to
UNCLOS and thus UNCLOS was part of Community law.196 Another argument that might
have been made was that Article 292 could have been construed more narrowly to refer to
‘the Treaties’ only, not to secondary legislation or especially international agreements, since
the exclusivity of the external competence was a creation of the ECJ, rather than the Treaties.
Based on these arguments, it seems that lex specialis, i.e. Article 292, did not provide a
complete solution, though the limitation of literal argument in supporting the Court’s
conclusion was not really fully canvassed in the judgment.197 Based on teleological
argumentation as to the effectiveness of the Community legal order, the familiar integration
narrative, the ECJ ruled out any overlap of norms of jurisdictional competence. In other
words, the ECJ adopted a kind of generic coherence, result-oriented argument. Lex posterior,
which would privilege UNCLOS, did not provide a clear solution, because what was at stake
was an interpretation of lex superior, i.e. the EU Treaties. The case well illustrates the
choice between minimalist and expansive approaches to interpretation in the absence of a
clear rule of norm conflict providing a solution. Unsurprisingly, the ECJ adopted an
expansive approach to enhance the specificity of the Community or Union legal order.198
Subsidiarity has not generally been discussed in caselaw on external relations, nor does
it seem to have been much argued before the ECJ in that context. It does, however, seem to
have implications for this area in so far as there is uncertainty as to the exclusive competence
of the EU in a given case. To demonstrate that the law of external relations respects
subsidiarity, some analysis is needed for why the limitation of Member States’ autonomy is
195
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necessary to achieve the Union’s objectives and is thus worth the cost to Member States’
freedom of action. For example, in MOX Plant, the ECJ could have offered a justification as
to why concurrent jurisdiction of other courts was necessarily harmful to the Union,
especially given the international law doctrine whereby international courts and tribunals
seek to facilitate each other’s jurisdiction as much as possible.199 The traditional ECJ
approach of differentiating the Union legal order from public international law seems, of
itself, too general and inadequate to discharge that burden of persuasion in specific cases.
Opinion 1/03,200 on the Lugano Convention201 and private international law, provides another
example. Here, the ECJ held that the Community had exclusive competence to deal with the
jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.202 As Kruger
notes, the effect of this was to limit the contractual freedom of private parties to choose a
forum for dispute resolution and also to restrict the ability of Member States to conclude
bilateral agreements with non-EU States, even though in both cases it may be commercially
beneficial to have relative freedom of action.203

6.6.2.2 The Boundary between the General Law of External Relations and the Common
Foreign and Security Policy
As well as the divide between Member State and Union competence in external relations, EU
law has an internal divide between the external competences of the Union as an adjunct to
the common market, developed through the doctrine of parallelism discussed above, and the
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Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP is governed by a much looser,
intergovernmental framework in which the Union institutions have much less power. As with
foreign policy generally, competence is not usually exercised through legislation, but through
executive action. Whether a matter comes under the CFSP or the general law of external
relations thus has much practical significance for the exercise of competence or powers. In
the main judgment to date in this field, Light Weapons,204 the ECJ suggested at one point in
its judgment a similar centre-of-gravity or main purpose test that it has used to delimit
Article 95 ECT/114 TFEU. This approach would suggest that what is needed is an overall
assessment of the different aims of a particular legislative instrument and a weighing
exercise to determine what was the preponderant aim. The case is revealing because it shows
perhaps subtle differences in how this test is applied, which can make a big difference to the
extent to which the test reflects the notion of lex specialis. The judgment was based on the
Treaties prior to the passing of the Treaty of Lisbon, which meant Article 47 TEU applied
and abrogated the lex posterior rule of general public international law in favour of a lex
superior rule giving priority to the ECT or First Pillar over the CFSP or second Pillar.205
The main issue in the case was whether a legal instrument concerning the EU’s
contribution or assistance to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
through a moratorium on small arms and light weapons fell under the First Pillar or the
Second Pillar. The Council considered this a matter for the CFSP and adopted a Joint Action
and then a Decision, both under the CFSP, to this end. The Commission argued that the issue
was properly considered as one of development cooperation and therefore fell as a matter of
priority within Articles 177-181 ECT. In his Opinion, Advocate General Mengozzi
canvassed different possible approaches in some detail. He rejected an argument that there
was a parallel to be drawn between the EU-Member State competence divide, in the context
of a non-exclusive competence, and the EU-Community or First Pillar-Second Pillar divide.
Even if the Member States were free to act independently of the EU in the matter because it
was not a matter of Community exclusive competence, it did not mean that the EU
framework could be used to exercise their independent competence.206 Thus, a decision had
to be made as to whether the correct legal basis was in the First or Second Pillar. On how to
204
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characterise the aim of the Union measures being contested, the Advocate General adopted
the following test:
171. It would be erroneous and excessive to consider that any measure which fosters
the economic and social development of a developing country falls within the
competence of the Community pursuant to Title XX of the EC Treaty.
172. Any other interpretation would undoubtedly deprive the other Community
policies, such as the common commercial policy, of their reason for existence and
render them ineffective. (M) It would also be likely to harm the practical effect of the
provisions of Title V of the EU Treaty, in spite of the limits on the actions of the
Community laid down by Article 5 EC.

173. Where a measure is likely to fall within the scope of the aims of the CFSP and
also to contribute to the social and economic aims of the Community development
cooperation policy, it is necessary, having regard to the content and purpose of that
measure, to seek its main aim in order to secure a balance between the observance of
Article 47 EU and of Article 5 EC. (references omitted)207

This invokes a concept of lex specialis in that it adopts a characterisation based on the
greatest specificity. Applying this test, the Advocate General concluded that instruments in
question were mainly related to the CFSP, not to development cooperation.208 In much
briefer reasoning, the ECJ appeared to endorse a main purpose test.209
However, the ECJ went on to hold that the contested decision pursued a number of
objectives, falling both within the CFSP and development cooperation policy, without one of
those objectives being incidental to the other. This had the result that Article 47 TEU was
engaged so as to give priority to Community competence.210 In other words, the ECJ held
that neither aim was preponderant or possessed the greatest specificity in the context of the
instrument. Again, however, lex specialis was not explicitly articulated, and it may be argued
that Advocate General’s approach was more sensitive in application to the idea of lex
207
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specialis than the judgment of the ECJ. The Advocate General engaged in a somewhat more
detailed analysis of the provisions of the Joint Action and resulting Decision.211 The ECJ
noted more briefly the reference to development in the Decision’s preamble and also the fact
that technical assistance and funding was to be provided as indicating the development
aspect of it.212 The Advocate General thought the provision for funding and technical
assistance was neutral as to the objectives involved.213 This seems more persuasive in so far
as expenditure is likely to feature across many exercises of legislative competence and so
does not seem to offer a clear basis for distinguishing them. However, both the Advocate
General and ECJ could have been more sensitive to the competence question by an analysis
of the foreign and development policies of the Member States, in order to determine if the
Member States classify a restriction on arms sales as part of development policy, to offer an
empirical basis for the characterisation of the Decision overall as concerning development as
much as CFSP. Herlin-Karnell accurately captures the underlying competence dynamic and
context in ECOWAS:
There is no doubt that Art 47 constitutes the EC’s trump card – perhaps one may
(provocatively) add – as being somewhat outside the reach of the principle of attributed
powers. The Light Weapons case also illustrates that the Court, in contrast to AG
Mengozzi, has subscribed to the depillarization trend where the facade – or Chinese
wall – of the ‘pillars approach’ is not intact but in fact steadily falling into pieces, as
has been evident in the Court’s case law ever since the failure of the Constitutional
treaty in 2005.214

A tendency to silently subsume the character of legal reasoning within the substance of
a particular decision may not fully survive the passing of the Treaty of Lisbon and its
implications for external relations and the CFSP. In what might be considered an example of
the EU stalling on an often assumed inevitable trajectory of increasing supranationalisation,
the Treaty of Lisbon abolishes the priority given to what was previously the Community over
what is now still essentially an intergovernmental CFSP (although the Pillar terminology has
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been discarded).215 Article 40 TEU now states that the CFSP and other Union competences
shall not affect the application of each other. In that context, it seems inevitable that the ECJ
will have to start articulating the lex generalis-lex specialis distinction to extent in order
adopt a principled approach to choice of legal bases, as some commentators have pointed
out.216 The alternative seems to be that the Court adopts a more restrained or deferential
stance and allows the Council considerable discretion to determine the correct legal bases in
sovereignty-sensitive CFSP-related matters without really entertaining challenges to it.

6.6.3 Criminal Law
6.6.3.1 Criminal Competence to Date217
In the area of criminal law, which has only featured within the Court’s jurisdiction under the
Third Pillar since the Treaty of Amsterdam,218 the Court began its case law in a creative vein
and essentially transplanted the meta-teleological reasoning it has employed under the First
Pillar.219 The Court interpreted Article 54 of the Schengen Convention220 contrary to the text
in holding that ‘a trial finally disposed of’ encompassed out-of-court settlements, based on
general arguments as to effectiveness and with reference to the free movement principle.221
A formula sometimes adopted and found also in Gözütok and Brügge is to link an argument
as to effectiveness with the lack of textual contradiction, which seems to invert the normal
priority given in textual interpretation. In other words, it is enough that the text does not
expressly contradict a particular conclusion222 (although it could be argued in this case that
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the text actually did contradict the conclusion). This is to subsume any conflicting textual
indications into broadly stated purpose, when is then considered decisive:
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that nowhere in Title VI of the Treaty on
European Union relating to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Articles
34 and 31 of which were stated to be the legal basis for Articles 54 to 58 of the CISA),
or in the Schengen Agreement or the CISA itself, is the application of Article 54 of the
CISA made conditional upon harmonisation, or at the least approximation, of the
criminal laws of the Member States relating to procedures whereby further prosecution
is barred.223

Given the sensitivity of the intergovernmental pillars with respect to sovereignty, it was to an
extent surprising that the ECJ adopted such a bold approach in its first Third Pillar judgment.
More recently, the Court in Commission v. Council (Environmental Crimes), took a
further expansive step in determining that the principle of effectiveness required that
sanctions for breaches of Community law may be required to be criminal in nature,224
notwithstanding the deliberate cordoning off of criminal competence from the First Pillar in
the Third Pillar:
As a general rule, neither criminal law nor the rules of criminal procedure fall within
the Community’s competence (see, to that effect, Case 203/80 Casati [1981] ECR
2595, paragraph 27, and Case C-226/97 Lemmens [1998] ECR I-3711, paragraph 19).
… However, the last-mentioned finding does not prevent the Community legislature,
when the application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by
the competent national authorities is an essential measure for combating serious
environmental offences, from taking measures which relate to the criminal law of the
Member States which it considers necessary in order to ensure that the rules which it
lays down on environmental protection are fully effective.225

Although previous legislative measures of the Member States may have made reference to
criminal sanctions, it was a step further to suggest such sanctions could be required as a
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matter of Community law. Here the lex generalis of effectiveness226 as a principle of Union
law prevailed over the lex specialis of the Third Pillar provisions on criminal law, thereby
contributing to depillarization in a way that cannot plausibly be attributed to the intentions of
the Member States. Perhaps to dissipate accusations of judicial overreach, in two other recent
decisions, the ECJ drew limits to the implications of the Community Pillar for criminal law.
In Berlusconi and Ors.,227 the Court held, following its previous caselaw, that a Directive
could not of itself have the effect of increasing the criminal liability in a national system for
breach of a rule of Community law, and in Commission v. Council (Sea Pollution),228 the
Court decided that the type of criminal penalties to be adopted for breaches of Community
law was not within the Community’s competence.
However, both these decisions seem to have been on pragmatic grounds, and it seems
difficult to identify any normative aspect of interpretation identified by the Court that
explains the difference in approach with Environmental Crimes. For example, it seems
clearly possible for a Member State to set only minimal criminal sanctions, e.g. which
entailed discretion exercisable by national courts as to the establishment of a criminal record,
and which might not effectively deter breaches of Community law at national level. Sea
Pollution rules out any review on grounds of effectiveness in this scenario, though
effectiveness was the criterion of adjudication of competence in Environmental Crimes,229
and no reasoning is offered to explain the difference.
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6.6.3.2 The Competence of a European Public Prosecutor
Article III-274 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe230 contained a legal basis
for the establishment of an EPP, subject to a unanimous decision of the Member States, and
it has been essentially reproduced by Article 69 E of the Treaty of Lisbon to create Article 86
TFEU. It is clear that the powers of the EPP go considerably beyond the common law
tradition in this area. The EPP would have the authority to ‘investigate’, ‘prosecute’, and
‘bring to judgment’. Thus it would seem to have a police function of investigation, as well as
purely prosecutorial one.231 The reference to ‘bringing to judgment’ appears to be a basis for
the complete responsibility of the EPP for the prosecution up to the delivery of a verdict.
Special rules as to the admissibility of evidence are envisaged,232 hinting at perhaps the more
far-reaching idea of free movement of evidence envisaged in a Commission’s Green
Paper.233 A basis for a potentially substantial extension of its competence beyond crimes
against the financial interests of the Communities is contained in the last paragraph: its
competence could be extended to include serious crime having a cross-border dimension
and/or serious crimes affecting more than one Member State.234 This cross-border basis for
an extension of competences is potentially very far-reaching, as experience with the common
market has shown. The EPP is to be established from Eurojust,235 which currently has a very
limited remit of facilitating, in the manner of a diplomatic agent, existing methods of
criminal justice cooperation between member States of the EU. In addition to what was in
230
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the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, there is the possibility for nine Member
States to proceed, through the enhanced cooperation procedure, with the adoption of an EPP
in their jurisdictions in the absence of unanimity.236
A practical question of accountability is that of the dividing line between police and
prosecution competences. This present the possibility of ‘accountability forum shopping’ in
this context: if the overlap of police and prosecution powers is unclear, the avenue of
accountability may be shifted from one to the other in a way that reduces accountability. For
example, in Ireland the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) acts as a legal advisor to the
police or Garda Síochána. Since the establishment of a more robust system of police
accountability in Ireland,237 there may be a temptation for the Gardaí to attribute their
actions to legal advice from the DPP, which would then shift the framework of
accountability away from the police to the much more limited accountability framework
applicable to the prosecution authority. It is possible that legal advice from the prosecution
authority might be deliberately framed in a general or ambiguous way in order to give a
maximum cloak of relative protection to police action. The question, therefore, of
competence interacts in an important way with that of accountability. It relates to the goals of
accountability as a concept: to have some ultimately democratic control over the competence
of prosecutors and police (through democratic enactment of competence norms) and to
prevent the over-concentration and abuse of power.238 This is a matter especially pertinent in
the context of an EU-wide prosecution authority, given that Community/Union competence
has been marked by the phenomenon of competence creep. In the context that an EPP would
for the first time represent the direct involvement of a Union institution in the legal systems
of the Member States,239 and in the especially sovereignty-sensitive context of criminal and
prosecution powers, a concern with clarifying and defining competences is likely to figure
prominently in debate on an EPP.
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In light of the analysis offered in this chapter, it may be difficult to determine the
exact limits of the competence of an EPP once Member States adopt measures granting it
competence beyond financial crimes against the Communities. Article 86(4) TFEU invokes
the concept of ‘cross-border impact’ that has proven seductive as a source of increased
Union competence in other spheres, albeit that Article 86 qualifies ‘cross-border crime’ with
the adjective ‘serious’. Just as even relatively minor divergences of national laws on virtually
any matter can in the abstract be understood as an obstacle to free movement, so almost any
crimes could be understood in the abstract as having a cross-border dimension. Crime
occurring within a given Member State, when it is at a higher level than another Member
State, can be conceptualised as an obstacle to free movement in that the more crime exists in
a Member State, the less likely it is to be viewed favourably by bearers of free movement
rights (workers, service providers, and their families). When the fact that the EPP is to
possibly have what are actually police powers of investigation is also considered, the EPP
could be seen as a Trojan horse for a federalised combined police and prosecution force
within the competence of the EU,240 if the ECJ were to adopt the logic of the integration
imperative as it has done in the field of the common market.
In contrast to its communautaire logic, the ECJ could adopt here for determining the
threshold justifying the extension of EPP competence the standard of ‘appreciable impact’ on
serious cross-border crime, as it has at least formally done to justify competence in
competition law. Nonetheless, the standard seems to need more specification. The
background issue is subsidiarity, i.e. justifying a preference for Union competence as
opposed to existing national competence. One practical application of subsidiarity would be
to require data or evidence241 demonstrating that traditional intergovernmental cooperation
and mutual legal assistance (MLA) in the criminal justice sphere was inadequate and could
only be remedied by the adoption of the ‘Community method’ (to use pre-Lisbon
terminology). Ample raw data and evidence are available on the efficacy of traditional MLA
in Europe, as the Council of Europe has been involved to a significant extent. Its work has
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been comparatively modest in general,242 yet that of itself does not point to the need for the
Community/Union method in this field. The burden of justification for a transfer of
competence from the Member States to the Union institutions, instead of using their inherent
faculty of cooperation under general international law as they currently do with the Council
of Europe system, rests with those advocating further integration.243 Generic appeals to the
need for more cooperation arguably do not meet this burden, since cooperation is inherently
possible under general international law as matters stand.
The Treaty lists the area of freedom, security, and justice as a matter of shared
competence between the Union and Member States.244 This seems to leave somewhat open
the question of the exact nature of the competence of an EPP. Given that, in the view of the
ECJ, criminal competence cannot be effectively severed from other competences, as
demonstrated in Ship Source Pollution,245 it is thus possible the ECJ could consider that the
EPP impacted upon an area of exclusive competence.246 In other words, the attempted
division between exclusive and shared competences may not work meaningfully in practice
given the competence ‘spillover’ in the caselaw. In an area of shared competence, Member
State competence is conditional upon the non-exercise of Union competence, which itself
can be expansively interpreted by the ECJ. The exact contours of here are unclear. It is
conceivable, for example, the ECJ could apply the doctrine of pre-emption, translated from
an external relations context, so as to exclude any parallel competence of national
prosecutors in relation to the same facts as are subject to proceedings instituted by an EPP.247
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The Corpus Juris permitted the national prosecutor to prosecute alongside an EPP ‘if
national interests are also under threat’,248 though without indicating how a difference of
views between the EPP and a national prosecutor would be resolved.249 An additional issue is
the extent to which the ECJ could impose procedural requirements on national proceedings
involving prosecution by the EPP in order to ensure the ‘effectiveness’ of Union law, given
that effectiveness has often featured in ECJ caselaw as a criterion of interpretation.250 As
Herlin-Karnell notes, despite its popularity in the official discourse of the EU institutions,
“[t]he problem is that this principle is a far from being an unambiguous navigator when
discussing legislation either in EU law or criminal law terms”.251 A similar point has at least
as much force when applied to the invocation by the ECJ of effectiveness as a criterion for
extensive interpretation.252 Any jurisdiction for the ECJ to determine the scope of
competence norms in that context would likely prove highly sensitive, since it would give the
ECJ in a more direct way than before jurisdiction in national legal processes.

6.7 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to demonstrate the differing ways that competence norms can be
addressed in legal reasoning. In 1995, Weiler et al set out clearly the general dynamic of
competence as it had emerged since the 1950s:
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Sooner or later, “Supreme” courts in the Member States would realize that the “Sociolegal contract” announced by the Court in its major constitutionalizing decisions,
namely that “the Community constitutes a new legal order…for the benefit of which
the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields” (emphasis
added) has been shattered, that although they (the “Supreme” courts) have accepted the
principles of the new legal order – supremacy and direct effect – the fields do not seem
any more to be limited, and that in the absence of Community legislative or legal
checks it will fall to them to draw the jurisprudential lines of the Community and its
Member States.253

This chapter has sought to address this issue by outlining the different normative approaches
to addressing competence in legal reasoning. Perhaps in the area of competence more than
any other aspect of EU law, it is true that the ECJ “has . . . assumed powers that would
properly belong to a democratically elected legislature”.254 The framework of norm conflict
can illustrate why this is so, by revealing the alternative ways in which competence norms
can be dealt with in legal reasoning and showing thus the absence of any inevitability in the
approach of the ECJ. The treatment of competence in ECJ caselaw, whereby a single value
of integration is privileged above all others in contrast to an approach articulating varying
ways of dealing with competence norms, provides a very good example of the general
critique directed by Burley & Mattlii. In their view, “the staunch insistence on legal realities
as distinct from political realities may in fact be a potent political tool”. The analysis if
competence in this chapter bears out this view, whereby a poorly articulated and justified
approach to legal reasoning provides the ECJ with a role in economic and even political
integration, allowing it to make a decisive contribution to competence creep.255
Competence norms are distinct relative to other legal norms in the conferring of an
ability or amenity to change legal relations. The relationship between competence conferring
norms and the exercise of a competence norm helps reveal an important structural feature of
competence norms as concepts, their relationship to each other in a chain of validity. This
has implications for their treatment in legal reasoning. First, it suggests that the idea of
253
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‘conferral’ is inherent in a competence norm, and indeed conferral has been articulated
explicitly through EU Treaty revisions. The context of the principle of conferral can be said
to be the sensitive issue of the status and role of the Member States as ‘Masters of the
Treaties’: can the Member States alone confer competence, or is competence by the
institutions self-generating through the mechanism of expansive legal reasoning? The
explicit articulation by the Treaties of constitutional principles could be taken to provide an
unequivocal answer to this question, against the idea of self-generating competences.
However, the reality of institutional practice and of the legal reasoning of the ECJ
suggests a more complex answer. Flexibility and ambiguity characterise the question of
competence in EU law.256 There are sharp differences in how competence norms are
mediated in legal reasoning. Perhaps most importantly is the distinction between lex specialis
and lex generalis, which can be understood as relating to the phenomenon of levels of
generality in legal reasoning. Applying lex specialis much more fully reflects the idea of
conferral, as lex specialis logically reflects the will of the constituent power. The effect
would be to exclude the use of Article 114 TFEU (ex Article 95 ECT) when a more specific
Treaty basis is available. Surprisingly under-articulated in EU legal literature, the lex
specialis-lex generalis distinction explains the differing treatments of competence norms in
Tobacco Advertising and the Laval and Viking line of caselaw. Lex specialis localises the
identification of Treaty objectives to a particular policy field,257 as opposed to a global
teleology linked to the highest level of generality in the Union system of enhanced
integration.
Lex specialis thus offers a conceptual key to understanding the differing treatment of
competence norms in caselaw, while normatively supporting the idea of limited and
conferred powers. It gives practical substance in legal reasoning to Dashwood’s view that
“The technique of specific and detailed attribution … remains the most effective method of
setting identifiable limits to the competences of the European Union”.258 Somewhat in
contrast to Article 114 TFEU, Article 352 TFEU (ex 308 ECT) by definition invokes lex
generalis, in that it applies when a more specific Treaty basis is not available to achieve a
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Treaty policy (not just referring to the internal market as does Article 114 TFEU, though
internal market can be very broadly conceptualised). A narrow approach to the idea of
implied powers is needed to avoid the use of this provision to circumvent the principle of
conferral, although it is open to debate as to what extent the limit identified in the caselaw,
the ‘general framework of the Treaties’, is a constraint, since the Treaties can always be
conceptualised at a high level of generality. A test based on subsidiary or ancillary powers
might be more constraining.
The different possibilities for applying the subsidiarity principle, which is a principle
for resolving conflict between the competing competences of the Member States and the
Union, are also under-articulated in the caselaw, though they have been more fully canvassed
in the legal literature. A key to rendering subsidiarity for meaningful as a tool of judicial
review is the integration of Member State autonomy as part of the weighing exercise in a
subsidiarity test. This has an evidential implication of requiring cogent evidence to justify a
claim of comparative efficiency for the exercise of competence at the Union level. It also
serves to exclude the approach in ECJ caselaw of equating the existence of diversity of
Member State laws as a justification in and of itself for the exercise of Union competence.
The latter tendency effectively negates subsidiarity and more generally the principle of
conferral as a meaningful control or limit on Union competence. It thus creates a problem of
sharp conflict between constitutional self-articulation by the EU and institutional practice as
mediated through the legal reasoning of the ECJ, which tends to avoid any extensive
articulation of these issues, thereby undermining the legitimacy of its adjudication.
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion

This thesis has sought to present an account, both descriptive and normative, of norm
conflict resolution in EU law and the legal reasoning of the ECJ. Norm conflict as a
conceptual framework offers much for understanding legal reasoning. Klabbers in his recent
study of Treaty conflict in EU law concludes that treaty conflicts at bottom involve questions
of value choice that law can only resolve to a limited extent and that ultimately need to be
resolved by the body politic.1 The present work has sought illustrate how the prism or
framework of conflict illustrates these value choices in EU law and how legal reasoning
reflects fundamental choices of value across the areas of norms of interpretation, human
rights norms, and competence norms. This approach allows a fuller judgment to be made
about the legitimacy, i.e. the coherence with basic values of the EU legal system, of the
choices made in the course of legal reasoning. The analysis suggests that the role of value
choices highlighted by Klabbers in the domain of treaty conflict is similarly important in
conflicts of legal reasoning generally, but is much under-articulated in EU law. ‘Political
decision’ in the broad sense of value choices not pre-determined by legal rules can take place
sub silentio in legal reasoning, and this tendency is especially marked in EU law.
It is a truism that conflict is inherent and endemic in the law. Conflict is the context
of all caselaw and adjudication. Yet the law at the point of judgment speaks with relative
coherence. Coherence as a minimum notion of intelligibility and thus non-contradiction is as
much a requirement for an effective legal system as conflict is its context. How the law
reaches a coherent conclusion is a much more contested question. Apart from some of the
theoretical writing of Ronald Dworkin, coherence is not considered an exhaustive or semiexhaustive criterion of adjudication.2 Much of the theory of norm conflict resolution is, thus,
a matter of looking beyond coherence to examine what are the other ingredients or elements
of adjudicating conflict of constitutional and legal norms. For Joseph Raz, any approach to
1
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legal reasoning that consists of a recipe of suitable steps is unrealistic in failing to reflect the
local and contingent character of much of adjudication.3 In contrast, most theorists accept the
universalisable character of legal reasoning.4
Fundamentally, legal reasoning is not a local or parochial enterprise. This widely
accepted view reflects another universal notion associated with or inherent in law, namely,
the rule of law. Tamanaha, for example, identifies ‘formal legality’ as the core and universal
requirement of the rule of law, i.e. an understanding of legal rules that distinguishes them
from other social rules and that enables the law to have a politically neutral and objective
core so that it constitutes a universal human good (the ‘minimum content of the rule of law’,
common to several somewhat diverging versions of the concept comprises the principle of
government being bound by the law; formal requirements of the law being public,
prospective, general, applied equally, and certain; and in contrast with ‘the rule of men’, a
non-discretionary and objective character). Beyond coherence, therefore, formal legality
represents an additional minimum threshold for adjudication and relates to the idea of
objectivity in the law. What this thesis has tried to do is to relate these minimal requirements
of legal reasoning to a fuller account of the role of values in the context of a particular type
of conflict in the law, namely, conflict of norms and in an EU context.
As noted, conflict is endemic in the law. Conflict of norms is perhaps the central case
of legal conflict. Most caselaw before the courts consists of conflict of evidence or of fact.
Conflict of norms concerns those cases where the disagreement is on the applicable norm or
the correct interpretation of an applicable norm, the kind of cases that make up the work of
the appellate courts. Norms here are understood as the operative requirements in a legal
system, and generally they consist of rules giving full reasons for legal action. Rules here are
contrasted with principles: rules have an all or nothing character that tends to dispose of a
case, whereas principles are more open and require to a much greater extent the mediating
role of the interpreter or judge. Conflict of norms thus relates to a conflict between prima
facie valid reasons for adjudication, whether those reasons are in the form of rules of
principles. As such, it represents a test case for a legal system, since in a case of conflict, the
normative force of otherwise applicable norms is lost to some extent. Relatively strong
3
4

See above Chapter 4.3.1.
See above Chapter 2.3.
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reasons are needed to cancel the normative force of a norm, and so norm conflict presents in
an acute and sharpened form the problem or question of normativity in a legal system.
Prior to the resolution of any situation of norm conflict, the norms in question need to
be interpreted. Sometimes conflict may be prima facie or only possible as opposed to
inevitable, in that the initial apprehension of meaning suggests a conflict that can ultimately
be resolved through interpretative discretion. However, the choice of interpretation itself
involves deciding between values, between conflicting interpretative norms. That
interpretation is often not a simple, mechanical process is by now accepted in mainstream
legal theory. Debate persists, however, as to the degree of independence of an interpreter on
the interpretation of the lawmaker or constituent power. This raises a fundamental question
of legitimacy in a legal system: who ultimately controls the content of legal norms, the
judiciary or the law-maker or constituent power? In EU law, evolutive and teleological
interpretation has been practised by the ECJ with the spectacular result of fashioning many
of the key constitutional features of the legal system: direct effect, supremacy, exclusive
powers through the doctrine of parallelism, the development of human rights, and an
expansive reading of competence norms. A contrasting or conflicting interpretative approach
is originalist or conserving interpretation, which entails a much more low-key role for the
judiciary.
However, the normative case for and against originalist interpretation in EU law has
not been fully addressed either by the ECJ or secondary literature. A tendency has been to
assume that the ingrained practice since the early days of the ECJ is necessarily legitimate.
Criticisms have tended to be deflected by the attribution to the Community or Union of a sui
generis character, but generic claims to uniqueness of the system do not provide a
convincing or conclusive case for a particular normative understanding of any particular
feature of it. The EU legal system does not operate in a vacuum of pure novelty. It is intermeshed with the legal systems of the Member States, as the ECJ has discovered despite its
success in building a largely cooperative relationship with the judiciaries of the Member
States. The German Federal Constitutional Court, in particular, has cautioned against the
revision of the Treaties by the ECJ under the guise of interpretation and has emphasised the
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need for prior democratic consent to any transfers of sovereignty.5 These shots across the
bow of the ECJ adopt an implicitly originalist interpretation: it is the Member States that
create the EU Constitution and invest it with legitimacy.
Chapter 4 presented an account of the conflict of interpretative norms on which this
debate rests: that between conserving and evolutive interpretation. Though this debate has a
strong public profile in the US, in the EU, the question has been, for the most part, sidelined.
The argument was that (i) Raz’s argument for innovative interpretation is not fully
persuasive; (ii) originalism can be understood normatively as supporting the rule of law and
democracy, though the argument from democracy alone is the main justifying rationale for
subjective historical interpretation (whereas innovative interpretation is premised on a
conception of output legitimacy); and (iii) epistemic difficulties attributed to corporate
intention are sometimes over-stated in critiques of originalism. A rule-bound approach to
interpretation can be contrasted with a broad principles-driven approach that moves legal
reasoning much closer to ordinary practical reasoning on the merits. Evolutive interpretation
is thus not an inevitable feature of EU law, and occasionally the ECJ has actually endorsed
the opposing principle of originalist interpretation (most obviously in Kaur6). This
conclusion allows the normative attractiveness of originalism and evolutive interpretation to
be more fully judged. A defence of evolutive interpretation rests upon a notion of output
legitimacy, avoiding the ‘dead hand of the past’ in order to achieve a more fitting or suitable
result. From an originalist perspective, this justification is questionable, because the
legitimacy of outputs or results requires criteria of assessment that cannot be determined
independently of an originalist analysis. Originalism privileges the text conventionally
understood as the point of departure and as a limit on the available meaning, given that the
text is the strongest evidence of intention. Differing approaches to interpretation are a
domain of norm conflict in their own right, but different approaches can also add to or
detract from conflict of substantive norms.
Evolutive interpretation is more flexible and thus offers a greater possibility on
interpreting away a prima facie conflict based on an initial apprehension of ordinary
meaning. In contrast, what prima facie seems to be a conflict of norms will likely in fact be a
5
6

See Chapter 2.2.6 above.
Case C-192/99, Kaur [2001] ECR I-1237, paras. 23-24.
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conflict of norms if originalism is applied, in the sense that originalism is less malleable than
evolutive interpretation, by definition. Originalism is conceptually linked with the traditional
norm conflict maxim of lex specialis, in that the more specific norm was logically more
strongly intended. A rule-bound approach to legal reasoning, therefore, sharpens the
possibility of norms conflict, but particular legal rules may also provide the solution to
conflict. For example, ambiguity in a text can be clarified by originalist interpretation so as
to remove the possibility of norm conflict. An example from EU law of where the latter
could have occurred, but did not because of the EC’s expansive interpretation, is the caselaw
of the Court on non-discriminatory obstacles discussed as a case study in Chapter 4. An
originalist interpretation seems to confirm that only discriminatory national laws were
prohibited. On this interpretation, the national measures in questions were not contrary to
Community law, so there was no norm conflict between national and Community law. The
approach of the ECJ generated a conflict here. By expansively interpreting the scope of
Treaty free movement, a conflict with national law resulted, which the ECJ resolved through
a standard lex superior rule, i.e. the supremacy of EU law. Despite a frequent critique of the
notion of corporate intention, discovering the original intention of the Member States may
well be epistemically possible. As the ECJ moves out of the arena of being a court for an
organisation of largely economic powers and becomes closer to what a constitutional court is
in a national context, its methods of interpretation are likely to become the focus of much
more sustained attention and critique.7 In that context, originalism merits re-examination as a
method of constitutional interpretation.
The consideration of conflicts of interpretative norms provided a prelude to the
discussion of conflict of substantive norms in two central areas of constitutional concern in
the EU: conflict of human rights norms and of competence norms. In these two areas, the
picture that emerges is of a relatively unsystematic and under-articulated approach in EU law
to the problem of norm conflict.

7

J. Shaw, ‘European Union Legal Studies in Crisis? Towards a New Dynamic’, 16(2) OJLS 231-253 (1996),
230, noting a tendency for critical voices on the Court to be denounced and an absence of critique where it
might be expected; JHH. Weiler, ‘Rewriting Van Gend en Loos: Towards a Normative Theory of ECJ
hermeneutics’ in O. Wiklund (ed.), Judicial Discretion in European Perspective (Kluwer 2003), 129,
suggesting that the ECJ should not be excluded from the democratic deficit critique of the EU. See also A.
Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (Oxford Univ. Press 2nd ed. 2006), 614-615, suggesting
that the approach of the ECJ on this is likely to change toward greater use of travaux préparatoires, especially
relating to more recent Treaty changes.
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Conflicts of human rights involve a deep, symbolically significant, moral
accountability: conflicts cases inevitably involve some degree of moral loss or tragedy.8
Failing to articulate moral loss, by failing to identify fully the conflict of rights, fails to
capture the moral drama of rights and of their demand for justice. Fundamental rights
conflicts involve particular complexity and difficulty, as traditional norms conflicts maxims
of lex specialis, lex posterior, and lex superior may not provide a clear solution, in that
catalogues of rights contain equally abstracts statement of potentially rights adopted at the
same time with minimal internal hierarchy. It is important for the law-maker or constituent
power to make substantive choices to address conflicts of rights as much as possible, so as to
avoid leaving the judiciary in the difficult position of basing decisions on very abstract
catalogues of rights with no priority rules.9 In so far as possible, specification can be used
extend to develop narrowly drawn exceptions.10 In an EU context, specificationism of rights
(which is really the principle of lex specialis applied to rights) may be easier because of the
pre-existing national protections of human rights and also the already agreed ECHR level of
protection. This approach has been adopted to a substantial extent in the drafting of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights,11 even if the latter is still unfortunately ambiguous on how
rights relate to the general interests and objectives of the Union, especially the free
movement and undistorted competition principles. The latter have been translated into the
language of rights in the Charter itself, but the normative relationship between these
‘economic rights’ and more classical rights is ambiguous in ECJ caselaw. The result is that
the general scope of rights in EU law is quite, and disappointingly, uncertain.
On the question of competence, the Treaties suggest a deceptively simple answer to
the problem of definition: the EU only has what competences are conferred on it by the
Member States. However, Chapter 6 has argued that the reality of institutional practice and
of the legal reasoning of the ECJ suggests a more complex and variegated situation. The
central difficulty of definition is that the general principles of competence, free movement
and undistorted completion, have a conceptual generality that can be applied to almost any
area of Member State competence. Thus, even in areas where the EU ostensibly does not
8

Zucca (2007), op cit, 24.
See ibid, 169, noting that bills of rights need to address the question of conflict specifically.
10
This follows ibid, 141, 169-170, though Zucca’s argument is not presented in terms of a hierarchy of rights
or the literature on specificationism.
11
OJ C 364/01, 18.12.2000, p. 1.
9
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have a competence, it may still have negative as opposed to regulatory competence. There
are sharp differences in how competence norms are mediated in legal reasoning. Perhaps
most importantly is the distinction between lex specialis and lex generalis, which can be
understood as relating to the phenomenon of levels of generality in legal reasoning.
Applying lex specialis much more fully reflects the idea of conferral, as lex specialis
logically reflects the will of the constituent power. It in effect subjects the interpretation of
competence norms to a more determinate, rule-bound definition. For example, the effect
would be to exclude the use of Article 114 TFEU (ex Article 95 ECT) when a more specific
Treaty basis is available. Article 352 TFEU can be confined to a more modest role by
relating it to implied powers, to avoid the risk of it being used as a vehicle for de facto Treaty
amendment or competence extension. In this regard, the existing limits on it identified in the
caselaw, ‘the general framework of the Treaty’, seems overly general, since it does not
address at what level of generality the general framework of the Treaty is to be identified.
This is in effect what the ECJ did in Tobacco Advertising (without fully articulating it),12 but
took the opposite approach in the Laval and Viking line of caselaw.13 Lex specialis localises
the identification of Treaty objectives to a particular policy field,14 as contrasted with a
global teleology linked to the highest level of generality in the Union system of enhanced
integration.
On questions of competence, generalisation based on overall Treaty objective of
enhanced integration can always be used in legal reasoning to extend competence to some
degree, especially to extend negative competence. Lex specialis offers a conceptual key to
understanding the differing treatment of competence norms in caselaw, while normatively
supporting the idea of limited and conferred powers. The thesis argues that it gives practical
substance in legal reasoning to Dashwood’s view that “The technique of specific and detailed
attribution … remains the most effective method of setting identifiable limits to the

12

Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419.
Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareföbundet [2007] ECR I-11767; Case C438/05, The International Transport Workers’ Federation and The Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP
and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779.
13

14

On the application of Article 308 ECT in this more specific sense, see R. Schütze, From Dual To
Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure Of European Law Oxford Univ. Press 2009), , 136-137.
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competences of the European Union”.15 Finally, on competence, the thesis has argued that a
key to rendering subsidiarity for meaningful as a tool of judicial review is the integration of
Member State autonomy as part of the weighing exercise in a subsidiarity test, with a
resulting evidential implication of requiring cogent evidence to justify a claim of
comparative efficiency for the exercise of competence at the Union level.
Overall, thus, this thesis has sought to demonstrate how values underlie choices made
in legal reasoning across the dimensions of differing norms of interpretation, fundamental
rights norms, and competence norms. Beyond these specific contexts, the analysis offered
also has implications for a general constitutional conception of the EU.16 In the first place, by
demonstrating that integration as a justification of choice in legal reasoning is normatively
insufficient at this juncture of the development of the Union, given the breadth of values
explicitly articulated in the Treaties, the argument casts doubt over the continuing dominance
of a prospective, meta-teleological approach in the caselaw of the ECJ geared at supporting
increased integration. This approach of the ECJ could be understood as directed at output
legitimacy, but even this justification is problematic given that what constitutes output
legitimacy is itself contested. The extent to, and pace at, which integration should occur at
the expense of Member States’ autonomy or constitutional traditions is much contested, as
the long saga of non-ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution and of eventual
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty demonstrates. The invocation of ‘an ever-closer Union’ in
the Preamble to the Treaties points to a goal of continuing and increased cooperation
between Member States, but does not dispose of the question of how such integration is to
proceed.
The framework of norm conflict highlights the tension between the integration
narrative dominant from the early period of the caselaw of the ECJ with the authority claims
of the Member States to be Masters of the Treaties. The early conceptualisation by the ECJ
of the Communities as a new legal order distinct from public international law and as
possessing a degree of autonomy is in conflict with the concept of the Member States as
15

A. Dashwood, ‘The Relationship Between the Member States and the European Union’, 41 CMLRev 355-381
(2004), 380.
16
See generally Shaw (1996), op cit, calling for a move away from the integration-enhancement as orthodox in
EU scholarship; JHH. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999), noting the tension
between the increased competence of the institutions of supranational integration and citizens’ rights rooted in
the national setting.
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constituent power.17 As Chapter 6 has demonstrated, the open-ended nature of EU
competences resulting from the ambiguous treatment of competence in ECJ caselaw has the
effect that EU competences can quite easily and are in fact extended beyond what can be
plausibly attributed to the Member States in their drafting and adoption of the Treaties. What
this suggests, adopting a broad constitutionalist perspective, is that the ECJ needs to recalibrate its reasoning from the pro-integration methodology that characterises it toward a
more articulated approach in which the input of the Member States is more strongly
reflected. This re-calibration can be related to what Dashwood aptly describes as the peculiar
constitutional character of the EU as ‘a constitutional order of States’.18 Solely teleological
interpretation, whether of competence through the exalting of lex generalis at the expense of
lex specialis or of fundamental human rights norms through their subordination or
ambiguous articulation relative to pro-integration values, conceives of the EU in selfreferential terms and as set loose from the constraint of the continuing political authority of
the Member States. In contrast, a constitutionalist privileging of democracy and the rule of
law would support originalist interpretation over evolutive teleology, greater emphasis on the
normative priority of core human rights, and the specific enumeration of competence norms
over self-generating competences by the EU institutions.
On the one hand, this self-referentiality of orthodox EU legal discourse might be
understood as strong constitutionalism, enhancing the specificity of the EU legal order
against competing claims to constitutional legitimacy. Normatively, however, this seems
best-regarded as weak constitutionalism, despite this strong political content and
17

This general, constitutionalist analysis questioning the claimed autonomy of the Union legal order is not new:
see T. Schilling, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal order – an analysis of Possible Foundations, 37(2)
Harvard JIL 389-409 (1996). For a reply, see JHH. Weiler & U. Haltern, ‘The Autonomy of Community Law Through the Looking Glass’, 37(2) Harvard JIL 411-448 (1996), 416, arguing that the ECJ is no different to
any court in insisting it has final authority on kompetenz-kompetenz, though agreeing with Schilling that
Community law cannot be severed from general public international law (for a general defence of autonomy of
Union law, see also R. Barents, The Autonomy of Community Law (Kluwer 2003)). What distinguishes the ECJ,
however, is that it claims supremacy of Union law in national legal systems, which is not a claim made by
conventional international law, and is much more intrusive in national legal systems through the added
operation of direct effect and the preliminary reference system. Moreover, what matters in practice at least as
much as the kompetenz-kompetenz question is how competence is treated or mediated at the level of legal
reasoning, rather than at the level of meta-constitutional theory. Weiler & Haltern acknowledge this point
toward the end of their article, describing the lack of clear limits to the competence of the Community as a
“ticking constitutional time bomb” (ibid, 444). Their solution, however, is to suggest an institutional reform
through the creation of a specialised court for determining competence, like the French Conseil Constitutionnel
(ibid, 447-448), rather than to engage the issue at the level of legal reasoning. This thesis has sought to address
the question of legal reasoning more fully than has been the case to date in the literature.
18
A. Dashwood, ‘The Limits of European Community Powers’, 21 ELR 113-128 (1996), 114.
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consequence: weak because it is not consistent with how the EU articulates itself and how it
relates to its fundamental constituent units, i.e. the Member States, rather than the Union
institutions. The Union institutions, from the point of view of democracy and the rule of law
as meta-principles of political morality for Europe, cannot self-conceive in autonomous
terms as acting in opposition to the Member States in toto or as the ultimate political
authority in the EU (though the institutions’ particular constitutional role may often pit them
against some or individual Member States in the context of disputes as to the valid
implementation of Union law at national level).
Dashwood’s expression of a constitutional order of States captures the competing
claims to political legitimacy in the Union. On the one hand, the Member States remain those
with sole explicit authority to amend the Treaties, while on the other, such amendment often
represents an alienation and diminishment by the Member States of their own individual
political authority in favour of supranational competences. The assumption that has tended to
dominate ECJ caselaw is of a continual process of reduction of competences of the Member
States in favour of the telos of integration, with the consequence that explicit sanctioning in
any given case by the Member States of sovereignty transfer is no longer decisive. On this
approach, the move from Member States as decisive authorities toward an ever-increasing
importance of supranational institutions can be bundled into a process of ever-increasing
integration, with specific and careful normative articulation of the steps of the process. This
is consequentalist justification writ large, but where the consequences are much contested. If
the Member Sates had (unanimously) agreed on an ultimate goal of a European super-State,
such an approach to legal reasoning might seem more justified, though it would still run into
problems with respect to ordinary rule of law values of certainty, predictability, and formal
stability in the law. Given, however, that the journey of integration is ‘toward an unknown
destination’,19 the case for pro-integration teleology as the decisive criterion of the legal
reasoning of the ECJ remains normatively unjustified.
Finally, the thesis has been written on the premise, and has sought to demonstrate,
that the conceptual framework of norm conflict has much to offer for understanding the
dynamics of legal reasoning in general. Norm conflict inevitably entails a normative loss in a
19
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legal system: a norm that is usually valid and possessing normative force loses some of that
force (though usually not to the extent of losing validity, unless the superior norm touches on
a question of basic competence or something of a jus cogens or fundamental human rights
character). This normative loss requires an explanation and thus an elaboration of the steps of
legal reasoning. The present work argues that this elaboration should distinguish between
principles and rules and that the distinction has a very practical application for the values that
are reflected in a legal system. A narrower, rule-bound approach to norm conflict (applying
lex specialis and originalist interpretation in particular) reflects classic values of
constitutionalism: the rule of law, democratic input, and limits on powers. This contrasts
with a narrower, internal perspective focused on system coherence and output legitimacy,
understood in EU law as advancing above all a project of integration. What norm conflict
theory suggests, in an EU context, is that integration as a sole or dominant value is too
simple a narrative to capture the range of values – democracy, the rule of law, subsidiarity,
human rights, accountability, transparency, as well as integration and an ever-closer Union –
that now constitute the self-articulated normative basis of the EU legal system. The concern
with integration was naturally dominant in the earlier decades of EU law and ECJ
jurisprudence, but the growing maturity of the EU legal order presents a thicker normative
context that needs a fuller articulation in the legal reasoning of the Court and in the
resolution of conflicts of norms. In conclusion, the constitutionalist approach in this thesis,
therefore, is to privilege the values of democracy and the rule of law and to explain how
these values are mediated in legal reasoning. Central to the argument is the role of and
connection between speciality and historical or originalist interpretation, both of which have
long been marginalised in legal reasoning by the ECH, but which deserve to be re-habilitated
and to feature much more prominently. This approach opens up a perspective critical of prointegration teleology as a dominant interpretative method, arguing it fails to accurately
capture the normative depth of the Union as now articulated, much more fully than in the
past, in the Treaties. The framework of norm conflict is a conceptual key to understanding
normativity in legal reasoning more fully.
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Appendix – Translation of French text referred to in Chapter 4.5
* The excerpts below are from S. Neri & H. Sperl (eds.), Traité Instituant la Communautée
Économique Éuropéenne: Travaux préparatoires, déclarations interpretatives des six
gouvernements, documents parlementaires (Cour de Justice Imprint Luxembourg 1960), 7893.
** Translation by Kwintissential Ltd., London.

ARTICLE 30
The quantitative restrictions on importation, as well as any equivalent effective measures, are
forbidden among the member States, without prejudice to the provisions hereafter.

I. - History
At the heart of this article, there is the following draft plan:
"The quotas on importation are gradually removed among the States
within the conditions set out hereafter" (l).
Whilst resuming its suggestion dated 13/07/1956 ( 2 ) , t h e G.M.C. decides in its meetings
on 15 and 16/10/l956 (3) to replace the “quota” terms with "quantitative restrictions" so as
not only to cover the cases where some quotas are open, but also those where there is a total
ban on importation.
On 15/11/1956, the Italian delegation, whilst adopting this method, adds the proposal of
abolishing and banning "any equivalent effective measure" in the trade between the member
States (4).
These two methods come across in a version drawn up on 20 and 21/11/1956 by the
Secretariat of the G . M . C . :
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"the quantitative restrictions on importation, of the products between the
member States as well as any equivalent effective measures, are forbidden
within the Common Market" (5) (6).
This text is accepted in principle for the draft plan drawn up on 24/01/1957 by the
Delegation Leaders (7).

(1)

MAE Document 175/56.

(2)

MAE Document 174/56.

(3)

MAE Document 465/56.

(4)

MAE Document 545/56.

(5)

MAE Document 626/56.

(6)

This text is followed by a second paragraph which anticipates that this ban is applied to the products
which come from the member States as well as to the products from third world countries which have
been made available for consumption in the member States. A specific note is made stating that this
paragraph would need to be reviewed after the resolution of the problems relating to the commercial
policy.
See article 111§ 5, paragraph 2.

(7)

MAE Document 254/57.
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Article 31

ARTICLE 31
The member States refrain from introducing, amongst themselves, any new quantitative
restrictions and equivalent effective measures.
However, this obligation is only applied to the level of deregulation achieved in
accordance with the rulings of the Council of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.) on 14th January 1955. The member States notify the Commission, no
later than six months after the coming into force of the present Treaty, of their lists of
products deregulated in accordance with these rulings. The lists, thus notified, are
consolidated between the member States.

I. - History
In its findings on 13/07/1956, (l) the G.M.C. states that
"It is advisable:
a) to determine in this article, the principle of consolidation between the
member States, from the level of deregulation achieved within the
framework of the O . E . E . C . Moreover, it shall be determined under what
conditions and until what date the method of deregulation of trade practiced
by t h e O . E . E . C . w i l l b e a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e member States,
b) to re-examine the issue of knowing whether, and, if need be, to what extent,
a provision shall be anticipated making it compulsory for the member States
to maintain the deregulations granted beyond the minimum standards
required by the rules and procedures of the O.E.E.C.
During the meetings of the G.M.C, held on 15 and 16/10/1956, the following alternatives
are put forward:
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- the French and Italian delegations declare themselves in favour of a consolidation of
the level of the deregulations;
- the German and Dutch delegations declare themselves in favour of a consolidation by list
of products (2).
Moreover, the French delegation, supported by the Luxembourg delegation (3), suggests
removing any reference to the O.E.E.C. (4).

(1)

MAE Document 174/56.

(2)

MAE Document 465/56.

(3)

MAE Document 496/56.

(4)

MAE Document 465/56.
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A proposal from the German delegation on 06/11/1956 (l), however, records that there
is unanimity regarding the fact that i t i s a d v i s a b l e t o c o n s o l i d a t e the
deregulation of trade achieved between the member States within the framework of the
provisions of the O.E.E.C. o n c e t h e present Treaty has come into force:
"However, the opinions have differed about the issue of knowing
whether it is necessary to take, as the starting point, the level of
deregulation actually achieved ( 2 ) or the obligations resulting
from the application of the rulings of the Council of the O.E.E.C.
on 14/01/1955" (3).
In the event that the group is won over by this last solution, the following text could be
proposed:
"At the time of the coming into force of the present Treaty, the
member will consolidate the measures of deregulation which they
have taken in accordance with the rulings of the Council of
Ministers of the O.E.E.C. on 14/01/1955.
The suggestions made by the French delegation are accepted in the draft plan of the G.M.C.
on 20 and 21/11/1956 (4), resumed on 28/11/1956 (5) and accepted by the Delegation
Leaders on 10/12/1956 (6).

"From the coming into force of the present Treaty, the member
States refrain in their mutual trade from establishing any new
quantitative restrictions on importation as well as any equivalent
effective measure" (7).
On 11/01/1957 (8), the Italian delegation proposes to add to this text the following
paragraphs:
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The obligation above is only applied, during the period of transition, to the
level of deregulation achieved in accordance with the rulings of the
Council of Ministers of the O.E.E.C. o n 14/01/1955.

The member States notify the Commission of their lists of products
deregulated in accordance with the aforementioned rulings.

(1)

MAE Document 510/56.

(2)

This stance is supported on 05/11/1956 in the draft plan drawn up by the Italian delegation (MAE Document
504/56).

(3)

Method put forward on 16/10/1956 in the text drawn up by the Dutch delegation (MAE Document 434/56).

(4)

MAE Document 626/56.

(5)

MAE Document 686/56.

(6)

MAE Document 787/56.

(7)

The sentence continues as follows: … and to make the quotas "in place on this date" more restrictive; this
provision has been inserted into paragraph 1 of article 32.

(8)

MAE Document 787/56.
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The lists, thus notified, are consolidated between the member States (l).

The text drawn up by the G.M.C. on 14/01/1957 (2) brings together the suggestions made by
the French and Italian delegations in a draft article in two paragraphs which is approved on
24/01/1957 (3) by the Delegation Leaders.

II. – Act of Parliament
Italy
Senate of the Republic.

Term of office II,

1953-1957

Article 31, paragraph 2
"In other words, article 31 allows the member States, who, at their own initiative,
have deregulated their importations beyond the level set by the abovementioned
ruling made by the O.E.E.C, to restore partially some quotas provided that the overall
rate of deregulation, thus carried out, is not lower than the level of deregulation
ended on 14th January 1955" (4).
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(1)

The text of the second paragraph has been suggested for the first time in an amendment submitted by
the G.M.C. on 04/12/1956 (MAE Document 694/56).

(2)

MAE Document 105/57.

(3)

MAE Document 254/57.

(4)

MAE Document 2107 – A

p. 24.
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Article 32

ARTICLE 32
The member States refrain, in their mutual trade, from making the quotas and
equivalent effective measures more restrictive, which are in place on the date
of the present Treaty coming into force.
These quotas must be removed no later than the expiry of the period of
transition. They are gradually eliminated during this period within the
conditions set out hereafter.

I - History
At the beginning of this article, there is a proposal made by the G.M.C. on
20 and 21/11/1956 (1).

(1) MAE Document 626/56.
See also the History of article 31, note 4.
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